Yevamot 92b (צב:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Yehuda said:

Rav said: From where is it derived that betrothal does not take effect

for a stranger

with a yevama

who has not yet undergone halitza, even according to the Rabbis, who maintain generally that betrothal takes effect with those subject to prohibitions of the Torah?

as it is stated: “The wife of the deceased shall not be married outside, to a stranger”—

The verse teaches by saying, “She shall not be,”

that there shall be no marital status

of betrothal

for

a

stranger.

And Shmuel said: In our impoverished state,

as we do not know how to interpret the verse—

she requires a bill of divorce.

The Gemara explains Shmuel’s statement:

Shmuel was uncertain

whether

this phrase, “The wife of the deceased shall not be”—

if

only

to

prohibit her with a

negative commandment—

is what it comes to teach,

that this alone is what the verse comes to teach.

If

also for the purpose

that betrothal does not take effect with her—

is what it comes to teach, as the verse says, “She shall not be.”

Rav Mari bar Rahel said to Rav Ashi: So said Ameimar: The halakha is in accordance with Shmuel,

that a yevama who married outside the yibbum framework requires a bill of divorce.

Rav Ashi said: Now that Ameimar has said

that

the halakha is in accordance with Shmuel—

If her yavam was a kohen,

and his yevama married a stranger,

and she required a bill of divorce from him, in accordance with Shmuel—then the bill of divorce renders her forbidden to the kohen yavam because she is a divorcee. And therefore,

he performs halitza with her,

the kohen, and he does not perform yibbum with her.

And she is permitted to him,

the yevama is permitted to the stranger who married her after the yavam performed halitza.

The Gemara raises an objection to this:

Has he profited!?

Indeed, the stranger gained an advantage through his transgression! For it turns out that by marrying the yevama in violation of the prohibition, the stranger gained more than he would have had if he had not married her in violation. Before he married her, the yavam could have performed yibbum with her, and she would not have married him; but now that the stranger married her and rendered her forbidden to the kohen yavam, he gained the ability to have her as his wife.

If so, we find that a sinner profits!?

Rather,

this is what Rav Ashi said:

If

the yevama

married a stranger, and

her yavam was an Israelite—

the second one gives her

the

second

one, the stranger,

a bill of divorce

against his will, as the court compels him to do so, in order that the sinner should not profit,

and she becomes permitted to him

for yibbum.

Rav Giddel said that Rav Hiyya bar Yosef said that Rav said: With regard to a yevama—

betrothal

is what

does not apply to her

with regard to a stranger, but

marriage does apply to her,

and he proceeds to explain it.

The Gemara assumes that this is what Rav said: If the yevama married a stranger, for example, witnesses told her, “Your husband died, and afterward your son died,” and you are not subject to the obligation of yibbum—she requires a bill of divorce.

And therefore the Gemara asks:

If betrothal does not apply to her,

then

marriage likewise does not apply to her!

For marriage is impossible without betrothal.

And we answer:

Say that this is what Rav said:

Betrothal and marriage do not apply to her

in the sense of requiring her to receive a bill of divorce.

And if you wish, say instead: What does ‘marriage applies to her’ mean—

through licentious relations!

That is, Rav was not speaking with regard to requiring her to receive a bill of divorce, but rather with regard to the fact that if she married a stranger, even though he had not yet engaged in intercourse with her, it is considered licentious conduct, and she becomes forbidden to her yavam.

And this halakha is in accordance with Rav Hamnuna! As Rav Hamnuna said: A yevama awaiting yibbum who engaged in licentious relations—

in accordance with Rav Hamnuna!

is forbidden to her yavam.

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, it is as we said initially,

that

betrothal does not apply to her

with regard to a yevama who marries outside the yibbum framework on the testimony of one or two witnesses—in the sense of requiring her to receive a bill of divorce.

But

marriage does apply to her

in the sense of requiring her to receive a bill of divorce, if witnesses told her, “Your husband died, and afterward your son died,” and it subsequently became clear that her son had died before her husband.

And as for the difficulty you raised—if betrothal does not apply to her, surely all the more so marriage does not apply to her—this is not difficult:

For certainly her marriage is not a fully valid marriage.

Rather, the Sages required her to receive a bill of divorce because

it becomes confused

the law of a yevama who marries outside the yibbum framework on the testimony of one witness

with

the

law of

a married woman whose husband went overseas,

and one witness came and told her, “Your husband died,” and she married on the basis of the testimony before the court, and afterward her husband came, in which case she indeed requires a bill of divorce.

And people might come to say that even a married woman does not require a bill of divorce.

Rabbi Yannai said: At a gathering

[there was a day of assembly or a meeting day for them, which they called a “gathering”]

they counted and concluded:

the Sages took a vote and reached a majority agreement:

Betrothal does not take effect with a yevama

outside the yibbum framework!

Since it is stated, “The wife of the deceased shall not be married outside, to a stranger,” and we expound: There shall be no marital status for her with a stranger!

Rabbi Yohanan said

to Rabbi Yannai:

Rabbi!

Is

this not our Mishna

that states that betrothal does not take effect with a yevama outside the yibbum framework!?

As we learned:

A. With regard to one who transfers ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world, such as the fruit of a date palm that has not yet grown, the tannaim disagree.

Some maintain that when one transfers ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world, his acquisition is an acquisition. According to the Rabbis, however, one who transfers ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world has acquired nothing.

B. And they did not disagree only about this matter. Rather, anyone who performs an act of acquisition in a manner in which the acquisition does not take effect immediately, but takes effect only later, since it is impossible for the acquisition to take effect now, is included in the category of one who transfers ownership of an “entity that has not yet come into the world.”

According to the Rabbis, it is impossible to perform an act of acquisition now so that it will take effect in the future, when the acquisition cannot take effect now. Therefore, even when the time arrives at which the acquisition could take effect, it does not take effect. And therefore—

A gentile, who cannot betroth an Israelite woman while he is still a gentile,

says to

an Israelite woman:

Behold, you are betrothed to me,

and your betrothal shall take effect

after I convert.

Or an Israelite says to a gentile woman, who is not fit to become betrothed to him while she is a gentile: “Behold, you are betrothed to me”

after you convert.

Or a Canaanite slave says to an Israelite woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me”

after I am emancipated,

and become fit for betrothal.

Or an Israelite says to a Canaanite maidservant: “Behold, you are betrothed to me”

after you are emancipated.

Or he says to a married woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me”

after your husband dies.

Or he says to his wife’s sister, who is not fit to become betrothed to him while her sister is alive: “Behold, you are betrothed to me”

after your sister dies.

Or

he says to a yevama who is subject to halitza and is not currently fit to become betrothed: “Behold, you are betrothed to me”

after your yavam performs halitza with you.

Each and every one of these women

is not betrothed,

for this is like transferring ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world, and in accordance with the Rabbis, who maintain that one who transfers ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world acquires nothing.

It is therefore evident from the Mishna that betrothal does not take effect with a yevama, and consequently one who says to a yevama subject to halitza, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after your yavam performs halitza with you,” has not betrothed her.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yannai to Rabbi Yohanan:

Had I not lifted a potsherd for you,

if I had not raised a potsherd for you from the bottom of the sea [Rabbeinu Tam]—

would you have found the pearl beneath it!?

Would you have found on your own the pearl lying beneath it?

That is, had I not revealed to you that betrothal does not take effect with a yevama, you would not have known the true reason for the Mishna. Rather, you would have said that whenever one performs an act of acquisition whose effect is to take place only later, the acquisition does not take effect, even if he is capable of making the acquisition take effect immediately.

Reish Lakish said

to Rabbi Yohanan:

Had a great man not praised you

[had Rabbi Yannai, who is a great man, not praised your words],

I would have said to you myself,

I would have told you that your proof is no proof, since

the Mishna

from which you proved your point, based on what we learned in it—that if one says, “After your yavam performs halitza with you,” she is not betrothed, because this is an entity that has not yet come into the world—

is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said: Betrothal does not take effect with those subject to prohibitions of the Torah.

A yevama outside the yibbum framework is included among those subject to prohibitions of the Torah.

But according to the Rabbis, betrothal takes effect even with a yevama!

The Gemara challenges Reish Lakish’s interpretation of the Mishna:

And if

this Mishna is stated according to the opinion of

Rabbi Akiva, the following that we learned in it is difficult:

When he says to her,

the man betrothing the woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me”

after your yavam performs halitza with you—

she is not betrothed, because this is an entity that has not yet come into the world.

If it is Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, why does

betrothal not take effect with her

after he performs halitza with her!?

For we have heard Rabbi Akiva say: A person can transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world!

For we have heard Rabbi Akiva say: A person can transfer ownership of something that does not yet exist!