Yevamot 92a — the Talmud in English

Every report that is

after the marriage

, every report that emerges after the marriage, such as a priest who married a woman and a report emerged about her after the marriage that she is a divorced woman or a woman who engaged in forbidden relations,

any rumor that emerges after marriage—for example, a kohen who married a woman and a rumor emerged after the marriage that she was divorced or a zona—

we do not take account of it

, we do not have concern for it.

And the Gemara resolves that our case is not similar to other reports after marriage, and therefore Rav Ashi needed to teach us that even here we do not have concern for a report after marriage:

For

lest you say

, I might have said:

since she came to the court and we permitted her

, since every woman about whose husband one witness testifies that he died must come to court so that they will permit her, perhaps we should say

it is like a report that emerged before marriage

—as though the report had emerged before the marriage—for we too were concerned lest there was no truth in the witness’s words, and therefore we required a court—

and she should be forbidden

[and she should become forbidden], even though she had meanwhile married.

It teaches us this!

We learned in the Mishna:

If she married on the basis of a court’s ruling, she must leave

and she is exempt from the offering:

A person who mistakenly commits a transgression for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and whose mistake was because a court mistakenly ruled that this was not an act of transgression—

if this ruling was the ruling of the supreme court in Jerusalem, and the majority of the public erred and acted on its basis, they bring the “bull of the concealment of a matter by the public,” and each one does not bring an individual sin-offering.

But if the court did not mislead the majority of the public, but only an individual committed an act of transgression on the basis of the court’s mistaken ruling, the tannaim disputed the matter at the beginning of Tractate Horayot, whether the court’s ruling exempts one from the offering.

The halakha was decided that an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling is liable for a sin-offering.

The later authorities discussed whether the case of an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling applies specifically to the supreme court, or to the ruling of every court, even that of three ordinary laymen.

And the matter is relevant as well to one who asked a rabbi who rules halakha concerning the laws of forbidden and permitted things, and the rabbi erred in his ruling: must the questioner who was misled by the rabbi’s error bring an offering [or is he liable for atonement as one who acted unintentionally, or is his status that of one compelled, who does not require atonement]?

See the explanation of this matter in the words of the Hazon Ish, who brings and explains at length the various views concerning this matter, at the beginning of our chapter.

The sugya before us deals with the matter of a “court’s ruling,” and distinguishes between a court’s mistaken ruling and a court’s mistake concerning facts, and discusses testimony concerning a woman in which it was subsequently clarified that the husband was alive: was there here a court’s error in its ruling, or an error concerning facts?

Zeira said: The Mishna is not applicable—

from what was taught in the beit-midrash!

The halakha is not in accordance with our Mishna, which exempts her from the offering, by virtue of what we learned in another teaching in the beit-midrash, which obligates her to bring an offering!

For it was taught in the beit-midrash

, this is what they taught in the beit-midrash:

If

the court ruled that the sun had set

on the conclusion of Shabbat, and it was already permitted to perform labor, and people performed labor on the basis of their ruling,

and in the end it rose

, the sun shone, because it had not yet set—

this is not a “ruling

” of a court that exempts the individual from the offering.

Rather

it is

a “mistake

” of the court, for they permitted this because they erred concerning the facts, and everyone sees that the court erred concerning the facts, and there was no “ruling” of the court here.

And here too, when the court permitted her, it permitted her because it relied on the witness; and now it has become clear to all that the witness was a false witness and misled the court. Therefore this is not a “ruling” that exempts the individual who acts on its basis from the obligation of an offering, but rather a mistake of the court, which does not exempt from the offering.

And Rav Naḥman said: It is a ruling!

For the Sages did not say that they should rely on the witness in order to permit the woman; rather, it is the court, by virtue of its reasoning that a woman is precise and marries, that permits her.

And since he relied on the court’s ruling, his status is like that of an “individual who acted on the basis of a court’s ruling,” who is exempt from an offering.

Rav Naḥman said: Know that it is a “ruling,”

that the court issued a mistaken ruling, and this was not merely a mistake concerning facts—

for

after all,

throughout the entire Torah one witness is not trusted,

and

if

here,

in testimony concerning a woman, he is indeed

trusted—

And

for what reason

is one witness trusted here?

Is it not

because he

is a ruling

of the court, which ruled on the basis of its reasoning and understanding that it is possible to permit the woman here because of the presumption that a woman is precise and marries?

But Rava disagrees with Rav Naḥman:

Rava said: Know that it is an error

and not a “ruling,” as Rav Naḥman said—

for

after all,

if the court ruled

a mistaken ruling

concerning fat and blood, to permit them

[to say concerning particular fat or blood that they are not included in the Torah prohibition], even though they did not give us a completely clear reason for this permission, we listen to them.

And

if

they then reconsidered

the court

a reason for prohibition

[the court reconsidered the matter and found a decisive and clear reason for prohibition], then from now on,

when they again return and say that it is permitted—

we do not heed them

[if the court were to return again and give a reason for permitting it, exactly like the first reason, without providing us with more clarification than the first, we certainly would not heed them].

But

with regard to testimony concerning a woman,

where one witness comes—

we permit

her [if a witness first comes and testifies concerning the husband’s death, we permit the woman], even though the matter is not entirely clear.

And if

two come—

after the woman has married—

we prohibit

[and if two come who contradict the first witness, we prohibit her, because one does not stand against two].

And nevertheless,

when another witness then comes,

and says, “He died now” [if another witness comes and says, “He died now,” after the time when the two saw him alive]—

we permit her

, we permit her to marry, even though the new permission contains no clarification greater than the first.

And

for what reason

do we believe the second witness?

Is it not

because

it is an error!

For if it were a ruling, we would not have listened to the court the last time, since it is exactly like the first.

Rather, certainly their first ruling is an error: the court thought that this witness would not lie and that the woman is precise and marries.

It follows that we relied on the witness’s reliability in error.

And because we erred concerning him, we cannot say that we should not believe the second witness and say that he too is lying; for if the first was established as a liar, have all of Israel been established as liars? And if she was not careful the first time and was thereby harmed, presumably she is careful now.

And the Gemara adds:

And Rabbi Eliezer too holds that it is an error

, and this is not included among an individual who acted on the basis of a court’s ruling, who is exempt!

For it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says

: A woman who married on the basis of a court that permitted her on the basis of one witness, and her husband came—

let the judgment pierce the mountain!

We follow the depth of the law,

and she shall bring a “choice sin-offering

” [a choice one], for she married in a prohibited manner, and the court’s ruling does not exempt her.

And the Gemara infers:

Granted, if you say that it is an error—

that is why she brings an offering.

But if you say that it is a ruling—

why does she bring an offering?

After all, an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt.

And it is thereby proven that Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is an error, and not a ruling!

And we raise an objection to this:

Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer holds: An individual who acted on the basis of a court’s ruling is liable,

and not because it is an error.

And we explain:

If so—

that according to Rabbi Eliezer the court’s ruling exempts nowhere—

what

is this that Rabbi Eliezer said concerning one who married on the basis of one witness,

“Let the judgment pierce the mountain”?

For this expression implies that if one does not delve deeply into the matter, she would indeed be exempt by virtue of the court’s ruling.

Rather, certainly an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt from an offering even according to Rabbi Eliezer; but in this case one must delve deeply into the matter and regard her as one who acted not on the basis of a court’s ruling, and therefore she is liable for an offering.

We learned in the Mishna:

If the court ruled that she may marry

, and she acted improperly, she is liable for an offering, for they permitted her only to marry:

What is “acted improperly”?

Rabbi Elazar says: She engaged in forbidden relations

, that is, she had intercourse as an unmarried woman, without marrying.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said

: For example, she married while she was

a widow to a High Priest,

or

a divorced woman or a woman released from levirate obligation to an ordinary priest.

The one who says “She engaged in forbidden relations”—all the more so a widow to a High Priest

, for she is liable for an offering.

But

the one who says “a widow to a High Priest,” but not “she engaged in forbidden relations”

is liable for an offering—

What is the reason?—

Because

she said

the woman:

You,

the court,

are the ones who made me an unmarried woman

[you, the court, ruled to me that I am an unmarried woman].

It was taught

explicitly

in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan

, that she is liable only if she had intercourse in a prohibited manner:

One who sinned unintentionally several times in the same transgression, and the unintentional acts occurred within “one state of unawareness”—for example, one who ate an olive-sized portion of forbidden fat and again ate another olive-sized portion of forbidden fat because he did not know of the prohibition of forbidden fat, or because he did not know that this substance was defined as forbidden fat but thought that it was in the category of permitted fat, and only after he ate several times did he learn of the prohibition of forbidden fat, or learned that the substance which he had regarded as permitted fat was legally defined as forbidden fat—must bring only one offering, since all his acts were performed unintentionally within “one state of unawareness.”

But if he ate one olive-sized portion of forbidden fat, and learned that he had committed a transgression, and then the matter again became unknown to him and he ate an additional olive-sized portion, he is liable for two offerings, because the knowledge in between divides the offering obligation for the two transgressions into two separate obligations.

However, there are certain distinctions by virtue of which a person becomes liable for several sin-offerings for acts that he performs within one state of unawareness.

For example, according to Rabbi Eliezer, if he had intercourse with one of all the forbidden sexual relations [for which he is liable for a sin-offering when he has intercourse with her unintentionally] and again had intercourse with her during the same state of unawareness, he is liable for each and every act of intercourse, because according to Rabbi Eliezer the separate acts of intercourse “divide” his obligation for an offering. And the Sages disputed him because according to their view the acts of intercourse do not divide it.

But if he had intercourse with his five wives while they were menstruating, within one state of unawareness, even the Sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer that he is liable for a sin-offering for each and every woman, because the five women are “separate bodies,” and they divide his obligation for a sin-offering with regard to each one, even if he acted within one state of unawareness.

For this dispute was taught in a beraita in Tractate Keritot, page 15a, and there the reasoning of each one is explained.

For it was taught:

If the court ruled that she may marry, and she went and acted improperly,

and

for example

she married

a widow to a High Priest

or

a divorced woman or a woman released from levirate obligation to an ordinary priest,

she

is liable for an offering,

for they permitted her only to marry—

Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disputed, in accordance with their positions, concerning the offerings for which she is liable:

And she is liable for an offering

for each and every act of intercourse, the words of Rabbi Elazar

, because the acts of intercourse divide the obligations.

And the Sages say: One offering for all

, because acts of intercourse do not divide the obligations.

And the Sages agree with Rabbi Elazar that if she married five men, she is liable for an offering for each and every one, since they are separate bodies.

Mishna:

A woman is subject to levirate obligation only if her husband had no children; and if he had children and they died before the husband died, she is subject to levirate obligation; but if at the time of falling before the levirate obligation he had children and afterward they died, his wife is no longer subject to levirate obligation.

a.

A woman whose husband and son went to an overseas country, and they came and said to her: “Your husband died and afterward your son died,”

and she is exempt from levirate obligation, for your husband had a son at the time of his death,

and she married

outside the levirate bond,

and afterward they said to her:

“The matters were reversed,”

and your son died before your husband died, and you were subject to levirate obligation.

She

must leave

the man whom she married, for she is subject to levirate obligation.

And the first and last child [the child born to her before she heard the second report and the one born afterward]

is a mamzer.

For our Mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who holds that there is a mamzer from those liable for ordinary prohibitions. And a woman subject to the levirate bond who marries outside it is included among those liable for ordinary prohibitions.

b. And if

they said to her:

“Your son died, and afterward your husband died,”

and you are subject to levirate obligation to your husband’s brother,

and she entered into levirate marriage.

And afterward they said to her:

“The matters were reversed,”

and you are not subject to levirate obligation, for your husband had a son at the time of his death—

She

must leave

her husband’s brother who entered into levirate marriage with her, since she is forbidden to him with the severity of a forbidden relation.

And the first and last child [before the second report and afterward]

is a mamzer,

as are other children born from those liable for excision.

c. And if

they said to her:

“Your husband died”

[and he had no brother, or he had children],

and she married

another man.

And

afterward they said to her: “He was alive,”

your husband was alive at the time when you married the other man,

and

but now he is already

dead—

she

must leave

him, as explained in the previous Mishna, “She must leave both this one and that one.”

And the first child,

who was born to her from her second husband before her first husband died, is

a mamzer

by Torah law.

And the last one,

who was born to her from him after the death of her first husband,

is not a mamzer

by Torah law, but by rabbinic law, as we learned in the previous Mishna, “The child is a mamzer from this one and from that one.” d.

They said to her: “Your husband died,” and she became betrothed,

but she had not yet married.

And afterward her husband came—

she is permitted to return to him

, for she did not commit a prohibition.

But if she married, even though she did not have intercourse, she is forbidden to return to him.

And

even though the last one gave her a divorce

, since according to the law he did not need to give her a divorce—

he did not disqualify her from the priesthood.

For

this is what Rabbi Elazar ben Mattia expounded: “And a divorced woman from her husband

, ‘they shall not take’ [the priests]—the verse teaches that only when a woman receives a divorce document from ‘her husband’ is she forbidden as a divorced woman to a priest,

but not

a woman who receives a divorce document

from a man who is not her husband.

Gemara:

And we inquire:

What

is the child called the

“first”

, and what

is the child called the

“last”

that we stated in our Mishna?

If you say, “the first

” is the child born

before the report

that she was standing in a forbidden relationship with her husband, and

“the last

” is the one born

after the report —

If so,

let it teach

in our Mishna, in the first two paragraphs,

“the child is a mamzer

,” and that would suffice; and why did the tanna of our Mishna need to divide the children into “first” and “last”?

And we answer:

Because they needed to teach in the final clause

in the third paragraph:

“They told her, ‘Your husband has died,’ and she married, and afterward they told her, ‘He was alive

”

and died

now—then

the first is a mamzer, and the last is not a mamzer.

Therefore,

he also taught the first clause: ‘The first and the last are mamzerim.’

The Sages taught: This

that we stated in our Mishna—that a yevama who marries outside the levirate bond, in a forbidden manner, has a mamzer as a child, and therefore, when they told her that her son had died and afterward that her husband had died, the child is a mamzer—

According

to the words of Rabbi Akiva

it was taught.

For

Rabbi Akiva

would say: Marriage does not take hold with those liable for negative commandments

, and the child born from her is a mamzer; and a yevama who marries outside the levirate bond stands under a prohibition. As it is stated: “She shall not be the wife of the dead man outside, to a strange man.” Therefore, if a stranger has intercourse with her, the child born from her is a mamzer.

But the Sages say: There is no mamzer from a yevama

outside the levirate bond.

And we are astonished:

Let him say

the following: “But the Sages say,

There is no mamzer from those liable for negative commandments”!?

For this is the view of the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Akiva and hold that, in all cases of those liable for negative commandments, marriage does take hold with them, and the child is not a mamzer!? And we answer: The “Sages” mentioned in the beraita are not the Sages who disagree with the words of Rabbi Akiva.

Rather,

this tanna [“

Sages” in the beraita]—

this is the tanna of Rabbi Akiva!

There is another tanna who holds differently concerning Rabbi Akiva’s view,

who says

that tanna: Rabbi Akiva does not make a mamzer from every case of those liable for negative commandments, but only

from those liable for negative commandments involving “kinship”

, of relatives,

is there a mamzer

, such as one who marries his father’s raped woman or his halutza.

But

from those liable for mere negative commandments [

alone], such as a yevama outside the levirate bond, where the stranger does not transgress a prohibition involving a relative—

there is no mamzer.