Yevamot 95b (צה:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, Rava said:

Indeed, the lenient prohibition from which we derive the ruling is the prohibition of

a married woman,

as, if a man transgressed and had relations with her, she becomes forbidden to the husband who had forbidden her to the adulterer. And from this prohibition we derive the ruling that one who engages in relations with his wife’s sister causes his wife to become forbidden to him.

And likewise, when Ravin came

when Ravin arrived],

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

The lenient prohibition mentioned in the beraita is the prohibition of

a married woman!

a married woman!

And why does he call

the prohibition of a married woman—one who transgresses this prohibition is liable to strangulation—

a lenient prohibition

relative to the prohibition of one’s wife’s sister?

Because

the one who forbade her

to the adulterer, namely, the husband,

forbids her

to him

all his days,

the husband’s entire lifetime! For if the husband divorces her, she again becomes permitted to everyone.

Can you say this with regard to the prohibition of one’s wife’s sister, where the woman forbids her sister to her husband all her days, even if her husband divorces her?

It was taught likewise:

Indeed, we learned this in another beraita: The kal va-chomer is derived from one who engages in relations with a married woman:

Abba Ḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

The prohibition of

a married woman

is the prohibition from which we would derive the ruling for one who engages in the severe prohibition of one’s wife’s sister, were it not that the verse stated: “her”

And this is how we would derive it:

And if, in a case where one engaged

in relations with

a married woman, which is

a lenient prohibition,

because

the one who forbade her does not forbid her all his days,

but only until he divorces her,

the one who forbade her becomes forbidden—

the one who causes the prohibition becomes forbidden—

One who engages in relations with

his wife’s sister, which is

a severe prohibition, since

she

is forbidden by the one who forbade her all his days,

even if he divorces her—

is it not logical that the one who forbade her becomes forbidden!

And in order that we should not forbid his wife to him when he engages in relations with her sister—

the verse states: “her.”

“Her”—

his wife who deviated and had relations with another man—

her relations render her forbidden

to her husband,

but the relations of her sister

with her husband

do not render her forbidden

to her husband.

We learned in our Mishna: If a man’s wife went overseas, and people came and told him, “Your wife died,” and he married her sister, and afterward his wife came, she is permitted to return to him.

Rabbi Yosei says: Anyone who disqualifies

through others disqualifies through himself, and anyone who does not disqualify through others does not disqualify through himself:

Introduction to the Gemara’s first explanation of the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei:

Earlier, in the Gemara [94b], it was explained that the first tanna, who permits his wife to return to him, includes the case in which Reuven’s wife went overseas together with his brother-in-law [the husband of the sister with whom he had relations], and one witness testified concerning both his wife and his brother-in-law that they had died. On the basis of this testimony, Reuven went and married his wife’s sister, who was his brother-in-law’s wife.

The first tanna maintains that although his brother-in-law’s wife—who married Reuven in violation of the prohibition—is forbidden to her brother-in-law, in accordance with the law of a woman whose husband went overseas and one witness told her, “Your husband died,” in which case she must leave her husband, nevertheless Reuven’s wife does not become forbidden to Reuven.

For we do not say: Since the marriage to the sister was effective in rendering her forbidden to her brother-in-law, the marriage was likewise effective in rendering her sister forbidden to her husband by the prohibition of one’s wife’s sister.

In the discussion below, it is explained that Rabbi Yosei disputes the first tanna on this ruling, and maintains that the law of his brother-in-law’s wife with regard to his brother-in-law is to be equated with the law of his own wife with regard to him.

At first, the Gemara assumes that both women are permitted, and concludes that, on the contrary, both are forbidden.

The Gemara interprets the wording of the Mishna in accordance with this explanation.

The Gemara asks:

What is Rabbi Yosei saying?

If you say,

perhaps one might interpret Rabbi Yosei’s statement, “Anyone who does not disqualify through others does not disqualify through himself,” as follows: This is how Rabbi Yosei disputes the first tanna—

For the first tanna says: If

that one might explain Rabbi Yosei’s statement, “Anyone who does not cause her to become disqualified through others does not cause her to become disqualified through himself,” as follows—that Rabbi Yosei disagreed with the first Tanna—

Reuven’s wife

went

and

Reuven’s wife

and

also

his brother-in-law

the husband of Reuven’s wife’s sister

went overseas,

and one witness came and said to Reuven, “Your wife and your brother-in-law died overseas,” and Reuven went and married his brother-in-law’s wife [who was his wife’s sister, who became permitted to him with the death of her husband and of her sister, who was his wife], then:

His brother-in-law’s wife,

who married Reuven,

is forbidden

to her brother-in-law, like other women who married on the basis of one witness’s testimony and are forbidden to return to their husbands when their husbands subsequently appear.

And

if

Reuven’s wife,

Reuven’s wife,

is permitted

she is permitted] to Reuven, since his relations with his wife’s sister do not render his wife forbidden to him.

And Rabbi Yosei said to him

the first tanna: There is no distinction between the law of his brother-in-law’s wife with regard to his brother-in-law and the law of Reuven’s wife with regard to Reuven—

Rather,

just as his wife

Reuven’s wife

is permitted

to Reuven, since the sister’s relations do not render her forbidden, so too

his brother-in-law’s wife is permitted

to her brother-in-law. Her case is not like that of other women who become forbidden to their husbands if they mistakenly married another man.

And this is what Rabbi Yosei said: Anyone who does not [Reuven] disqualify [through his relations with the woman with whom he had relations] through others [with regard to his brother-in-law]—he does not [Reuven] disqualify through himself [by rendering his wife forbidden to him]!

This cannot be the interpretation. For:

If so,

if this is what is meant, how did the tanna formulate Rabbi Yosei’s statement:

“Anyone who does not disqualify through others—

does not disqualify through himself”?!

But

“anyone who does not

Reuven

disqualify through himself,”

since his wife does not become forbidden to him, should likewise mean:

he does not disqualify

Reuven

through others”

meaning that Reuven’s relations with his brother-in-law’s wife do not render her forbidden to her brother-in-law]—

it is obvious

that the tanna should have formulated it that way!?

Rather,

in another way Rabbi Yosei equated the law of his brother-in-law’s wife with regard to his brother-in-law to the law of Reuven’s wife with regard to Reuven, and Rabbi Yosei came to be stringent against the ruling of the first tanna.

And this is how you should interpret what we learned: “Anyone who disqualifies through others disqualifies through himself”:

Just as his brother-in-law’s wife is forbidden,

just as his brother-in-law’s wife is forbidden to her brother-in-law because of her marriage to Reuven, which was forbidden—so too

his wife,

Reuven’s wife,

is likewise forbidden

to Reuven.

For we say: Since Reuven’s marriage was effective in rendering the woman forbidden to her brother-in-law, this marriage was effective in rendering Reuven’s wife forbidden to Reuven.

And this is what we learned: “Anyone who disqualifies [Reuven] through others”—when his marriage and relations render his brother-in-law’s wife forbidden to her brother-in-law—“disqualifies through himself,” since his own wife also becomes forbidden to him.

But this interpretation does not explain all of Rabbi Yosei’s statement—

Granted,

indeed, according to this interpretation it is understandable what Rabbi Yosei said:

“Anyone who disqualifies

through others disqualifies through himself.”

But with regard to what Rabbi Yosei said:

“Anyone who does not disqualify

through others does not disqualify through himself”—

what is its function,

how will you interpret it?

Rather,

said

Rabbi Ami

said: The two clauses in Rabbi Yosei’s statement

refer to the opening clause

of the Mishna [the first Mishna of this chapter, which is the opening clause of our Mishna].

and she is exempt from bringing an offering

That is, our Mishna, which is the concluding clause of the previous Mishna, deals with the two cases mentioned in the opening clause, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

In one of them he disqualifies through others, and then his own wife also becomes forbidden to him; in the other he does not disqualify through others, and then his own wife does not become forbidden to him.

These two cases are the two clauses in Rabbi Yosei’s statement.

For we learned in the opening clause:

If the woman married

the woman

on the basis of the ruling of the court,

which permitted her to marry on the basis of one witness, she

must leave

both this man and that man,

and she is exempt from an offering

for her unwitting transgression, having had relations with a man other than her husband.

And if she married

on the basis of

two

witnesses,

who told her, “Your husband died,” and she did not need to rely on the ruling of a court to permit her to marry, she

must leave

the second man,

and she is liable to bring an offering,

but she is permitted to return to the first husband. Since

the authority of the court is greater—

which permitted her to marry on the basis of one witness—

in that it exempted her from an offering.

And Rabbi Yosei said to the first Tanna:

It follows, according to what was explained in the opening clause, that whether his brother-in-law’s wife is permitted to return to her brother-in-law depends on whether she married Reuven on the basis of one witness who told her, “Your husband died”; in that case she is forbidden to return to her brother-in-law, whereas if she married on the basis of two witnesses, she is permitted to return to her brother-in-law—

And the first tanna said,

the first tanna’s position is that there is a distinction only with regard to the prohibition of his brother-in-law’s wife to her brother-in-law, but:

It makes no difference

if the brother-in-law’s wife married Reuven

on the basis of witnesses

who told her, “Your husband died,”

for

then

his brother-in-law’s wife is permitted

to her brother-in-law—and

it makes no difference

if the brother-in-law’s wife married Reuven

on the basis of the ruling of the court,

which instructed her, on the basis of one witness, that she was permitted to marry since her brother-in-law had died,

for

then

his brother-in-law’s wife is forbidden

to her brother-in-law—

In either case, Reuven’s wife is permitted to return to him.

And Rabbi Yosei said to him,

the first tanna: That is not so. Rather, I maintain that the two cases are not equivalent:

If his brother-in-law’s wife married him

on the basis of the ruling of the court,

meaning on the basis of one witness,

for

then he

disqualifies

her

through others,

as his marriage renders his brother-in-law’s wife forbidden to her brother-in-law—

then he

also disqualifies

even

through himself,

and his own wife also becomes forbidden to him.

And this is what Rabbi Yosei said: Anyone who disqualifies through others disqualifies through himself.

But only when his brother-in-law’s wife married him

on the basis of witnesses, for

then he

does not disqualify through others,

since his brother-in-law’s wife does not become forbidden to her brother-in-law through this marriage—then

he does not disqualify through himself,

and his own wife is not forbidden to him.

And this is what Rabbi Yosei said: Anyone who does not disqualify through others does not disqualify through himself.

Introduction to Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa’s explanation of Rabbi Yosei’s statement and his dispute with the first tanna:

A. Earlier, in the Gemara, the reason was explained why a woman whose husband went overseas must leave the first man: it is a penalty for having married without making proper inquiries. Indeed, this is the position of the first tanna of our Mishna.

However, according to Rabbi Yosei—in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa—she is forbidden to return to the first husband when he comes from overseas for a different reason. There is concern that people, seeing that her first husband is alive and present, will not know that the second man married her because he believed that her first husband had died. Rather, people will say: The first husband divorced her, and this man then married her.

Therefore, if the woman returns to the first husband, people will say that the first husband is taking back his divorced wife after she married another man. Consequently, the Sages said that she may not return to the first husband.

B. The practical difference between the two reasons is: If Reuven’s wife and his brother-in-law went overseas, and Reuven went and married his brother-in-law’s wife on the basis of the mistaken testimony that his wife and his brother-in-law had died:

According to the first reason, she would be forbidden to return to her husband [Reuven’s brother-in-law], since she had relations with Reuven in violation of the prohibition.

According to the second reason, however, there is no basis for forbidding his brother-in-law’s wife from returning to her husband. There is no concern that people will say that the brother-in-law divorced her and that Reuven—who was her sister’s husband—married her, and that there was no mistake here, since his wife’s sister is forbidden to Reuven. How could Reuven marry her even if his brother-in-law had divorced her? Certainly, people would say that there had been a mistake concerning the deaths of Reuven’s wife and his brother-in-law,

and therefore there is no reason to forbid her from returning to her husband, since she had not in fact married another man; the marriage had resulted from a mistaken belief.

C. This applies, according to the second reason, when the brother-in-law’s wife married the man who married her sister in violation of the prohibition. But if she married the man who betrothed her sister in violation of the prohibition, then even according to the second reason the brother-in-law’s wife would be forbidden to return to him.

This is because we are concerned that people might say that the brother-in-law divorced his wife and she married Reuven, and that there was no mistake here. Although she was Reuven’s wife’s sister and therefore not permitted to him, one could still say that Reuven had stipulated a condition at the betrothal of her sister and that the condition was not fulfilled. Reuven therefore married her sister, who was not considered his wife’s sister at all; and now that he has divorced her, she is forbidden to her brother-in-law because she is one who returns to her husband after having married another. Consequently, she is forbidden to return to her brother-in-law even according to the second reason.

All this applies only when she married Reuven, who had betrothed her sister, since it is indeed possible to assume that Reuven had made a condition at the betrothal of his fiancée. But when she married Reuven, who had married her sister, there is no concern that people might say that Reuven had made a condition regarding his wife’s marriage, since it is not customary to make a condition at marriage and thereby render the marital relations relations of licentiousness.

Therefore, people will understand that if she married him, it was certainly because of his mistaken belief concerning the deaths of his wife and his brother-in-law, and that the first husband is not taking back his divorced wife after she married another man.

D. According to Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei dispute one another on two matters:

The first is the reason for the prohibition against a woman who married on the basis of one witness returning to her husband, as explained in section A.

The second is that Rabbi Yosei maintains that if Reuven’s marriage was effective in rendering his brother-in-law’s wife forbidden to her brother-in-law, then, consequently, her marriage was also effective in rendering Reuven’s wife forbidden to Reuven. This is unlike the position of the first tanna, who distinguishes between the two cases. In this matter, Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa agrees with Rabbi Ami’s explanation of their dispute.

Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa said:

This is how Rabbi Yosei’s two statements are to be understood:

It is always referring to the latter clause,

and Rabbi Yosei is speaking only of one witness. This is how Rabbi Yosei’s words are to be understood:

This

that Rabbi Yosei said: “Anyone who does not disqualify through others does not disqualify through himself”—is referring to a case such as

where “his wife”

of Reuven

and his brother-in-law

went overseas, and one witness came and said to Reuven: “Your wife and your brother-in-law have died.” Reuven then went and married his wife’s sister, who was the wife of his brother-in-law, as will be explained.

And that

which Rabbi Yosei said: “Anyone who disqualifies through others disqualifies through himself”—is referring to a case such as

where “his betrothed”

of Reuven

and his brother-in-law

went overseas, and one witness came and said to Reuven: “Your betrothed and your brother-in-law have died.” Reuven then went and married his betrothed’s sister, who was the wife of his brother-in-law, as will be explained.

And this is the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei:

And the first tanna says:

It makes no difference

whether

the wife

of Reuven

and his brother-in-law went overseas.

And it likewise makes no difference

whether

the betrothed

of Reuven

and his brother-in-law went overseas.

In either case:

His brother-in-law’s wife

of Reuven

is forbidden

to her brother-in-law, since she was not careful and married Reuven; and the Sages penalized her by forbidding her to her husband.

And

if

his wife

of Reuven—

is permitted [

that is, she is permitted to Reuven, because his intercourse with her sister does not forbid his wife to him.

And Rabbi Yosei said to him

to the first tanna:

Not as you said. Rather, there is a distinction between the case in which Reuven’s wife and his brother-in-law went overseas, in which case Reuven’s brother-in-law’s wife is not forbidden to her brother-in-law, and consequently Reuven’s wife is not forbidden to Reuven,

and the case in which Reuven’s betrothed and his brother-in-law went overseas, in which case his brother-in-law’s wife becomes forbidden to her brother-in-law, and consequently Reuven’s wife also becomes forbidden to Reuven.

And this is because I maintain that:

a. The reason that any woman is forbidden to her husband when he returns alive from overseas is not as a penalty. Rather, it is because people might say: “The first husband divorced her and the second married her,” and if the first husband takes her back, people will say that he is taking back his divorced wife after she married another man.

b. If Reuven’s marriage succeeded in forbidding his brother-in-law’s wife to her brother-in-law, then Reuven’s first wife is likewise forbidden to him by virtue of the prohibition against a wife’s sister.

Therefore, I do not concede that Reuven’s wife is permitted to Reuven, except when

his wife and his brother-in-law

went overseas and he married his wife’s sister. In that case, there is no concern that people will say that the brother-in-law divorced her and Reuven married her, because his wife’s sister is forbidden to him. People will know that Reuven married his brother-in-law’s wife by mistake, because they misled him concerning the deaths of his wife and his brother-in-law; and therefore the brother-in-law’s wife is permitted to return to her husband—

And there is likewise no concern that people will in fact say that the brother-in-law divorced her and Reuven married her, and that, since she is Reuven’s wife’s sister and therefore forbidden to him, perhaps Reuven had stipulated a condition concerning his wife that was not fulfilled, so that she is not his wife’s sister, and Reuven therefore married her sister—

You need not be concerned about this either,

for

there

is no basis for saying that he had made a condition at the time of the marriage [

because people do not customarily make a condition at marriage that would render their intercourse intercourse with a promiscuous woman].

It follows

that he does not disqualify—

Reuven, who married her—

through another.

That is, he does not forbid his brother-in-law’s wife to her brother-in-law, since there is no concern that people will say that one divorced her and the other married her, and that the former is consequently taking back his divorced wife after she married another.

Therefore, he

also does not disqualify through himself,

and his marriage to his wife’s sister does not forbid his own wife to him.

But if

his betrothed

of Reuven

and his brother-in-law

went overseas, and Reuven married the sister of his “betrothed,” there is concern that people will say that one divorced her and the other married her. For although she is his betrothed’s sister and is therefore forbidden to him, nevertheless, since

there is basis for saying that he had made a condition at the time of the betrothal

that was not fulfilled, and the woman he is marrying is therefore not his betrothed’s sister, there is once again concern that people will indeed say that one divorced her and the other married her—

And

it follows that he

does disqualify

through others,

that is, his brother-in-law’s wife becomes forbidden to her brother-in-law because of the concern that people will say that the former is taking back his divorced wife after she married another.

Therefore, he

also disqualifies through himself.

That is, his wife becomes forbidden to him because she is his wife’s sister. Since Reuven’s marriage succeeded in forbidding his brother-in-law’s wife to her brother-in-law, the marriage also succeeded in establishing her status as Reuven’s wife; and his first wife is consequently his wife’s sister and is forbidden to him.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei!

An introduction to explaining Rav Yosef’s question:

It might have entered our minds that his intention was to say that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei according to Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa’s interpretation, namely:

a. The reason that a woman whose husband went overseas and whom she married on the basis of the testimony of one witness is forbidden to return to her husband is that people might say: “The first husband divorced her and the second married her,” and that the former is consequently taking back his divorced wife after she married another.

b. Even when a woman whose husband went overseas married a man to whom she is forbidden as a wife’s sister—so that one cannot say that the first man betrothed her and the second divorced her, since she is forbidden to him—nevertheless, if there is room to attribute the matter to a condition he made at the kiddushin, such as when the woman married the man who had betrothed her sister but had not married her, she is forbidden to return to her husband. For perhaps people will say: “The first man divorced her and the second married her,” because he had made a condition at her kiddushin and she was suitable for him; and the first husband is consequently taking back his divorced wife.

c. According to this rationale, if Shimon’s wife married her husband’s brother, who believed that Shimon had died, and he performed yibbum with her, and Shimon then returned from overseas, she is permitted to return to her husband. There is no concern that people will say: “Shimon divorced her and Reuven married her,” so that if Shimon takes her back he will be taking back his divorced wife after she married another,

For people will certainly know that Reuven married her because of a mistake concerning Shimon’s death, and not because of a divorce, since Reuven is forbidden to take his brother Shimon’s divorced wife. Since he married her by mistake, she can return to Shimon, her husband.

c. However, if Shimon betrothed a woman but did not marry her, and Shimon went overseas, and Reuven married her because he was misled concerning the death of his brother Shimon, she may not return to Shimon, her husband. For there is concern that people will say: “Reuven was not misled concerning his brother’s death. Rather, Shimon had made a condition at the kiddushin of his betrothed that was not fulfilled, and she was not his betrothed; therefore his brother Reuven married her.” And if the woman returns to Shimon, people will say that he is marrying Reuven’s divorced wife, his brother’s wife, which is forbidden to him.

Rav Yosef raised an objection to him: Did Shmuel really say this,

that we are concerned that people might say: “He had made a condition at the kiddushin”?!

And it was stated: A yevama—

Rav said: She has the status of a married woman.

And Shmuel said: She does not have the status of a married woman,

and the Gemara proceeds to explain their dispute.

And

he explained

Rav Huna

their dispute:

For example, when

Shimon,

the brother

of Reuven,

betrothed the woman

but did not marry her,

and went away

Shimon

overseas, and Reuven heard

that

his brother Shimon had died, and

Reuven

arose

and

married [

performed yibbum with]

his wife

of Shimon.

Both Rav and Shmuel maintain that the reason a woman whose husband went overseas is forbidden to return to her husband is that people might say: “The former divorced her and the latter married her,” and he is consequently taking back his divorced wife after she married another, or something similar.

For Rav said: She has the status of a married woman

who married another man and is forbidden to return to her husband—

and

this woman too

is forbidden

to

return

to Shimon, her first husband, who is the

yevamer

of Reuven.

Rav’s reasoning is as follows: Perhaps people will say that Shimon had made a condition at the kiddushin of the woman that was not fulfilled, and therefore his brother Reuven married her. If Shimon takes her back, it follows that he is marrying his brother’s divorced wife. [But if she had been married to Shimon, she would be permitted to return to him, because people do not attribute a condition to a marriage. As for the concern that people might say that Shimon divorced her and Reuven married her, with the result that Shimon would be marrying his brother’s divorced wife, there is no such concern, since she would be forbidden to Reuven if Shimon had divorced her rather than died].

And Shmuel said: She does not have the status of a married woman

who married another man,

and she is permitted to him

to Shimon, her husband—

Shmuel’s reasoning is that he is not concerned that people will say that Shimon had made a condition at the kiddushin of his wife, because this is an uncommon matter, and people will not attribute the case to it.

All the more so, there is no concern that people will say that Shimon divorced her and Reuven married her, with the result that Shimon would be marrying his brother’s divorced wife, since she would be forbidden to Reuven by Shimon’s divorce. She was permitted to him only because his brother died, and therefore she is permitted to return to Shimon.

We have thus learned from Shmuel’s position that we are not concerned that people will attribute the matter to a condition—

If so, even when Reuven’s betrothed and his brother-in-law went overseas, and Reuven then married his brother-in-law’s wife, the sister of his betrothed, we should have permitted the brother-in-law’s wife to return to her brother-in-law. Everyone would know that Reuven married her by mistake, since she is forbidden to him. We should not have been concerned that people would say: “Reuven’s kiddushin with her sister was subject to a condition that was not fulfilled, and therefore Reuven married his betrothed’s sister.” If her brother-in-law takes her back, it would follow that he is taking back his divorced wife after she married another.

If so, this is difficult: How could Shmuel have said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, according to Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa’s interpretation, which forbids the brother-in-law’s wife to return to her brother-in-law when she married Reuven, who had betrothed her sister, because people might say that he had made a condition at the kiddushin?!

He said

and answered

Abaye

to Rav Yosef, resolving the contradiction between Shmuel’s statements in two ways, which are four:

The first approach: two alternative explanations of Shmuel’s statement, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei”:

a.

From where

do you know

that when Shmuel said, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,” he was referring to Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa’s interpretation?!

Perhaps he was referring to Rabbi Ami’s interpretation?!

That is: From where do you know that Shmuel interprets Rabbi Yosei’s words as Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa does, and that it is regarding this interpretation that he said the halakha follows him?

Perhaps Shmuel interprets Rabbi Yosei’s words as Rabbi Ami does, maintaining that Rabbi Yosei did not distinguish, with regard to forbidding the brother-in-law’s wife to her brother-in-law, between whether she married the man who married her sister and whether she married the man who had betrothed her sister but had not married her. In either case, she is forbidden to her brother-in-law.

And if Shmuel indeed interprets Rabbi Yosei’s words in accordance with Rabbi Ami, we have not found that we are concerned that people might say that there was a condition at the kiddushin, and Shmuel’s statements are resolved.

b.

Alternatively, he was referring to Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa,

and even if Shmuel interprets Rabbi Yosei’s words according to Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa’s interpretation, namely:

“Anyone who disqualifies through others disqualifies through himself”—this is when Reuven’s betrothed and his brother-in-law went overseas, and because his brother-in-law’s wife became forbidden to her brother-in-law, since people would say that Reuven had made a condition concerning his betrothed, and if Shimon took her back he would consequently be taking back his divorced wife after she married another, Reuven also became forbidden to his wife.

“And anyone who does not disqualify through others does not disqualify through himself”—this is when Reuven’s wife and his brother-in-law went overseas, and his brother-in-law’s wife did not become forbidden to her brother-in-law, since there is no concern that people will say that she had been married to Reuven, as she is forbidden to him; therefore Reuven does not become forbidden to his wife.

Even so, this is not difficult, for you cannot prove from the fact that Shmuel ruled that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei that he is concerned that people might say that there was a condition at the kiddushin. For:

From where do you know that

“anyone who

disqualifies

through others” is what Shmuel was referring to when he said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, so that you can learn from this that Shmuel maintains that a brother-in-law’s wife becomes forbidden to her brother-in-law because of the concern that people might say there was a condition at the kiddushin?!