Yevamot 91a — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this:

It is obvious

that she is disqualified from marrying a priest—if her first husband dies—for she is a woman who engaged in illicit intercourse!?

And we answer:

A daughter of a Levite

who is disqualified

from the tithe—

it was necessary for him

to teach us this.

And the Gemara wonders about the substance of this law, that a daughter of a Levite is disqualified through her illicit intercourse from the tithe:

And

if

a daughter of a Levite is [disqualified] from the tithe—

is she disqualified through illicit intercourse!?

And is it the case that illicit intercourse disqualifies a woman of Levitical descent from eating the tithe, so that you say that because she engaged in illicit intercourse she becomes disqualified from the tithe!?

And it was taught: A woman of Levitical descent who was taken captive

by gentiles, and there is concern that she had intercourse with a gentile.

Or who engaged in illicit intercourse,

such as with a gentile, or with a slave, or with a disqualified priest, or with anyone whose intercourse with a woman disqualifies her from teruma—

They give her the tithe, and she eats it!

And we answer:

Rav Sheshet said:

This that the Sages said, that a daughter of a Levite becomes disqualified from the tithe, is not the substance of the law, but

a penalty

for failing to investigate carefully before she married.

We learned in the Mishna: And

a daughter of a priest [is disqualified] from teruma:

And the Gemara explains:

Even from rabbinic teruma

she may not eat.

We learned in the Mishna:

And neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one inherit her marriage settlement:

And we ask:

The marriage settlement—

what is it doing here!?

What does the marriage settlement have to do here with regard to inheritance? This woman has no marriage settlement either from this one or from that one, as we learned in the first clause of our Mishna!?

The obligation of the marriage settlement that a man undertakes toward his wife when he marries her, so that if he dies during her lifetime or divorces her, she may collect her marriage settlement, includes three things:

a. A sum of two hundred zuz for a virgin [or one hundred zuz for a non-virgin].

b. An addition to the marriage settlement, which he undertakes to give her beyond this sum.

c. The husband’s undertaking to return to her the value of the property that she brought to him as a “dowry” [which is iron-flock property].

The dowry property was given by the father to his daughter, and she brought it to her husband as iron-flock property.

And the Sages wanted a man to give his daughter property for her dowry just as he gives to his son, and that a person should not be concerned lest his daughter die during her husband’s lifetime, in which case her husband would inherit her, and lest her husband marry additional women and have sons also from the other women, and when the husband dies, the sons from the other women would also inherit the dowry property that he gave to his daughter. And since a person wants his property to remain after his death in the hands of his family, he would give property only to his sons and not to his daughters.

Therefore the Sages instituted, as one of the “conditions of the marriage settlement,” that any woman who dies during her husband’s lifetime, and her husband inherits her—when her husband dies after her, only her sons from him will inherit the dowry property that she brought, and his sons from other women will not inherit it at all.

And now, since a person is assured that the property he gives his daughter for her dowry will remain in the possession of his descendants and will not be divided among strangers, he will give property to his daughter as he gives to his son.

The Sages made this enactment a “condition of the marriage settlement,” and it applies even if the husband did not explicitly undertake it in the marriage settlement, and it is called the “marriage settlement of male sons” [sons].

And if a man married a woman, and she died during his lifetime, and he inherited her, and he married another woman and died, the male children of the first woman take all the dowry property that their mother brought to their father, whereas the remaining property is divided between them and the heirs of the second woman.

But, on the other hand, the heirs of the second woman are entitled to receive the obligation of their mother’s marriage settlement, for her husband died during her lifetime, and she was entitled to collect the money of her marriage settlement from him, and this right passes to her heirs, even if they are female heirs only.

Rav Pappa said:

Indeed, the woman herself lost her marriage settlement, as we learned that she has no marriage settlement either from this one or from that one. But our Mishna is dealing here with

“the marriage settlement of male sons.”

And the Mishna teaches us that this woman’s sons do not alone inherit the dowry property that she brought to him; rather, it is divided equally among all the sons of her husband, including his sons from other women.

And likewise, the sons that her husband has from a proper wife, who did not go and marry another, are entitled first to collect what was due to their mother through her marriage settlement, and only afterward the remaining property is divided equally among all the heirs of the husband.

But it still must be wondered: Is this too not a matter of

obviousness

?

For she herself has already lost the dowry [the iron-flock property] that she brought to her husband—and what novelty is there in the fact that her sons will not alone inherit this property!?

And we answer:

Lest you say:

Only

for her

the woman herself, because

she committed a prohibition [

for she committed a prohibition by marrying another while her husband was alive],

the Rabbis imposed a penalty

so that she would not collect her dowry from him.

But

for her offspring,

who committed no prohibition,

the Rabbis did not impose a penalty,

the Rabbis, and her sons from the first husband would inherit her dowry property alone.

and her sons from the first husband would inherit her dowry property by themselves.

It teaches us

that they imposed a penalty to remove her rights entirely, even the rights of her offspring!

We learned in the Mishna:

The brother of this one and the brother of that one—

perform halitza but do not perform yibbum:

And the Gemara explains:

The brother of the first—

performs halitza

with her

by Torah law,

for she is bound to him, and she is not an adulteress according to the Torah, who is exempt from yibbum, since she was under duress.

But he does not perform yibbum

with her—the brother of the first—

by rabbinic law.

The brother of the second—

performs halitza

with her

by rabbinic law,

because perhaps people will say, “This one divorced her and that one married her,” just as they required a divorce document from the second.

But he does not perform yibbum—

not by Torah law,

for she is not his wife,

and not by rabbinic law.

We learned in the Mishna the words of three tannaim who disagree with the first tanna:

a.

Rabbi Yosei says: Her marriage settlement—

from the property of her first husband,

the first one;

b. Rabbi Elazar says: The first husband is entitled to her found objects, to the proceeds of her labor, and to the annulment of her vows.

c. Rabbi Shimon says: Her intercourse or her halitza with the brother of the first exempts her rival wife:

Rav Huna said: The later ones,

the last two tannaim among the three tannaim mentioned, namely Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon—

agree with the earlier ones.

Each one agrees with the tanna preceding him in the order of the Mishna.

But

the earlier ones,

the first two tannaim, Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Elazar—

do not agree with the later ones.

Each one does not agree with the one later than him in the order of the Mishna.

And Rav Huna explains his words:

Rabbi Shimon,

who is the last tanna, who holds that the brother of the first may perform yibbum,

agrees with Rabbi Elazar,

the tanna preceding him, that her found objects and the proceeds of her labor belong to her first husband.

Since

if

it is the case that

intercourse, which is the principal prohibition,

he is,

Rabbi Shimon did not impose a penalty

upon her, but leaves her according to her law, so that she may undergo yibbum and have intercourse with his brother,

all the more so her found objects and the proceeds of her labor, which are monetary matters,

that Rabbi Shimon leaves her according to her law, and agrees with Rabbi Elazar that her found objects and the proceeds of her labor belong to the first husband.

And

however,

Rabbi Elazar,

who precedes Rabbi Shimon in the order of the Mishna—

does not agree with Rabbi Shimon,

who is taught after him, that the brother of the first performs yibbum.

For specifically with regard to

her found objects and the proceeds of her labor, which are monetary matters, Rabbi Elazar did not impose a penalty

upon her.

But with regard to intercourse, which

is a matter of

prohibition—

Rabbi Elazar imposed a penalty

and he does not perform yibbum.

And both of them,

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon—

agree with Rabbi Yosei,

who is taught first, that she did not lose her marriage settlement from the first husband.

For if

these,

her found objects and the proceeds of her labor,

which she sits beneath him [

found objects and the proceeds of labor are given to the husband while she remains living under his authority]

he did not impose a penalty,

although there is concern that perhaps he will keep her with him, since he treats her as a wife.

And all the more so, the marriage settlement,

that he did not impose a penalty,

for it stands to be taken and she stands to leave.

For the marriage settlement is given to one who leaves her husband, and if she has a marriage settlement, she will strive to leave him.

And

if

Rabbi Yosei did not agree with them,

with Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who hold that her found objects and the proceeds of her labor belong to the first husband, and that if the first wishes, he performs yibbum—

For specifically

the marriage settlement, which stands to be taken and she stands to leave,

since by taking the marriage settlement she leaves him,

Rabbi Yosei did not impose a penalty

upon her, so that she would leave him.

But these,

her found objects and the proceeds of her labor, which cause

her to sit beneath him,

so that she continues to remain under his authority—

Rabbi Yosei imposed a penalty

so that her husband would remove her from under his authority.

And all the more so he imposed a penalty with regard to intercourse, so that his brother would not perform yibbum with her, which is a matter of prohibition, for even Rabbi Elazar disagreed with Rabbi Shimon concerning this and held that she should not undergo yibbum.

But

Rabbi Yohanan said

the opposite:

The earlier ones—

agree with the later ones.

The later ones—

do not agree with the earlier ones:

And Rabbi Yohanan explains his words:

Rabbi Yosei [

who is taught first in the Mishna]

agrees with Rabbi Elazar [

who is taught after him], that the husband is entitled to her found objects and to the proceeds of her labor.

For

the marriage settlement, which goes from him to her,

which is given from the husband to the woman, and she is the one whom it would be necessary to penalize, nevertheless

Rabbi Yosei did not impose a penalty

upon her.

And all the more so her found objects and the proceeds of her labor, which go from her to him

[from the woman to the husband].

from the woman to the husband. Since you are coming to cause the husband a loss, and he should not be penalized—certainly Rabbi Yosei did not impose a penalty.

And

if

Rabbi Elazar did not agree with him [

with Rabbi Yosei, who is taught earlier], that the woman should not lose her marriage settlement—

For

it is her found objects and the proceeds of her labor that go from her to him—

Rabbi Elazar did not impose a penalty

so as not to cause the husband a loss, since we should not penalize him.

But the marriage settlement, which goes from him to her—

Rabbi Elazar imposed a penalty

upon her.

And both of them [

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Elazar]

agree with Rabbi Shimon

that she undergoes yibbum through the first husband.

For

what

if

these [

the marriage settlement, the found object, and the proceeds of labor]

that belong to the husband during his lifetime

are his,

they did not impose a penalty,

although we should have said that there is reason to impose a penalty so that she would leave him—

Intercourse

of yibbum,

which is after the death

of the husband who was obligated to divorce her,

all the more so

they did not impose a penalty upon her.

And Rabbi Shimon does not agree with them [

with Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Elazar], that she should receive her marriage settlement and he should receive her found objects and the proceeds of her labor.

For

it is intercourse that is after death—

Rabbi Shimon did not impose a penalty

upon her.

But these, who are alive

of the husband, since we must be concerned that if the bond between them is not severed, perhaps he will keep her and not divorce her -

Rabbi Shimon imposed a penalty upon

Rabbi Shimon.

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Shimon says

if she married without permission

[on the basis of two witnesses, so that she did not require the permission of a beit din] she is permitted to return to him:

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: This is the halakha

[this was the halakha]!

Rav Naḥman said

to Rav Huna:

You are stealing, stealing \-

Why do you need this!?

Why do you state a matter like a person sneaking away, for you ruled without qualification that this is the halakha, meaning that even the Sages in the first clause agree with it !?

But

if you hold like Rabbi Shimon—

say, “The halakha is like Rabbi Shimon”!

For your teaching—

does it follow Rabbi Shimon!?

If indeed you hold like Rabbi Shimon, you should have said that the halakha is like Rabbi Shimon, for your words are the words of Rabbi Shimon !

And if you will say, perhaps you will answer that

perhaps you will explain that

if I had said,

if I had said

“The halakha is like Rabbi Shimon,”

it would have

implied

that the halakha is like him in all the matters in our Mishna,

even in the first one,

in his first ruling, that the brother of the first one may perform yibbum, and that the child of the first one is not a mamzer; and in these rulings the halakha is not like him, and therefore it is impossible to say, “The halakha is like Rabbi Shimon

” No. This is not an answer, for

say

you should have said that

the halakha is like Rabbi Shimon—

in the latter one.

And we conclude: indeed, it is

difficult

for Rav Huna in the name of Rav!

Rav Sheshet said,

regarding the words of Rav Huna in the name of Rav, who said that the halakha is like Rabbi Shimon with regard to one who married on the basis of witnesses, that she is permitted to return to her first husband:

I say,

I say

that when Rav was drowsing and lying down, he stated this teaching.

I say that Rav said this matter while drowsing in a lying position

!

For from the fact that Rav said that this is the

“halakha”

-

By implication

you learn this,

that they disagree

the Rabbis disagree with this and hold that she is forbidden to return to her first husband even if she married on the basis of two witnesses.

And how can one say this, since there is no dispute that if she married on the basis of two witnesses she is permitted to return to her husband, since

what could she have done?

And if so,

she was coerced by circumstances!

What else could she have done after she heard from two witnesses that her husband had died? And if so, she is coerced by circumstances—and why should she be forbidden !?

Furthermore,

there is an additional difficulty against him from that which

it was taught: Concerning all the forbidden relations that they said

are forbidden relations, and with whom betrothal does not take effect—

they do not require a get from him,

not even by rabbinic law [and this matter will be explained in the sugya below, 94b].

Except for a married woman who married

on the basis of one witness who testified concerning the death of her husband, and she was permitted to marry

on the basis of

the instruction of a

court,

and it was found that her husband was alive.

The Sages required that woman to receive a get from the second husband, despite the fact that he is not her husband, because of the concern “perhaps people will say: This one divorced her and this one married her,” as explained in our Mishna and as explained in the Gemara above, 89a.

And it is proven from this beraita that only when she married

on the basis of

the instruction of a

court—

is it that she requires a get

from the second husband.

But if she married

on the basis of

two

witnesses,

and she did not need to resort to the permission of a court’s instruction—since she is coerced by circumstances—

she does not require a get

from the second.

And just as they did not impose a penalty upon her by requiring her to receive a get from the second, since she relied upon two witnesses, so too there is no basis for imposing a penalty upon her by considering her like a woman who committed adultery willingly and forbidding her to return to her first husband.

And Rav Sheshet analyzes: This beraita, which holds that a woman who marries on the basis of two witnesses is considered coerced by circumstances, and they did not impose upon her the stringencies that they imposed upon a woman who marries on the basis of one witness—

who is it,

who stated it? It is certainly the Rabbis who stated it!

For

if you say, perhaps we should say that

perhaps we should say that

Rabbi Shimon

is the one who stated it—

This cannot be said.

For according to Rabbi Shimon, even if she married on the basis of one witness,

on the basis of a court—

does she require a get

from the second!?

For according to Rabbi Shimon, the Sages did not impose any penalty at all by requiring her to receive a get from the second husband, even in a case where they impose other penalties upon her. For Rabbi Shimon is not concerned that “perhaps people will say: This one divorced her and this one married her,” as is demonstrated by the beraita that the Gemara now cites.

And was it not taught: Rabbi Shimon says: They treated

according to their instruction—

like the willful act of a man with a woman!

A man and a woman who married on the basis of the testimony of one witness who testified that the woman’s husband had died, and they did this according to the instruction of a court, which instructed that she was permitted to marry on the basis of one witness alone. If it became clear that the instruction had been erroneous, because the husband returned, the Sages made their laws regarding them more stringent, as though they had done this not inadvertently but willfully, and the woman is forbidden to her husband, like a woman who commits adultery under her husband willfully.

But if they did this

on the basis of

the testimony of two

witnesses—

like the inadvertent act of a man with a woman.

If the man married the woman on the basis of two witnesses, so that they did not require a “court’s instruction” for this, it is as though the woman had been intimate with the second inadvertently and under coercion.

And it is proven from these words of Rabbi Shimon that

whether

the one who married on the basis of one witness,

or whether

the one who married on the basis of two witnesses—

does not require a get

from the second!

For he compares the distinction between one who marries on the basis of one witness and one who marries on the basis of two witnesses to the distinction between a married woman who commits adultery willfully and one with whom a man had intercourse inadvertently.

And according to this definition, she does not require a get from the second in any circumstance, in accordance with the law of a woman who commits adultery under her husband, who does not require a get from the one with whom she committed adultery.

Rather, is it not the case that since according to Rabbi Shimon even a woman who marries on the basis of one witness does not require a get—the earlier beraita, which distinguishes between a woman who marries on the basis of one witness, who requires a get from the second husband, and a woman who marries on the basis of two witnesses, who does not require a get from him—

since according to Rabbi Shimon even a woman who married on the basis of one witness does not require a bill of divorce, it follows that the earlier baraita, which distinguishes between a woman who married on the basis of one witness, who requires a bill of divorce from the second husband, and a woman who married on the basis of two witnesses, who does not require a bill of divorce from him—

is the Rabbis’.

And Rav Sheshet proves: The fact that according to the Rabbis she does not require a get from the second when she married him on the basis of two witnesses is because of the reason I stated, that she is coerced by circumstances, for “what could she have done?”

And for this reason she is also permitted to return to her first husband, even according to the Rabbis.

And necessarily, Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis did not disagree concerning this matter.

And this is difficult for Rav, who said, “The halakha is like Rabbi Shimon,” which implies from his words that according to the Rabbis she is forbidden to return to her husband even if she married on the basis of two witnesses!

And the Gemara rejects Rav Sheshet’s proof:

Actually,

that beraita, which distinguishes between one witness and two with regard to a get, is stated only according to

Rabbi Shimon

but according to the Rabbis, even when she marries on the basis of two witnesses, she requires a get from the second.

And Rabbi Shimon agrees with the Rabbis when she marries on the basis of one witness, that she requires a get from the second, and this beraita is according to Rabbi Shimon.

And what you challenged from the words of Rabbi Shimon in the second beraita—“They treated according to their instruction”—which implies that according to Rabbi Shimon even a woman who marries on the basis of one witness does not require a get from the second—do not find this difficult.

And explain,

correct that beraita and say in it

as follows:

Rabbi Shimon says:

If

they acted according to their instruction,

that the woman married on the basis of one witness according to the instruction of a court—

like the intention of a man with a woman.

She is like an unmarried woman whom a man intended to betroth, who requires a get from him.

And

the same law is that she

requires a get

from the second husband.

And the one who married

on the basis of witnesses—

they treated her

as one with whom a man did not intend to be intimate.

Like an unmarried woman with whom a man had intercourse not for the purpose of betrothal,

and she does not require a get

from him.

And since Rabbi Shimon admits that she requires a get from the second when she marries on the basis of one witness, it is indeed possible to say that even the first beraita is stated according to Rabbi Shimon, and that it is he who distinguished between one who marries on the basis of one witness and one who marries on the basis of two witnesses.

But according to the Rabbis, there is no distinction between them with regard to this matter, and in both cases she requires a get from the second.

And if so, it is possible to say that according to the Rabbis, a woman who marries on the basis of two witnesses is forbidden to return to her husband, like a woman who marries on the basis of one witness. And this is as Rav said!

Rav Ashi said

he too says that the first beraita, which states that one who marries on the basis of a court’s instruction requires a get from him, is stated only according to Rabbi Shimon, and not according to the Rabbis.

Since according to the Rabbis, even a woman who marries on the basis of two witnesses requires a get from the second husband.

Therefore, it provides no proof for Rav Sheshet’s claim against Rav.

But Rav Ashi does not correct the words of Rabbi Shimon in the second beraita, as the Gemara corrected them [that the comparison is to one who had intercourse with a woman with the intention of betrothal and to one who had intercourse with a woman without the intention of betrothal].

Rather, he leaves Rabbi Shimon’s words as they were stated previously, and the comparison to one who had intercourse with a woman in prostitution “willfully” and to one who had intercourse with a woman in prostitution “inadvertently” remains in Rabbi Shimon’s words as it stands.

Rather, Rav Ashi explains, you should not infer Rav Sheshet’s inference from this wording of Rabbi Shimon, which compares the law of one who marries on the basis of testimony to the law of a woman who commits adultery, as though he thereby disagrees with the Rabbis and holds that she does not require a get at all from the second, even when she marries on the basis of one witness, just as a woman who commits adultery does not require a get from the one with whom she committed adultery.

Since that beraita is only

with regard to the prohibition

upon her husband,

it teaches

it, and not with regard to a get from the second husband,

and this is what

Rabbi Shimon says in it:

They acted according to their instruction—

like the willful act of a man with a woman

[with a married woman].

And she becomes forbidden to her husband.

They acted

on the basis of witnesses—

like the inadvertent act of a man with a woman.

And she does not become forbidden to her husband.

But with regard to the get, the beraita did not speak at all. Therefore, despite the fact that the beraita compares this to “willfulness,” nevertheless she requires a get from the second.