Yevamot 91b (צא:) — the Talmud in English

Ravina said:

There is another answer: one cannot infer from that beraita with regard to the bill of divorce from the second husband, since Rabbi Shimon was not speaking there even with regard to the woman’s prohibition.

Rather,

only with regard to an offering

is it that he

teaches

this halakha.

And this is what Rabbi Shimon said:

“They treated their instruction”—

a woman who marries on the basis of the testimony of one witness, following the instruction of the court—

“like intentional transgression”

by

a man with another man’s wife.

Her status is like that of one who intentionally has relations with another man’s wife, who is not liable to bring an offering [but is punished by death].

And

this woman as well as the man who had relations with her—

does not bring an offering.

[And Rabbi Shimon follows his own position, that an individual who acted on the instruction of the court is exempt from an offering. Tosafot.]

But if she married

on the basis of the testimony of witnesses—

it is like unintentional transgression by a man with another man’s wife,

as one who unwittingly has relations with another man’s wife is liable to bring an offering.

And

here too, a woman who marries on the basis of the testimony of witnesses

brings an offering.

And if you wish, say

another answer:

Actually,

this

beraita,

the first one—

indeed, it is according to the statement of

the Rabbis,

and not according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

Nevertheless, you cannot prove from it that according to the Rabbis a woman who marries on the basis of the testimony of witnesses does not require a bill of divorce from the second husband, despite the fact that the beraita says, “Except for a married woman who married on the basis of the ruling of a court,” indicating that she does require a bill of divorce from the second husband. This apparently implies that a married woman who marries on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses does not require a bill of divorce from the second husband, as in the case of all other forbidden sexual relationships—

But resolve

and emend

it thus,

that beraita:

“Except for a married woman,

who marries on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses;

and

likewise a married woman

who marries on the basis of the ruling of a court—

both this one and that one require a bill of divorce from the second husband.”

Ulla raised an objection

to Rav Sheshet, who had objected to Rav: Why should she become forbidden when she married on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses? After all, there is the rationale of “What could she have done?” by virtue of which she should be considered coerced:

“Do we say, ‘What could she have done’,”

as a rationale for permitting a married woman who had relations with another man relying on the testimony of two witnesses that her husband had died!?

And didn’t we learn

in tractate Gittin [79b]:

A bill of divorce must contain the place where it was written and the date on which it was written. Since in the time of the Gemara the years were not counted from the creation of the world, as we count them, but rather according to the years of the reign of the king—each kingdom according to the time when its king was enthroned—the bill of divorce must specify the “year” according to the reckoning of the reign of the king ruling in the place where the bill was written. Thus one writes in it: “In such-and-such a year of the reign of so-and-so.”

One who was in Babylonia and

wrote

the date of the bill of divorce

according to

the reckoning of the years of the Roman kingdom, which is

an improper kingdom.

Or he wrote in Babylonia

according to the kingdom of Media,

or

according to the kingdom of Greece.

Or he wrote, “In such-and-such a year”

from the building of the Temple [the Temple], rather than writing according to the years of the king; or he wrote the number of years

from the destruction of the Temple—

or if

the

scribe who wrote the bill of divorce was

in the east,

where he should have written the place in the east, which was the place of the witnesses who signed the bill of divorce,

and

he

wrote

the name of the place in the bill of divorce as being

in the west.

Or he was

in the west and wrote that he was in the east,

and the woman went and married another man with this bill of divorce—

such a woman

must leave both this one and that one, and all these ways apply to her.

All the stringencies stated in our Mishna concerning a woman whose husband came after she had married another man apply to her, for she too had relations with another man while still married, since rabbinically her divorce is not considered a divorce.

And

this poses a difficulty to Rav Sheshet, who holds that everyone agrees that we say, “What could she have done.”

Why

did the Sages say that

“all these ways apply to her”?

Let us say, “What could she have done”! For she believed that the bill of divorce was valid!

Rather, the Rabbis certainly disagree with Rabbi Shimon and do not accept the claim of “What could she have done.” Therefore, a woman who marries with an invalid bill of divorce becomes forbidden, just like a woman who marries on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses concerning her husband’s death.

And we answer:

She should have had the bill of divorce read to her,

for she should first have had the bill of divorce read to a scholar beforehand.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Come and hear

a proof that according to the Rabbis we do not say, “What could she have done,” from what we learned in tractate Gittin [80a]:

One who marries his yevama,

thereby exempting her rival from levirate marriage,

and his rival went and married

outside the family,

and

afterward

it was discovered

that this

yevama

whom he performed levirate marriage with was

an aylonit,

a woman incapable of bearing children, who has no levirate bond, and intercourse by the yavam with her does not exempt her rival from levirate marriage. It follows that the rival had relations with a stranger while awaiting levirate marriage, with the brother of her deceased husband—

Such a woman

must leave this one,

the yavam to whom she is subject. Since by Torah law she is still subject to him, he must perform halitza with her, but he may not perform levirate marriage with her, by rabbinic decree.

And

she likewise leaves

this one,

the husband whom she married, since she married him while forbidden to him, at a time when she was awaiting levirate marriage.

And all these ways apply to her.

And

Rav Sheshet is subject to the following difficulty:

Why

are we stringent with regard to the rival who married another man, although she did not know that the other yevama was an aylonit!?

Let us say: “What could she have done!?”

And we reject this:

She should have waited.

The rival of the aylonit should have waited until she knew whether the woman was an aylonit, and she should not have married before that.

Abaye said: Come and hear

a proof from another Mishna in tractate Gittin [there]:

As we learned:

All

the women who are forbidden as

forbidden relatives

to the yavam,

concerning whom they said

that they

exempt

their

rivals

from halitza and from levirate marriage, and the rivals are permitted to marry outside the family [as we learned at the beginning of the tractate]. If

the rivals went

of the forbidden relative

and married

outside the family,

and

afterward

these were found,

the forbidden relatives, to be

“aylonit”,

meaning that their marriages were mistaken transactions.

It is now established that the betrothals of the aylonit women were in the category of mistaken transactions, and their rivals are not considered rivals of a forbidden relative, since it has now become clear that the aylonit women were never married at all; they are not their “rivals,” and they were not exempted from levirate marriage on their account [Rashi; and as we learned at the beginning of the tractate, see above note 4].

Such a woman

must leave both this one and that one, and all these ways apply to her.

But why!?

Let us say, “What could she have done”!?”

And we reject this:

She should have waited

until she knew whether the forbidden relative was an aylonit, and only afterward should she have married outside the family.

Rava said: Come and hear

from what we learned there:

The

scribe

wrote

the

bill of divorce for the man, and

the

receipt [a receipt for payment of the ketuba]

for

the woman,

who “receipts” her ketuba, meaning that she receives payment of it at the time of the divorce.

And he erred,

the scribe, and switched them,

and gave

the

bill of divorce to the woman,

instead of giving it to the husband so that he could give it to his wife.

And

he gave the

receipt

to

the man,

instead of giving it to the woman so that she could give it to her husband when he paid her ketuba.

And they gave them to each other:

the husband gave the woman the receipt instead of giving her the bill of divorce,

and each gave the other

the woman gave the husband the bill of divorce instead of giving him the receipt, and the woman went and married another man,

and after

some time, the bill of divorce was found in the possession of the man,

who had received it from the woman,

and the receipt was found in the possession of the woman,

who had received it from the husband.

It follows that this woman married another man while still a married woman—

such a woman

must leave both this one and that one, and all these ways apply to her.

But why!?

Let us say: “What could she have done!?”

And we reject this:

She should have had the bill of divorce read to her.

After she received the receipt as though it were a bill of divorce, she should have had it read to a scholar, in order to ascertain whether she had received a valid bill of divorce.

Come and hear: “He changed his name”

of the husband on the bill of divorce,

and her name [or her name]

of the woman, or

the name of his city

of the husband,

and the name [or the name]

of her city,

and she went and married with this bill of divorce; such a woman

must leave this one and that one, and all these ways apply to her.

But why!?

Let us say: “What could she have done!?”

And we reject this:

She should have had the bill of divorce read to her,

and checked its validity.

The Sages instituted that priests who divorce their wives should divorce them with a “folded bill of divorce,” because priests are quick-tempered: they would write a bill of divorce hastily for their wives, later regret it, and be unable to take them back. They therefore instituted a folded bill of divorce for them, which is not convenient to write quickly, so that in the meantime the husband might be reconciled with his wife; and its witnesses would sign on the outside.

He writes one or two lines, folds it, wraps it over the blank margin, and sews it. One witness signs on the outside of the fold. He then writes another two lines or more on the inside, wraps them over the blank portion, and the second witness signs on the outside of the fold, and likewise the third witness. If there is a fold with no witness signed behind it, it is a “bald” bill of divorce and is invalid [the wording of Rashi, Gittin 81b].

Ravina said: Come and hear: “If she married with a bald bill of divorce” [which is an invalid bill of divorce], which the woman received from her priest-husband, such a woman

must leave this one and that one

and all these ways apply to her.

But why!?

Let us say: “What could she have done!?”

And we reject this:

She should have had the bill of divorce read to her.

Rav Pappa considered acting in accordance with the principle of “What could she have done.”

That is, in the case of a woman whose husband went overseas and who married on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, after which her husband came back, Rav Pappa wished to permit her to return to her first husband, since she was coerced, in accordance with the principle, “What could she have done.”

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa:

But wasn’t it taught: “All these teachings” [and yet we learned all the Mishnayot cited above], from which it is demonstrated that we do not say, “What could she have done”!?

He said to him,

Rav Pappa to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

And

have

they

not been refuted!?

Have we not answered and rejected these proofs!?

He said to him,

Rav Huna to Rav Pappa:

And should we stand and rely on

the answers

—

on forced explanations!?

Are we to rely on strained answers!?

Rav Pappa accepted his words and refrained from doing what he had initially considered.

Rav Ashi said: And as for a public rumor,

if she married through a court on the basis of the testimony of one witness, and afterward a rumor emerged that her husband was alive, but he did not appear before us—

we are not concerned

about it, and she need not leave the man whom she married lawfully on the basis of the rumor.

And we raise a question about this:

What rumor [that is, when did the rumor emerge]?

If you say it is a rumor that emerged after the marriage,

if the case concerns a rumor that emerged after the marriage—

Rav Ashi already stated this law once

[for Rav Ashi had already stated this ruling on another occasion]!?

As Rav Ashi said: