Yevamot 95a (צה.) — the Talmud in English

However,

the sister of his wife

, if the husband had intercourse with her

intentionally, his wife is not prohibited

to him

by Torah law

—

inadvertently, the Sages did not decree a prohibition concerning her.

And the Gemara explains:

And from where do we know that she is not prohibited

—that his wife is not prohibited to him when he has intercourse with her sister?

As it is taught

: It is written in the passage concerning a sota, who becomes prohibited to her husband: “And a man lies with

her

sexually.”

The verse teaches by stating “with her”:

With her

alone:

her intercourse renders her prohibited.

That is, if another man has intercourse with a married woman with her consent, she becomes prohibited to her husband.

But intercourse with her sister

by her husband

does not render her prohibited

to him.

And the verse had to teach us this, because

it could have been

said that intercourse with one’s wife’s sister renders his wife prohibited to him by means of a kal va-chomer:

For

is this not an a fortiori inference

that she should become prohibited?

If, when one has intercourse

with a woman

under

a

lenient prohibition

, namely, the prohibition of a married woman, which is considered lenient in that she can become permitted to him through a bill of divorce,

the one who causes the prohibition becomes prohibited

through his intercourse with her.

That is, the husband, who is the one who “causes” his wife to be prohibited to others, becomes prohibited to his wife after she commits adultery.

If, when one has intercourse

with a woman

under

a

severe prohibition

, such as one who has intercourse with his wife’s sister, which is a severe prohibition, as it cannot be remedied through a bill of divorce but only through the death of her sister—

is it not logical that the one who causes the prohibition becomes prohibited?

That his wife, who causes her sister to be prohibited to him, should become prohibited to him.

Rabbi Yehuda said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree concerning

one

who has intercourse with his mother-in-law, that he disqualifies his wife

to him. The Gemara will later explain the scriptural source for this.

Concerning what did they disagree

—Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel?

Concerning one who has intercourse with his wife’s sister

, whether his wife becomes prohibited to him:

As Beit Shammai say: He disqualifies

his wife through a kal va-chomer from the law of a sota.

And Beit Hillel say: He does not disqualify.

He said

that

Rabbi Yosei

disagreed with Rabbi Yehuda and said:

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree concerning one who has intercourse with his wife’s sister

—

that he does not disqualify his wife.

Concerning what did they disagree

—Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel?

Concerning one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law

, whether he renders his wife prohibited to him:

As Beit Shammai say: He disqualifies

, as the Gemara will explain below from the verse.

And Beit Hillel say: He does not disqualify.

Rabbi Yosei explains his reason for why they did not disagree concerning the sister of one’s wife, and according to everyone his wife does not become prohibited to him through intercourse with her sister:

Because initially

, before he betrothed his wife,

he was permitted with all the women in the world, and

even

she

, his wife,

was permitted with all the men in the world.

But once he

betrothed

her as his wife,

he renders her prohibited

to all men in the world],

and

she too

renders him prohibited

with regard to her relatives.

And

the prohibition that he imposed

upon his wife

is more extensive than the prohibition that

his wife imposed upon him—

He rendered her prohibited

as a wife

to all the men in the world, whereas she rendered him prohibited only with regard to her relatives.

And

, since this is so,

is it not logical

that his wife should not become prohibited if he inadvertently has intercourse with his wife’s sister?

And if he, who rendered her prohibited

as a wife

to all the men in the world

, nevertheless—

when

his wife inadvertently

had intercourse

with

one who is

prohibited to her

, for example, she married another man on the basis of two false witnesses who testified that her husband had died—she

does not become prohibited to the one to whom she is permitted

, her husband.

For the Torah said that only when “she was not seized,” meaning that she committed adultery willingly, does she become prohibited to her husband. But if “she was seized,” meaning that she was violated, she remains permitted.

If so, it is a kal va-chomer:

she

, his wife,

who rendered him prohibited

to her husband

only with regard to her relatives—

when

her husband inadvertently

had intercourse

with one prohibited to him

, and had intercourse with her sister—

is it not logical that he should not become prohibited

through this

to one permitted to him

, namely, his wife?

“And this law”

is a derivation

for an inadvertent act

alone.

For from this kal va-chomer you can derive that if he inadvertently had intercourse with his wife’s sister, his wife does not become prohibited to him.

However,

with regard to an intentional act

, if he had intercourse with his wife’s sister intentionally—

from where

do we know that his wife does not become prohibited to him?

The verse states

in the passage concerning a sota: “And a man lies with

her

sexually.”

The verse teaches that only the intercourse in which a strange man lies with “her” alone renders her prohibited—

Her intercourse

—

renders her prohibited

as a wife to her husband.

But intercourse with her sister

—

does not render her prohibited

as a wife to her husband.

Rabbi Ami said that Reish Lakish said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda

, who maintains that when one has intercourse with his mother-in-law, his wife becomes prohibited to him, although when he has intercourse with his wife’s sister his wife does not become prohibited to him?

It is

because it is written

concerning one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law:

“They shall burn him and them with fire

”.

The meaning of the verse is that his wife should also be burned.

Is the entire household to be burned?

Did the Torah say that the entire household, the righteous together with the wicked, should be burned? What sin did his wife commit if he had intercourse with her mother!?

Rather,

if it does not refer to burning, apply it to prohibition

, teaching that his wife becomes prohibited to him when he has intercourse with her mother.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda

, who says that when one has intercourse with his mother-in-law, his wife becomes prohibited to him.

There was a certain man who committed a transgression with his mother-in-law

an incident occurred in which a man had prohibited intercourse with his mother-in-law]—

Rav Yehuda brought him and flogged him

he brought him to the court and flogged him].

He said to him

, Rav Yehuda said to that man:

Were it not that Shmuel said, “The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, I would have rendered

your wife

permanently prohibited to you

if Shmuel had not ruled contrary to Rabbi Yehuda, I would have rendered your wife permanently prohibited to you].

And now the Gemara returns to explain what we learned in the beraita above:

“‘With her’—her intercourse renders her prohibited, but intercourse with her sister does not render her prohibited. It could have been said: Is this not a logical inference? If, when one has intercourse with a woman under a lenient prohibition, the one who causes the prohibition becomes prohibited, then when one has intercourse with a woman under a severe prohibition, is it not logical that the one who causes the prohibition becomes prohibited?”

And we raised a difficulty concerning this:

What

is the

prohibition

that is

lenient

—that if one violated it and had intercourse with the woman, the one who renders her prohibited becomes prohibited, and from it we derive by a kal va-chomer that when one violates the severe prohibition of a wife’s sister, the woman who rendered him prohibited to that wife should also become prohibited?

Rav Ḥisda said

: The lenient prohibition is that of one who has intercourse with

his divorced wife after she married another man

, in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yosei ben Kippur, who maintains that one is liable for her only if she married another man and had intercourse with him — for she is prohibited to him by a negative commandment.

And this is how we derive it by a kal va-chomer:

If

he has intercourse with her

, the divorced woman,

this one

another man]

renders her prohibited to him

to the first man who divorced her].

For once she married another man and had intercourse with him, it became prohibited for the first man to remarry his divorcee. It follows that the second man, who married her and had intercourse with her, is the one who “renders” the woman prohibited to the first man who divorced her.

And if, after the second man also divorced her, he remarried her and

had intercourse with her—the other one

the first husband], thereby violating the prohibition against remarrying one’s divorcee—

he renders her prohibited to this one

the second husband], because now she becomes prohibited with regard to the second husband under the prohibition against remarrying one’s divorcee after she married another man.

It is evident from here that if the one who is prohibited [the first husband] violated the lenient prohibition against remarrying his divorcee, which is only a negative commandment, he thereby renders the one who caused the prohibition [the second husband] prohibited with regard to the woman.

And it is a kal va-chomer that the same should apply if he violated the prohibition of a wife’s sister, which is a severe prohibition, and had intercourse with her, so that the one who caused the prohibition [his wife] should become prohibited. The Gemara refutes this kal va-chomer:

What can be said concerning one who remarries his divorcee after she married another man

, that it is logical that even the one who caused the prohibition should become prohibited? It is because:

That very

body

body

the divorcee]

became defiled —the one whom we seek to prohibit to the one who caused the prohibition. Can you say the same with regard to a wife’s sister, where you seek to prohibit a woman who did not become defiled at all? Rather, it was her sister who became defiled.

Moreover, although the prohibition against remarrying one’s divorcee is more lenient than the prohibition of a wife’s sister, the former being a negative commandment while the latter is punishable by karet, the prohibition against remarrying one’s divorcee nevertheless possesses another stringency:

And its prohibition

—the prohibition of the divorcee to the man who divorced her after she married another man—is

permanent

, with no possibility of dispensation. Can you say the same of the prohibition of a wife’s sister, which becomes permitted after the death of his wife?

Rather

, in light of this difficulty,

Reish Lakish said

that the “lenient prohibition” must be explained differently:

The “lenient prohibition” from which we derive that if the one who is prohibited violates it and has intercourse with the woman who is prohibited to him, the one who rendered her prohibited to him also becomes prohibited, is the prohibition of a

yevama

, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

And the Gemara explains: From which prohibited intercourse involving a yevama do we derive this?

To whom

, meaning, with whom did the yevama have prohibited intercourse and thereby become prohibited to the one who caused her prohibition?

If you say

that perhaps the yevama—who is subject to yibbum or ḥalitza—had intercourse

with another

an unrelated man], and this is a lenient prohibition that is merely a negative commandment, then this is how we would derive it:

If one violates the prohibition against a yevama marrying an outsider and has intercourse with her, the law is that the yavam, who renders the woman prohibited to that other man, becomes prohibited to her,

as Rav Hamnuna said: For Rav Hamnuna said: A woman awaiting levirate marriage who commits adultery is prohibited to her yavam.

It would follow by a kal va-chomer that if a man violated the prohibition of a wife’s sister and had intercourse with her, his wife—who renders her sister prohibited to him—should also become prohibited.

This cannot be the explanation:

For

what can be said concerning a yevama, since

that very

body

that you seek to prohibit to the yavam, namely, the yevama, became defiled.

Can you say the same with regard to a wife’s sister, where you seek to prohibit his wife to him even though she did not become defiled?

Moreover, the prohibition against a yevama marrying an outsider has a stringency over the prohibition of a wife’s sister:

And its prohibition

—the prohibition of a yevama to an outsider—is

widespread

throughout the world [meaning, it applies to most people]. Can you say the same with regard to a wife’s sister, who is prohibited only to her sister’s husband?

Rather, it is from a

from a

yevama

who has intercourse

with the brothers

in violation of the prohibition that we derive the lenient prohibition, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

And this is how we derive it: If

this one performed a ma’amar with her

, meaning, if one of the brothers performed ma’amar—an acquisition with money or a document, which effects acquisition only by rabbinic law—with his yevama, then

he renders her prohibited to this one

, meaning, he prohibits her to all the other brothers through the lenient rabbinic prohibition of an “aḥot ish,” a brother’s wife.

It follows that the brother who performed ma’amar is the one who “renders” the woman prohibited to his other brothers.

And if

the other one had intercourse with her

one of the other brothers], thereby acquiring her through a complete Torah acquisition, the brother who had intercourse with her then

renders her prohibited to this one

the brother who performed ma’amar], since the one who had intercourse with her acquired her through intercourse, which effects a Torah acquisition with regard to a yevama. Thus, with respect to all the brothers, including the one who performed ma’amar, the yevama is a brother’s wife by Torah law and is prohibited to them.

It is evident that since the brother who had intercourse with her violated the lenient rabbinic prohibition of a brother’s wife, the woman again became prohibited to the one who had caused her prohibition, namely, the brother who performed ma’amar.

And it follows by a kal va-chomer that the same should be said with regard to a wife’s sister.

The Gemara challenges this explanation by means of a kal va-chomer: If so,

why does the beraita specifically say: “when the second had intercourse with her,”

why does the beraita say “who violated a lesser prohibition,” implying that the one who had caused the prohibition becomes prohibited only through intercourse—

and yet in this case, when one of the brothers performed maamar, the one who caused the prohibition [that is, the one who performed maamar] would become prohibited

even

if

one of the brothers performed an act with her

[one of the brothers did with her]

also maamar

after the first brother’s maamar!

In this case as well, the one who caused the prohibition would become prohibited, since just as the yevama is rabbinically acquired by the first one who performed maamar, so too she is rabbinically acquired by the second one who performed maamar. She consequently becomes prohibited to the first one who performed maamar, by rabbinic law, as the wife of a brother!?

The Gemara resolves the kal va-chomer from the case of a yevama who became prohibited to the brothers through maamar:

This is not difficult—

Since this beraita

is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel,

it

who says: no

is effective

the maamar

of one brother among the brothers

after

another brother has already performed

maamar

.

It follows that if one of the brothers had not had intercourse with her, the yevama would not have become prohibited to the first brother who performed maamar.

The Gemara again challenges the kal va-chomer:

Rather,

this is how we must challenge it:

Why does the beraita say “who violated a lesser prohibition,” when

even

if the second did not have intercourse with her after the first one’s maamar, but instead

gave her a bill of divorce, or even performed halitza with her,

in this case too the yevama would become prohibited to the one who performed maamar. Since the maamar did not sever the bond of zikah, the bill of divorce or halitza of one of the brothers is effective in prohibiting her to all the other brothers, including the one who performed maamar.

Rather, Rabbi Yohanan said

to explain the nature of the “lesser prohibition” that we learned in the beraita: A lesser prohibition is the prohibition of

a sotah

whose husband warned her against seclusion with a particular man and she then secluded herself with him, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

The Gemara explains which prohibition associated with a sotah was violated by the one who violated it, as a result of which the man whom she had caused to become prohibited to him becomes prohibited to her:

A sotah—

to whom?

Who is the man with whom the sotah had intercourse, thereby causing her to become prohibited to the one who had prohibited her to him?

If you say

that the derivation is from a sotah who had intercourse

with her husband

after he warned her and she secluded herself with the man, in which case he is subject to a prohibition derived from a positive mitzva with regard to her until he gives her the sotah waters to drink and she is found to be pure. For the Torah says in the passage concerning a sotah: “She became defiled,” and the Sages interpret this to mean that she is defiled with regard to her husband, so that the husband is prohibited to his sotah wife.

And this is what we would learn: The man who had intercourse with her is the one who “prohibits” the sotah to her husband. And if the husband violated the prohibition and

had intercourse with her,

then

he would prohibit her to the man who had intercourse with her,

since the man who had intercourse with her is prohibited to a sotah who secluded herself with him [even if her husband divorces her or dies, so that she is no longer a married woman].

We would therefore learn that if the husband violated the lesser prohibition of “she became defiled,” the man who had intercourse with her—the one who “prohibited” her—thereby becomes prohibited to the woman, and we should say the same with regard to a man’s wife’s sister.

This cannot be said:

For

why does the verse specifically say, “had intercourse with her,”

“her husband”? This implies that only once the husband violated the prohibition and had intercourse with her does the sotah become prohibited to the man who caused the prohibition.

But the prohibition of a sotah with regard to both her husband and the man who had intercourse with her applies

even

if her husband did not have intercourse with her, but instead

the husband gave her

the husband

a bill of divorce,

and she is already no longer a married woman; nevertheless, she remains prohibited to the man who had intercourse with her, since she became prohibited to him from the time of her seclusion.

For the Torah says “she became defiled” twice with regard to a sotah who secluded herself, and the Sages explained that one mention comes to prohibit her to her husband after warning and seclusion, while the other comes to prohibit her to the man who had intercourse with her—

And even

if only

the husband said

the husband

“I will not give her the sotah waters to drink,”

the sotah has already become prohibited to the man who had intercourse with her!?

Rather,

the derivation is from

a sotah

who had intercourse

with the man who had intercourse with her.

That is, from a married woman who strayed and had intercourse with a strange man, we learn from there that the one who caused the prohibition becomes prohibited through this intercourse. For the husband is the one who prohibited his wife to the man who had intercourse with her, and once she has intercourse with that man, she becomes prohibited to the one who caused the prohibition—to her husband.

The Gemara is astonished at this explanation: Is

this—

a married woman who had intercourse with the man who had intercourse with her—

a lesser prohibition?

For

it is a severe prohibition, namely

the prohibition of

a married woman,

which is punishable by strangulation and is even more severe than the prohibition of a man’s wife’s sister, which is punishable only by karet. How, then, can we explain the beraita in this manner, when it speaks of one who violated a lesser prohibition and thereby caused the one who caused the prohibition to become prohibited!?