Yevamot 96a (צו.) — the Talmud in English

Perhaps

Samuel said that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosei only with regard to

“

“who

does not disqualify

through others,” and Samuel came to teach us that if the woman married Reuven, her sister’s husband, she is not forbidden to Reuven’s brother-in-law, because the entire reason for the prohibition is that people might say: This one divorced her and that one married her; this does not apply when she married Reuven, her sister’s husband. And this is unlike the first tanna, who forbids her to Reuven’s brother-in-law as a penalty.

However, with regard to Rabbi Yosei’s view that if the woman married Reuven, who betrothed her sister but did not marry her, she is forbidden to Reuven’s brother-in-law—in this case Samuel did not say that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosei, because he is not concerned that people might say that there was a condition in the betrothal.

The second approach:

Alternatively, from where is it established that Rav Huna’s statement

[how do we know that Rav Huna’s explanation of the dispute between Rav and Samuel is correct]?

Perhaps Rav Huna’s statement is entirely inapplicable!

For the dispute between Rav and Samuel can be explained in two other ways:

a.

And they disagree with regard to Rav Hamnuna’s

view—Rav and Samuel:

As Rav Hamnuna said: A woman awaiting yibbum who engaged in adultery—

is forbidden to her yavam.

And it is with regard to this matter that Rav and Samuel disagree.

For Rav said,

a yevama who is awaiting yibbum

is like a married woman

of the yavam,

and she becomes disqualified

to him

through adultery,

in accordance with Rav Hamnuna.

But

if

Samuel said: She is not like a married woman, and she does not become disqualified through adultery

to the yavam, contrary to Rav Hamnuna.

b.

Alternatively,

it is possible that

with regard to

the question of whether

betrothal takes effect with a yevama

they disagree

—Rav and Samuel.

For Rav said,

a yevama who is awaiting yibbum

is like a married woman, and betrothal does not take effect with her

after another man betroths her.

And Samuel said: She is not like a married woman, and betrothal does take effect with her

by any man.

The Gemara raises an objection concerning this second explanation of the dispute between Rav and Samuel:

But they already disagreed about this once!

Rav and Samuel already disagreed as to whether betrothal takes effect with a yevama, and their dispute was mentioned above [92b]. Why, then, did they need to disagree about this matter again in a different formulation? The Gemara answers:

One—

was stated by inference from the other.

Rav and Samuel did not disagree about the same matter in two formulations. Rather, they disagreed only once, and in the study hall their second dispute was stated on the basis of their first dispute.

Mishna:

Our Mishna is divided into two matters:

The first part deals with the prohibition involving one’s wife’s sister, and the second part deals with the intercourse of a minor yavam with a yevama.

The first part:

A man may not marry a woman and her sister while both sisters are alive; however, he may marry his wife’s sister after his wife’s death.

The prohibition against marrying two sisters applies whether they are paternal sisters or maternal sisters.

If his wife had a paternal sister, and that sister had a maternal sister, he may marry that other sister, since there is no relationship of sisterhood between his wife and her sister’s sister.

a.

They said to him

the husband:

“Your wife has died!”

b. And he went and

married

a second woman, who was

her paternal sister

of his wife, but was not her maternal sister.

And afterward they said to him:

“Your

second wife has died [who, as stated, was his first wife’s paternal sister]!” c. And he went and

married

a third woman,

her maternal sister

of his second wife.

This sister was “distant” from his first wife and was not her sister at all.

And afterward they said to him:

“Your

third wife has died [her second wife’s maternal sister, who was entirely unrelated to his first wife]!”

d. And he went and

married

a fourth woman,

her paternal sister

of his third wife, who was distant both from his second wife and from his first wife.

And again they said to him:

“Your

fourth wife has died [her third wife’s paternal sister, entirely unrelated to his second and first wives]!”

e. And he went and

married

a fifth woman, who was

her maternal sister

of his fourth wife, entirely unrelated to his third, second, and first wives.

Afterward it became clear that all those testimonies concerning the deaths of his wives had been false, and

all of them were found to be alive—

He is

permitted to

his

first wife, and to

his

third, and to

his

fifth.

Because his third wife was distant from his first wife, and her betrothal took effect.

Likewise, his fifth wife was distant from his third wife, and therefore her betrothal took effect.

The betrothals of the third and fifth wives are complete and valid betrothals.

Therefore, if the husband subsequently dies, and his three wives fall before his brother for yibbum, and the brother, the yavam, performs yibbum with one of his three wives and has intercourse with her, that intercourse is valid and not invalid,

and

they

exempt their co-wives.

That is, if the yavam has intercourse with one of them, that intercourse is valid and not invalid; therefore, if he wishes to release her, a bill of divorce is sufficient, and neither she nor her co-wives require halitza [as they would have required had this been invalid intercourse].

And he is forbidden to the second and fourth wives.

The betrothal of the second wife did not take effect, because she was forbidden to him due to the prohibition against his first wife’s paternal sister.

Likewise, the betrothal of the fourth wife did not take effect, because she was forbidden to him as his third wife’s paternal sister.

And

therefore, if the husband dies and his wives fall before his brother for yibbum,

the intercourse with none of them

[the second and fourth]

exempts “her co-wife”

[his three actual wives, because the second and fourth are not his wives at all].

This applies when all the testimonies concerning the deaths of his wives were false.

But

if

the husband had intercourse

with

the

woman

second after the death of

the

first—

That is, the testimony concerning the death of his first wife was true, and the husband’s betrothal of the second woman took effect through his intercourse with her, while only the other testimonies concerning the deaths of the remaining wives were false—

the husband is

permitted to

his

second wife, and to

his

“fourth”,

who was distant from her.

And

if the husband dies and his wives fall for yibbum, his brother’s intercourse with one of them, the second or the fourth, which is valid intercourse,

exempts their co-wives.

And

the husband is

forbidden to the third,

because she is his second wife’s sister, and the betrothal of the second wife took effect after the death of his first wife.

And

he is also forbidden

to

the

fifth

woman whom he betrothed, because she is his fourth wife’s sister, and the betrothal of the fourth wife took effect.

And the intercourse of the yavam with

the

one of them

[the third and fifth, who are not his brother’s wives]

does not exempt her co-wife

[his two actual wives, the second and fourth].

The second part:

A yavam can acquire his yevama through an acquisition called maamar, which consists of betrothal by money or by a document.

The Sages instituted that the yavam betroth his wife through maamar before having intercourse with her.

Maamar is not a complete acquisition, because through his maamar the yavam has not yet fulfilled the mitzva of yibbum, and the yevama still awaits yibbum or halitza.

Maamar has three effects:

First, maamar performed by one of the yevamim with his yevama disqualifies the yevama with regard to the other brothers. And if there are several yevamot, the maamar disqualifies the other yevamot from undergoing yibbum.

Second, if the yavam wishes to release the “woman of maamar,” he must give her a bill of divorce in addition to halitza.

Third, the brother who performs maamar with his yevama becomes forbidden to the relatives of the woman of maamar, as though she were his wife.

We learned at the beginning of the fifth chapter that the Sages and Rabban Gamliel disagree as to whether there is “maamar after maamar” or “there is no maamar after maamar.”

That is, can a second brother return and perform maamar with a yevama even after his first brother has already performed maamar with her, thereby forbidding her to the first brother who performed maamar with her—while, of course, the second brother is also forbidden to her because of the first brother’s maamar? Or is the second brother’s maamar of no effect?

Likewise, they disagree as to whether there is a bill of divorce after maamar. If the second brother gave her a bill of divorce, did he thereby disqualify her with regard to all the brothers, even the first brother who performed maamar with her, or is the second brother’s bill of divorce of no effect?

But if the second brother performed halitza with her or had intercourse with her after the first brother’s maamar, everyone agrees that the yevama becomes forbidden to the first brother, despite the fact that he performed maamar with her.

A minor yavam cannot betroth his yevama through maamar, just as he cannot betroth a woman.

Rather, if he has intercourse with his yevama [from the age of nine years he is considered capable of valid intercourse], his intercourse with his yevama is considered for him an acquisition of maamar, which, as stated, is not considered a complete acquisition like yibbum.

And since the intercourse of a minor yavam with his yevama acquires her through an acquisition in the category of maamar, all the laws of maamar apply to it. Therefore:

a. If the minor has intercourse with his yevama, he disqualifies her with regard to the other brothers, just as maamar disqualifies the yevama with regard to the other brothers.

b. If, after the minor’s intercourse, his brother has intercourse with her or performs maamar with her, or gives her a bill of divorce—and all the more so if he performs halitza with her or has intercourse with her—the yevama becomes disqualified with regard to the minor, the first “man of maamar.”

A minor yavam,

nine years and one day old, who has intercourse with his yevama—

who had intercourse with his yevama—

He—

disqualifies through the brothers,

for through his intercourse he forbids all his brothers with regard to the yevama.

And the brothers,

the adults—

disqualify through him,

for through their intercourse with the yevama they forbid her to him.

However,

the minor’s ability to disqualify his adult brothers is more limited than the ability of his adult brothers to disqualify him. For—

He disqualifies

the yevama with regard to the other brothers only

at the outset,

only if his intercourse [his “maamar”] preceded the brothers’ act with the yevama.

But

if

the brothers disqualify

the yevama with regard to him both

at the outset and

also at the

end, as the Mishna explains:

as the Mishna explains:

How

does he disqualify at the outset?

A nine-year-old boy and one day old who has intercourse with his yevama—

disqualifies through the brothers,

for from that point she is forbidden to them because of his intercourse [his “maamar”].

And how does he not disqualify at the end?

If his adult brother already had intercourse with her before him and performed yibbum, the minor cannot disqualify her with regard to him if he has intercourse with her [and all the more so if he merely performs maamar with her or gives her a bill of divorce, since a minor’s act has no effect], because after the intercourse of an adult there is no consequence to any subsequent act.

And how do the brothers disqualify at the outset and at the end?

If the brothers had intercourse with her,

whether before the minor’s intercourse or afterward,

and performed,

or performed

maamar with her, or

or

gave

her

a bill of divorce, or performed halitza

with her—

they

disqualify through him,

forbid her to him, whether they did so before the minor’s intercourse with her or afterward.

Gemara:

The Gemara first explains the first part of the Mishna—

We learned in the Mishna: If he had intercourse with the second wife after the death of the first, he is permitted to the second and fourth wives.

The wording of the Mishna could imply that he had intercourse with the second wife after the death of the first, but that he betrothed the women while the first wife was still alive.

And we raise the question:

Is it so

that

all of them,

all four women,

were not after the death of the first!?

It is obvious that he took them only after his wife’s death, because if he took them before her death, the law would be as we learned in the first clause: only the third and fifth women are permitted!

And we answer:

Rav Sheshet said:

The Mishna intends to say that this law applies only if he had intercourse with the second wife

after the first wife’s certain death.

But if there was uncertainty as to when the first wife died, and it is possible that he betrothed the second wife before the first wife’s death, then all of them are forbidden.

The Gemara now explains the second part of the Mishna:

A nine-year-old

disqualifies at the outset, while the brothers disqualify at the outset and at the end.

And we raise the question: Is it true that

a nine-year-old boy and one day old

disqualifies only

at the outset,

only if he has intercourse with her first, before his brothers perform an act with her, is she disqualified through his intercourse with regard to the brothers?

But

at the end,

if he has intercourse with the yevama after one of the brothers has performed maamar with her—is it true that he

does not disqualify

her with regard to him through his intercourse?

But Rav Zevid, son of Rabbi Oshaya, taught:

An older brother

who performs maamar with his yevama, and afterward his brother comes,

the minor,

who is nine years and one day old, and has intercourse with her—

he disqualifies her

through his intercourse with regard to the man of maamar!?

Thus, the intercourse of a minor disqualifies both at the outset and at the end!

They said

in response: Indeed,

intercourse

of a minor

does disqualify

the yevama with regard to his brothers,

even

if the minor had intercourse with her

at the end,

after his adult brother had performed maamar with her.

To resolve the difficulty, we must introduce a new interpretation of the Mishna’s intent:

Maamar

alone by a minor [even without intercourse!], performed by the minor

at the outset,

does disqualify,

because the minor’s act of betrothal with his yevama is considered equivalent to an adult’s maamar for disqualifying his yevama with regard to the brothers.

But the maamar that he performs

at the end,

after his adult brother’s maamar,

does not disqualify

the minor’s maamar.

For the minor’s power was not enhanced to the extent that his maamar would be effective even after his adult brother’s maamar!

But the intercourse

of a minor—

even at the end,

after his adult brother’s maamar—

does disqualify!

And we refute this:

But it is taught

explicitly in our Mishna that a minor has no power to disqualify at the end at all, not even through intercourse!

For we learned in it:

Rather, he

[the minor]

disqualifies at the outset, and they

[the adult brothers] disqualify

at the outset and at the end.

And the Mishna says

how

he disqualifies only at the outset and not at the end, and immediately explains that it is referring to

a nine-year-old boy and one day old who has intercourse with his yevama,

who disqualifies through his intercourse only at the outset and does not disqualify through intercourse at the end!?

And we answer:

The Mishna is lacking

a phrase,

and this is what it teaches

:

A nine-year-old boy and one day old—

he disqualifies at the outset, while they disqualify at the outset and at the end.

In what case

is there a distinction for the minor between the outset and the end?

With regard to maamar.

The minor’s maamar cannot disqualify the adult’s maamar.

But intercourse

of the minor with his yevama

disqualifies even at the end!

Even after his adult brother’s maamar.

According to this emendation of the Mishna, the word “how” does not introduce the manner in which a minor disqualifies through intercourse at the outset. Rather, it introduces

how

the minor disqualifies his brother’s maamar at the end, and the Mishna explains—

a nine-year-old boy and one day old who comes upon his yevama—

disqualified

through his intercourse

through the brothers,

the brothers’ maamar that preceded his intercourse!

The Gemara now questions the novel point in this answer: that a minor can perform maamar betrothal at the outset, and his maamar disqualifies her with regard to the other brothers:

And does he have

the minor have

maamar betrothal at all

to disqualify

through the brothers?

But it is taught: A nine-year-old boy and one day old—

he disqualifies

his yevama with regard to his brothers

in one matter—

while the brothers disqualify through him in four matters.

The beraita explains:

He disqualifies through

the

brothers—

through intercourse.

And the brothers disqualify through him:

Through intercourse, through maamar, through a bill of divorce, and through halitza!

This proves that a minor can disqualify with regard to the brothers only through intercourse, and not through maamar!?

And we answer:

Intercourse

of a minor,

which disqualifies

the yevama with regard to the brothers

both at the outset and at the end,

and is an absolute, undivided matter—

it is certain to him;

the tanna finds it convenient to teach it as an absolute and definitive matter.

But

maamar

of a minor,

which

only

at the outset

it

disqualifies

with regard to the brothers, while

at the end

it

does not disqualify, is a divided matter—

and it is a divided matter—

it is not certain to him

that the tanna should teach it.

It was also stated: Rav Yehuda said that Samuel said:

A minor

has a bill of divorce,

for if the minor gives his yevama a bill of divorce, he thereby disqualifies her with regard to the brothers, so that they are all forbidden to her, because with regard to all of them I apply the verse: “Once he has not built, he shall not build again”!

And likewise Rav Taḥlifa bar Avimi said:

A minor

has maamar.

It was also taught in a beraita thus:

A minor

has a bill of divorce and has maamar; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And we raise the question:

And

does

Rabbi Meir maintain

that a minor

has a bill of divorce?

But it is taught: They rendered the intercourse of a nine-year-old—

equivalent to maamar by an adult.

Rabbi Meir says: They rendered the halitza of a nine-year-old,

to reject the other brothers from yibbum,

equivalent to the bill of divorce of an adult,

which disqualifies her from yibbum through the brothers, but she requires halitza from them in order to permit her to marry outside the yibbum bond; and the same applies to the halitza of a minor: it disqualifies her from undergoing yibbum, but she still requires halitza.

The Gemara infers:

And if it is so,

that according to Rabbi Meir a minor has a bill of divorce—

let it teach

in Rabbi Meir’s statement: They rendered the halitza of a nine-year-old

equivalent to his bill of divorce,

the bill of divorce of a nine-year-old minor. Why did they need to compare it to the bill of divorce of an adult!?

Rather, this provides proof that according to Rabbi Meir they did not institute a bill of divorce for a minor; therefore, they had to compare the halitza of a minor to the bill of divorce of an adult.

And we answer:

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Rabbi Meir holds that a minor

Rabbi Meir holds that a minor

does have,

indeed has, a bill of divorce with which to disqualify.

But

this bill of divorce is a “bill of divorce

of lesser force,”

which does not have the same power to disqualify as an adult’s bill of divorce with regard to a yevama, as will be explained below.

Therefore Rabbi Meir said that the halitza of a minor is equivalent to the bill of divorce of an adult: the halitza of a minor is equal in its force of disqualification to the bill of divorce of an adult, but not to the bill of divorce of a minor, which is weaker in its power to disqualify than the bill of divorce of an adult.

Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, explains what constitutes the “smallness” of the bill of divorce that a minor gives to a yevama:

According to Rabban Gamliel, who says: “There is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce”—

And this means that the get which the yavam gives to his second yevama has no effect, and he is not rendered forbidden to her relatives as the relative of his divorcee—

These words apply to

a get of

another adult

after a get of

an adult, and

likewise a get of

another minor

after a get of

a minor.

But

a get of

another adult

after a get of

a minor—

is effective!

But

according to the Rabbis, who say, "there is a get after a get"—

These words apply in the case of an adult after an adult, or a minor after a minor.

But a minor after an adult—

is not effective!