Yevamot 96a — the Talmud in English

And perhaps

Shmuel said that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosei only

“

whoever

does not disqualify

“through others,” and Shmuel came to teach us that if the woman married Reuven, her sister’s husband, she is not forbidden to Reuven’s brother-in-law, because the entire reason is on account of lest they say, “This one divorced her and this one married her,” which is not applicable to say when she married Reuven, her sister’s husband. And it is not like the first tanna, who forbids her to his brother-in-law on account of a fine.

However, regarding that which Rabbi Yosei holds—that if the woman married Reuven, who betrothed her sister but did not marry her, she is forbidden to Reuven’s brother-in-law—in this Shmuel did not say that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosei, because he is not concerned lest they say that there was a condition in the betrothal.

The second manner:

Alternatively, from where is it established that the statement of Rav Huna is correct [from where is it known that Rav Huna’s words are correct] in explaining the dispute between Rav and Shmuel?

[how do we know that Rav Huna’s words in explaining the dispute between Rav and Samuel are correct]?

Perhaps Rav Huna’s statement is entirely inapplicable!

For it is possible to explain the dispute between Rav and Shmuel in two other explanations:

.

And they disagree regarding Rav Hamnuna,

Rav and Shmuel:

For Rav Hamnuna said: A shomeret yavam who committed adultery—

is forbidden to her yavam.

And it is regarding this that Rav and Shmuel disagree.

For Rav said,

a yevama who is bound to levirate marriage

is like a married woman

of the yavam,

and she is disqualified

for him

through adultery,

and this accords with Rav Hamnuna.

But

if

Shmuel said: She is not like a married woman, and she is not disqualified through adultery

for the yavam, and this is not like Rav Hamnuna.

.

Alternatively,

it is possible that

in

the question whether

betrothal takes effect with a yevama—

Rav and Shmuel disagree

Rav and Shmuel.

For Rav said,

a yevama who is bound to levirate marriage

is like a married woman, and betrothal does not take effect with her

after he betrothed her.

And Shmuel said: She is not like a married woman, and betrothal takes effect with her

for every person.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the second explanation of the dispute between Rav and Shmuel:

But they already disagreed about this once!

For Rav and Shmuel already disagreed whether betrothal takes effect with a yevama, and their dispute was mentioned above [92b]; why did they need to disagree about this matter again in a different formulation? And the Gemara answers:

One [formulation]—

was stated by inference from the other.

Rav and Shmuel did not disagree about the same matter in two formulations; rather, they disagreed once, and in the beit-midrash they stated their second dispute on the basis of their first dispute.

Mishna:

Our Mishna is divided into two matters:

The first section deals with the prohibition of a wife’s sister, and the second section deals with the intercourse of a minor yavam with a yevama.

The first section:

It is forbidden for a person to marry a woman and her sister when both sisters are alive, but he is permitted to marry his wife’s sister after his wife’s death.

The prohibition against marrying two sisters applies whether they are sisters through their father or sisters through their mother.

And if his wife had a paternal sister, and that sister had a maternal sister, he is permitted to marry that sister, since there is no relationship of sisterhood at all between his wife and his wife’s sister’s sister.

.

They said to him

to the husband:

“Your wife has died!”—

B. And he went

and married

a second woman, who was

her paternal sister

of his wife, but was not her maternal sister.

And afterward they said to him:

“Your

second wife has died [who, as stated, was his wife’s paternal sister]!” C. And he went

and married

a third woman,

her maternal sister

of his second wife.

And this sister is “distant” from his first wife, and is not her sister at all.

And afterward they said to him:

“Your

!]]third wife has died [her second wife’s maternal sister, who is entirely distant from his first wife]!”

D. And he went

and married

a fourth woman,

her paternal sister

of his third wife, who was distant both from his second wife and from his first wife.

And again they said to him:

“Your

!]]fourth wife has died [her third wife’s paternal sister, and entirely distant from his second and first wives]!”

E. And he went

and married

a fifth woman, who was

her maternal sister

of his fourth wife, who was entirely distant from his third, second, and first wives.

And afterward it became clear that all those testimonies were false testimonies,

and all of them were found to be alive—

he is

permitted to

his

first wife, and to

his

third wife, and to

his

fifth wife.

Because his third wife is distant from his first wife, and her betrothal took effect.

And likewise his fifth wife is distant from his third wife, and therefore her betrothal took effect.

And the betrothals of the third and fifth are complete and valid betrothals.

And therefore, if afterward the husband died, and his three wives fell before his brother for levirate marriage, and his brother, the yavam, came to perform levirate marriage with one of his three wives and had intercourse with her, this is valid intercourse and not disqualified intercourse,

and

they are

“releasing” their rival wives.

That is, if the yavam has intercourse with one of them, this is valid intercourse and not disqualified intercourse, so that if he comes to remove her, a bill of divorce is sufficient for her, and neither she nor her rival wives require halitza [as they would have required had this been disqualified intercourse].

And he is forbidden to the second and the fourth.

The betrothal of the second did not take effect, since she is forbidden to him because of the prohibition of his first wife’s paternal sister.

And likewise the betrothal of the fourth did not take effect, since she is forbidden to him on account of the prohibition of his third wife’s paternal sister.

And

therefore, if the husband died and his wives fell before his brother for levirate marriage,

the intercourse of one of them [in the second and fourth]

[the second or fourth]

does not release “her rival wife” [the three true wives, because the second and fourth are not his wives at all].

[the husband’s three true wives, since the second and fourth wives are not his wives at all].

When does this apply? When all the testimonies concerning the deaths of his wives were false.

But,

if

if

the husband

had intercourse with

the

second woman after the death of

the

first woman—

That is, the testimony concerning the death of his first wife was true, and the husband’s betrothal took effect through his intercourse with the second woman, while only the other testimonies concerning the deaths of the other women were false—

the husband is

permitted to

his

second wife, and to

his

“fourth” wife,

who is distant from her.

And

if the husband died and his wives fell for levirate marriage, his brother’s intercourse with one of them, with the second or the fourth, which is valid intercourse—

releases their rival wives.

And the husband is forbidden

to

to the third,

because she is his second wife’s sister, with whom betrothal took effect after his wife’s death.

And he is also forbidden

to

to

the

fifth woman

whom he betrothed, since she is his fourth wife’s sister, with whom betrothal took effect.

And the intercourse of the yavam

with

one of them [the third and fifth, who are not his brother’s wives]

[the third or fifth, who are not his brother’s wives]

does not release her rival wife [his two true wives, the second and fourth].

[the two true wives, the second and fourth].

The second section:

The yavam can acquire his yevama through the acquisition of “maamar,” which is betrothal through money or a document.

And the Sages instituted that the yavam should betroth his wife with maamar betrothal before he has intercourse with her.

The maamar is not a complete acquisition, since the yavam has still not fulfilled through his maamar the mitzva of levirate marriage, and the yevama is still bound either to levirate marriage or to halitza.

The maamar accomplishes three things:

First, a maamar that one of the yevamim performed with his yevama disqualifies the yevama with regard to the other brothers. And if there were several yevamot, the maamar disqualifies the other yevamot from undergoing levirate marriage.

Second, if the yavam wishes to remove the “possessor of the maamar,” he must give her a bill of divorce in addition to halitza.

And third, the brother who performs maamar with his yevama becomes forbidden to the relatives of the possessor of the maamar, as though she were his wife.

And we learned at the beginning of the fifth chapter that the Sages and Rabban Gamliel disagree whether there is “maamar after maamar,” or “there is no maamar after maamar.”

That is, whether a second brother can return and perform maamar with the yevama even after his first brother has already performed maamar with her, and thereby the second brother will forbid the yevama to the first brother who performed maamar with her—and, obviously, the second brother is also forbidden to her on account of the first brother’s maamar—or whether the second brother’s maamar is nothing.

And likewise they disagree whether there is a bill of divorce after maamar: if the second brother gave her a bill of divorce, whether he disqualified her with regard to all the brothers, even with regard to the first brother who performed maamar with her, or whether the second brother’s bill of divorce is nothing.

But if the second brother performed halitza with her or had intercourse with her after the first brother’s maamar, according to everyone the yevama becomes forbidden to the first brother, despite the fact that he performed maamar with her.

A minor yavam cannot betroth his yevama through maamar betrothal, just as he cannot betroth a woman.

Rather, if he has intercourse with his yevama [and from the age of nine his intercourse is considered intercourse], his intercourse with his yevama is considered for him an acquisition of “maamar,” which, as stated, is not considered a complete acquisition like levirate marriage.

And since the intercourse of a minor yavam with his yevama acquires her with an acquisition in the category of maamar, she has all the laws of maamar, and therefore:

A. If the minor has intercourse with his yevama, he disqualifies her with regard to the other brothers, just as maamar disqualifies the yevama with regard to the other brothers.

B. If, after the minor’s intercourse, his brother has intercourse with her, or performs maamar with her, or gives her a bill of divorce—and all the more so if he performs halitza with her or has intercourse with her—the yevama is disqualified with regard to the minor, the first “possessor of the maamar.”

A minor yavam,

nine years and one day old

who had intercourse with his yevama—

he—

disqualifies through the brothers,

for through his intercourse he forbids all his brothers with regard to the yevama.

And the brothers

the adults—

disqualify through him,

for through their intercourse with the yevama they forbid him.

Rather,

the minor’s ability to disqualify his adult brothers is less than the ability of his adult brothers to disqualify him. For—

he disqualifies

the yevama with regard to the other brothers only

at the beginning,

only if his intercourse [“his maamar”] preceded the act of the brothers with the yevama.

But

if

the brothers disqualify

the yevama with regard to him both

at the beginning and

also at the

end,

as the Mishna explains:

How

does he disqualify at the beginning?

A nine-year-old and one day who had intercourse with his yevama—

disqualified through the brothers,

since from now she is forbidden to them on account of his intercourse [“his maamar”].

And how does he not disqualify at the end?

If his adult brother had already had intercourse with her before him and performed levirate marriage with her, the minor cannot disqualify her with regard to him if he has intercourse with her [and all the more so if he merely performs maamar with her or gives her a bill of divorce, since the act of a minor is nothing], since after the intercourse of an adult there is nothing [further]!

And how do the brothers disqualify at the beginning and at the end?

The brothers had intercourse with her,

whether before the minor’s intercourse or after it,

and performed,

or performed

with her maamar,

or

gave

her

a bill of divorce, or performed halitza

with her—

they

disqualify through him,

for they forbid her to him, whether they did this before the minor’s intercourse with her or afterward.

Gemara:

And the Gemara first explains the first section of the Mishna—

We learned in the Mishna: If he had intercourse with the second after the death of the first, he is permitted to the second and the fourth.

From this wording of the Mishna it could be understood that he had intercourse with the second after the death of the first, but he betrothed the women while the first was still alive.

And we raised it:

Is that so?

Does

all of them,

all four women,

not come after the death of the first!?

It is obvious that he took them only after his wife’s death, for if he took them before her death, the law would be as we learned in the first clause, that only the third and fifth are permitted!

And we answer:

Rav Sheshet said:

The intention of the Mishna is to say that this law applies only if he had intercourse with the second

after the death of the first was certain.

But if there was uncertainty as to when the first died, and it is possible that he betrothed the second before the death of the first, then all of them are forbidden.

And now the Gemara explains the second section of the Mishna:

A nine-year-old

disqualifies at the beginning, and the brothers disqualify at the beginning and at the end.

And we raised it: Is it so that

a nine-year-old and one day

only

disqualifies at the beginning,

only if he has intercourse with her first, before his brothers perform an act with her, is she disqualified through his intercourse with regard to the brothers?

But

at the end,

if he has intercourse with the yevama after one of the brothers performed maamar with her—is it so that

he does not disqualify

her with regard to him through his intercourse!?

But Rav Zevid bar Rabbi Oshaya taught:

An adult brother

who performs maamar with his yevama, and afterward his brother

the minor,

who is nine years and one day, has intercourse with her—

he disqualifies her

through his intercourse, with regard to the possessor of the maamar!?

Thus the intercourse of a minor also disqualifies at the beginning and at the end!

They said to answer:

to explain: Indeed,

intercourse

of a minor

disqualifies

the yevama with regard to his brother,

even

if the minor has intercourse with her

at the end,

after his adult brother performed maamar with her.

And in order to answer the difficulty, we must establish that the intention of the Mishna is to say as follows:

A maamar

performed by a minor alone [even without intercourse!], which the minor performs

at the beginning—

disqualifies,

since the act of betrothal of a minor with his yevama is considered like the maamar of an adult to disqualify his yevama with regard to the brothers.

But a maamar that he performs

at the end,

after the maamar of his adult brother,

does not disqualify

the minor’s maamar.

For they did not strengthen the minor’s power to such an extent that his maamar would be effective even after the maamar of his adult brother!

But intercourse

of a minor—

even at the end,

after his adult brother’s maamar—

does disqualify!

And we refute:

But it was taught

explicitly in our Mishna that the minor has no power to disqualify at the end at all, not even through intercourse!

For we learned in it:

Rather, he [the minor]

[the minor]

disqualifies at the beginning, and they [the adult brothers]

disqualify

at the beginning and at the end.

And the Mishna says,

how

he disqualifies only at the beginning and not at the end, and immediately explains afterward that it concerns

a nine-year-old and one day who has intercourse with his yevama,

who disqualifies through his intercourse only at the beginning and does not disqualify through intercourse at the end!?

And we answer:

The Mishna is deficient,

in our Mishna,

and this is what it teaches

in it:

A nine-year-old and one day—

he disqualifies at the beginning, and they disqualify at the beginning and at the end,

In what case is this said

that there is a distinction with regard to the minor between the beginning and the end?—

With regard to maamar.

For the maamar of a minor cannot disqualify the maamar of an adult.

But intercourse

of a minor with his yevama—

disqualifies even at the end!

Even after his adult brother’s maamar.

And according to this emendation in the Mishna, it does not say “how does the minor disqualify through his intercourse at the beginning,” but rather

how

does the minor disqualify at the end the maamar of his brother? And thus the Mishna explains—

a nine-year-old and one day who has intercourse with his yevama—

disqualified

through his intercourse

through the brothers,

the maamar of the brothers that preceded his intercourse!

And now the Gemara is astonished at the innovation in the answer, that a minor can perform maamar betrothal at the beginning, and his maamar will disqualify her with regard to the other brothers:

And does he have

a minor

any maamar betrothal at all

to disqualify

through the brothers?

But it was taught: A nine-year-old and one day—

he disqualifies

his yevama with regard to his brothers

in one matter—

and the brothers disqualify through him in four matters.

And the beraita explains:

he disqualifies through

the

brothers—

through intercourse.

And the brothers disqualify through him:

Through intercourse, through maamar, through a bill of divorce, and through halitza!

And it is proven that a minor can disqualify with regard to the brothers only through intercourse, and not through maamar!?

And we answer:

Intercourse

of a minor,

which disqualifies

the yevama with regard to the brothers

both at the beginning and at the end,

and it is an absolute matter and not divided—

it is decisive for him,

it is convenient for the tanna to state it as an absolute and decisive matter.

But

the maamar

of a minor,

which

only

at the beginning

it

disqualifies

with regard to the brothers, but

at the end

it

does not disqualify,

and it is a divided matter—

it is not decisive for him

for the tanna to state it.

It was also stated: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

A minor

has a bill of divorce,

for if the minor gave a bill of divorce to his yevama, he thereby disqualifies her with regard to the brothers, so that from now on they are all forbidden to her, since I apply to all of them, “Since he did not build, he shall no longer build”!

And likewise Rav Taḥlifa bar Avimi said:

A minor

has maamar.

It was taught likewise:

A minor

has a bill of divorce and has maamar; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

And we raised it:

And

is it so that

Rabbi Meir holds

that a minor

has a bill of divorce?

But it was taught: They made the intercourse of a nine-year-old

like maamar in an adult.

Rabbi Meir says: They made the halitza of a nine-year-old

to reject the other brothers from levirate marriage

like a bill of divorce in an adult,

which disqualifies her from levirate marriage through the brothers, but she requires halitza from them in order to permit her to marry outside; and the same is the law with the halitza of a minor, which disqualifies her from undergoing levirate marriage, but she still requires halitza.

And the Gemara infers:

And if it is so

that according to Rabbi Meir a minor has a bill of divorce—

let him teach

in the words of Rabbi Meir: They made the halitza of a nine-year-old

like his bill of divorce

of a nine-year-old minor; and why did they need to compare it to the bill of divorce of an adult!?

Rather, there is a proof from here that according to Rabbi Meir they did not institute a bill of divorce in an adult, and therefore they needed to compare the halitza of a minor to the bill of divorce of an adult.

And we answer:

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said:

Rabbi Meir holds that a minor

does have,

indeed he has a bill of divorce in order to disqualify.

But,

however, this bill of divorce is a “bill of divorce

minor,”

which is not equal in its power to disqualify to the bill of divorce of an adult with a yevama, as will be explained below.

And therefore Rabbi Meir said that the halitza of a minor is like the bill of divorce of an adult, for the halitza of a minor is equal in its force to disqualify to the bill of divorce of an adult, but not to the bill of divorce of a minor, which is weaker in its power to disqualify than the bill of divorce of an adult.

And Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, explains what the “smallness” is of the bill of divorce that a minor gives to a yevama:

According to Rabban Gamliel, who says: “There is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce”—

And this is [the meaning], that the get which the yavam gives to his second yevama does nothing, and he is not prohibited from her relatives as the relative of his divorcee -

This applies to

a get of

another adult

a get of

an adult, and

likewise, a get of

another minor

a get of

a minor.

But

a get of

another adult

a get of

a minor -

is effective!

But

according to the Rabbis, who say, "there is a get after a get" -

This applies to an adult after an adult, or a minor after a minor.

But a minor after an adult -

is not effective!