Yevamot 93a (צג.) — the Talmud in English

As we learned:

A woman who said to her husband:

“The work of my hands is konam to you,”

meaning: The products of my labor that I produce shall be forbidden to you as an offering dedicated to the Temple, so that you may not derive benefit from them [konam: This is a designation for an offering, and it is an expression used in making vows]—

the husband

need not annul

the vow for her, because even without his annulling it, her vow does not take effect, since she is obligated to him with regard to the products of her labor. This is analogous to one who says to another: “Your produce shall be forbidden to you as a konam,” in which case the vow does not take effect, since the produce does not belong to the one making the vow.

Rabbi Akiva says: He must annul

it—the husband!

He may, and he must annul it, because although the woman is obligated to him with regard to the products of her labor, there is concern

perhaps she will produce more for him

than the standard amount of her labor,

more than is fittingly owed to him.

She can forbid this surplus to her husband, since she is not obligated to produce for him beyond the amount established by the Sages [as explained in tractate Ketubot].

And it is evident from here that although the woman has not yet produced anything, and the products of her labor do not yet exist in the world, she can nevertheless forbid them as a konam.

This is because, according to Rabbi Akiva, a person can transfer ownership of an entity that does not yet exist.

If so, it is impossible to interpret the Mishna, “One who betroths a woman,” as reflecting the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, since according to his view, all those women mentioned in the Mishna are betrothed, even though they are entities that do not yet exist.

And we answer:

Was it not stated concerning it: Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: It is referring to a woman who says

the woman

“Let my hands become consecrated to the One who made them,”

to the Holy One, blessed be He, who made them.

That is, she forbids her husband from deriving benefit from the products of her hands, since

hands

exist in the world

[they exist in the world], and this is not a case of transferring ownership of an entity that does not yet exist.

And once the proof that Rabbi Akiva holds that a person can transfer ownership of an entity that does not yet exist has been rejected, we can again interpret the Mishna in which we learned that betrothal does not take effect with a yevama, and that one who betroths her before she performs halitza is like one who betroths an entity that does not yet exist—as referring to Rabbi Akiva, who holds that betrothal does not take effect with a yevama.

And it disagrees with

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, who interprets Rabbi Akiva’s words according to the view that a person cannot transfer ownership of an entity that does not yet exist—

he disagrees with

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, who holds that according to Rabbi Akiva, a person can transfer ownership of an entity that does not yet exist.

For Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Rav Huna

who holds that according to Rabbi Akiva a person can transfer ownership of an entity that does not yet exist, as he proceeds to explain—

holds

like Rav,

from whom Rav Huna learned his position.

And Rav follows Rabbi Yannai, and Rabbi Yannai follows Rabbi Ḥiyya, and Rabbi Ḥiyya follows Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi follows Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Meir follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov follows Rabbi Akiva—

who said,

Rabbi Akiva,

“A person can transfer ownership of an entity that does not yet exist!”

The Gemara now explains the source for Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s statement, according to the position of all these Sages, that a person can transfer ownership of an entity that does not yet exist:

Rav Huna—

what is it?

Where do we find that he holds this way?

As it was stated: With regard to one who sells the fruit of a date palm—

which has not yet come into the world—

to another:

Rav Huna said:

The acquisition takes effect when the fruit comes into the world.

Therefore:

Before it comes into the world, he

can retract,

since the acquisition has not yet taken effect.

But

once it has come into the world,

the acquisition takes effect, and thereafter he

cannot retract.

And Rav Naḥman said: Even once it has come into the world, he can retract,

because a person cannot transfer ownership of an entity that does not yet exist, and his acquisition never took effect.

Rav Naḥman said:

Although I hold that the seller can retract even after the fruit has come into the world, nevertheless—

I concede: If the buyer seized it and ate it, he

is not compelled to return it!

I concede that if the buyer ate some of the fruit before the seller retracted, the seller cannot take from the buyer what he ate, since as long as he had not retracted, he had waived his claim to the buyer’s consumption. Although he waived it mistakenly, since he did not know that he could retract, it is nevertheless a valid waiver.

Rav—

Where do we find that he holds this way?

For Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who says to another, “This field that I am acquiring”

[that he is about to acquire]—

“When I acquire it, it is acquired by you from now” —

This one

has acquired it.

This is so even though at the time he sold the field, the field did not belong to him and he could not sell it, making this analogous to transferring ownership of an entity that does not yet exist.

Rav follows Rabbi Yannai, and

Rabbi Yannai follows Rabbi Ḥiyya—

For Rabbi Yannai had a sharecropper who would bring him a basket

a full vessel

of fruit every Friday eve

[Rabbi Yannai’s sharecropper would regularly bring Rabbi Yannai a vessel containing fruit from the field every Friday eve].

On one particular day, he was delayed and did not come

[on one of the Friday eves, the sharecropper was delayed], and there was concern that he would arrive on Shabbat, when Rabbi Yannai would be unable to separate terumot and tithes from the fruit, since tithes are not separated on Shabbat.

Rabbi Yannai took

some of his own untithed produce and

separated tithes from the produce of his household

for them.

Rabbi Yannai took some of the untithed produce in his possession and separated tithes from it on behalf of the produce of the sharecropper, which the sharecropper was going to bring him, although it was still in the sharecropper’s possession.

He came

Rabbi Yannai

before Rabbi Ḥiyya,

to ask whether his separation of tithes was effective, since this was analogous to transferring ownership of an entity that does not yet exist, as on that day he could not separate tithes from the sharecropper’s produce.

He said to him,

Rabbi Ḥiyya to Rabbi Yannai:

You acted properly,

in separating the tithes, even though this concerned an entity that does not yet exist!

Because

it was taught:

It is written: “You shall surely tithe all the produce of your seed that comes forth in the field year by year. And you shall eat before the Lord your God the tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil”—

“So that you may learn to fear the Lord

your God all the days.” “

All the days”—

these are Shabbatot and Festivals!

You are thus instructed to take care that the delight of Shabbat should not be nullified because of the rectification of untithed produce; rather, rectify it.

And

for what halakhic purpose,

for what matter did the verse come to warn you not to nullify the delight of Shabbat on account of rectifying untithed produce?

If you say it is referring to separating tithes

on Shabbat

and eating

[in order to eat], without being concerned about the prohibition against handling terumot and tithes on Shabbat—

But

was a verse needed to permit handling

that is prohibited only by rabbinic decree?

After all, the prohibition against separating terumot and tithes on a Festival is only a rabbinic shevut, analogous to the labor of “rectifying a vessel,” and the verse need not come to permit it!