Yevamot 91b — the Talmud in English

Ravina said:

another answer: one cannot prove from that beraita with regard to the bill of divorce from the second husband, since Rabbi Shimon did not speak there even with regard to the woman’s prohibition.

Rather, only

with regard to a sacrifice

alone is it that he

teaches

it.

And this is what Rabbi Shimon said:

They treated her in accordance with their ruling—

a woman who married on the basis of one witness, in accordance with the ruling of the court—

as the intentional sin

of

a man with a married woman.

Her status is like that of one who intentionally had intercourse with a married woman, who is not liable to bring a sacrifice [rather, her punishment is execution].

And

this woman as well, and her paramour—

does not bring a sacrifice.

And Rabbi Shimon follows his own position, that an individual who acted on the basis of the ruling of the court is exempt from a sacrifice. Tosafot.

But if she married

on the basis of witnesses—

like the unintentional sin of a man with a married woman—

since one who unintentionally has intercourse with a married woman is liable to bring a sacrifice.

And

here too, a woman who marries on the basis of witnesses

brings a sacrifice.

And if you wish, say

another answer:

In fact,

this

beraita

first—

indeed, it is according to the words of

the Rabbis

that it is stated, and it is not according to the words of Rabbi Shimon.

Nevertheless, you cannot prove from it that according to the Rabbis a woman who marries on the basis of witnesses does not require a bill of divorce from the second husband, despite the fact that the beraita says, “Except for a married woman who married on the basis of the court,” that she requires a bill of divorce from the second husband. This seemingly implies that a married woman who marries on the basis of two witnesses does not require a bill of divorce from the second husband, as with all the forbidden sexual relations—

And explain

and correct

it thus,

that beraita:

Except for a married woman, who marries on the basis of two witnesses.

who marries on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses;

And

so too a married woman

who married on the basis of the court—

both this one and that one require a bill of divorce from the second husband.

Ulla raised an objection

to Rav Sheshet, who had challenged Rav: Why should she become forbidden when she married on the basis of two witnesses, given that there is the rationale of “What could she have done?” by virtue of which she is considered coerced:

And do we say, “What could she have done,”

as a rationale for permitting a married woman who committed adultery on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses that her husband had died?

And we learned

in tractate Gittin [79b]:

For a bill of divorce, the place of the bill of divorce and the date of the bill of divorce must be written. Since in the time of the Gemara they did not count the years according to the counting from the creation of the world, as we count them, but rather counted the years according to the number of years of the reign of the king, in each kingdom according to the time of the king’s enthronement, the year in the bill of divorce must be identified according to the number of years of the reign of the king ruling in the place where the bill of divorce was written. And one writes in it: “In such-and-such year, to King So-and-so.”

One who was in Babylonia and

wrote

the date of the bill of divorce

for

the counting of the years of the reign of Rome, which is

an unworthy kingdom.

Or if he wrote in Babylonia

for the kingdom of Media,

or

for the kingdom of Greece.

Or if he wrote, “In such-and-such year,”

for the building of the Temple [the Temple],

and did not write according to the years of the king; or if he wrote the number of years

since the destruction of the Temple—or if

the scribe who

was

writing the bill of divorce

in the east,

when he should have written the place in the east, which was the place of the witnesses signing the bill of divorce,

and

he

wrote

in the bill of divorce the name of the place that was

in the west.

Or if he

was in the west and wrote in the east,

and the woman went and married another man with this bill of divorce—

Behold, she

must leave this one and that one, and all these ways apply to her.

All the stringencies stated in our Mishna concerning one whose husband came after she married another man apply to her, for she too committed adultery while married, since rabbinically her divorce is not a divorce.

And

this is a difficulty for Rav Sheshet, who holds that everyone says, “What could she have done.”

Why

did the Sages say that “all these ways apply to her”?

Let us say, “What could she have done”!

She thought that the bill of divorce was valid!

Rather, certainly the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon and do not accept the claim “What could she have done.” Therefore, a woman who marries with an invalid bill of divorce becomes forbidden, like one who marries on the basis of two witnesses that her husband died.

And we answer:

She should have had the bill of divorce read to her,

she should have had the bill of divorce read to a scholar first.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Come and hear

a proof that according to the Rabbis one does not say “What could she have done,” from that which we learned in tractate Gittin [80a]:

One who takes his yevama,

and thereby exempts her rival from levirate marriage,

and his rival went and married

outside,

and

afterward

it was found

that the yevama

this

whom he performed levirate marriage with was

an aylonit,

who has no levirate bond, and the intercourse of the yavam with her does not exempt her rival from levirate marriage. It follows that the rival had intercourse with a stranger while she was awaiting levirate marriage, with her deceased husband’s brother—

Behold, she

must leave this one,

the yavam to whom she is subject. Since by Torah law she is still subject to him, he performs chalitza with her, but he does not perform levirate marriage with her, by rabbinic law.

And

so too she leaves

this one,

the husband whom she married, for she married him in prohibition, at the time when she was awaiting levirate marriage.

And all these ways apply to her.

And

for Rav Sheshet this is a difficulty:

Why

do we impose stringency on the rival who married another man, and she did not know that the other yevama was an aylonit?

Let us say: What could she have done!?

And we reject this:

She should have waited.

The rival of the aylonit should have waited until she knew whether she was an aylonit, and she should not have married before that.

Abaye said: Come and hear

a proof from another Mishna in tractate Gittin [there]:

For we learned:

All

the women who are forbidden as

forbidden relations

to the yavam,

concerning whom they said

that they

exempt

their

rivals

from chalitza and from levirate marriage, and the rivals are permitted outside [as we learned at the beginning of the tractate]. If

the rivals went

of the forbidden relation

and married

outside,

and

afterward

these were found,

the forbidden relations who were

“aylonit”,

whose transaction was a mistaken transaction.

It is now established that the betrothals of the aylonit women were in the category of a “mistaken transaction,” and their rivals are not considered rivals of a forbidden relation, for it is now established that the aylonit women were not married at all, and they are not their “rivals,” and they were not exempted from levirate marriage on their account [Rashi; and as we learned at the beginning of the tractate, see above note 4].

Behold, she

must leave this one and that one, and all these ways apply to her.

And why!?

Let us say, “What could she have done”!

And we reject this:

She should have waited

until she knew whether the forbidden relation was an aylonit, and afterward she should marry outside.

Rava said, Come and hear

from that which we learned, there:

The scribe wrote

the

bill of divorce

for

the man, and

the

receipt [a receipt for payment of the marriage contract]

for

the woman,

the “recipient of the receipt” for her marriage contract, which she receives at the time of the divorce.

And the scribe erred

and switched them,

and gave

the

bill of divorce to the woman,

instead of giving it to the husband, who would give it to his wife.

And

the

receipt

he gave

to the man,

instead of giving it to the woman, so that she would give it to her husband when he paid her marriage contract.

And they gave them to one another:

the husband gave the woman the receipt instead of giving her the bill of divorce,

and this one to that one,

and the woman gave the husband the bill of divorce instead of giving him the receipt, and the woman went and married another man,

and after

some time, behold, the bill of divorce emerged from under the hand of the man,

who had received it from the woman,

and the receipt from under the hand of the woman,

who had received it from the husband.

It follows that this woman married another man while she was a married woman—

Behold, she

must leave this one and that one, and all these ways apply to her.

And why!?

Let us say: What could she have done!?

And we reject this:

She should have had the bill of divorce read to her.

After she received the receipt as a bill of divorce, she should have had it read to a scholar, to know whether she had received a bill of divorce properly.

Come and hear: He changed his name

of the husband in the bill of divorce,

and her name [or her name]

of the woman, or

the name of his city

of the husband,

and the name [or the name]

of her city,

and she went and married with this bill of divorce, behold, she

must leave this one and that one, and all these ways apply to her.

But why!?

And why!?

Let us say: What could she have done!?

And we reject this:

She should have had the bill of divorce read to her,

and checked its validity.

The Sages instituted that kohanim who divorce their wives should divorce them with a “bound bill of divorce,” because kohanim are quick-tempered, and they would write a bill of divorce quickly for their wives, regret it after some time, and be unable to take them back. And they instituted for them a bound bill of divorce, which is not convenient to write quickly, lest meanwhile the husband be reconciled with her; and its witnesses would sign on the outside.

He writes one or two lines, folds them, wraps them around the blank margin, and sews them; one witness signs on the outside of the fold, and he returns and writes two lines or more inside, wraps them around the blank portion, and the second witness signs on the outside of the fold, and likewise the third. And if there is a wrapped fold and no witness signed behind it, this is a “bald” bill of divorce and is invalid [the wording of Rashi, Gittin 81b].

Ravina said: Come and hear: If he took her with a bald bill of divorce

[which is an invalid bill of divorce], which the woman received from her kohen husband, behold, she

must leave this one and that one

and all these ways apply to her.

And why!?

Let us say: What could she have done!?

She should have had the bill of divorce read to her.

And we reject this:

She should have had the bill of divorce read to her.

Rav Pappa was considering performing an act in accordance with “What could she have done.”

That is, a woman whose husband went overseas, and she married on the basis of two witnesses, and her husband came, and Rav Pappa wished to permit her to return to her first husband, since she was coerced, for “What could she have done?”

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa:

But it was taught: all these mishnayot

[and yet we learned all the aforementioned Mishnayot], and it is proved from them that one does not say, “What could she have done”!?

He said to him,

Rav Pappa to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

And

indeed,

were they not answered!?

Did we not answer and reject these proofs!?

He said to him,

Rav Huna to Rav Pappa:

And on the answers—

shall we stand and rely!?

Are we to rely on forced answers!?

And Rav Pappa accepted his words and refrained from doing as he had initially considered.

Rav Ashi said: And as for a rumor,

if she married in court on the basis of one witness, and afterward a rumor emerged that her husband was alive, but he did not appear before us—

we are not concerned

with it, and she need not leave the one whom she married lawfully on account of the rumor.

And we considered it:

Which rumor

[that is, when did the rumor emerge]?

If you say it is a rumor that emerged after the marriage,

if we say that the case concerns a rumor that emerged after the marriage—

Rav Ashi already said this one time

[behold, Rav Ashi already stated this law once]!?

For Rav Ashi said: