Yevamot 93b — the Talmud in English

Rather, is it not so?

Is it not

in such a case

that Scripture came to teach you that it is permitted to tithe on what has not yet come into the world, but is destined to come, because of the enjoyment of Shabbat?

He said to him

Rabbi Yannai to Rabbi Hiyya:

But they recited to me in a dream, “a bruised reed” [

for they recited to me in a dream on this Shabbat night one verse concerning “a bruised reed” ]—

What, is it not

was this

what they were saying to me

from Heaven in the dream, that this verse should be read concerning me [II Kings 18]:

“Behold, you trust in the support of this bruised reed”—

to teach me that I did not do the correct thing.

Rabbi Hiyya said to Rabbi Yannai:

No.

Rather

this

verse [Isaiah 42]

they were saying to you:

“A bruised reed—

he shall not break; and dim flax—

he shall not extinguish.

He shall bring forth judgment according to truth,” and they taught you that the judgment you judged is true.

Rabbi—

what is it?

For it was taught:

It is written

“You shall not deliver a slave to his master.”

And with what does Scripture deal?

Rabbi says: Scripture deals with one who purchases a slave with the intention of freeing him,

to warn you that if you did so, you may not enslave him.

And the Gemara explains:

What are the circumstances?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

For example,

that he wrote for him

the master in a document for his slave, at the time when he acquired him from another master:

“When I acquire you—

behold, you yourself are acquired to yourself, from now!”

And Scripture taught you that he is freed at the time when this master acquired him from the previous master, and if such a slave fled from his second master, do not deliver him to his master who acquired him.

Rabbi Meir—

what is it?

For we learned: One who says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after I convert,”

or

“after you convert,”

or

“after I am freed,”

or

“after you are freed,”

or

“after your husband dies,”

or

“after your sisters die,”

or

“after your yavam performs ḥalitza for you”—

she is not betrothed.

Rabbi Meir says: She is betrothed,

for one who transfers ownership of something that has not yet come into the world has acquired it.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov—

what is it?

For it was taught: Moreover, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said:

A. Produce attached to the ground is not obligated in teruma, since with regard to teruma the Torah said, “the first of your grain,” implying something that can be made into a grain-heap, which is gathered into a heap, and not something attached to the ground.

Therefore, if he separated teruma from detached produce for attached produce, he separates from that which is obligated for that which is exempt, and the designation of teruma does not take effect upon the detached produce.

And if he gave it to a kohen—a member of the priestly class who served in the Temple—the produce is untithed produce in the kohen’s possession, and he may separate teruma for it from another place; all of it remains ordinary, non-sacred produce.

And likewise, the attached produce has not been rectified; rather, when it is detached, he must separate teruma for it [Rashi, Kiddushin 62a].

B. Produce becomes obligated in terumot and tithes only when it has produced a “third” of its growth, [and is detached], for it is written, “And it shall produce the grain for the three years,” and the Sages expounded: Do not read “for the three years,” but rather “for a third of its growth,” to teach you that the grain is not made and its processing is not complete until it reaches a third of its growth.

Even if he said: “The produce of this garden-bed, detached, shall be teruma for the produce of this garden-bed, attached,” [

when they produce a third and are detached, as he explains ].

Or

he said:

“The produce of this garden-bed, attached,

shall be teruma

for the produce of

this garden-bed,

detached, when they produce”—

the produce for which he is making the teruma, or the produce that he is making teruma—

a third

of its growth,

and are detached—

And they produced a third and were detached—

his words stand.

And it is demonstrated that although the teruma or the produce that he is rectifying has not yet been detached, and it follows that he cannot designate teruma upon it or rectify it now, and it is like something that has not yet come into the world, nevertheless Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that his words stand.

Rabbi Akiva—

what is it?

For we learned:

The woman who said to her husband: “By a konam prohibition

shall be the work of my hands

that I make

for you”—

he need not annul it.

Rabbi Akiva says: He must annul it, lest she produce for him

through the work of her hands

more than is proper for him

to have her do for him.

They asked Rav Sheshet: One witness

who testifies

concerning a yevama

that her husband died —

what

is the law concerning permitting her to perform yibbum on his testimony?

Is

the reason for one witness

being trusted concerning a married woman to permit her,

because people do not lie about a matter destined to become known

[people do not lie about something that will become known]?

And if so, he is also trusted with regard to yibbum, since the matter is destined to become known if her husband returns.

Or perhaps, the reason for one witness

is

because she investigates and marries

[the woman carefully verifies before she marries a man].

And

if so,

here,

with regard to yibbum,

since at times she loves him

[she sometimes loves her husband’s brother who is destined to be her yavam],

she does not investigate, and marries

him without checking, and she is not trusted.

Rav Sheshet said to them: You have learned it

we learned this matter in our Mishna, and one witness is indeed trusted:

For we learned:

They said to her, “Your son died and afterward your husband died,” and she performed yibbum, and afterward they said to her, “The order was reversed,”

the facts

were so, she must leave him, and the first and the last child are a mamzer.

But

what are the circumstances

[who initially testified concerning her to permit her to perform yibbum, and who were the deniers]?

If you say

if you say that

two

witnesses initially came and said that her son died and afterward her husband died,

and

afterward

two

other witnesses came and said that the order was reversed—

It is impossible to say this.

For if so, why must she leave him? After all,

what have you seen that you rely upon these, rely upon those

[what have you seen to rely upon the latter two who testify that her husband lived longer, rather than upon the first two who testify that her husband died]?

And since it is uncertain, we should have said that she does not leave him!

And furthermore:

How did we learn that the child is

“a mamzer,”

the meaning of which is that the child from the yavam is certainly a mamzer, when

he is a doubtful mamzer

only?

For opposite the two witnesses who testify that the son died after his father, so that the woman is not obligated in yibbum and the child born from her is a mamzer, there are two witnesses who say that the son died before the husband, so that his wife was obligated in yibbum and the child born from her is fit!?

And if you would say,

if you would say that

he was not precise

[the tanna was not precise] in his wording, and in fact he is a doubtful mamzer—

But from what it teaches in the latter clause: “The first is a mamzer, and the last is not a mamzer,”

it follows that the tanna was precise in this, and

infer from it

that also in the first clause

he teaches precisely

that the child is certainly a mamzer.

Rather, is it not so? Infer from it

that our Mishna speaks of a

single

witness who came first, and afterward two witnesses came and contradicted him, saying that the order was reversed.

And

we learn from this that

the reason is that two witnesses came

and contradicted him.

If not for this,

if two witnesses had not come to contradict the one witness, we would say that

the first witness is trusted

to permit her to the yavam.

And it is demonstrated from our Mishna that one witness is trusted concerning a yevama to permit her to perform yibbum.

And some say:

A. We learned in the Mishna below, 114b: The woman who went with her husband to an overseas country, and came and said:

“My husband died” [and she is not obligated in yibbum, for example, because he has no brother or because he has sons]—she may marry.

“My husband died” [and she is obligated in yibbum]—she may perform yibbum.

B. We further learned in the Mishna below, 118b: The woman who went with her husband to an overseas country, with her son with them, and came and said:

“My husband died and afterward my son died” [and I am permitted to marry outside, because I had a son when my husband died]—she is trusted.

For she emerged with a presumption of being permitted to marry outside, because she had a son who exempted her from yibbum. Although she herself says that her son died, and if so, perhaps he died before her husband and she is obligated in yibbum, nevertheless, “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” Since she is the one who told about her son’s death, she is trusted to say that he died after her husband. Rashi.

“My son died and afterward my husband died” [and I am obligated in yibbum, since my husband’s son died before his own death]—she is not trusted [to perform yibbum].

C. We further learned below, 118b: The woman is not trusted to say, “My yavam died,” so that she may marry.

D. The Gemara’s method in the preceding wording is that although the woman herself is trusted to say, “My husband died, and I am obligated in yibbum,” as explained in the Mishna mentioned in section B,

nevertheless the Gemara is uncertain whether one witness is not trusted concerning her, because one witness is weaker than the woman herself, since there is no reason to say that she would deliberately lie because of her love for the yavam.

But where she can rely upon a witness who says that her husband indeed died and that she is permitted to perform yibbum with him, she will no longer investigate so carefully on her own to ascertain the truthfulness of the witness’s words.

But this wording holds that it is more proper to trust an unrelated witness than to trust the woman herself.

This—

one witness concerning a yevama who testifies that her husband died so that she may perform yibbum —

you need not ask,

you need not be uncertain that he is trusted.

For

behold,

even she herself—

the woman herself—

also

is trusted

[she too is trusted], and all the more so an unrelated witness, and

as we learned:

The woman who said, “My husband died”—

and she is not obligated in yibbum, because he has no brother or has sons—behold, she may

marry.

The woman who said

“My husband died”—

and she is obligated in yibbum—behold, she may

perform yibbum.

When you ask

whether one witness is trusted

to permit

a yevama to everyone,

for example, when the witness says, “Your yavam died,” in which case she herself is not trusted [as explained in the Mishna below], nevertheless there is uncertainty whether an unrelated witness is trusted.

What is the reason that one witness

is believed regarding a married woman to permit her?

Is it

because concerning a matter destined to be revealed, he does not lie,

and

here too he does not lie.

Or perhaps the reason for one witness is because she verifies carefully and marries, but this one does not verify carefully and marry,