Yoma 74a (עד.) — the Talmud in English

And according to Rabbi Akiva, who says: A person

who swears not to eat, without specifying how much,

prohibits himself

through his oath

from

eating

any amount whatsoever.

This is referring to a case in which he ate less than the requisite quantity, regarding which he is not already under oath and bound by the revelation at Sinai not to eat it; therefore, his oath takes effect. [

Rabbi Shimon disagrees and exempts him, since according to his view the prohibition against eating applies by Torah law to any amount whatsoever, even with regard to punishment by lashes, and the stated quantities apply only with regard to liability for a sacrifice. According to him, even regarding less than an olive-size he is already under oath and bound by the revelation at Sinai not to eat it.]

And if we say that according to Reish Lakish there is a rabbinic prohibition against eating half the requisite quantity, this is difficult: How can the oath of the Rabbis take effect regarding less than the requisite quantity? He is already under oath and bound by the revelation at Sinai to heed the words of the Sages!

And should you say: Since he holds that

a thing that is less than the requisite quantity has

the status of being permitted by Torah law

to eat, he is not considered already under oath regarding it, despite the rabbinic prohibition that applies to it; therefore his oath takes effect regarding less than the requisite quantity, and

there takes effect

the liability for

a sacrifice for an oath,

it is impossible to answer in this manner.

For

we learned: The oath of testimony,

in which a person adjures witnesses to come and testify on his behalf, and they falsely deny this and claim that they do not know testimony on his behalf, and are liable [for denying his adjuration] to bring a sacrifice for an oath of testimony—

applies only

to witnesses

fit to testify,

who denied under oath that they knew the testimony.

And we raised a difficulty,

regarding the wording of the Mishna, “and it applies only to those fit to testify”:

What does this exclude?

For the Mishna already explained at the outset all those who are fit to testify and all those who are unfit to testify.

Rav Pappa said: It excludes a king,

who is fit to testify but does not testify because of the honor of the monarchy. The Mishna therefore teaches that if a person adjured the king to come and testify on his behalf, and the king denied it and falsely claimed that he did not know testimony on his behalf, he is exempt from a sacrifice for an oath of testimony.

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: It excludes

one who is unfit to testify by rabbinic law because he is

“a gambler”

[a bettor who is not actually a robber], and who denied under the oath administered by a person who adjured him to testify on his behalf. He is exempt from a sacrifice for an oath of testimony, since by rabbinic law he is unfit to testify.

The Gemara proves this:

But a gambler

is fit by Torah law,

as he is fit to testify by Torah law,

and

only

the Sages disqualified him

from testifying.

And

nevertheless,

the oath does not take effect upon him,

the oath of testimony does not take effect upon him because he is unfit to testify by rabbinic law.

If so, the same should apply to an oath of utterance: the oath should not take effect with regard to something prohibited by rabbinic law.

The question therefore returns: If according to Reish Lakish half the requisite quantity is prohibited by rabbinic law, how can an oath not to eat half the requisite quantity of a prohibited food take effect, when this eating is prohibited by rabbinic law?

And we answer: In reality, an oath does take effect with regard to something prohibited only by rabbinic law.

But

there it is different,

in the case of an oath of testimony, for an oath of testimony does not take effect upon one who is disqualified from testifying by rabbinic law, since

the verse says

[Leviticus 5]

“If he does not testify,

he shall bear his iniquity.”

And this

gambler, who is disqualified from testifying by rabbinic law,

is altogether not fit to testify!

For he cannot testify because of this disqualification.

The Gemara now returns to discuss what we initially found difficult: Why did the Mishna say, “Yom Kippur is prohibited with regard to eating,” rather than use the wording of liability for karet?

And we raised a difficulty:

And

is it the case that

wherever the tanna teaches that one is punished by karet, he

does not teach

the wording

“prohibited”?

But it was taught in a beraita: Even though they said

that Yom Kippur

is prohibited with regard to

the five forms of affliction

in their entirety, they did not say

that one is

punished by karet except for eating and drinking and performing labor.

It is evident from the beraita that even in a case involving punishment by karet, the tanna uses the wording “prohibited.”

And we answer:

This is what

the tanna in the beraita is saying:

When they said

that Yom Kippur

“is prohibited

with regard to eating,”

they said this only with regard to half the requisite quantity.

But

one who eats on Yom Kippur

the requisite quantity—

is punished by karet.

And although one is punished by karet, one is punished by karet only for eating and drinking and performing labor.

And if you wish, say: When it teaches

in the beraita

“prohibited” —

it refers to the rest,

the other forms of affliction, for which one is not liable to karet.

For Rabba and Rav Yosef taught in the other collections of the school of Rav

[the midrashim of the tannaim in Torat Kohanim, also called Sifra, which are on the Book of Leviticus, are called “the collections of the school of Rav.” The midrashim of the tannaim on the Books of Numbers and Deuteronomy, called Sifrei, are here called “the other collections of the school of Rav”]:

From where is it derived that on Yom Kippur it is prohibited to wash, to anoint oneself, to wear sandals, and to engage in marital relations?

The verse states

[Leviticus 16], with regard to the mitzva of affliction on Yom Kippur, “a

Sabbath of complete rest”—

teaching you that the other forms of affliction [apart from eating and drinking] are only in the category of

“rest”

from pleasure and self-indulgence; their prohibition is not from Torah law, but only by way of an asmakhta, as a rabbinic law.

That is, the Sages based these forms of affliction on the command to abstain from pleasures on Yom Kippur, just as the Sages based the prohibition of incomplete labors, which were not performed in the Tabernacle, on the mitzva of complete rest on Shabbat, and called them “the prohibition of shevut.”

The essential matter: Half the requisite quantity:

Rabbi Yohanan said: It is prohibited by Torah law; Reish Lakish said: It is permitted by Torah law.

The Gemara explains their dispute:

Rabbi Yohanan said: It is prohibited by Torah law, since it is fit

because half the requisite quantity is fit

to combine

with another half of the requisite quantity and thereby constitute a complete prohibited quantity. It follows that

he is already eating a prohibited thing

when eating the first half, even before the second half has joined it.

Reish Lakish said:

Half the requisite quantity

is permitted by Torah law,

because the prohibition of

“eating,” the Merciful One stated, and

with less than the requisite quantity

there is no

“eating.”

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish

from what we learned in a beraita:

The eating of the fat of a domesticated animal is prohibited by Torah law, as the Torah states [Leviticus 3]: “You shall not eat any fat.” This is a prohibition.

Since the verse says “any fat,” its meaning is any amount, and here the verse expanded the prohibition to teach that the Torah forbids eating even half the requisite quantity of animal fat.

The verse continues: “For anyone who eats the fat—the soul shall be cut off!” This is the punishment.

Since, with regard to the punishment, the verse says “for anyone who eats the fat,” we learn from here that the quantity that entails liability for karet for eating fat is an olive-size, which is the quantity defined as “eating.”

For with regard to the punishment it does not say “any fat,” but “anyone who eats fat”; consequently, the word “any” refers to the adjacent word “eats,” and not to “fat.”

The prohibition against eating fat applies only to a domesticated animal and does not apply to the fat of a non-domesticated animal.

And the beraita says:

Had the verse not said “any fat” with regard to the quantity of the prohibition, it could have been said:

I have derived only that anything

that

is subject to punishment

[such as something that has an olive-size]

is subject to a prohibition.

But one who eats the fat of a

koוי

[which is uncertainly a non-domesticated animal, whose fat is permitted, or a domesticated animal, whose fat is prohibited, and therefore does not entail liability for karet].

And

likewise one who eats

half the requisite quantity

of fat.

Since it is not subject to punishment

by karet,

one might think that it is not subject to a prohibition

against eating it.

The verse states

[Leviticus 7]

“Any fat

you shall not eat.”

And we learn from the amplification “any” that even eating any amount of fat is included in the prohibition. Likewise, the fat of a kוי is included.

It is evident from here that half the requisite quantity is prohibited by Torah law, which is difficult for Reish Lakish.

The Gemara answers: In reality, half the requisite quantity is prohibited only

by rabbinic law.

And the verse “any” cited in the beraita, from which we derived the prohibition against eating any amount—

is merely

an asmakhta

and not a full Torah derivation.

The Gemara proves this:

This too is reasonable,

that the Gemara intends merely an asmakhta and not an actual derivation.

For if it enters your mind

that the amplification “any,” which includes half the requisite quantity and the fat of a kוי, is a prohibition

by Torah law

—

but

a kוי is a matter of uncertainty

[whether it is a non-domesticated animal or a domesticated animal]

itself.

And is it possible that

the verse came to include a matter of uncertainty?

The uncertainty whether the kוי is a non-domesticated or domesticated animal exists only for us, and not with regard to the Holy One, blessed be He!

If so, it is impossible that the amplification “any” was intended to prohibit eating the fat of a kוי, since he is exempt from karet because of the uncertainty.

Rather, it is evident from here that the derivation from “any fat” is merely an asmakhta, and this is consistent with Reish Lakish.

The Gemara rejects the proof that the derivation from “any” is merely an asmakhta.

If that is the basis,

this proof—

it is not conclusive;

it is no proof.

For it can be answered that indeed this derivation is a Torah amplification, and nevertheless it is necessary in order to include a kוי.