Yevamot 93b (צג:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, is it not so:

is it not the case that

in such a manner

the verse came to teach you that it is permitted to separate tithes from produce that has not yet come into the world but is destined to come, for the sake of the delight of Shabbat?

He said to him

Rabbi Yannai said to Rabbi Hiyya:

But they recited to me in a dream, ‘a bruised reed’ [

they recited to me in a dream on this Shabbat night a verse concerning “a bruised reed” ]—

What, is it not

is it not the case that

this is what they were saying to me

from Heaven in the dream, that this verse should be applied to me [II Kings 18]:

“Behold, you have trusted in the staff of this bruised reed”—

to teach me that I did not do the right thing.

Rabbi Hiyya said to Rabbi Yannai:

No.

Rather,

this

verse [Isaiah 42]

they were saying to you:

“A bruised reed—

he will not break; and a dimly burning wick—

he will not extinguish.

He will bring forth justice in accordance with truth”; and they taught you that the judgment you rendered is indeed true.

Rabbi—

what is his source?

As it was taught:

It is written:

“You shall not hand over a slave to his master.”

And of what does the verse speak?

Rabbi says: The verse speaks of one who purchases a slave with the intention of emancipating him,

to warn you that if you do so, you may not subjugate him.

The Gemara explains:

What are the circumstances?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

For example,

when he wrote to him

the master wrote in a document to his slave, at the time that he purchased him from another master:

“When I acquire you—

behold, you are acquired by yourself, from now!”

Therefore he must say “from now,” because he emancipates him through the document, and since he emancipates him only after a period of time, if the document is torn or lost, his acquisition has already “come to an end” at the time that the emancipation takes effect, according to the Tosafot on the first side.

The verse teaches you that he is emancipated at the moment that this master purchased him from the previous master. And if such a slave flees from his second master, do not hand him over to the master who purchased him.

Rabbi Meir—

what is his source?

As we learned: One who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after I convert,”

or

“after you convert,”

or

“after I am emancipated,”

or

“after you are emancipated,”

or

“after your husband dies,”

or

“after your sister dies,”

or

“after your yavam performs ḥalitza for you”—

she is not betrothed.

Rabbi Meir says: She is betrothed,

because one who transfers ownership of something that has not yet come into the world acquires it.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov—

what is his source?

As it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said even more:

1. Produce attached to the ground is not obligated in terumot, since the Torah says with regard to teruma, “the first of your grain,” which indicates something that can be made into a pile (diggun), meaning that it has been gathered into a heap, and not something that is attached to the ground.

Therefore, if one separated teruma from detached produce for attached produce, he has separated from produce that is obligated for produce that is exempt, and the status of teruma does not take effect upon the detached produce.

And if he gave it to a kohen, it is tevel in the possession of the kohen, and he can separate teruma for it from another place; and all of it remains non-sacred produce.

Likewise, the attached produce has not been rectified. Rather, when it is detached, one must separate teruma for it [Rashi, Kiddushin 62a].

2. Produce becomes obligated in terumot and tithes only when it has reached one-third of its growth, [and is detached], as it is written: “And the produce shall yield for the three years,” and the Sages expounded: Do not read “for the three years,” but “for one-third,” teaching you that the produce is not considered developed and its processing is not complete until it reaches one-third of its growth.

Even if he said: “The detached produce of this garden bed shall be teruma for the produce of this garden bed that is attached” [

when they reach one-third of their growth and are detached, as he explains ],

or

he said:

“The produce of this garden bed that is attached

shall be teruma

for the produce

of

this one that is detached, when they reach”—

the produce for which he is designating the teruma, or the produce that he is designating as teruma—

one-third

of its growth,

and are detached—

And they reached one-third and were detached—

his words take effect.

It follows that although the teruma, or the produce that he is rectifying, has not yet been detached, so that he cannot cause teruma to take effect upon it or rectify it now, and it is therefore like something that has not yet come into the world, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov nevertheless holds that his words take effect.

Rabbi Akiva—

what is his source?

As we learned:

A woman who said to her husband: The products of my labor shall be prohibited to you with the prohibition of a

konam,

the products of my labor

that I produce for you—

he need not annul the vow.

Rabbi Akiva says: He must annul it, lest she produce for him

through the products of her labor

more than is proper for him

to have her produce for him.

They asked Rav Sheshet: With regard to one witness

who testifies

concerning a yevama

that her husband died —

what

is the ruling as to permitting her to perform yibbum on the basis of his testimony?

Is

the reason that one witness

is trusted with regard to a married woman to permit her,

because people do not lie about a matter that will become known [

people do not lie about something that will eventually be revealed ]?

If so, he should also be trusted with regard to yibbum, since it will eventually become known if her husband returns.

Or perhaps, the reason that one witness

is trusted is

because she investigates carefully and then marries [

the woman carefully verifies the matter before marrying a man ].

And

if so,

here,

with regard to yibbum,

since at times she loves him [

at times she loves her husband’s brother, who is destined to become her yavam ],

she does not investigate and marries

him without checking, and she is not trusted.

Rav Sheshet said to them: You have learned it—

we learned this matter in our Mishna, and one witness is indeed trusted:

As we learned:

If they told her, “Your son died and afterward your husband died,” and she performed yibbum, and afterward they told her, “The order was reversed,”

the facts

were as follows, she must leave him, and the first and the last child are mamzerim.

But

what are the circumstances [

who initially testified to permit her to perform yibbum, and who were the ones who contradicted them ]?

If you say

that

two

witnesses initially came and said that her son died and afterward her husband died,

and

then

two

other witnesses came and said that the order was reversed,

it is impossible to say this.

For if so, why must she leave him?

What have you seen that you rely on these, rely on those [

what have you seen to rely on the two later witnesses, who testify that her husband outlived her son, rather than on the two first witnesses, who testify that her husband died first ]?

Since the matter is uncertain, we should say that she need not leave him!?

And furthermore:

How can we have learned that the child is

“a mamzer,”

which implies that the child born to the yavam is certainly a mamzer, when

he is only a doubtful mamzer

?

For in opposition to the two witnesses who testify that the son died after his father, so that the woman was not subject to yibbum and the child born to her is a mamzer, there are two witnesses who say that the son died before the husband, so that his wife was subject to yibbum and the child born to her is fit!?

And if you would say,

you might say that

the tanna was not precise [

he was not exact ] in his wording, and in fact the child is a doubtful mamzer—

But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: “The first is a mamzer, and the last is not a mamzer,”

it follows that the tanna was precise in this matter,

learn from it

that even in the first clause

he teaches it specifically,

that the child is certainly a mamzer.

Rather, is it not so? Learn from it

that our Mishna is speaking of a case where one

single

witness came first, and afterward two witnesses came and contradicted him, saying that the order was reversed.

And

we thereby learn that

the reason is that two witnesses came

and contradicted him.

and contradicted him. This is how it should be stated: It is specifically because two witnesses contradicted the single witness that she must leave him.

If not for this,

if two witnesses had not come to contradict the one witness, we would say that

the first witness is trusted

to permit her to the yavam.

It follows from our Mishna that one witness is trusted with regard to a yevama to permit her to perform yibbum.

And some say:

1. We learned in a Mishna below, 114b: A woman who went with her husband to a country overseas and returned and said:

“My husband died” [and she is not subject to yibbum, for example, because he has no brother or because he has children]—she may marry.

“My husband died” [and she is subject to yibbum]—she may perform yibbum.

2. We further learned in a Mishna below, 118b: A woman who went with her husband and her son to a country overseas and returned and said:

“My husband died and afterward my son died” [and I am permitted to marry outside the family, because I had a son when my husband died]—she is trusted,

because she left with a presumption that she was permitted to marry outside the family, since she had a son who exempted her from yibbum. Although she herself says that her son died, and therefore perhaps he died before her husband and she is subject to yibbum, nevertheless, “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” Since she was the one who reported the death of her son, she is trusted to say that he died after her husband. Rashi.

“My son died and afterward my husband died” [and I am subject to yibbum, since my husband’s son died before his own death]—she is not trusted [to perform yibbum].

3. We further learned below, 118b: A woman is not trusted to say, “My yavam died,” so that she may marry.

4. The Gemara’s approach in the previous formulation is that although the woman herself is trusted to say, “My husband died, and I am subject to yibbum,” as explained in the Mishna cited in section 2,

nevertheless, the Gemara is uncertain whether one witness is trusted concerning her, because one witness is inferior to the woman herself. There is no reason to say that she would deliberately lie because of her love for her yavam.

But where she can rely on a witness who says that her husband indeed died and that she is permitted to perform yibbum with him, she will no longer investigate so carefully herself to determine whether the witness’s words are truthful.

However, this formulation maintains that a stranger-witness is more readily believed than the woman herself.

That—

one witness concerning a yevama who testifies that her husband died so that she may perform yibbum —

do not ask

you need not raise the question, since it is obvious that he is trusted.

For

behold,

even she herself—

the woman herself—

also

is trusted [

she too is trusted ], and all the more so a stranger-witness;

as we learned:

A woman who said, “My husband died”—

and she is not subject to yibbum, because he has no brother or because he has children—she may

marry.

A woman who said

“My husband died”—

and she is subject to yibbum—she may

perform yibbum.

When you ask:

whether one witness is trusted

to permit

a yevama to marry outside the family,

for example, when the witness says, “Your yavam died,” in which case she herself is not trusted [as explained in the Mishna below]; nevertheless, one may raise the question whether a stranger-witness is trusted.

What is the reason that one witness

is deemed credible with regard to a married woman, to permit her?

Is it

because, concerning a matter that is destined to become known, he does not lie,

and

here too he does not lie.

Or perhaps the reason that one witness is accepted is that she investigates carefully and marries, whereas this one does not investigate carefully and marry,