Yevamot 94b — the Talmud in English

Behold, his wife

is permitted to return ![](pamud.bmp "

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to him

as at first.

For a woman does not render her sister forbidden to him unless she was married, but one who has intercourse with a woman does not render her sister forbidden to him. And this one's sister, although she “married” him while she was in the overseas country, the betrothal did not take effect, since it became clear that his wife was still alive, and betrothal does not take effect with the sister of a wife, who is among those liable for karet.

And our Mishna teaches us this: that intercourse with the sister of his wife, in a forbidden manner, does not render his wife forbidden to him, since it could have been said that she should be forbidden by a kal va-chomer from a sota, who is forbidden to her husband. As explained below, 95a.

And he is permitted

even

with

the other

relatives of the second woman.

For example, her daughter and her mother [and there is no prohibition involving them on account of “his wife’s daughter” or “his mother-in-law”], since she was not his wife, but merely had illicit intercourse with him; and we learned below: “One may marry the relatives of a woman who was raped or seduced.”

And

so too his

second wife is permitted to his relatives.

For example, his son and his father; and she is not forbidden to them on account of “his father’s wife” or “his daughter-in-law,” for all these are forbidden to him only through marriage and not through illicit intercourse.

And if she died,

his

first wife—

then he is

permitted to the second,

like any sister of a wife who becomes permitted after the woman’s death.

And if

they told him that his wife had died, and he married her sister,

and she gave birth,

and afterward they told him that she had been alive

at the time when you married her sister, and she had been forbidden to you by karet, according to the law of “the sister of a wife,”

and

now she has already

died.

Behold,

the first child [

who was born before his wife died] is

a mamzer,

for he was born from “the sister of a wife,” who is among those liable for karet.

But

if

the latter [

who was born after his wife died],

is not a mamzer.

Rabbi Yose says: Anyone who disqualifies through others

is

disqualifying

even

through himself, and anyone who does not disqualify through others does not disqualify through himself,

and Rabbi Yose’s words will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “One whose wife went to the overseas country; they came and told him, ‘Your wife has died,’ and he married her sister; afterward his wife came—she is permitted to return to him”:

The Gemara infers: It implies that we permit his wife to return to him,

even though

they [went] to the overseas country,

his wife and his brother-in-law

[the husband of the sister whom he now married]

to the overseas country,

and one witness testified about the deaths of both of them, and afterward his wife and his brother-in-law came,

that these marriages were effective—

that he married his wife’s sister, who was the wife of his brother-in-law—

so that his brother-in-law’s wife became forbidden to his brother-in-law [

the marriages that he contracted, the wife of his brother-in-law having been married to him in a forbidden manner, were effective in rendering her forbidden to her brother-in-law, for we learned: “She must leave both this one and that one”]—

And

even so, his brother-in-law’s wife is forbidden [

forbidden to her brother-in-law] because of her marriage, whereas

his wife—

who is the sister of his second wife—

is permitted [

permitted to him], and she is not rendered forbidden because of her sister’s marriage.

And we do not say: Since his brother-in-law’s wife became forbidden to his brother-in-law, his wife should become forbidden to him

—that is, since the marriage by which the woman married her sister’s husband was effective in disqualifying her from her own husband, this marriage was also effective in making her significant as her sister’s husband’s wife and in rendering her sister [who was his first wife] forbidden to him by virtue of the sister of a wife.

The Gemara further explains:

Let us say that our Mishna is not according to Rabbi Akiva:

For if it is Rabbi Akiva,

we should have forbidden the man who had intercourse with his wife’s sister to return his wife, because since according to Rabbi Akiva he must give a divorce to the sister of his wife whom he married, as will be explained, then

she becomes—

his first wife—

the sister of his divorced wife,

and is forbidden by rabbinic law.

For it was taught: All forbidden relations concerning whom they said—

if they married him in error—

do not require a divorce from him, except for the wife of

a married man who married on the basis of a court’s ruling,

as we learned in the first Mishna: “And she requires a divorce from this one and from that one.”

And Rabbi Akiva adds: Even the wife of a brother [

who has no children]

and the sister of a wife.

The Gemara assumes that Rabbi Akiva said as follows: If they told him, “His brother died,” and he performed yibbum with his wife, or if they told him, “Your wife died,” and he married her sister, and his brother and his wife came, these women require a divorce from him.

And since Rabbi Akiva said: She requires a divorce, she thereby became forbidden to him

—his wife, since

she becomes the sister of his divorced wife.

And we reject this: In truth, our Mishna can be according to Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Akiva did not say that she requires a divorce when his wife was “married to him,” as in our Mishna, for

was it not stated concerning it: Rav Giddel said that Rav Hiyya bar Yosef said that Rav said:

This “wife of a brother”

—of whom Rabbi Akiva said that she requires a divorce from the brother who married her in error—

what are the circumstances?

For example, “his brother betrothed

first

the woman

but had not yet married her,

and

his brother

went to the overseas country, and he heard

that he

had died, and he arose and married [

performed yibbum with]

his wife.

And Rabbi Akiva holds that since his brother had not married his wife but only betrothed her, she requires a divorce, since

people will say [

the public will say] when they see her first husband, his brother, return: Surely this is why his brother married her, because

this first one—

he had a condition in the betrothal [

the brother’s wife had a condition in her betrothal] that was not fulfilled,

and this one married properly [

and he who married her married her lawfully].

Since the condition was not fulfilled, she is not “the wife of a brother,” and it follows that if he sends her away without a divorce, people will say: A married woman is leaving without a divorce.

And this “sister of a wife” too—what are the circumstances?

For example, he “betrothed” a woman

but did not marry her,

and

his wife

went to the overseas country, and he heard that she had died; he arose and married her sister,

and therefore she requires a divorce from him, since

people will say

when they see his wife return: Surely

this first one had a condition in her betrothal

that was not fulfilled,

and this one [

who married her sister]

married properly,

and if she leaves without a divorce, they will say: A married woman is leaving without a divorce.

But

with

marriage [

when his brother married his wife, or when he married his wife and afterward married his brother’s wife or his wife’s sister]

is it possible to say that he had a condition in the marriage!?

That is: Is there concern that people might say that there was a condition in the first marriage, and that the later marriage was permitted, so that she requires a divorce!?

But everyone knows that a person does not make his intercourse an act of illicit intercourse, and when he has intercourse, he nullifies the condition and acts on every possibility. If so, everyone will know that these women were married now only because he thought they were permitted to him, because his brother or wife had died; therefore, she need not be required to receive a divorce even according to Rabbi Akiva.

And our Mishna is explained as dealing with one whose married wife went to the overseas country—even according to Rabbi Akiva.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana:

If it is Rabbi Akiva

that our Mishna follows,

it should also teach the case of his mother-in-law!?

Just as our Mishna taught us, regarding one who heard that his wife had died and, in error, had intercourse with his wife’s sister, that his wife is not rendered forbidden to him, so too the tanna of our Mishna should have taught us that one who married a woman, heard that she had died, and had intercourse with her mother, and then his wife returned, does not render his wife forbidden to him because he married his mother-in-law, although we should have learned that she is forbidden to him by a kal va-chomer from a sota, who becomes forbidden to her husband!?

For we have heard that Rabbi Akiva says: A mother-in-law after death is not subject to burning

and she is permitted, and it follows that when he heard that his wife had died, he married her mother permissibly; in such a case, the tanna should have taught us that his wife is not rendered forbidden to him.

For it was taught

in a beraita that Rabbi Akiva holds: “A mother-in-law after the death of her daughter” is permitted:

It is written: “And a man who takes a woman and her mother [and afterward lies with her mother]—it is depravity; they shall burn him and them with fire.” The plain meaning of the verse is that one who marries a woman and lies with her mother becomes liable to burning—the husband, the woman, and the mother-in-law—for the verse says, “him and them.” But surely it is impossible that the verse should say to burn the woman because her husband lay with her mother, for “this poor woman, what sin did she commit!?”

And Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagreed concerning the interpretation of the verse:

“They shall burn him and them with fire

him

the husband

and one of them

who was married to him last. And although the verse says “the two of them,” it means only one of them, since in the Greek language they call one hina. And it is as though the verse had said, “and one of them.” And certainly the reference is to the one whom he married last,

the words of Rabbi Ishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says: “Him, and the two of them.”

And Abaye and Rava disagreed in Tractate Sanhedrin concerning the explanation of their disagreement and the explanation of Rabbi Akiva’s words, and all agree that Rabbi Akiva does not mean that the woman who did not sin should be put to death.

Abaye said: The “two of them” that Rabbi Akiva stated means his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother.

That is, if he lay with his mother-in-law and with his mother-in-law’s mother, both of them are subject to burning. Rabbi Ishmael did not disagree concerning this matter, for he too concedes the fundamental law.

Rather, according to Rabbi Ishmael, “his mother-in-law’s mother” is learned from another exposition, which is explained in the Gemara, Sanhedrin 76b.

And according to Abaye, it follows that Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva did not disagree concerning the law, but rather concerning the interpretation of the verse. And what distinguishes them is “the meanings derived through exposition.”

Rava said: They disagree in this way:

Rabbi Ishmael holds that even if he lay with his mother-in-law after her daughter’s death, when she is the only one remaining [of the two women, “a woman and her mother”], he and she are liable to burning. For this is what the verse said: “him, and one of them.” That is, even if only one of them remains, they are liable to burning.

Rabbi Akiva holds: The verse made the mother-in-law liable to burning only if, at the time of the intercourse, her daughter, who was the offender’s wife, was alive; and therefore the verse said, “him and the two of them.”

Now an objection can be raised against our Mishna: If it is Rabbi Akiva, why did it not teach “his mother-in-law”?

And

granted according to Abaye, who said

only

“the meanings derived through exposition distinguish them,” for Rabbi Ishmael holds: one

of the women, the woman and her mother

is written

in the Torah, that they should burn her,

and Rabbi Akiva holds: two are written

two women are written in the Torah, that they should burn them; that is, his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother—

then

properly

it is possible to establish our Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, for we have not heard Rabbi Akiva permitting the mother-in-law after the death of the daughter, the wife.

But according to Rava, who said

the liability

of his mother-in-law after death

of her daughter

distinguishes them

between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva, and according to Rabbi Akiva he is not liable for the mother-in-law if his wife died at the time of the intercourse.

If so, an objection can be raised: If our Mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

let it also teach

in our Mishna—

“his mother-in-law”!?

Rav Kahana said

to Rav Ashi:

Granted that the verse excluded her from burning, from the prohibition

did the verse exclude her!?

That is: Even according to Rabbi Akiva, according to Rava, the verse excluded only the burning of the mother-in-law and the offender if her daughter was not alive at the time of the intercourse. Nevertheless, the mother-in-law remains forbidden even after her daughter’s death, by means of another verse, as it is stated: “Cursed is he who lies with his mother-in-law,” in which the verse did not exclude his mother-in-law after death.

And since, in any event, the mother-in-law is forbidden even after her daughter’s death, the law of our Mishna can no longer apply except to a wife’s sister, and not to a mother-in-law; and it is properly possible to say that our Mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.

And here the Gemara returns to the main matter of our Mishna, in which we learned: They came and told her, “Your wife has died,” and he married her sister; she is permitted to return to him. And we raise an objection:

And should

his first wife

become forbidden through the intercourse with her sister, just as is the case with a woman whose husband went overseas!?

Just as in the case of a woman whose husband went overseas, and she went and married another man, she becomes forbidden to her first husband because of the intercourse with the latter, despite the fact that she is unwitting; so too we should say that if his wife went overseas and he lay with her sister, his first wife should become forbidden to him because of his intercourse with the latter!?

And we answer:

It is not comparable,

for:

His wife, who

if she committed adultery

intentionally is forbidden

to her husband

by Torah law;

therefore, when she committed adultery

unintentionally,

such as when she heard of her husband’s death—for according to the fundamental law she does not become forbidden, since she is coerced—

the Rabbis imposed a decree upon her.