Yevamot 92a (צב.) — the Talmud in English

Any voice that

arises

after marriage,

any rumor that emerges after marriage—for example, a kohen who married a woman and a rumor emerged after the marriage that she was divorced or a zona—

we are not concerned,

we do not take it into consideration.

The Gemara resolves that our case is not comparable to an ordinary rumor that emerges after marriage. Therefore, Rav Ashi had to teach us that here, too, we are not concerned about a rumor that emerges after marriage:

For

one might have said,

I would have said:

Since she came to court and we permitted her,

since every woman regarding whom one witness testifies that her husband died must come to court for the court to permit her to remarry, perhaps we should say that she is

considered as though the rumor had emerged before marriage

[as though it had emerged before the marriage], since we, too, were concerned that perhaps the witness was not telling the truth, and therefore she required a court ruling;

and she should be forbidden

[and become forbidden], even though she had meanwhile married.

This teaches us!

We learned in the Mishna:

If she married on the basis of a court’s ruling, she must leave

and is exempt from the offering:

When a person inadvertently commits a transgression for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and his error resulted from a mistaken ruling by the court that the act was not a transgression—

if this ruling was issued by the Great Court in Jerusalem, and the majority of the people erred and acted on its basis, they bring a bull for the unwitting decision of the community, and each individual does not bring a separate sin-offering.

However, if the court did not mislead the majority of the people, but only an individual committed a transgressive act on the basis of the court’s mistaken ruling, the tannaim disputed the matter at the beginning of tractate Horayot: Does the court’s ruling exempt him from the offering?

The halakha was established that an individual who acted on the basis of a court’s ruling is liable to bring a sin-offering.

The later authorities discussed whether the case of an individual who acted on the basis of a court’s ruling applies specifically to the Great Court, or whether it applies to the ruling of any court, even that of three ordinary, unordained judges.

This matter is also relevant to one who asked a rabbi who issues halakhic rulings concerning the laws of forbidden and permitted substances, and the rabbi erred in his ruling: Must the questioner, who was misled by the rabbi’s error, bring an offering [or is he required to obtain atonement as one who acted unintentionally, or is his status that of one under duress, who does not require atonement]?

See the explanation of this matter in the words of the Hazon Ish, who presents and explains at length the various approaches to this issue, at the beginning of our chapter.

The sugya before us concerns the matter of a “court’s ruling.” It distinguishes between a court’s mistaken ruling and a court’s mistake regarding the facts, and discusses the testimony concerning a woman whose husband was subsequently found to be alive: Was this a court’s mistaken ruling, or a mistake regarding the facts?

Zeira said: The Mishna is not authoritative—

because it was taught in the beit-midrash!

The halakha does not follow our Mishna, which exempts her from the offering, on the basis of what was taught in another beraita in the beit-midrash, which obligates her to bring an offering!

As it was taught in the beit-midrash,

this is what was taught in the beit-midrash:

If

the court ruled that the sun had set

at the conclusion of Shabbat, and it was already permitted to perform labor, and people performed labor on the basis of their ruling,

and ultimately it rose,

the sun illuminated the earth, because it had not yet set—

this is not a “ruling

” of the court that exempts the individual from the offering.

Rather,

it is

a “mistake

” of the court: They permitted this because they had erred regarding the facts, and everyone sees that the court had made a factual error; this was not a “ruling” of the court.

So, too, here: When the court permitted her, it did so because it relied on the witness. Now it has become clear to everyone that the witness was a false witness who misled the court. Therefore, this is not a “ruling” that exempts an individual who acted on its basis from the obligation to bring an offering; rather, it is a court’s mistake, which does not exempt one from the offering.

And Rav Naḥman said: It is a ruling!

This is because the Sages did not say that one should rely on the witness in order to permit the woman; rather, the court permits her on the basis of its reasoning that a woman investigates carefully before marrying.

Since he relied on the court’s ruling, his status is that of an “individual who acted on the basis of a court’s ruling,” who is exempt from an offering.

Rav Naḥman said: Know that it is a “ruling”,

that the court issued a mistaken ruling, and that this was not merely a factual error—

for

there is

no trust in one witness throughout the Torah,

but

if

here,

with regard to testimony concerning a woman, he is indeed

trusted—

And

for what reason

is one witness trusted here?

Is it not

because

it is a ruling

of the court, which ruled on the basis of its reasoning and understanding that the woman can be permitted here because of the presumption that a woman investigates carefully before marrying?

Rava, however, disagrees with Rav Naḥman:

Rava said: Know that it is an error

and not a “ruling,” as Rav Naḥman said—

for

if

the court had issued

a mistaken ruling

concerning milk-fat and blood, permitting them

[saying about particular milk-fat or blood that they are not included in the Torah prohibition], even if they had not given us an entirely clear reason for this permission, we would follow them.

But

if

they subsequently found

—the court—

a reason for prohibition

[the court reconsidered the matter and found a compelling and clear reason for prohibition], then,

when they subsequently returned and said that it was permitted—

we would not heed them

[if the court were to return and again give a reason for permission essentially identical to the first reason, without providing us with any greater clarification than before, we certainly would not heed them].

But

with regard to testimony concerning a woman,

when one witness comes—

we permit her

[if a witness first comes and testifies that the husband died, we permit the woman], even though the matter is not entirely clear.

And if

two come—

after the woman has married—

we forbid her

[if two witnesses come and contradict the first witness, we forbid her, since the testimony of one cannot stand against that of two].

Nevertheless,

when another witness subsequently comes,

and says, “He has just died” [if another witness comes and says, “He has just died,” after the time when the two witnesses saw him alive]—

we permit her,

we permit her to marry, even though the new permission contains no clarification greater than the first.

And

for what reason

do we trust the second witness?

Is it not

because

it is an error!

For had it been a ruling, we would not have followed the court’s final ruling, which is exactly like the first.

Rather, certainly, their first ruling was an error: The court believed that the witness would not lie and that the woman investigates carefully before marrying.

It follows that we relied on the witness’s trustworthiness in error.

And because we erred concerning him, we cannot say that we should not trust the second witness, claiming that he, too, is lying. For if the first witness was established as a liar, does that mean that all Jews have been established as liars? And if she did not investigate carefully the first time and was thereby misled, presumably she is investigating carefully now.

The Gemara adds:

And Rabbi Eliezer, too, holds that it is an error,

and this is not included in the category of an individual who acted on the basis of a court’s ruling and is exempt!

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says:

A woman who married on the basis of a court’s ruling that permitted her on the basis of one witness, and her husband then appeared—

let the law pierce the mountain!

We follow the full depth of the law,

and she must bring a “choice

” sin-offering [a superior offering], because she married while forbidden, and the court’s ruling does not exempt her.

The Gemara infers:

Granted, if you say that it is an error—

that is why she brings an offering.

But if you say that it is a ruling—

why does she bring an offering?

After all, an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt.

It is thereby demonstrated that Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is an error and not a ruling!

We challenge this:

Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer holds that an individual who acted on the basis of a court’s ruling is liable,

and not because it is an error.

We explain:

If so—

if according to Rabbi Eliezer a court’s ruling never exempts an individual—

what

is the meaning of what Rabbi Eliezer said concerning a woman who married on the basis of one witness,

“Let the law pierce the mountain”?

For this expression implies that if one did not delve deeply into the matter, she would indeed be exempt by virtue of the court’s ruling.

Rather, certainly, even according to Rabbi Eliezer, an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt from an offering. In this case, however, one must delve deeply into the matter and regard her as one who did not act on the basis of a court’s ruling; therefore, she is liable to bring an offering.

We learned in the Mishna:

If the court instructed her to marry,

and she acted improperly, she is liable to bring an offering, because they permitted her only to marry:

What does “acted improperly” mean?

Rabbi Elazar says: She engaged in licentious intercourse,

that is, she had intercourse as an unmarried woman without marrying.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

For example, she married as

a widow to a High Priest,

or as

a divorcee or a ḥalutza to an ordinary priest.

The one who says “she engaged in licentious intercourse” certainly agrees that she is liable for marrying a widow to a High Priest,

and that she is liable to bring an offering.

But

the one who says that she married a widow to a High Priest does not agree that she is liable for engaging in licentious intercourse

to bring an offering—

What is the reason?

Because

she said,

the woman:

It was you,

the court,

who made me an unmarried woman

[you, the court, instructed me that I was unmarried].

It was explicitly taught

in a beraita

in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan,

that she is liable only if she had forbidden intercourse:

One who inadvertently transgressed the same transgression several times, and the inadvertence occurred during one period of unawareness—for example, one who ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat and then ate another olive-bulk of forbidden fat because he did not know of the prohibition of forbidden fat, or because he did not know that this item was defined as forbidden fat and thought that it was categorized as permitted fat, and only after eating it several times did he learn of the prohibition of forbidden fat, or learned that the item he had regarded as permitted fat is legally defined as forbidden fat—is required to bring only one offering, since all his acts were performed unintentionally during one period of unawareness.

However, if he ate one olive-bulk of forbidden fat, learned that he had transgressed, and then the matter again became unknown to him and he ate an additional olive-bulk, he is liable to bring two offerings, because the intervening knowledge divides the obligation to bring an offering for the two transgressions into two separate obligations.

There are, however, certain distinctions by virtue of which a person becomes liable to bring several sin-offerings for acts performed during one period of unawareness.

For example, according to Rabbi Eliezer, if he engaged in intercourse with one of the women forbidden as arayot [for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering when he does so unintentionally] and again engaged in intercourse with her during the same period of unawareness, he is liable for each act of intercourse, because according to Rabbi Eliezer the separate acts of intercourse divide his obligation to bring an offering. The Sages disagreed with him, because in their view the acts of intercourse do not divide the obligation.

But if he engaged in intercourse with five of his wives while they were menstruating, during one period of unawareness, even the Sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer that he is liable to bring a sin-offering for each woman, because the five women are “distinct bodies,” and they divide his obligation to bring a sin-offering with regard to each one, even if all the acts were performed during one period of unawareness.

As this dispute was taught in a beraita in tractate Keritot, page 15a, where the rationale of each one is explained.

As it was taught:

If the court instructed her to marry and she acted improperly,

and

for example,

she married

a widow to a High Priest

or

a divorcee or a ḥalutza to an ordinary priest,

she

is liable to bring an offering,

because they permitted her only to marry—

Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disputed the number of offerings for which she is liable:

And she is liable to bring an offering

for each act of intercourse, this is the statement of Rabbi Elazar,

because the acts of intercourse divide the obligation.

And the Sages say: One offering for all of them,

because acts of intercourse do not divide the obligation.

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Elazar that if she married five men, she is liable to bring an offering for each one, since they are distinct bodies.

Mishna:

A woman is subject to yibbum only if her husband had no children. If he had children and they died before the husband died, she is subject to yibbum. But if, at the time she fell before the yavam, he had children and they subsequently died, his wife is no longer subject to yibbum.

a.

A woman whose husband and son went overseas, and people came and said to her: “Your husband died and afterward your son died,”

and she was exempt from yibbum, since your husband had a son at the time of his death,

and she married

outside the levirate bond,

and afterward they said to her:

“The facts were the reverse,”

and your son died before your husband died, so you were subject to yibbum.

She

must leave

the man whom she married, since she is subject to yibbum.

And the first and last child

[the child born to her before she heard the second report and the child born afterward]

is a mamzer.

For our Mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who holds that there is a mamzer from those liable for negative commandments. A yevama who marries outside the levirate bond is included among those liable for negative commandments.

b. And if

they said to her: “Your son died, and afterward your husband died,”

and you are subject to yibbum with your husband’s brother,

and she entered into levirate marriage.

And afterward they said to her:

“The facts were the reverse,”

and you are not subject to yibbum, since your husband had a son at the time of his death—

She

must leave

her husband’s brother, who entered into levirate marriage with her, since she is forbidden to him as his brother’s wife.

And the first and last child

[the one born before the second report and the one born afterward]

is a mamzer,

like all children born from unions subject to karet.

c. And if

they said to her: “Your husband died”

[and he had no brother, or he had children],

and she married

another man.

And

afterward they said to her: “Your husband was alive”

at the time when she married the other man,

but

now he is already

dead—

she

must leave

the other man, as explained in the previous Mishna: “She must leave both this one and that one.”

And the first child,

the child she had from her second husband before her first husband died, is

a mamzer

by Torah law.

But the last,

the child born to her from him after her first husband’s death,

is not a mamzer

by Torah law, but only by rabbinic law, as we learned in the previous Mishna: “The child is a mamzer from both this one and that one.” d.

They said to her: “Your husband died,” and she became betrothed,

but she had not yet married.

And afterward her husband came—

she is permitted to return to him,

since she committed no transgression.

But if she married, even though she did not have intercourse, she is forbidden to return to him.

And

even though the latter gave her a bill of divorce,

since by law he was not required to give her a bill of divorce—

he did not disqualify her from marrying a kohen.

For

this is what Rabbi Elazar ben Mattai expounded: “And a woman divorced from her husband

“they shall not take” [the kohanim]—the verse teaches that only when a woman receives a bill of divorce from “her husband” is she prohibited to a kohen as a divorced woman.

But not

a woman who receives a bill of divorce

from a man who is not her husband.

Gemara:

We raise the following question:

What

is the child called the

“first,”

and what

is the child called the

“latter”

mentioned in our Mishna?

If you say that the “first

is the child born

before the report

that she was living with her husband in a prohibited state, and

the “latter”

is the child born

after the report —

If so,

let the tanna state

in our Mishna’s first two clauses simply

“the child is a mamzer,”

and that would suffice; why does the tanna of our Mishna need to distinguish between the children as “first” and “latter”?

And we answer:

Because it was necessary for him to teach in the latter clause

the third clause:

“They told her, ‘Your husband died,’ and she married, and afterward they told her, ‘He was alive

at the beginning of your marriage,’

and

now

he died—the first is a mamzer, but the latter is not a mamzer.”

Therefore,

he also taught in the first clause: “The first and the latter are mamzerim.”

The Sages taught: This

case that we learned in our Mishna, in which a yevama who marries outside the levirate framework in violation of the prohibition has a mamzer child, and therefore, when they told her that her son had died and afterward that her husband had died, the child is a mamzer—

according

to the words of Rabbi Akiva

it was taught.

For

Rabbi Akiva

would say: “Kiddushin does not take effect in relationships subject to negative commandments,”

and the child born from such a union is a mamzer; and a yevama who marries outside the levirate framework stands under a negative commandment as well. As it is stated: “The wife of the dead man shall not be married outside to a strange man.” Therefore, if a stranger has intercourse with her, the child born from her is a mamzer.

But the Sages say: There is no mamzer from a yevama

who marries outside the levirate framework.

And we question this:

Let him say

this instead: “But the Sages say,

There is no mamzer from those subject to negative commandments”!

For that is the view of the Sages who dispute Rabbi Akiva, holding that kiddushin takes effect in every relationship subject to a negative commandment, and that the child is not a mamzer! And we answer: The “Sages” mentioned in the beraita are not the Sages who dispute Rabbi Akiva’s statement.

Rather,

this tanna [“

the Sages” mentioned in the beraita]—

this is the very tanna of Rabbi Akiva!

There is another tanna who understands Rabbi Akiva’s view differently,

who says

that Rabbi Akiva does not consider a child a mamzer from every relationship subject to a negative commandment, but only

from relationships subject to the negative commandments concerning “kinship,”

those involving relatives;

the child is a mamzer,

as, for example, when one marries his father’s raped woman or his halutza.

But

from relationships subject merely to ordinary negative commandments

alone], such as a yevama who marries outside the levirate framework, where the stranger does not violate a negative commandment concerning a relative—

the child would not be a mamzer.