Yevamot 96b (צו:) — the Talmud in English

The previous Mishna explained that the intercourse of a minor is considered like ma’amar with a yevama, thereby prohibiting her to the other brothers.

a. A minor yavam,

who is nine years and one day old,

from which age his intercourse is considered intercourse,

who had intercourse with his yevama—

acquires her.

However, since the acquisition of a minor yavam is not a complete acquisition, but is only in the category of ma’amar, and the yevama is not completely acquired by him [for she is not considered an ordinary yevama with whom an adult yavam had intercourse, but only like a yevama with whom one of the brothers performed ma’amar], therefore—

if

afterward,

after his intercourse,

his brother had intercourse with her,

the minor,

who

also

is nine years and one day old—

he disqualifies her because of him.

The yevama becomes disqualified with respect to the first brother, who acquired her through intercourse [which is considered ma’amar], because of his brother’s intercourse, since his brother’s intercourse is likewise considered an acquisition through ma’amar. This tanna follows the opinion of the Sages, and not that of Rabban Gamliel, who maintains that there is no ma’amar after ma’amar.

That is, each of the brothers who are yevamin may perform ma’amar with his yevama, even if another brother preceded him and performed ma’amar with her.

Through the second brother’s ma’amar, the yevama is also prohibited to the first brother, by virtue of the second brother’s ma’amar.

Likewise, the second brother himself becomes prohibited to her female relatives, just as the first brother did.

And she requires a get from both of them, and halitza from one of them.

And since the kiddushin effected by the ma’amar of both of them took effect with her, and she may undergo yibbum only if one of them divorces her, she is from now on prohibited to both of them, by virtue of the prohibition: “Since he did not build her house, he may no longer build it.”

Rabbi Shimon says:

The second brother

does not disqualify

the yevama with respect to the first brother.

Since, according to Rabbi Shimon, intercourse by a nine-year-old is not in the category of ma’amar, which is a partial acquisition. Rather, it is uncertain whether it effects a complete acquisition, like the intercourse of an adult, or whether it effects no acquisition at all.

If it is a complete acquisition, the second brother’s intercourse has no effect.

And if it effects no acquisition at all, the intercourse of both brothers accomplished nothing, and she is permitted to both of them.

Therefore, she is certainly permitted to the first brother, since according to both possibilities she is permitted to him, while she is prohibited to the second brother due to uncertainty, in the event that the first brother acquired her completely.

b. A minor yavam

who is nine years and one day old and had intercourse with his yevama,

and his intercourse is considered like ma’amar,

and afterward he had intercourse,

he himself, also

with her rival—

Since his intercourse is not a complete acquisition, his first intercourse does not exempt her rival; rather, it acquires the first woman according to the law of ma’amar.

And since his acquisition of the first woman is not a complete acquisition, if he subsequently has intercourse with her rival, he also acquires the rival through ma’amar.

It follows that he establishes two households, whereas the Torah stated: “He builds one house, but does not build two houses.”

And since he must divorce the second woman, the entire “house” is disqualified.

That is, all the yevama women who fall to yibbum together with the divorced woman are disqualified, because “since he did not build her house, he may no longer build it.”

It follows that through his intercourse with the rival he

disqualifies

the yevama whom he acquired through his intercourse [his ma’amar]—

by his own act!

Rabbi Shimon says:

Since it is uncertain whether the intercourse of a minor effects a complete acquisition or effects no acquisition at all, he

does not disqualify

the yevama with whom he first had intercourse through the intercourse with the second woman.

For if his intercourse effected no acquisition, the intercourse with both the first and the second woman has no effect, and they do not become prohibited.

And if his first intercourse acquired the first yevama completely, it completely exempted her rival. His intercourse with the second yevama does not prohibit the first one on account of “building two houses,” and he need not divorce either of them.

And since according to Rabbi Shimon the uncertainty is whether the intercourse effects a complete acquisition or no acquisition at all, he is certainly permitted to the first woman, since she is permitted to him whether he acquired her completely or did not acquire her at all.

However, he is prohibited to retain the second woman due to uncertainty, lest the first woman’s intercourse acquired her completely, in which case, if he retains the second woman, he violates the prohibition against building two houses.

We learned in the first section of the Mishna a dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon concerning a minor yavam who had intercourse with his yevama, and whose minor brother then had intercourse with her, whether she becomes prohibited to the first brother:

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon said to the Sages:

The minor’s acquisition through intercourse is not considered a partial acquisition. Rather, it is uncertain whether it is a complete acquisition or no acquisition at all. Therefore, I maintain that in either case, the second brother’s intercourse has no effect and does not prohibit her to the first brother. For:

If the first intercourse,

with which the first minor brother had intercourse with her, is considered

intercourse

that effects a complete acquisition—

the second intercourse,

with which the second minor brother had intercourse with her—

is not intercourse

that can disqualify the first brother’s acquisition, since the first brother acquired her completely. And we already learned concerning the intercourse of an adult [above, 96b] that “there is no intercourse after intercourse” to disqualify the first intercourse.

And if the first intercourse

of the first minor

is not intercourse

that effects any acquisition—

the second intercourse

of the second minor

is likewise not intercourse

that effects an acquisition.

The Gemara continues and explains another matter:

The Mishna,

our Mishna [according to the Sages], who maintain that the intercourse of a minor is like ma’amar, and that there is ma’amar after ma’amar—that is, the second ma’amar has the power to disqualify the first ma’amar.

And they stated this both when one yavam performed “ma’amar after ma’amar” with his two yevama women, as in the latter clause, where he had intercourse with one yevama and then had intercourse with her rival,

and when two yevamin performed ma’amar with one yevama, as in the first clause, where the first brother had intercourse with the yevama and then the second brother had intercourse with her—

it is

not in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai!

As it was taught in a beraita: Ben Azzai says: There is ma’amar after ma’amar

only

when there are two yevamin and one yevama.

But

there is

no ma’amar after ma’amar when there are two yevama women and one yavam.

For ben Azzai maintains that the acquisition effected by ma’amar is not a complete acquisition. Rather, the Sages instituted that ma’amar should be effective so that people would not mistakenly infer from the fact that ma’amar is ineffective with a yevama that intercourse is likewise ineffective for acquiring her.

Therefore, the Sages instituted that all the brothers should acquire through ma’amar equally, and consequently ma’amar after ma’amar is effective.

By contrast, when one yavam has two yevama women before him, once the sole yavam has performed ma’amar with one of the two yevama women, he has used the entire force of ma’amar, and he no longer has the power to perform ma’amar with the second.

According to ben Azzai, if the minor yavam subsequently has intercourse with the rival as well, the first woman does not become prohibited to him because he is “building two houses.” This is because ben Azzai maintains that when there is one yavam and two yevama women, there is no ma’amar after ma’amar.

The Mishna now explains the laws that result from the fact that the intercourse of a nine-year-old minor is considered an acquisition:

a.

A nine-year-old and one day old who had intercourse with his yevama and died—

she

performs halitza but may not undergo yibbum.

Since his acquisition does not constitute complete yibbum, she still falls to yibbum from both the first brother, who was an adult, and the minor brother, whose intercourse is like ma’amar. She is therefore the wife of two deceased men, a case excluded [above, 31a] by the verse: “And one of them dies—the yevama shall come to him.” The woman upon whom rests the levirate bond of one yavam may undergo yibbum, but not one upon whom rests the levirate bond of two yevamin!

b. When does the intercourse of a minor effect an acquisition? In the case of a yevama, since she is bound to him, the Sages accorded his intercourse with her the status of ma’amar.

However, although his intercourse with a yevama is considered like ma’amar, his kiddushin with an ordinary woman is not kiddushin, since a minor’s acquisition has no effect until he reaches majority.

Therefore, if

the minor married

the minor

a woman and died,

and he has brothers—

she is exempt

from halitza, since his kiddushin had no effect at all.

c.

A nine-year-old and one day old who had intercourse with his yevama, and after he reached majority married another woman and died,

and both his wives now fall to yibbum before his brother—

if he did not have intercourse with the first woman [

he did not have intercourse with her]

after he reached majority—

the first woman performs halitza but may not undergo yibbum,

for she now falls to yibbum both from the first brother [with whom she still has not undergone complete yibbum, since the minor’s intercourse is considered only like ma’amar] and from the second brother, who had intercourse with her while he was a minor and acquired her through ma’amar. She falls to yibbum also by virtue of his ma’amar, and is therefore the wife of two deceased men, upon whom rests the levirate bond of two yevamin. The Sages instituted that she may not undergo yibbum, but only halitza.

And the second woman—

may either perform halitza or undergo yibbum.

Rabbi Shimon says:

There is no prohibition due to the “levirate bond of two yevamin” [that is, Rabbi Shimon disagrees and maintains that the Sages did not institute this ordinance].

Therefore, the first woman too is fit for yibbum—by virtue of her falling to yibbum from the first brother—and the second woman too is fit for yibbum—by virtue of her falling to yibbum from the second brother.

Therefore, he

performs yibbum

with one of them,

whichever one he wishes.

The second woman is not exempted through his intercourse with the first, since here there are two acts of falling to yibbum: the first woman falls from the first brother, and the second from the second brother.

However, it is impossible for him to perform yibbum with the second woman as well, since she was partially her rival—by virtue of the rabbinic ma’amar. If both of them were to undergo yibbum, people might come to permit two yevama women who come from one household.

And

therefore, he

performs halitza with the second woman.

d.

One

yavam

who is nine years and one day old, and one

yavam

who is twenty,

but

has not manifested two pubic hairs,

are subject to all the same laws stated concerning a minor yavam, since as long as he has not manifested two pubic hairs, he is a minor.

Rava said: This statement that the Sages said

in the Mishna above, in the chapter “Four Brothers” [31b], that where there is

a levirate bond of two yevamin—

she performs halitza, but may not undergo yibbum.

Do not say,

do not err and say that when the Sages stated, “A woman upon whom rests the levirate bond of two yevamin may not undergo yibbum, but performs halitza,” this is due to a decree. Therefore, she is prohibited only where that decree applies, and it is not an absolute rule that every woman upon whom rests the levirate bond of two yevamin may not undergo yibbum, but performs halitza—

That is, we should not mistakenly say that the Sages stated this only

where there is a rival.

For example, the case above, involving two women who were married to two brothers: one of the brothers died, and the second performed ma’amar with his wife, and then the second brother also died, so that both his wives fell to yibbum before the third brother. One of them was the second brother’s first wife, while the other was the first brother’s wife, with whom the second brother had performed ma’amar, and upon her rested a levirate bond of two—

One might have said that only there may the woman with whom ma’amar was performed not undergo yibbum, while the second brother’s first wife may undergo yibbum, since

there is reason to issue a decree because of the rival,

as the Sages were concerned that if he performed yibbum with both of them, people would err and say that any two yevama women who come from one household may undergo yibbum.

Rather, this is an absolute rabbinic ordinance: the woman with whom ma’amar was performed, whose husband died, may not undergo yibbum even where she has no rival.

For the Sages based their ordinance on the verse, “And one of them dies—the yevama shall come to him,” teaching that any woman upon whom rests the levirate bond of two yevamin may not undergo yibbum, but performs halitza. The proof is:

For here,

in our Mishna,

there is no rival,

but she alone falls to yibbum from the first brother and by virtue of the second brother’s ma’amar, and there is no concern that people might say that two yevama women from one household may undergo yibbum.

Nevertheless, she

performs halitza only,

but

may undergo yibbum—

she may not undergo yibbum!

We learned in the Mishna:

the minor married

the minor

a woman and died,

she is exempt from halitza and from yibbum.

The Gemara adds that this law was also taught in a beraita:

We have also learned this,

this law of our Mishna, in a beraita,

as the Sages taught: A woman who is mentally incompetent and a minor who married

a

woman and died—

their wives are exempt from halitza and from yibbum.

We learned in the Mishna:

A nine-year-old

who had intercourse with his yevama, and after he reached majority married another woman and died—if he did not have intercourse with the first woman

after he reached majority—

the first woman performs halitza but may not undergo yibbum, while the second may either perform halitza or undergo yibbum.

And we raised the following question:

Let them treat the intercourse of a nine-year-old as ma’amar by an adult,

and when he dies, the first woman has upon her the levirate bond of two yevamin;

and let the rival be rejected [

the minor’s fully married wife, whom he married after reaching majority]

from yibbum,

according to the law of a fully married wife when she is “the rival of a woman upon whom rests the levirate bond of two yevamin,” concerning whom we learned above, in the chapter “Four Brothers” [31b], that she may not undergo yibbum.

Rav said: They did not treat the intercourse of a nine-year-old as ma’amar by an adult.

And Shmuel said: They did, and they did!

That is, indeed, they treated the intercourse of a nine-year-old as ma’amar by an adult.

And Rabbi Yohanan likewise said: They did, and they did.

And we raised the following question concerning the words of Rabbi Yohanan and Shmuel: If their statement is correct—

Let them treat

the intercourse of a minor as ma’amar by an adult also with regard to the prohibition of the rival of “a woman upon whom rests the levirate bond of two yevamin. If so, how can we have learned in our Mishna that her rival may even undergo yibbum?!

And we answer: The law of the rival of a woman upon whom rests the levirate bond of two yevamin is

a dispute between tannaim

that was taught in the Mishna.

That tanna who

above, in the chapter

“Four Brothers,” issued a decree

that the woman with whom ma’amar was performed, whose husband died, may not undergo yibbum

because of the rival,

lest they come to perform yibbum with her rival as well, and people would say that two yevama women who come from one household may undergo yibbum.

And he taught us

this law there

with regard to an adult, and the same applies to a minor,

who may not undergo yibbum.

And this statement that he said

there with regard to an

adult?—

Because it is with regard to an adult

who performed ma’amar with her that he

is speaking

there.

And this tanna here maintains

that indeed

they did

treat the intercourse of a minor as ma’amar by an adult, but

he did not issue a decree

that both women may not undergo yibbum

because of the rival,

lest people come to perform yibbum with her and her rival. Rather, he maintains that she herself may not undergo yibbum even where there is no rival. On the other hand, he maintains that she does not prohibit her rival as the rival of a woman upon whom rests the levirate bond of two yevamin.

And he taught us

this law

with regard to a minor,

whose intercourse is like ma’amar by an adult,

and the same applies to an adult.

And this statement that he said with regard to a minor?—

Because he is speaking about a minor

here.

Rabbi Elazar

ben Pedat, who was a student of Rabbi Yohanan, went and

stated this teaching

of his

in the beit-midrash,

in the study hall, what he had heard from Rabbi Yohanan,

but did not state it in the name of Rabbi Yohanan.

Rabbi Yohanan heard

that he had not stated it in his name, and

was angry

with him.

Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi entered his presence

Rabbi Yohanan,

Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi,

in order to appease him for his anger.

They said to him,

so that he would not become angry and allow his anger to have consequences:

Was it not

the incident in the synagogue of Tiberias, concerning the bolt [

a peg with a thickened head, which they insert into a hole at the entrance to a room, thereby closing the door],

whose head has a knob [

thickness],

concerning which Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei disagreed,

whether it is considered a utensil, since it is fit for grinding garlic and peppers, and inserting it into a hole in the floor does not constitute building on Shabbat, or whether inserting it is considered building, because it becomes annulled to the house and becomes part of it—

until they tore a Torah scroll in their anger!

The Gemara interjects and wonders: Did they

tear

a Torah scroll intentionally?

Could it enter your mind?

Rather, say: A Torah scroll was torn

unintentionally,

in their anger.

And Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma was there.

He said: I am astonished that this synagogue will not become a house of idolatry!

And so it happened.

But this did not calm Rabbi Yohanan; on the contrary,

again,

Rabbi Yohanan returned and

became even angrier.

He said: “A colleague as well!”

Are you comparing my student Rabbi Elazar as though he were my colleague, and therefore I should not be angry with him, just as it would not have been appropriate for colleagues such as Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei to become so angry with one another!?

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi entered his presence

to appease him.

He said to him:

It is written in the Book of Joshua [chapter 11]:

“Just as the Lord commanded Moses His servant, so Moses commanded Joshua, and so Joshua did. He did not remove a single thing

from all that the Lord had commanded Moses.”

Would Joshua mention concerning every matter that he said to them: “This is what Moses told me”?

Rather, Joshua would sit and expound without attribution, and everyone knew that it was the Torah of Moses.

So too, your student Rabbi Elazar

he

sits and expounds without attribution, and everyone knows that

all his statements

are yours.

He said to them,

Rabbi Yohanan:

“Why do you not know how to appease me like our colleague ben Idi!”

The Gemara now cites the Sages’ exposition concerning stating a teaching in the name of the one who said it, and the extent to which this benefits the person who said it. For it is written in the Book of Psalms [chapter 61]:

“I shall dwell in Your tent for worlds.”

Is it possible for a person to dwell in two worlds?

Rather,

so

David said before the Holy One, blessed be He: