Yevamot 94a — the Talmud in English

that I hate him ![](pamud.bmp "

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that she hates him.

Perhaps she hates the one who is destined to be her yavam, and therefore she marries outside without sufficient examination.

Rav Sheshet said to them: You have learned it in our Mishna, that one witness is trusted to permit a yevama to marry outside.

in our Mishna, which establishes that one witness is deemed credible to permit a yevama to marry outside the levirate bond.

For we learned:

They said to her, “Your husband died and afterward your son died,” and she married

outside,

and afterward they said to her, “The matters were the reverse”—

she must leave, and the first child and the last child are mamzerim.

And

what are the circumstances [who is the one who testified to permit the woman, and who were the deniers]?

кто свидетельствовал, чтобы разрешить женщине выйти замуж, и кто это опровергал]?

If you say: two, two witnesses testified to permit her,

witnesses who testified that she was permitted to marry

and two witnesses testified to deny them?

witnesses testified to contradict them,

What have you seen that you rely upon these? Rely upon those [What have you seen to rely upon the deniers and forbid her, rather than upon the two who permit her to marry outside]!?

что заставляет тебя доверять опровергающим свидетелям и запретить ей выйти замуж, а не доверять двум свидетелям, разрешившим ей это]?!

And furthermore, the following difficulty arises: how did we learn, “and the child

why does the Mishna state, “And the child is

is a mamzer,” whose meaning is that he is a certain mamzer, whereas

which implies that he is certainly a mamzer, when

he is a doubtful mamzer, since according to the testimony of those who permit him he is not a mamzer, while according to the testimony of those who forbid him he is a mamzer? If so, he is a doubtful mamzer!?

According to the testimony of those who permitted her, he is not a mamzer, whereas according to the testimony of those who prohibited her, he is a mamzer; if so, he is a mamzer of uncertain status!?

And if you will say, that the

that the

tanna was not precise in the wording of our Mishna [was not exact].

не был точен в формулировке Мишны]?

But since the latter clause of our Mishna teaches:

of our Mishna:

“The first is a mamzer and the last is not a mamzer,” conclude from it that it teaches precisely.

Rather, is it not so, necessarily, that at the outset there came only

necessarily the case that initially there came only

one to permit her to marry outside, and since two witnesses denied him, they are trusted and the child is a certain mamzer?

person to permit her to marry outside the levirate bond, and since two witnesses came to contradict him, they are deemed credible and the child is certainly a mamzer?

And we learn from our Mishna that

we learn from our Mishna that

the reason is that two witnesses came and denied him, only because two witnesses came to deny the one witness do we believe them rather than the one witness.

It is only because two witnesses came to contradict the one witness that we believe them rather than the one witness.

But if it were not so, if two witnesses had not come to deny the one witness, he would be

if two witnesses had not come to contradict the one witness, he would have been

trusted; even one witness who said, “Your husband died and afterward your son died,” to permit her to marry outside—thus, one witness is trusted concerning a yevama to permit her to marry outside.

even if only one witness said, “Your husband died and afterward your son died,” to permit her to marry outside the levirate bond. Thus, one witness is deemed credible regarding a yevama to permit her to marry outside the levirate bond.

And we reject this:

actually, our Mishna is dealing with

our Mishna is discussing

two witnesses who testified to permit her,

witnesses who testified that she was permitted to marry,

and two witnesses who testified to deny them.

witnesses who testified to contradict them.

And regarding what is difficult for you—“What have you seen that you rely upon these? Rely upon those”—it is not difficult:

As Rav Aḥa bar Minyomi said, concerning conspiring witnesses—

here too, it is concerning conspiring witnesses, who disqualified the witnesses denying the witnesses permitting her, for example, they said to them, “You were with us elsewhere,” and the Torah trusted them to nullify the testimony of the first ones; and afterward the witnesses who had been declared conspiring said that the matters were reversed.

who established that the witnesses who contradicted the witnesses who permitted her were conspiring witnesses, for example, by saying to them, “You were with us at that time.” The Torah has deemed them credible to nullify the testimony of the first witnesses, and afterward the conspiring witnesses themselves said that the events had been reversed.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi—and some say

Rav Aḥa said to Rav Ashi:

Come and hear to resolve our doubt, whether one witness is trusted to permit a yevama to marry outside:

to resolve our uncertainty, whether one witness is deemed credible to permit a yevama to marry outside the levirate bond:

For we learned:

A woman is not trusted to say, “My yavam died”—

“so that I may marry,” and, “My sister died”—

“so that I may enter

in her place

into her house,” meaning, “I shall marry her husband, who had been forbidden to me until my sister died.”

that is, so that I may marry her husband, to whom she had been forbidden until her sister died.

And it is proven:

she herself, the woman alone, is

the woman herself alone, is

not trusted.

But one witness—

is trusted to say, “Your yavam died,” and you are permitted to marry outside.

to say that your yavam died, and you are permitted to marry outside the levirate bond.

And the Gemara raises an objection to this proof:

And according to your reasoning, that you infer this—

that you infer this—

say the latter clause:

A man is not trusted to say, “My brother died”—

“so that I may perform levirate marriage with his wife, and, ‘My wife died’”—

“so that I may marry her sister.”

And according to your words and your inference, we should likewise infer from the latter clause:

he himself, the husband himself, is

the husband himself, is

not trusted.

But one witness is trusted to say, “Your wife died,” and you are permitted to marry her sister.

to say: “Your wife died,” and you are permitted to marry her sister.

But this is an impossible matter.

For

granted, concerning a woman, to say to her, “Your husband died, and you are permitted to every man,” therefore the Sages were lenient to trust him, because

to say to her: “Your husband died, and you are permitted to marry anyone,” the Sages were lenient and deemed a witness credible, because

because of her being chained, the Sages were lenient with her.

but concerning a man, to say to him, “Your wife died, so that he may marry her sister”—

to say to him: “Your wife died, so that you may marry her sister”—

what is there to say!?

Rather, necessarily, one may not infer from what we learned, that a woman is not trusted to say, “My yavam died,” that she alone is not trusted, whereas a witness is trusted, as is proven from the latter clause—

necessarily, one cannot infer from what we learned—that a woman is not deemed credible to say, “My yavam has died”—that she alone is not deemed credible, whereas one witness is deemed credible, as is demonstrated by the latter clause—

In fact, even one witness is not trusted to say, “Your yavam died,” because she does not examine carefully in her hatred of her yavam. And if you will say: if so, why did the tanna teach us this law concerning a woman? It would have been preferable for him to teach us this law concerning a stranger, who likewise is not trusted. It is not difficult:

On the contrary, there is a greater novelty in the woman herself being untrusted than in a stranger.

And

when it was necessary for our Mishna to teach this novelty concerning a woman,

for our Mishna to teach us this novelty with regard to a woman—

it was necessary for Rabbi Akiva,

that

it was necessary, for according to his method there is a novelty in the fact that she too is not trusted to say, “My yavam died,” because:

for according to his view it is a novelty that she too is not deemed credible to say, “My yavam has died,” because:

It might have entered your mind to say: since Rabbi Akiva said, “There is a mamzer from those liable for prohibitions,” and according to his method, a yevama who marries outside and her yavam comes must leave both this man and that man, and all the stringencies in the first Mishna apply to her [as explained above, 91b, and in Rashi there].

and according to his view, when a yevama marries outside the levirate bond and her yavam comes, she must leave both men, and all the stringencies stated in the first Mishna apply to her [as explained above, on 91b and in Rashi there].

And if so,

say—I would say: surely this woman will not both lie and bring about her own ruin, because

that one might have thought: Surely this woman would not both lie and cause herself to suffer, because

she is concerned about the ruin

and she examines carefully [she is concerned about the ruin and examines carefully].

она опасается последствий нарушения и поэтому проверяет тщательно].

It teaches us that she too is not trusted, because there is reason to fear that she hates her yavam.

that she too is not deemed credible, because there is reason to fear that she hates her yavam.

Rava said: One witness is trusted concerning a yevama to say, “Your yavam died,” to permit her to marry outside,

to say that her yavam died, permitting her to marry outside the levirate bond,

by a kal va-chomer:

If

you permitted a prohibition punishable by excision, for you permit a woman to marry on the basis of one witness who says, “Your husband died,”

for you permit a woman to marry on the basis of one witness who says, “Your husband died,”

for a prohibition, concerning a yevama who marries outside, who transgresses the prohibition of, “The wife of the dead shall not be outside to a foreign man”—

—the yevama who marries outside the levirate bond, thereby violating the prohibition “The wife of the dead man shall not be married outside to a stranger”—

is it not

all the

more so!?

A certain

objected

to him, to Rava:

But

she,

the woman,

herself—who comes to permit herself—

who comes to permit herself—

proves that you permitted a prohibition punishable by excision, for if she says, “My husband died,” she is trusted to permit herself from the prohibition of a married woman.

for if she says, “My husband died,” she is deemed credible and is permitted from the prohibition of a married woman.

But

for a prohibition, when she says, “My yavam died,” to permit herself to marry outside,

when she says, “My yavam died,” thereby permitting herself to marry outside the levirate bond—

you did not permit her—

But rather, certainly,

certainly

she herself [she herself],

именно она сама],

why is she not trusted [why is she not trusted]—

почему ей не доверяют]?

Because

since sometimes she hates him [sometimes she hates him]—

иногда она его ненавидит], —

she does not examine carefully and marries [she does not examine carefully before marrying].

она не проверяет известие тщательно, прежде чем выйти замуж].

If so,

one witness too, since sometimes she hates him—

she does not examine carefully and marries.

We learned in the Mishna:

“This is the exposition expounded by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya”: “And a woman divorced from her husband,” and not from a man who is not her husband.

“And a woman divorced from her husband,” and not from a man who is not her husband:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

Rabbi Elazar should have expounded a pearl in it, but he expounded a potsherd in it [Rabbi Elazar should have expounded a pearl from this verse, whereas he expounded it and brought away only a potsherd]!

у раби Элазара была возможность истолковать этот стих и найти в нем жемчужину, но он истолковал его так, что добыл лишь черепок]!

And we explain:

what is the pearl, what is the pearl that Rabbi Elazar ben Matya should have found in this verse?

what is the pearl that Rabbi Elazar ben Matya should have found in this verse?

For it was taught:

It is written:

“And a woman divorced from her husband,”

to teach you:

“Even if she was divorced only from her husband” [from her husband], and was not permitted to every man—for example, he wrote her a bill of divorce and said to her, “Behold, you are divorced from me, but you are not permitted to every man”—this woman was not completely divorced, but only separated from her husband—

от своего супруга], но не получила разрешения выйти замуж за любого мужчину, например если он написал ей разводной документ и сказал ей: «Вот, ты разведена от меня, но не разрешена любому мужчине». Такая женщина не была полностью разведена, а лишь отделена от своего мужа, —

she is

disqualified from the priesthood when her husband dies—

when her husband dies—

and this is “the scent of a bill of divorce,” which disqualifies from the priesthood.

Mishna:

A man’s wife’s sister is forbidden to him by a prohibition punishable by excision as long as his wife is alive, even if he divorced her. But if his wife dies, he is permitted to her sister, for this is what the Torah said: “And a woman to her sister you shall not take as a rival, to uncover her nakedness upon her—in her lifetime.” Thus, the Torah forbade a man’s wife’s sister only during his wife’s lifetime.

If a man’s wife went to an overseas country,

and

they came and said

to him: “Your wife died,”

and her sister, who had been forbidden to you by a prohibition punishable by excision, is now permitted to you.

And

the husband went and

married her sister, on the basis of what they had told him, that she was permitted to marry him.

on the basis of what they had told him—that she was permitted to marry him.

And afterward his first wife came—

the first one—