Yevamot 96b — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

In the previous Mishna it was explained that the intercourse of a minor is considered like a maamar with a yevama, to prohibit the other brothers from her.

A. A minor yavam,

nine years and one day old,

and from this age his intercourse is intercourse,

who had intercourse with his yevama—

he acquires her.

However, since the acquisition of a minor yavam is not a complete acquisition, but is only in the category of an acquisition through maamar, and the yevama is not entirely acquired by him [for she is not considered like an ordinary yevama with whom an adult yavam had intercourse, but only like a yevama with whom one of the brothers performed maamar], therefore—

if

afterward,

after his intercourse,

his brother had intercourse with her,

the minor,

who

who also

was nine years and one day old—

he disqualifies her because of him.

The yevama becomes disqualified from the first brother, who acquired her through intercourse [which is considered maamar], because of his brother’s intercourse, since his brother’s intercourse too is considered an acquisition through maamar. This tanna follows the Sages, and not Rabban Gamliel, that there is “maamar after maamar.”

That is, each of the levirate brothers has the possibility of performing maamar with his yevama, even if another brother had already preceded him and performed maamar with her.

And through the maamar of the second brother, the yevama becomes prohibited also to the first brother, by virtue of the maamar of the second brother.

And likewise, the second brother too becomes prohibited to her relatives, like the first brother.

And she requires a bill of divorce from both of them, and halitza from one of them.

And since the betrothals of maamar of both of them took effect with her, and she cannot undergo yibbum unless one of them divorces her, she is henceforth prohibited to both of them because of the prohibition, “Since he did not build, he shall no longer build.”

Rabbi Shimon says:

the second brother

does not disqualify

the yevama from the first brother.

For according to Rabbi Shimon, intercourse by a nine-year-old is not in the category of maamar, which is a partial acquisition; rather, it is uncertain whether it effects a complete acquisition, like the intercourse of an adult, or whether it effects no acquisition at all.

If it is a complete acquisition, the intercourse of the second has no effect.

And if it is no acquisition at all, the intercourse of both brothers accomplished nothing, and she is permitted to both of them.

Therefore, she is certainly permitted to the first, since according to both possibilities she is permitted to him, and she is prohibited to the second because of the uncertainty, according to the possibility that the first acquired her completely.

B. A minor yavam

nine years and one day old, who had intercourse with his yevama,

and his intercourse is considered like maamar,

and afterward he himself had intercourse,

he himself also

with her rival—

Since his intercourse is not a complete acquisition, his first intercourse does not exempt her rival; rather, it only acquires the first woman according to the law of maamar.

And since his acquisition of the first woman is not a complete acquisition, if afterward he has intercourse with her rival, the rival too is acquired by him through an acquisition of maamar.

It follows that he establishes two households, whereas the Torah said, “One household he builds, and he does not build two households.”

And since he must divorce the second, the “entire household” becomes disqualified.

That is, all the yevamot who fall together with the divorced woman become disqualified because of “Since he did not build, he shall no longer build.”

It follows that through his intercourse with the rival he

disqualifies

את יבמתו שקנאה בביאתו [מאמרו]] his yevama, whom he acquired through his intercourse [his maamar],—

through himself!

Rabbi Shimon says:

Since it is uncertain whether the intercourse of a minor acquires completely or acquires not at all, he

does not disqualify

his yevama with whom he had intercourse first, through the intercourse that he had with the second.

For if his intercourse acquired nothing, the intercourse with the first and the second accomplished nothing, and they do not become prohibited.

And if his first intercourse with the first yevama acquired her completely, it completely exempted her rival. His intercourse with the second yevama does not prohibit the first because of “building two households,” and he need not divorce one of them.

And since according to Rabbi Shimon the uncertainty is whether the intercourse acquires completely or acquires not at all, he is certainly permitted to the first, for she is permitted to him whether he acquired her completely or did not acquire her at all.

But he is prohibited to maintain the second because of the uncertainty, for perhaps the intercourse with the first acquired her completely, and then, if he maintains the second, he transgresses with regard to the second the prohibition of building two households.

Gemara:

We learned in the first part of the Mishna a dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon concerning a minor yavam who had intercourse with his yevama, and afterward his minor brother had intercourse with her, whether she becomes prohibited to the first:

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon said to the Sages:

The acquisition of the minor through intercourse is not considered a partial acquisition; rather, it is uncertain whether it is a complete acquisition or no acquisition at all. Therefore, I say that, in either case, the intercourse of the second has no effect and does not prohibit her to the first. For:

if the first intercourse

with which the first minor brother had intercourse with her is considered

intercourse

of a complete acquisition—

the second intercourse

with which the second minor brother had intercourse with her

is not intercourse

to disqualify the acquisition of the first, since the first acquired her completely, and we already learned concerning the intercourse of an adult [above, 96b] that “there is no intercourse after intercourse” to disqualify the first intercourse.

And if the first intercourse

of the first minor

is not intercourse

to acquire at all—

the second intercourse

of the second minor

is likewise not intercourse

to acquire.

The Gemara continues and explains another matter:

Mishna,

our Mishna [according to the Sages], who hold that the intercourse of a minor is like maamar, and that “there is maamar after maamar,” meaning that the second maamar has the power to disqualify the first maamar.

And they said this whether it concerned one yavam who performed “maamar after maamar” with his two yevamot, as in the latter clause, where he had intercourse with one yevama and afterward had intercourse with her rival,

or two yevamin with one yevama, as in the first clause, where the first had intercourse with the yevama and afterward the second had intercourse with her—

it is

not in accordance with ben Azai!

For it was taught in a beraita: ben Azai says: There is maamar after maamar

only

with two yevamin and one yevama.

But

But

there is no maamar after maamar with two yevamot and one yavam.

For ben Azai holds that the acquisition through maamar is not a complete acquisition. Rather, the Sages instituted that maamar should be effective, so that people would not mistakenly infer from the fact that maamar is ineffective with a yevama that intercourse too is ineffective with her for acquiring her.

Therefore, the Sages instituted equally for all the brothers that they acquire through maamar, and maamar after maamar is effective with her.

But, by contrast, when two yevamot fall before one yavam, since the single yavam performed maamar with one of the two yevamot, he acquired with her the entire power of maamar, and he no longer has the power to perform maamar with the second.

And according to ben Azai, if the minor yavam afterward had intercourse also with the rival, the first does not become prohibited to him because he is “building two households,” since with one yavam and two yevamot, ben Azai holds that “there is no maamar after maamar.”

Mishna:

The Mishna now explains the laws that result from the fact that the intercourse of a minor nine years old is considered an acquisition:

A.

A nine-year-old and one day old who had intercourse with his yevama and died—

she

performs halitza and does not undergo yibbum.

Since his acquisition is not a complete yibbum, she still falls for yibbum from both the first brother, who was an adult, and the minor brother, whose intercourse is like maamar. She is thus the wife of two dead men, who was excluded [above, 31a] from the verse, “And one of them dies—her brother-in-law shall come upon her”: one upon whom there is the bond of one yavam undergoes yibbum, but not one upon whom there is the bond of two yevamin!

B. In what case is it said that the intercourse of a minor acquires? With a yevama, because since she is bound to him, the Sages considered his intercourse with her like maamar.

But although his intercourse with a yevama is considered like maamar, his betrothal of an ordinary woman is not betrothal, since the acquisition of a minor has no effect until he becomes an adult.

Therefore, if

the minor married

the minor

a woman and died,

and he has brothers—

she is exempt

from halitza, since his betrothal accomplished nothing.

C.

A nine-year-old and one day old who had intercourse with his yevama, and after he became an adult married another woman and died,

and his two wives now fall for yibbum before his brother—

if he did not have intercourse with the first [

he did not have intercourse with her]

after he became an adult—

the first performs halitza and does not undergo yibbum,

for she now falls both from the first brother [since she has not yet undergone complete yibbum, as the intercourse of the minor is considered only like maamar], and from the second, who had intercourse with her while he was a minor and acquired her through maamar. She falls for yibbum also by virtue of his maamar, and is thus the wife of two dead men, with the bond of two yevamin upon her; the enactment of the Sages is that she does not undergo yibbum, but only performs halitza.

And the second—

either performs halitza or undergoes yibbum.

Rabbi Shimon says:

There is no prohibition because of “the bond of two yevamin” [that is, Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that the Sages did not institute this enactment].

Therefore, the first too is fit for yibbum—by virtue of her falling from the first—and the second too is fit for yibbum—by virtue of her falling from the second.

Therefore, he

performs yibbum

with one of them,

whichever one he wishes.

And the second is not exempted through his intercourse with her, since here there is falling from two households: the first falls from the first, and the second from the second.

But it is impossible to perform yibbum with the second as well, since she was partially the rival of the one with whom yibbum was performed, through a rabbinic maamar. And if yibbum were performed with both of them, people would come to permit two yevamot who come from one household.

And

And therefore, he

performs halitza with the second.

D.

One

yavam

who is

nine years and one day old, and one yavam

who is twenty years old,

but

has not grown two pubic hairs,

they are equal in all the laws stated concerning a minor yavam, since, because he has not grown two pubic hairs, he is a minor.

Gemara:

Rava said: That which the Sages said

in the Mishna above, in the chapter “Four Brothers” [31b], that where there is

the bond of two yevamin—

she performs halitza, but she does not undergo yibbum.

Do not say,

do not err by saying that what the Sages said—“one upon whom there is the bond of two yevamin does not undergo yibbum but performs halitza”—is because of a decree, and therefore she is prohibited only where the decree applies, and it is not an absolute rule that everyone upon whom there is the bond of two yevamin does not undergo yibbum but performs halitza—

that is, let us not mistakenly say that the Sages said this only

where there is a rival.

For example, above, where the matter concerns two women who were married to two brothers; one of them died, the second performed maamar with her, and he too died, and his two wives fell for yibbum before the third brother, one of them being the first wife of the second brother, while the other was the wife of his first brother, with whom the second performed maamar, and upon her there is the bond of two—

and it might have been said that only there does the woman with whom maamar was performed not undergo yibbum, but only his first wife does, whereas the woman with whom maamar was performed performs halitza, since

there is reason to decree because of the rival,

for the Sages were concerned that if he performed yibbum with both of them, people would come to err and say that any two yevamot who come from one household may undergo yibbum.

Rather, this is an absolute enactment of the Sages: a woman with whom maamar was performed, whose husband died, does not undergo yibbum even where she has no rival.

Since the Sages based their enactment on the verse, “And one of them dies—her brother-in-law shall come upon her,” to say that anyone upon whom there is the bond of two yevamin does not undergo yibbum but performs halitza. And the proof is:

For here,

in our Mishna,

there is no rival,

but she herself alone falls from the first brother and from the maamar of the second, and there is no concern here lest people say that two yevamot from one household undergo yibbum.

And nevertheless, she only

performs halitza,

but

as for yibbum—

she does not undergo it!

We learned in the Mishna:

the minor married

the minor

a woman and died,

she is exempt from halitza and from yibbum.

The Gemara adds that we also learned this law in a beraita:

we have learned this,

this law of our Mishna, in a beraita,

for the Sages taught: An imbecile and a minor who married

a woman

and died—

their wives are exempt from halitza and from yibbum.

We learned in the Mishna:

a nine-year-old

who had intercourse with his yevama, and after he became an adult married another woman and died; if he did not have intercourse with the first

after he became an adult—

the first performs halitza and does not undergo yibbum, and the second either performs halitza or undergoes yibbum.

And we raised an objection concerning it:

let them treat the intercourse of a nine-year-old as maamar by an adult,

and when he dies, there is upon her the bond of two yevamin,

and let the rival be rejected [

the minor’s complete wife, whom he betrothed after he became an adult]

from yibbum,

according to the law of his complete wife when she is “the rival of one upon whom there is the bond of two yevamin,” concerning whom we learned above in the chapter “Four Brothers” [31b] that she does not undergo yibbum.

Rav said: They did not treat the intercourse of a nine-year-old as maamar by an adult.

And Shmuel said: They did, and they did!

That is, indeed they treated the intercourse of a nine-year-old as maamar by an adult.

And Rabbi Yohanan likewise said: They did, and they did.

And we raised an objection, according to the words of Rabbi Yohanan and Shmuel: If it is as they say—

let them treat

the intercourse of a minor as maamar by an adult also with regard to the prohibition of the rival of “one upon whom there is the bond of two yevamin.” If so, how did we learn in our Mishna that her rival even undergoes yibbum!?

And we answer: The law of the rival of one upon whom there is the bond of two yevamin is a matter of dispute,

it is a dispute of tannaim

it is taught.

That tanna who,

above, in the chapter

“Four Brothers,” decreed

that the woman with whom maamar was performed, whose husband died, does not undergo yibbum

because of the rival,

lest they come to perform yibbum also with her rival, and people say that two yevamot who come from one household undergo yibbum.

and that tanna informs us

this law there

with an adult, and the same law applies to a minor,

that she does not undergo yibbum.

And this that he said

there

“adult”?—

because with an adult

who performed maamar with her

he is standing

there.

And this tanna here holds

that indeed

they treated

the intercourse of a minor as maamar by an adult, but he

did not decree

with regard to her that both of them should not undergo yibbum

because of the rival,

lest they come to perform yibbum with her and her rival. Rather, he holds that she herself does not undergo yibbum even where there is no rival. On the other hand, he holds that she does not prohibit her rival under the law of the rival of one upon whom there is the bond of two yevamin.

And that tanna informs us

of this law

with a minor

whose intercourse is like maamar by an adult,

and the same law applies to an adult.

And this that he speaks of a minor?—

because he is standing here

here.

Rabbi Eleazar went,

ben Pedat, who was Rabbi Yohanan’s student, and

stated this teaching

this,

in the beit-midrash,

in the beit-midrash, what he had heard from Rabbi Yohanan,

but did not state it in the name of Rabbi Yohanan.

Rabbi Yohanan heard

that he had not stated it in his name, and

he became angry

at him.

There entered before him

Rabbi Yohanan,

Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi,

in order to appease him over his anger.

They said to him,

so that he would not become angry and his anger would leave an effect:

And is it that

this was not what happened in the synagogue of Tiberias, concerning a bolt [

a peg whose head is thickened, which is inserted into a hole at the entrance to a room, and thus the door is closed],

which has a glustera at its head [

a thickening],

concerning which Rabbi Eleazar and Rabbi Yose disputed,

whether it is considered a vessel, since it is fit for grinding garlic and peppers with it, and inserting it into a hole in the floor does not make it building on Shabbat, or whether inserting it is considered building, because it is subordinated to the house and becomes part of it—

until they tore a Torah scroll in their anger!

And in a parenthetical remark the Gemara wonders: Is it that they

tore

a Torah scroll intentionally

enter your mind?

Rather, say: A Torah scroll was torn

unintentionally,

in their anger.

And Rabbi Yose ben Kisma was there.

He said: I wonder whether this synagogue will not become a house of idolatry!

And so it was.

But they did not calm Rabbi Yohanan through this; on the contrary,

again,

Rabbi Yohanan returned and

became even angrier.

He said: “A colleague as well!”

Do you compare Rabbi Eleazar, my student, as though he were my colleague, and therefore I should not be angry with him, just as it was not fitting for Rabbi Eleazar and Rabbi Yose, who were colleagues, to be so angry with one another!?

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi entered before him

to appease him.

He said to him:

it is written in the Book of Joshua [chapter 11]:

“Just as the Lord commanded Moses His servant, so Moses commanded Joshua, and so Joshua did. He did not remove a thing

from all that the Lord commanded Moses.”

And for every matter that Joshua said, would he say to them: “Thus Moses said to me”?

Rather, Joshua would sit and expound without attribution, and everyone knew that it was the Torah of Moses.

So too, Rabbi Eleazar your student,

he

sits and expounds without attribution, and everyone knows that

all his words are

yours.

He said to them,

Rabbi Yohanan:

Why do you not know how to appease as our colleague ben Idi does!

The Gemara now brings the Sages’ exposition concerning stating a matter in the name of the one who said it, and how much this benefits the one who said it. For it is written in the Book of Psalms [chapter 61]:

“I shall dwell in Your tent forever.”

And is it possible for a person to dwell in two worlds?

Rather,

thus

David said before the Holy One, blessed be He: