Yoma 74a — the Talmud in English

And according to Rabbi Akiva, who says: A person

who swears that he will not eat and does not specify how much

prohibits himself

by his oath

from

eating

any amount.

And it is speaking of when he ate less than the measure, concerning which he is not sworn and standing from Mount Sinai not to eat it, and therefore his oath was effective.

[And Rabbi Shimon disagrees and exempts, since according to his view the prohibition of eating is by Torah law for any amount, even for the punishment of lashes, and the measures were stated only with regard to liability for a sacrifice. According to him, even concerning less than an olive-bulk he is sworn and standing from Mount Sinai not to eat it].

And if we say that according to Reish Lakish there is a rabbinic prohibition against eating half a measure, this is difficult: How, according to the Sages, did his oath take effect upon less than the measure? After all, he is sworn and standing from Mount Sinai to heed the words of the Sages!

And if you would say: Since he has

concerning something less than the measure

permission by Torah law

to eat it, he is not considered sworn and standing concerning it, despite the fact that there is a rabbinic prohibition upon him, and therefore his oath takes effect upon less than the measure, and

takes effect

the obligation of

a sacrifice for an oath.

It is impossible to answer in this way.

For

we learned: An oath of testimony,

by which a person makes witnesses swear that they should come and testify for him, and they deny this falsely, claiming that they do not know testimony concerning him, although they are liable [for denying his adjuration] for a sacrifice for an oath of testimony —

applies only

to witnesses

fit to testify,

who denied under oath their knowledge of the testimony.

And we raised an objection,

concerning the wording of the Mishna, “and it applies only to those fit to testify” —

to exclude what?

For the Mishna already explained in its first clause all those who are fit to testify and all those who are not fit to testify.

Rav Pappa said: To exclude a king,

who is fit for testimony, but does not testify because of the honor of the kingship. The Mishna comes to say that if a person made the king swear that he should come and testify for him, and the king denied it and falsely claimed that he did not know testimony concerning him, he is exempt from a sacrifice for an oath of testimony.

Rav Aha bar Yaakov said: To exclude

one who is disqualified for testimony by rabbinic law, because he is

“a gambler”

[a bettor, who is not actually a robber], and he denied under the adjuration by which a person made him swear to testify for him; he is exempt from a sacrifice for an oath of testimony, since by rabbinic law he is not fit to testify.

And the Gemara proves:

But a gambler —

by Torah law he is seemingly fit,

he is fit to testify by Torah law,

and

only

the Sages disqualified him

from testifying.

And

nevertheless

the oath does not take effect upon him,

the oath of testimony does not take effect upon him because he is not fit for testimony by rabbinic law.

If so, the same is true concerning an oath of utterance: the oath does not take effect upon something that is forbidden by rabbinic law.

And the question returns: If we say that according to Reish Lakish half a measure is forbidden by rabbinic law, how did an oath not to eat half a measure of a forbidden thing take effect? After all, this eating is forbidden to him by rabbinic law!?

And we answer: In reality, the oath does take effect upon something that is forbidden only by rabbinic law.

And

it is different there, concerning an oath of testimony, for an oath of testimony does not take effect upon one who is disqualified for testimony by rabbinic law, since

in the case of an oath of testimony, for an oath of testimony does not take effect upon one who is disqualified from testifying by rabbinic law, since

the verse says

[Leviticus 5]

“if he does not tell

and bears his iniquity.”

And this

gambler, who is disqualified for testimony by rabbinic law —

is not at all capable of giving testimony!

For he cannot testify because of this disqualification.

And now the Gemara returns and discusses what we wondered at the beginning: Why did the Mishna say “Yom Kippur is forbidden in eating,” and did not state the wording of liability for karet?

And we raise an objection:

And

is it the case that

wherever it teaches “liable for karet” —

it does not teach

the wording

“forbidden”!?

But it was taught in a beraita: Even though they said

that Yom Kippur

is forbidden in

all five afflictions,

they did not say

that it is

liable for karet except for one who eats and drinks, and performs work בלבד.

And it is proven from the beraita that even in a place where there is liability for karet, the tannai uses the wording “forbidden.”

And we answer:

This is what he is saying,

the tannai in the beraita:

When they said

Yom Kippur

“is forbidden

in eating” —

they said this only concerning half a measure.

But

one who eats on Yom Kippur

the measure —

is liable for karet.

And although he is liable for karet, there is liability for karet only for eating and drinking and performing work.

And if you wish, say: When it teaches

in the beraita

“is forbidden” —

it refers to the rest,

the other afflictions, for which one is not liable for karet.

For Rabba and Rav Yosef taught in the other Sifra of the school of Rav

[the interpretations of the tannaim in “Torat Kohanim,” also called “Sifra,” which are on the book of Leviticus, are called “the Sifra of the school of Rav.” The interpretations of the tannaim on the books of Numbers and Deuteronomy, called “Sifrei,” are called here “the other Sifra of the school of Rav”]:

From where is it derived that Yom Kippur is forbidden in washing, in anointing, in wearing sandals, and in marital relations?

The verse says

[Leviticus 16] concerning Yom Kippur, regarding the mitzva of affliction, “a

Sabbath of complete rest” —

to teach you the other afflictions [apart from eating and drinking], which are only in the category of

“rest”

from pleasure and affliction, and their prohibition is not by Torah law, but only by way of asmachta, by rabbinic law.

And this means that the Sages based these afflictions upon the command to rest from pleasures on Yom Kippur, just as the Sages based the prohibition of incomplete labors, and of those that were not performed in the Tabernacle, upon the mitzva of the Sabbath of complete rest on Shabbat, and called them “the prohibition of shevut.”

The matter itself: Half a measure:

Rabbi Yohanan said: It is forbidden by Torah law; Reish Lakish said: It is permitted by Torah law.

And the Gemara explains their dispute:

Rabbi Yohanan said: It is forbidden by Torah law, since it is fit

because half the measure is fit

to combine

with another half-measure, and thereby to become a complete forbidden measure; it follows that

he is already eating a prohibition

now, in eating the first half, even before the second half has joined it.

Reish Lakish said:

Half a measure

is permitted by Torah law,

since the prohibition of

“eating,” the Merciful One said, and

in less than the measure

there is not

“eating.”

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish

from what we learned in a beraita:

Eating the fat of a domesticated animal is forbidden by Torah law, for the Torah said [Leviticus 3]: “You shall not eat any fat.” This is a negative commandment.

And since the verse said “any fat,” its meaning is any amount; here the verse increased the prohibition, for the Torah prohibited eating even half a measure of fat.

And the verse continues and says: “For anyone who eats fat—and shall be cut off!” This is the punishment.

And since the verse said with regard to the punishment “for anyone who eats fat,” we learn from here that the measure for becoming liable for karet for eating fat is an olive-bulk, which is the measure of “eating.”

For with regard to the punishment it did not say “any fat,” but “anyone who eats fat,” and it follows that the word “any” refers to “one who eats,” which is adjacent to it, and not to fat.

The prohibition of eating fat applies only to a domesticated animal and does not apply to the fat of a wild animal.

And the beraita says:

Had the verse not said “any fat” with regard to the measure of the prohibition, it would have been possible to say:

I have only

a thing

that has punishment

[such as one that has an olive-bulk] —

has a warning.

But one who eats the fat of a

[which is in doubt whether it is a wild animal, whose fat is permitted, or a domesticated animal, whose fat is forbidden, and therefore there is no liability for karet].

And

likewise one who eats

half a measure

of fat.

Since it does not have punishment

of karet —

it could be that it does not have a warning

concerning its eating.

The verse says

[Leviticus 7]

“Any fat

you shall not eat.”

And we learn from the increase “any” to include even eating any amount of fat as a prohibition. And likewise, to include a kוי.

And it is proven from here that half a measure is forbidden by Torah law, and this is difficult for Reish Lakish.

The Gemara answers: In reality, half a measure is forbidden only

by rabbinic law.

And the verse “any” brought in the beraita, from which we learned the prohibition of eating any amount —

is merely

is merely an asmachta

and not a Torah derivation.

And the Gemara proves:

This too is logically indicated,

that the Gemara’s intention is merely an asmachta and not an actual derivation.

For if it should enter your mind

that the increase “any,” which includes half a measure and likewise the fat of a kוי, is a prohibition

of Torah law

——

But

a kוי is a doubt

[whether it is a wild animal or a domesticated animal]

itself.

And is it so that

the verse came to include a doubt?

The uncertainty whether the kוי is a non-domesticated or domesticated animal exists only for us, and not with regard to the Holy One, blessed be He!

If so, it is impossible that the increase “any” came to prohibit eating the fat of a kוי, since he is exempt from karet because of the doubt!?

Rather, it is proven from here that the derivation from “any fat” is merely an asmachta, and this is satisfactory according to Reish Lakish.

And the Gemara rejects the proof that the derivation from “any” is merely an asmachta.

If because of this,

this proof —

it is not relevant,

it is not a proof.

For it can be answered that indeed this derivation is an increase by Torah law, and nevertheless there is a need for it to include a kוי.