Yevamot 94b (צד:) — the Talmud in English

Behold, his wife is

permitted to return

to him

as at first.

For a woman renders her sister forbidden only if she was married, but one who has intercourse with a woman does not thereby render her sister forbidden to him. And as for the sister of this woman, although she “married” him while she was in a distant land, the kiddushin did not take effect, since it became clear that his wife was still alive; and kiddushin does not take effect with the sister of one’s wife, who is among those liable for karet.

And our Mishna teaches us that intercourse with his wife’s sister, even though forbidden, does not render his wife forbidden to him, because one might have thought that she should become forbidden by means of a kal va-chomer from a sota, who is forbidden to her husband, as explained below, on 95a.

And he is permitted

even

to

the other

relatives of the second woman.

For example, her daughter and her mother [and they are not forbidden as “his wife’s daughter” or as “his mother-in-law”], since she was not his wife; she was merely with him in licentious intercourse. And we learned below: “One may marry the relatives of a woman who was raped or seduced,” meaning her relatives.

And

so his

second wife is permitted to his relatives.

For example, his son and his father; they are not forbidden to her as “her husband’s father” or as “her son’s wife,” since all these prohibitions apply only through marriage and not through licentious intercourse.

And if she died,

his

first wife—

then he is

permitted to the second,

like any wife’s sister, who becomes permitted after the woman’s death.

And if

they told him that his wife had died, and he married her sister,

and she gave birth,

and afterward they told him that she had been alive

at the time when he married her sister, and she had therefore been forbidden to him by karet, as is the law concerning “a wife’s sister,”

and

now she has already

died.

Then

the first child,

who was born before his wife died, is

a mamzer,

for he was born from “a wife’s sister,” who is among those liable for karet.

But

if

the latter,

who was born after his wife died,

there is no mamzer.

Rabbi Yosei says: Whatever renders a woman disqualified through others—

that is

disqualified

also

through herself; and whatever does not render a woman disqualified through others does not render her disqualified through herself,

and the words of Rabbi Yosei will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If a man’s wife went to a distant land, people came and told him, “Your wife has died,” and he married her sister, and afterward his wife came, she is permitted to return to him:

The Gemara infers: It indicates that we permit his wife to return to him,

even though

[they] went to a distant land,

his wife and his brother-in-law,

the husband of the sister whom he had now married,

to a distant land,

and one witness testified to the deaths of both of them, and then his wife and his brother-in-law returned.

That these marriages were effective—

that is, that he married his wife’s sister, who was the wife of his brother-in-law—

so that his brother-in-law’s wife becomes forbidden to her brother-in-law [that is, the marriage by which his brother-in-law’s wife was married to him in violation was effective in rendering her forbidden to her brother-in-law, for we learned: “She must leave both this one and that one”]—

? The marriages that took place when he married his brother-in-law's wife unlawfully were effective in rendering her forbidden to her brother-in-law, as we learned: “She must leave both this man and that man.”

And

even so, his brother-in-law’s wife is forbidden [forbidden to his brother-in-law] because of her marriage, whereas

—forbidden to her brother-in-law—because of her marriage, whereas

his wife—

who is the sister of his second wife—

is permitted [permitted to him] and is not rendered forbidden because of her sister’s marriage.

And

we do not say: Since his brother-in-law’s wife became forbidden to her brother-in-law, his wife should likewise become forbidden to him,

that is: Since the marriage by which the woman married her wife’s sister’s husband was effective in disqualifying her from her own husband, that marriage was also effective in making her significant as the wife of her wife’s sister’s husband and in rendering her sister [his first wife] forbidden to him by virtue of the prohibition of a wife’s sister.

The Gemara further explains:

Let us say that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva:

Shall we say that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva:

For if it follows Rabbi Akiva, we should have forbidden the man who had intercourse with his wife’s sister from returning to his wife. Since, according to Rabbi Akiva’s view, he must give a bill of divorce to the sister whom he married, as will be explained,

she would become—

his first wife—

the sister of his divorced wife,

and would be forbidden by rabbinic law.

For it was taught in a beraita: With regard to all forbidden relationships that they stated—

if the women married him in error—

they do not require a bill of divorce from him, except for the wife of

a married man who married on the basis of a court ruling,

as we learned in the first Mishna: “And she requires a bill of divorce from this one and from that one.”

And Rabbi Akiva adds: Also the wife of a brother

[who has no children]

and a wife’s sister.

The Gemara assumes that Rabbi Akiva said as follows: If they told a man, “Your brother has died,” and he performed yibbum with his wife, or if they told him, “Your wife has died,” and he married her sister, and the brother or wife then came, these women require a bill of divorce from him.

And since Rabbi Akiva said that she requires a bill of divorce, she thereby becomes forbidden to him,

his wife, since

she becomes the sister of his divorced wife.

And we reject this: Our Mishna may indeed follow Rabbi Akiva, but Rabbi Akiva did not say that she requires a bill of divorce when she was “married to him,” as in our Mishna. For

was it not stated concerning this matter: Rav Giddel said that Rav Hiyya bar Yosef said that Rav said:

This “wife of a brother”—

concerning whom Rabbi Akiva said that she requires a bill of divorce from the brother who married her in error—

what are the circumstances?

For example, “his brother betrothed

first

the woman,”

but had not yet married her,

and

his brother

went to a distant land, and he heard

that

his brother had died, and he arose and married

[performed yibbum with]

his wife.

Rabbi Akiva maintains that since his brother had not married the woman but had only betrothed her, she requires a bill of divorce, since

people will say

[when they see that her first husband, his brother, has returned]: Surely this is why his brother married her, because

the first one

had a condition in his betrothal

[the brother’s wife had a condition in her betrothal] that was not fulfilled,

and this one married her properly

[and the one who married her did so lawfully].

Since the condition was not fulfilled, she is not “the wife of a brother,” and if he sends her away without a bill of divorce, people will say: A married woman is leaving without a bill of divorce.

And this case of a wife’s sister—what are its circumstances?

For example, he “betrothed” the woman

but did not marry her,

and

his wife

went to a distant land, and he heard that she had died; he arose and married her sister,

and therefore she requires a bill of divorce from him, since

people will say,

when they see his wife return: Surely

the first woman had a condition in her betrothal

that was not fulfilled,

and this one

[the one who married her sister]

married her properly;

and if she leaves without a bill of divorce, they will say: A married woman is leaving without a bill of divorce.

But

in

marriage

[when his brother married his wife, or when he married his wife and afterward married his brother’s wife or his wife’s sister],

is it possible to say that there was a condition in the marriage!?

That is: Is there concern that people might say that there was a condition in the first marriage, and that the later marriage was permitted, so that she requires a bill of divorce!?

But everyone knows that a person does not make his intercourse into licentious intercourse. When he engages in intercourse, he nullifies the condition and acts with complete intent. If so, everyone will know that these women were married now only because he thought that they were permitted to him, because his brother or his wife had died. Therefore, she does not require a bill of divorce even according to Rabbi Akiva.

And our Mishna is thereby shown to apply even according to Rabbi Akiva, since it deals with a man whose married wife went to a distant land.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana:

If it follows Rabbi Akiva,

our Mishna,

should it not also teach the case of his mother-in-law!?

Just as our Mishna taught us, with regard to one who heard that his wife had died and inadvertently had intercourse with his wife’s sister, that his wife is not rendered forbidden to him, so too the tanna of our Mishna should have taught us that one who married a woman, heard that she had died, and had intercourse with her mother, and then his wife returned, does not render his wife forbidden to him because he married his mother-in-law—even though we might have derived that she should become forbidden to him by a kal va-chomer from a sota!?

For we know that Rabbi Akiva says: A mother-in-law after death is not subject to burning,

and she is permitted. Thus, when he heard that his wife had died, he married her mother permissibly, and in such a case the tanna should have taught us that his wife is not rendered forbidden to him.

For it was taught

in a beraita that Rabbi Akiva maintains that “a mother-in-law after the death of her daughter” is permitted:

It is written: “And a man who takes a woman and her mother [and afterward has relations with her mother], it is depravity; they shall burn him and them in fire.” The plain meaning of the verse is that one who marries a woman and has relations with her mother incurs the death penalty of burning—the husband, the woman, and the mother-in-law—for the verse says, “him and them.” Yet it is certainly impossible for the verse to say that the woman should be burned because her husband had relations with her mother, for “this unfortunate woman—what sin did she commit

?” Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disputed the interpretation of the verse:

“They shall burn him and them in fire

him

the husband

and one of them

the one whom he married last. Although the verse says “both of them,” it means only one of them, since in the Greek language one is called hina. Thus, it is as though the verse had said, “and one of them.” And certainly it refers to the one whom he married last

the words of Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says: “Him, and both of them.”

Abaye and Rava disputed the meaning of their dispute and the meaning of Rabbi Akiva’s words in tractate Sanhedrin, and all agree that Rabbi Akiva did not mean that the woman who did not sin should be put to death.

Abaye said: The “both of them” that Rabbi Akiva mentioned means his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother.

That is, if he had relations with his mother-in-law and with his mother-in-law’s mother, both of them are subject to burning. Rabbi Yishmael did not dispute this matter, for he too agrees with the basic law.

Rather, according to Rabbi Yishmael, the law concerning his mother-in-law’s mother is derived from another exposition, which is explained in the Gemara, Sanhedrin 76b.

It follows, according to Abaye, that Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute the law, but only the interpretation of the verse. And “the difference between them is only the significance of the exposition.”

Rava said: They disagree as follows:

Rabbi Yishmael holds that even if he had relations with his mother-in-law after her daughter had died, so that she was the only one remaining [of the two women, “a woman and her mother,”] he and she are subject to burning. For this is what the verse says: “him, and one of them”—that is, even if only one of them remains, they are subject to burning.

Rabbi Akiva holds that the verse subjects the mother-in-law to burning only if, at the time of the intercourse, her daughter—the wife of the man who had relations with her—was alive. Therefore, the verse says: “him and both of them.”

Now, an objection arises against our Mishna: If it is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, why did it not teach “his mother-in-law”?

But

granted according to Abaye, who said

only

“the difference between them is only the significance of the exposition,” for Rabbi Yishmael holds: one

of the women, the woman and her mother

is written

in the Torah, indicating that she should be burned,

whereas Rabbi Akiva holds: two are written

two women are written in the Torah as subject to burning—and these are his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother—

then

it is entirely

possible to establish our Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, since we have not heard Rabbi Akiva say that the mother-in-law is permitted after the death of the daughter, the wife.

But according to Rava, who said,

the liability

for his mother-in-law after the death

of her daughter

is the difference between them,

between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva, and according to Rabbi Akiva one is not liable for the mother-in-law if his wife died at the time of the intercourse—

if so, an objection arises: If our Mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

let it also teach

in our Mishna

“his mother-in-law”!

Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi:

Even if it is so that

the verse excluded her from burning, did the verse exclude her from the prohibition

as well!?

That is: Even according to Rabbi Akiva, in accordance with Rava, the verse excluded only the burning of the mother-in-law and the man who had relations with her if her daughter was not alive at the time of the intercourse. Nevertheless, the mother-in-law remains forbidden even after her daughter’s death by virtue of another verse, as it is stated: “Cursed is he who lies with his mother-in-law.” In that verse, the Torah did not exclude one’s mother-in-law after death.

Since, in any event, the mother-in-law remains forbidden even after her daughter’s death, our Mishna’s law can apply only to the wife’s sister and not to the mother-in-law. It is therefore entirely possible to say that our Mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.

Here the Gemara returns to the main subject of our Mishna, in which we learned: If they came and told her, “Your wife has died,” and he married her sister, she is permitted to return to him. And we raise an objection:

Should

his first wife

become forbidden because of intercourse with her sister, just as is the case with a woman whose husband went overseas!?

Just as in the case of a woman whose husband went overseas, and she went and married another man, she becomes forbidden to her first husband because of her intercourse with the second man, despite the fact that she acted unwittingly, so too we should say that if his wife went overseas and he had relations with her sister, his first wife should become forbidden to him because of his intercourse with the other woman!?

And we answer:

It is not comparable,

because:

His wife, if she

committed adultery

intentionally, is forbidden

to her husband

by Torah law.

Therefore, when she committed adultery

unwittingly,

as, for example, when she heard that her husband had died—when, according to the basic law, she does not become forbidden because she acted under duress—

the Sages instituted a decree concerning her.