Yevamot 95b — the Talmud in English

Rather, Rava said:

Indeed, the lenient prohibition from which we learn is the prohibition of

a married woman,

for if a man transgressed and had intercourse with her, she becomes forbidden to the husband who had forbidden her to the adulterer. And from this prohibition we learn that one who had intercourse with the prohibition of a wife’s sister causes his wife to become forbidden to him.

And likewise, when Ravin came [

when Ravin came ]

Rabbi Yohanan said:

The lenient prohibition that they stated in the beraita is the prohibition of

a married woman!

a married woman!

And why does he call it

the prohibition of a married woman—for one who transgresses this prohibition is liable to strangulation—

a lenient prohibition

in relation to the prohibition of a wife’s sister?

Since

the one who forbade her

to the adulterer, namely, the husband,

forbids her

to him

all his days

of the husband! For if the husband divorced her, she is again permitted to everyone.

Can you say this with regard to the prohibition of a wife’s sister, where the woman forbids her sister to her husband all her days, even if her husband divorced her?

It was taught likewise,

Indeed, so we learned in another beraita, that the kal va-chomer is from one who had intercourse with the prohibition of a married woman:

Abba Hanan said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

The prohibition of

a married woman

is the prohibition from which we would learn that one who had intercourse with the severe prohibition of a wife’s sister [were it not that Scripture stated “her”]—

And this is how we would learn it:

And if, in a place where one had intercourse

with

a married woman, which is

a lenient prohibition,

since

the one who forbade her does not forbid her all his days

but only until he divorces her,

the one who forbade her becomes forbidden—

the one who causes the prohibition becomes forbidden—

One who comes upon

his wife’s sister, which is

a severe prohibition, for

she is

forbidden by the one who forbade her all his days

even if he divorced her—

is it not certainly the case that the one who forbade her becomes forbidden!

And in order that we should not forbid his wife to him when he had intercourse with her sister—

Scripture states: “her”.

“Her”—

his wife who deviated and had intercourse with another—

whose intercourse forbids her

to her husband,

but the intercourse of her sister

with her husband

does not forbid her

to her husband.

We learned in our Mishna: If a man’s wife went overseas, and people came and told him, “Your wife has died,” and he married her sister, and afterward his wife came—she is permitted to return to him.

Rabbi Yosei says: Anyone who disqualifies

through others disqualifies through himself, and anyone who does not disqualify through others does not disqualify through himself:

Introduction to the Gemara’s first explanation of the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei:

It was explained above in the Gemara [94b] that included in the words of the first tanna, who permits his wife to return to him, is also the case in which Reuven’s wife went overseas together with his brother-in-law [the husband of the sister with whom he had intercourse], and one witness testified concerning both his wife and his brother-in-law that they had died, and on the basis of this testimony Reuven went and married his wife’s sister, who was his brother-in-law’s wife.

And the first tanna holds that although his brother-in-law’s wife—who was married to Reuven in violation—becomes forbidden to her brother-in-law, in accordance with the law of a woman whose husband went overseas and one witness came and said, “Your husband has died,” so that she must leave her husband, nevertheless Reuven’s wife does not become forbidden to Reuven.

For we do not say: Since the marriage by which the sister married him was effective to forbid her to her brother-in-law, so too her marriage was effective to forbid her sister to her husband by the law of a wife’s sister.

It is explained in the following passage that Rabbi Yosei disputes this law with the first tanna, and holds that he equates the law of his brother-in-law’s wife with regard to his brother-in-law to the law of his wife with regard to him.

At first the Gemara thinks that both are permitted, and the Gemara concludes that, on the contrary, both are forbidden.

And the Gemara explains the wording of the Mishna according to this explanation.

The Gemara discusses:

What is Rabbi Yosei saying?

If you say,

perhaps you will explain what Rabbi Yosei said, “Anyone who does not disqualify through others does not disqualify through himself,” as follows: Rabbi Yosei disagreed with the first tanna—

For the first tanna says: If

that one might explain Rabbi Yosei’s statement, “Anyone who does not cause her to become disqualified through others does not cause her to become disqualified through himself,” as follows—that Rabbi Yosei disagreed with the first Tanna—

goes [

she went ]

his wife

of Reuven

and

also

his brother-in-law [

the husband of Reuven’s wife’s sister ]

overseas,

and one witness came and said to Reuven, “Your wife and your brother-in-law died overseas,” and Reuven went and married his brother-in-law’s wife [who was his wife’s sister, who became permitted to him through the deaths of her husband and her sister, who was his wife], then:

His brother-in-law’s wife,

who married Reuven,

is forbidden

to her brother-in-law, like other women who married on the basis of one witness, who are forbidden to return to their husbands when their husbands come.

And

if

his wife,

of Reuven,

is permitted [

she is permitted ] to Reuven, since his intercourse with his wife’s sister does not forbid his wife to him.

And Rabbi Yosei says to him,

to the first tanna: There is no difference between the law of his brother-in-law’s wife with regard to his brother-in-law and the law of Reuven’s wife with regard to Reuven—

Rather,

just as his wife

of Reuven

is permitted

to Reuven, for the sister’s intercourse does not forbid her, so

his brother-in-law’s wife is also permitted [

she is permitted ] to her brother-in-law. Her law is not like that of other women who become forbidden to their husbands if they mistakenly married another.

And this is what Rabbi Yosei said: Anyone whom [Reuven] does not disqualify [by his intercourse with the woman with whom he had intercourse] through others [with regard to his brother-in-law]—[Reuven] does not disqualify through himself [to forbid his wife to him]!

It is impossible to explain it this way. For:

If so,

if this is said, how did the tanna phrase Rabbi Yosei’s words:

“Anyone who does not disqualify through others—

does not disqualify through himself”?!

But

“anyone who does not

Reuven

disqualify through himself,”

since his wife does not become forbidden to him, so

he does not disqualify

Reuven

through others” [

that is, Reuven’s intercourse with his brother-in-law’s wife does not forbid her to her brother-in-law ]—

it was obvious to him;

the tanna should have taught it?!

Rather,

in fact, Rabbi Yosei equated the law of his brother-in-law’s wife with regard to his brother-in-law to the law of Reuven’s wife with regard to Reuven in a different manner, and Rabbi Yosei came to be more stringent than the words of the first tanna.

And this is how you should explain what we learned: “Anyone who disqualifies through others disqualifies through himself”:

Just as his brother-in-law’s wife is forbidden,

just as his brother-in-law’s wife is forbidden to her brother-in-law because of her marriage in violation to Reuven—so

his wife

of Reuven

is also forbidden

to Reuven.

For we say: Since Reuven’s marriage was effective to forbid the woman to his brother-in-law, this marriage was effective to forbid Reuven’s wife to Reuven.

And this is what we learned: “Anyone who disqualifies [Reuven] through others”—whose brother-in-law’s wife becomes forbidden to his brother-in-law through Reuven’s marriage and intercourse—Reuven therefore “disqualifies through himself,” for even his own wife becomes forbidden to him.

But this explanation does not explain all of Rabbi Yosei’s words—

That works,

indeed, according to this explanation it is understood what Rabbi Yosei said,

“Anyone who disqualifies

through others disqualifies through himself.”

But what Rabbi Yosei said,

“Anyone who does not disqualify

through others does not disqualify through himself”—

what is its function,

how will you explain it?

Rather,

said—

explained

Rabbi Ami:

The two clauses in Rabbi Yosei’s words

refer to the beginning [

to the first Mishna of this chapter, which is the beginning of our Mishna ].

That is, our Mishna, which is the end of the previous Mishna, deals with the two cases mentioned at the beginning, as it proceeds to explain.

In one of them he disqualifies through others, and then even his wife becomes forbidden to him; and in one he does not disqualify through others, and then his wife does not become forbidden to him.

And these two cases are the two clauses in Rabbi Yosei’s words.

For we learned at the beginning:

The woman married

the woman

on the basis of a court

that permitted her to marry on the basis of one witness, she must

leave

both this one and that one,

and is exempt from an offering

for her inadvertence, having had intercourse with a man other than her husband.

And if she married

on the basis of

two

witnesses,

who told her, “Your husband has died,” and she did not need to resort to the ruling of a court to permit her, she must

leave

the second,

and is liable to bring an offering,

and is permitted to return to the first. Since

the power of the court is greater—

which permitted her to marry on the basis of one witness—

for it exempted her from an offering.

And Rabbi Yosei said to the first Tanna:

It follows, according to what is explained at the beginning, that whether his brother-in-law’s wife is permitted to return to her brother-in-law depends on whether his brother-in-law’s wife married on the basis of one witness who told her, “Your husband has died,” in which case she is forbidden to return to her brother-in-law, whereas if she married on the basis of two witnesses, she is permitted to return to her brother-in-law—

And the first tanna says,

the view of the first tanna is that there is a distinction in this matter only with regard to the prohibition of his brother-in-law’s wife to his brother-in-law, but:

It makes no difference

whether his brother-in-law’s wife married Reuven

on the basis of witnesses

who told her, “Your husband has died,”

for

then

his brother-in-law’s wife is permitted

to her brother-in-law—or

it makes no difference

whether his brother-in-law’s wife married Reuven

on the basis of a court,

which ruled for her on the basis of one witness that she was permitted to marry since her brother-in-law had died,

for

then

his brother-in-law’s wife is forbidden

to her brother-in-law—

In either case, Reuven’s wife is permitted to return to him.

And Rabbi Yosei says to him,

to the first tanna: That is not so. Rather, I hold that the two cases are not equal:

For if his brother-in-law’s wife married him

on the basis of a court,

that is, on the basis of one witness,

for

then he

disqualifies

her

through others,

for his brother-in-law’s wife becomes forbidden to her brother-in-law through his marriage—

then he

disqualifies

even

through himself,

and even his wife becomes forbidden to him.

And this is what Rabbi Yosei said: Anyone who disqualifies through others disqualifies through himself.

But only when his brother-in-law’s wife married him

on the basis of witnesses, for

then he

does not disqualify through others,

for his brother-in-law’s wife does not become forbidden to her brother-in-law through this marriage—then

he does not disqualify through himself,

and his wife is not forbidden to him.

And this is what Rabbi Yosei said: Anyone who does not disqualify through others does not disqualify through himself.

Introduction to Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa’s words in explaining Rabbi Yosei’s words and his dispute with the first tanna:

A. It is explained above in the Gemara that the reason a woman whose husband went overseas must leave the first husband is as a penalty, because she married without taking care. And indeed, this is the view of the first tanna of our Mishna.

However, according to Rabbi Yosei—in the view of Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa—she is forbidden to return to the first husband when he comes from overseas for another reason. There is concern that perhaps people will not know [since they see her first husband alive and present] that the second married her because he believed that her first husband had died; rather, people will say: The first husband divorced her, and this man went and married her.

Therefore, if the woman returns to the first husband, people will say that the first husband is taking back his divorced wife after she married another; and therefore the Sages said that she may not return to the first husband.

B. The practical difference between the two reasons is: If Reuven’s wife and his brother-in-law went overseas, and Reuven went and married his brother-in-law’s wife on the basis of mistaken testimony that his wife and his brother-in-law had died:

For according to the first reason, she would be forbidden to return to her husband [Reuven’s brother-in-law], since she had intercourse with Reuven in violation.

But according to the second reason, there is no basis for forbidding his brother-in-law’s wife to return to her husband, for there is no concern that people might say that the brother-in-law divorced her and Reuven—who was her sister’s husband—married her, and that there was no error here at all, since his wife’s sister is forbidden to him, and how could Reuven marry her even if his brother-in-law had divorced her? People would certainly say that there had been an error concerning the deaths of his wife and of his brother-in-law,

and if so, there is no reason to forbid her to return to her husband, since she did not in fact marry another, as the marriage was one of error.

C. When do these words apply, that according to the second reason the brother-in-law’s wife is permitted to return to him? When she married in violation a man who married her sister. But if she married in violation a man who betrothed her sister, then even according to the second reason the brother-in-law’s wife would be forbidden to return to him.

And this is because we are concerned that perhaps people will say that the brother-in-law divorced his wife, and she married Reuven, and that there was no error here at all. Although she is Reuven’s wife’s sister and is not permitted to him, it can still be said that she was not at all Reuven’s wife’s sister, because Reuven had made a condition in the betrothal of his betrothed, and the condition was not fulfilled. Therefore Reuven married her sister, who was not at all his wife’s sister; and now that he divorced her, she is forbidden to the brother-in-law as one who takes back his divorced wife who married, and therefore she is forbidden to return to her brother-in-law even according to the second reason.

All this applies only when she married Reuven, who had betrothed her sister, for indeed it can be attributed that Reuven had made a condition in the betrothal of his fiancée. But when she married Reuven, who had married her sister, there is no concern that people might say that Reuven had made a condition in his wife’s marriage, for it is not customary to make a condition in marriage and make his intercourse an intercourse of licentiousness.

Therefore people will understand that if she married him, it was certainly because of his error concerning the death of his wife and the death of his brother-in-law that he married her, and the first husband is not taking back his divorced wife who married another.

D. According to Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa, the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei disagree in two matters:

The first: concerning the reason for the prohibition against a woman who married on the basis of one witness returning to her husband, as explained in section A.

The second: Rabbi Yosei’s view is that if Reuven’s marriage was effective to forbid his brother-in-law’s wife to his brother-in-law, then consequently her marriage was also effective to forbid Reuven’s wife to Reuven, unlike the view of the first tanna, who distinguishes between them; and in this matter Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa agrees with Rabbi Ami’s explanation of their dispute.

Rabbi Yitzhak Nafha said:

This is how the two statements of Rabbi Yosei are to be explained:

Entirely on the latter clause,

and Rabbi Yosei is speaking only of one witness, and this is how Rabbi Yosei’s words are explained:

That

which Rabbi Yosei said: “Anyone who does not disqualify through others does not disqualify through himself”—this is speaking in a case

where “his wife”

of Reuven

and his brother-in-law

went to a distant country, and one witness came and said to Reuven: “Your wife and your brother-in-law have died,” and Reuven went and married his wife’s sister, who was his brother-in-law’s wife, as he proceeds to explain.

And that

which Rabbi Yosei said: “Anyone who disqualifies through others disqualifies through himself”—this is speaking in a case

where “his betrothed”

of Reuven

and his brother-in-law

went to a distant country, and one witness came and said to Reuven: “Your betrothed and your brother-in-law have died,” and Reuven went and married his betrothed’s sister, who was his brother-in-law’s wife, as he proceeds to explain.

And in this they disagreed, the tanna kamma and Rabbi Yosei:

And the tanna kamma said:

It makes no difference

whether

the wife

of Reuven

and his brother-in-law went to a distant country.

And it makes no difference

whether

his betrothed

of Reuven

and his brother-in-law went to a distant country.

In either case:

His brother-in-law’s wife

of Reuven

is forbidden

to her brother-in-law, since she was not careful and married Reuven, and the Sages penalized her by forbidding her to her husband.

And

if

his wife

of Reuven—

is permitted [A0040]to Reuven, because his intercourse with her sister does not forbid his wife to him.

that is, she is permitted to Reuven, because his intercourse with her sister does not forbid his wife to him.

And Rabbi Yosei said to him

to the tanna kamma:

Not as you said; rather, there is a distinction between when Reuven’s wife and his brother-in-law went to a distant country, in which case Reuven’s brother-in-law’s wife is not forbidden to her brother-in-law, and consequently Reuven’s wife is also not forbidden to Reuven,

and when Reuven’s betrothed and his brother-in-law went to a distant country, in which case his brother-in-law’s wife became forbidden to his brother-in-law, and consequently Reuven’s wife also became forbidden to Reuven.

And because I hold:

a. The reason for forbidding every woman to her husband when he returned alive from a distant country is not on account of a penalty, but because perhaps people will say: The first one divorced her and the second one married her; and if the first one takes her back, people will say that this is one who takes back his divorced wife after she married another.

b. If Reuven’s marriage was effective in forbidding his brother-in-law’s wife to her brother-in-law, then Reuven’s first wife is also forbidden to him by the law of a wife’s sister.

Therefore, I do not agree with you to permit Reuven’s wife to Reuven, unless

his wife and his brother-in-law

went to a distant country and he married his wife’s sister, since there is no concern that people will say that the brother-in-law divorced her and Reuven married her, for his wife’s sister is forbidden to him; and people will know that Reuven married his brother-in-law’s wife as a result of a mistake, because they misled him concerning the death of his wife and his brother-in-law, and if so, the brother-in-law’s wife is permitted to return to her husband—

And there is also no concern that people will say: Indeed, the brother-in-law divorced her and Reuven married her; and as for the fact that she is Reuven’s wife’s sister and is forbidden to him, perhaps Reuven had a condition with his wife that was not fulfilled, and this is not his wife’s sister, and therefore Reuven married her sister—

This too you have no need to be concerned about,

for

there

is no way to say that he had a condition in the marriage [A0056]since it is not the way of people to make a condition in marriage that his intercourse should not be intercourse of promiscuity].

because people do not customarily make a condition at marriage that would render their intercourse intercourse with a promiscuous woman].

And it follows

that he does not disqualify—

Reuven who married her—

through another.

That is, he does not forbid his brother-in-law’s wife to her brother-in-law, since there is no concern that people will say: This one divorced her and that one married her, and it follows that this one is taking back his divorced wife after she married another.

And therefore, he also

does not disqualify through himself,

and his marriage to his wife’s sister does not forbid his wife to him.

But if

his betrothed

of Reuven

and his brother-in-law

went to a distant country, and Reuven married his “betrothed’s” sister, there is concern that people will say: This one divorced her and that one married her, for although she is his betrothed’s sister and is forbidden to him, nevertheless, since

it is possible to say that he had a condition in the kiddushin

of his betrothed that was not fulfilled, and it turns out that this woman whom he is marrying is not his betrothed’s sister, there is again concern that indeed people will say: This one divorced her and that one married her—

And

it follows that he

disqualifies

through

others,

that is, his brother-in-law’s wife becomes forbidden to her brother-in-law, out of concern that people will say: It follows that this one is taking back his divorced wife after she married another.

And therefore, he

also disqualifies through himself.

That is, his wife becomes forbidden to him on account of a wife’s sister, because since Reuven’s marriage was effective in forbidding his brother-in-law’s wife to her brother-in-law, the marriage was also effective in considering her Reuven’s wife, and his first wife is, after all, his wife’s sister and is forbidden to him.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei!

An introduction to explaining Rav Yosef’s objection:

It entered our minds that his intention was to say that the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei according to Rabbi Yitzhak Nafha’s explanation, namely:

a. The reason that a woman whose husband went to a distant country and who married on the basis of one witness is forbidden to return to her husband is because perhaps people will say: The first one divorced her and the second one married her, and it follows that this one is taking back his divorced wife who married another.

b. Even when a woman whose husband went to a distant country married one to whom she is forbidden by the prohibition of a wife’s sister, so that one cannot say concerning her, “This one betrothed her and this one divorced her,” since she is forbidden to him, nevertheless, if there is room to attribute a condition in the kiddushin—for example, the woman married one who betrothed her sister but did not marry her—she is forbidden to return to her husband. For perhaps people will say: “This one divorced her and that one married her,” because he had a condition in his kiddushin and she was fit for him, and it follows that the first one is taking back his divorced wife.

c. According to this reason, if Shimon’s wife married her husband’s brother, who thought that Shimon had died, and he performed yibbum with her, and Shimon returned from a distant country, she is permitted to return to her husband. For there is no concern that people will say: Shimon divorced her and Reuven married her, and it follows that if Shimon takes her back, he is taking back his divorced wife after she married another,

For people will certainly know that Reuven married her because of a mistake concerning Shimon’s death, and not by means of a divorce, since Reuven is forbidden to take his brother Shimon’s divorced wife; and since he married her because of a mistake, she can return to Shimon, her husband.

c. However, if Shimon betrothed a woman but did not marry her, and Shimon went to a distant country, and Reuven married her because he was misled concerning the death of his brother Shimon, she is not permitted to return to Shimon, her husband, because there is concern that people will say: Reuven was not misled concerning his brother’s death; rather, Shimon had a condition in the kiddushin of his betrothed that was not fulfilled, and she is not his betrothed, and therefore Reuven, his brother, married her. And if the woman returns to Shimon, people will say that he is marrying the divorced wife of his brother Reuven, who is forbidden to him.

Rav Yosef challenged him: And did Shmuel say this,

that we are concerned that people will say: He had a condition in the kiddushin?

But it was stated: A yevama—

Rav said: She is like a married woman.

And Shmuel said: She is not like a married woman,

and he proceeds to explain their dispute.

And

explained

Rav Huna

their dispute:

For example, he betrothed

Shimon

his brother

of Reuven

the woman

but did not marry her,

and he went away

Shimon

to a distant country, and Reuven heard

that

his brother had died

Shimon

and Reuven arose

and

married [A0115][performed yibbum with]

performed yibbum with]

his wife

of Shimon.

Both Rav and Shmuel hold that the reason a woman whose husband went to a distant country is forbidden to return to her husband is because perhaps people will say: This one divorced her and that one married her, and it follows that he is taking back his divorced wife after she married another, or something similar.

For Rav said: She is like a married woman

who married another, who is forbidden to return to her husband—

and

this one too

is forbidden

to

return

to Shimon, her first husband, who is the

brother-in-law

of Reuven.

And Rav’s reason is: Perhaps people will say that Shimon had a condition in the kiddushin of the woman that was not fulfilled, and therefore his brother Reuven married her; and if Shimon takes her back, it follows that he is marrying his brother’s divorced wife. [But if she had been married to Shimon, she would be permitted to return to him, since people do not attribute a condition to marriage; and as for the concern that people will say that Shimon divorced her and Reuven married her, and it follows that Shimon is marrying his brother’s divorced wife, there is no such concern, for she is forbidden to Reuven if Shimon divorced her and did not die].

And Shmuel said: She is not like a married woman

who married another,

and she is permitted to him

to Shimon, her husband—

And Shmuel’s reason is: He is not concerned that people will say that Shimon had a condition in the kiddushin of his wife, because it is something uncommon, and people will not attribute it to that.

And all the more so there is no concern that people will say that Shimon divorced her and Reuven married her, and it follows that Shimon is marrying his brother’s divorced wife, since she is forbidden to Reuven through Shimon’s divorce; she was permitted to him only through his brother’s death. Therefore, she is permitted to return to Shimon.

We have thus learned from Shmuel’s position that we are not concerned that people will attribute it to a condition—

And if so, even when Reuven’s betrothed and his brother-in-law went to a distant country, and Reuven went and married his brother-in-law’s wife, his betrothed’s sister, we should have permitted the brother-in-law’s wife to return to her brother-in-law, because everyone would know that Reuven married her because of a mistake, since she is forbidden to him; and we should not have been concerned that people would say: Reuven’s kiddushin with her sister was conditional upon a condition that was not fulfilled, and therefore Reuven married his betrothed’s sister; and if her brother-in-law takes her back, it follows that he is taking back his divorced wife after she married another.

And if so, this is difficult: How did Shmuel say that the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei, and according to Rabbi Yitzhak Nafha’s position, which forbids the brother-in-law’s wife to return to her brother-in-law when she married Reuven, who had betrothed her sister, because people will say that he had a condition in the kiddushin?

He said

he answered

to him, Abaye

to Rav Yosef, resolving Shmuel’s words against Shmuel in two ways, which are four:

The first manner: two other explanations of Shmuel’s statement, “The halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei”:

a.

And from where

do you know

that when Shmuel said, “The halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei,” he was speaking according to Rabbi Yitzhak Nafha!?

Perhaps he was speaking according to Rabbi Ami!?

That is to say: From where do you know that Shmuel explains Rabbi Yosei’s words according to Rabbi Yitzhak Nafha, and that it is concerning this that he said that the halakha is according to him?

For it is possible that Shmuel explains Rabbi Yosei’s words according to Rabbi Ami, who holds that Rabbi Yosei did not distinguish, with regard to forbidding the brother-in-law’s wife to her brother-in-law, between whether she married one who married her sister or whether she married one who betrothed her sister; in either case she is forbidden to her brother-in-law.

And if indeed Shmuel explains Rabbi Yosei’s words according to Rabbi Ami, then we have not found that we are concerned lest people say that there was a condition in the kiddushin, and Shmuel’s words are resolved.

b.

Or alternatively, he was speaking according to Rabbi Yitzhak Nafha,

and even if Shmuel explains Rabbi Yosei’s words according to Rabbi Yitzhak Nafha’s explanation, namely: “Anyone who disqualifies through others disqualifies through himself,” that is, when Reuven’s betrothed and his brother-in-law went to a distant country, and because his brother-in-law became forbidden to his brother-in-law’s wife, since people will say that Reuven had a condition with his betrothed, and if he takes her back Shimon is found taking back his divorced wife after she married, therefore Reuven also became forbidden to his wife. “Anyone who does not disqualify through others does not disqualify through himself,” that is, when Reuven’s wife and his brother-in-law went to a distant country, and his brother-in-law’s wife was not forbidden to her brother-in-law, since there is no concern lest people say that she had been married to Reuven, because she is forbidden to him; therefore Reuven is not forbidden to his wife.

“Anyone who disqualifies through others disqualifies through himself”—this is when Reuven’s betrothed and his brother-in-law went overseas, and because his brother-in-law’s wife became forbidden to her brother-in-law, since people would say that Reuven had made a condition concerning his betrothed, and if Shimon took her back he would consequently be taking back his divorced wife after she married another, Reuven also became forbidden to his wife.

Even so, this is not difficult, for you cannot prove from the fact that Shmuel ruled that the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei that he is concerned lest people say that there was a condition in the kiddushin, for:

From where is it that

“anyone who”

“disqualifies through others”

disqualifies

through himself,” is what Shmuel said the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei, and you would learn from here that Shmuel holds that the brother-in-law’s wife becomes forbidden to her brother-in-law out of concern lest people say that there was a condition in the kiddushin!?