Yevamot 91a (צא.) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this:

Obviously

she is disqualified from marrying a priest—if her first husband dies—for she is a zona, a woman disqualified from the priesthood through illicit relations !?

And we answer:

The daughter of a Levite

who is disqualified

from the tithe—

it was necessary for him

to teach us this.

The Gemara is astonished at the substance of this law, that a Levite’s daughter is disqualified from the tithe through her illicit relations:

And

is it the case that

a Levite’s daughter from the tithe—

is she disqualified through illicit relations!?

Do illicit relations disqualify a Levite woman from eating tithe, so that you say that because she engaged in illicit relations she becomes disqualified from the tithe !?

And it was taught in a beraita: A Levite woman who was taken captive

by gentiles, and there is concern that she had relations with a gentile,

or who engaged in illicit intercourse,

for example, with a gentile, a slave, a ḥalal, or anyone whose intercourse with a woman disqualifies her from teruma—

they give her tithe, and she eats it!

And we answer:

Rav Sheshet said:

The ruling that the Sages stated—that a Levite’s daughter becomes disqualified from tithe—is not the fundamental law; rather,

it is a penalty

for failing to investigate carefully before she married.

We learned in the Mishna: And

a priest’s daughter with regard to teruma:

And the Gemara explains:

Even with regard to rabbinic teruma,

she may not eat.

We learned in the Mishna:

And neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one inherit her marriage contract:

And we ask:

The marriage contract—

what is it doing here!?

What relevance does the marriage contract have here with regard to inheritance? This woman has no marriage contract from either this husband or that husband, as we learned in the first clause of our Mishna !?

The financial obligation of the marriage contract that a man assumes toward his wife when he marries her—so that if he dies during her lifetime or divorces her, she may collect her marriage contract—includes three elements:

a. A sum of two hundred zuz for a virgin [or one hundred zuz for a non-virgin

]. b. An addition to the marriage contract, which he undertakes to give her beyond that sum.

c. The husband’s undertaking to return to her the value of the property that she brought him as a dowry [the property known as nikhsei tzon barzel ].

The dowry property was given by the father to his daughter, and she brought it into her marriage as nikhsei tzon barzel.

The Sages wished a man to give his daughter property for her dowry just as he gives property to his son, and they did not want a man to fear that his daughter might die during her husband’s lifetime, in which case her husband would inherit her, and that her husband might marry additional wives, having sons from those other wives as well. Then, when the husband died, the sons from the other wives would also inherit the dowry property that he had given his daughter. Since a person wants his property to remain after his death in the hands of his family, he would give property only to his sons and not to his daughters.

Therefore, the Sages instituted, as one of the “conditions of the marriage contract,” that if a woman dies during her husband’s lifetime and her husband inherits her, then, when her husband subsequently dies, only her sons from him inherit the dowry property that she brought into the marriage; his sons from other wives do not inherit it at all.

From now on, since a man is assured that the property he gives his daughter for her dowry will remain in the possession of his descendants and will not be divided among outsiders, he will give property to his daughter just as he is accustomed to give property to his son.

The Sages made this ordinance a “condition of the marriage contract,” and it applies even if the husband did not explicitly undertake it in the marriage contract. It is called “the marriage contract of male children” [male descendants

]. If a man married a woman, she died during his lifetime, he inherited her, he married another woman, and then he died, the sons of the first wife take all the dowry property that their mother brought to their father, while the remaining property is divided between them and the heirs of the second wife.

On the other hand, the heirs of the second wife are entitled to receive their mother’s marriage-contract payment, since her husband died during her lifetime and she was entitled to collect the money of her marriage contract from him. This right passes to her heirs, even if they are female heirs only.

Rav Pappa said:

Although the woman herself forfeited her marriage contract, as we learned that she has no marriage contract from either this husband or that husband, our Mishna is discussing

“the marriage contract of male children”.

The Mishna teaches that this woman’s sons do not inherit alone the dowry property that she brought to him. Rather, they divide it equally among all the sons of her husband, including his sons from other wives.

Likewise, the sons that her husband has from a fit wife, who did not go and marry another man, are entitled first to collect what was due to their mother under her marriage contract, and only afterward is the remaining property divided equally among all the husband’s heirs.

But it is still difficult: This too is a matter of

obvious

law!

For she herself already forfeited the dowry [the nikhsei tzon barzel] that she brought to her husband—and what novelty is there in saying that her sons do not inherit this property alone !?

And we answer:

Lest you say: Only

for

her

—the woman herself—

who committed a transgression

[because she committed a transgression by marrying another man while her first husband was alive],

the Sages imposed a penalty

so that she could not collect her dowry from him.

But

with regard to her offspring,

who committed no transgression,

the Sages did not impose a penalty,

the Sages,

and her sons from the first husband would inherit her dowry property alone.

It teaches us that the penalty was imposed so as to divest her completely of her rights, even the rights of her offspring!

It teaches us that the penalty was imposed so as to divest her completely of her rights, even the rights of her offspring!

We learned in the Mishna:

The brother of this one and the brother of that one—

perform halitza but may not perform yibbum:

And the Gemara explains:

The brother of the first husband—

performs halitza

with her

by Torah law,

because she is bound to him through the levirate bond, and she is not a woman suspected of adultery, who by Torah law is exempt from yibbum, since she was coerced.

But he may not perform yibbum—

the brother of the first husband may not perform yibbum with her—

by rabbinic law.

The brother of the second husband—

performs halitza

with her

by rabbinic law,

because of the concern that people might say, “This one divorced her and that one married her,” and just as they required her to receive a bill of divorce from the second man,

but may not perform yibbum—

not by Torah law,

because she is not his wife,

and not by rabbinic law.

We learned in the Mishna the statements of three tanna’im who dispute the first tanna:

a.

Rabbi Yosei says: Her marriage contract—

is secured by property belonging to her first husband

;

b. Rabbi Elazar says: The first husband is entitled to her found property, to the proceeds of her labor, and to annul her vows.

c. Rabbi Shimon says: Her intercourse or her halitza with the brother of the first husband exempts her rival wife:

Rav Huna said: The latter ones,

the last two of the three tanna’im mentioned, namely Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon—

agree with the earlier ones.

Each of them agrees with the tanna who precedes him in the order of the Mishna.

But

the earlier ones,

the first two tanna’im, Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Elazar—

do not agree with the latter ones.

Each one does not agree with the tanna who follows him in the order of the Mishna.

Rav Huna explains his statement:

Rabbi Shimon,

the last tanna, who holds that the brother of the first husband may perform yibbum,

agrees with Rabbi Elazar,

the tanna preceding him, that her found property and the proceeds of her labor belong to her first husband.

Since

if

the case of

intercourse, which is the primary matter of the prohibition,

is

not penalized

by Rabbi Shimon, but he leaves her according to her original status, so that she undergoes yibbum and has intercourse with his brother,

all the more so her found property and the proceeds of her labor, which are monetary matters,

Rabbi Shimon leaves her according to her original status and agrees with Rabbi Elazar that her found property and the proceeds of her labor belong to the first husband.

And

however,

Rabbi Elazar,

who precedes Rabbi Shimon in the order of the Mishna—

does not agree with Rabbi Shimon,

who is stated after him, that the brother of the first husband performs yibbum.

For specifically with regard to

her found property and the proceeds of her labor, which are monetary matters, Rabbi Elazar does not impose a penalty

on Rabbi Elazar.

But with regard to intercourse, which

is a matter of

prohibition—

Rabbi Elazar imposes a penalty

and does not perform yibbum.

And both of them,

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon—

agree with Rabbi Yosei,

who is stated first, that she did not forfeit her marriage contract from the first husband.

For if

these,

her found property and the proceeds of her labor,

which she receives while living under him

[found property and the proceeds of her labor are given to the husband while she remains living under him]

are not penalized,

even though there is concern that he might retain her as his wife, since he treats her as wives are treated,

all the more so her marriage contract

is not penalized,

for she stands to take it and leave.

For a marriage contract is given to one who leaves her husband, and if she has a marriage contract, she will make an effort to leave him.

And

if

Rabbi Yosei did not agree with them,

with Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who hold that her found property and the proceeds of her labor belong to the first husband, and that if the first husband wishes, he performs yibbum,

then specifically

with regard to the marriage contract, for she stands to take it and leave,

since by taking the marriage contract she leaves him,

Rabbi Yosei does not impose a penalty

so that she can leave him.

But these,

her found property and the proceeds of her labor, which cause

her to remain living under him,

so that she continues to live under him—

Rabbi Yosei imposes a penalty

so that her husband will remove her from living under him.

And all the more so he imposes a penalty with regard to intercourse, so that his brother may not perform yibbum with her, as this is a matter of prohibition; even Rabbi Elazar disputes Rabbi Shimon concerning this and holds that she may not undergo yibbum.

But

Rabbi Yohanan said

the opposite:

The earlier ones—

agree with the latter ones.

The latter ones—

do not agree with the earlier ones:

Rabbi Yohanan explains his statement:

Rabbi Yosei

[who is stated first in the Mishna]

agrees with Rabbi Elazar

[who is stated after him], that the husband is entitled to her found property and the proceeds of her labor.

For

with regard to the marriage contract, which passes from him to her,

which is given from the husband to the wife, and she is the one who should be penalized, nevertheless

Rabbi Yosei does not impose a penalty

on her.

All the more so her found property and the proceeds of her labor, which pass from her to him

[from the wife to the husband].

Since by doing so one would cause the husband to suffer a loss, and he is not the one who should be penalized, certainly Rabbi Yosei does not impose a penalty.

And

if

Rabbi Elazar did not agree with him

[with Rabbi Yosei, who is stated earlier], that the woman does not forfeit her marriage contract,

then

with regard to her found property and the proceeds of her labor, which pass from her to him—

Rabbi Elazar does not impose a penalty

so as not to cause the husband a loss, since he is not the one whom we should penalize.

But with regard to the marriage contract, which passes from him to her—

Rabbi Elazar imposes a penalty

on her.

And both of them

[Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Elazar]

agree with Rabbi Shimon

that she undergoes yibbum through the first husband.

For

if,

when

these

[the marriage contract, found property, and proceeds of labor]

are from the time of life,

they belong to the husband,

they do not impose a penalty,

even though we might have said that she should be penalized so that she would leave him—

intercourse

through yibbum,

which is after the death

of the husband who would have been obligated to divorce her,

all the more so

they do not impose a penalty upon her.

And Rabbi Shimon does not agree with them

[with Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Elazar], that she should receive her marriage contract and he should receive her found property and the proceeds of her labor.

For

with regard to intercourse, which is after death—

Rabbi Shimon does not impose a penalty

on Rabbi Shimon.

But these, who are alive

belonging to the husband, since we must be concerned that if the bond between them is not severed, perhaps he will keep her as his wife and not divorce her—

Rabbi Shimon penalized

Rabbi Shimon.

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Shimon says

if she married without authorization [

on the basis of two witnesses, so that she did not require authorization from the rabbinical court] she is permitted to return to him:

Rav Huna said that Rav said: This is the halakha [

this was the halakha]!

Rav Naḥman said

to Rav Huna:

You are stealing words \-

Why do you need to do that!?

Why do you state the matter like someone sneaking away, having ruled without qualification that this is the halakha—in other words, that even the Sages in the first clause agree with it!?

But

if you hold like Rabbi Shimon—

say, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon”!

For your teaching—

does it follow Rabbi Shimon!?

If you indeed hold like Rabbi Shimon, you should have said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, since your words are the words of Rabbi Shimon!

And if you would say,

perhaps you will answer that

if I had said,

if I had said

“The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,”

it would have

implied

that the halakha follows him in all the matters in our Mishna,

even in the first clause,

in his first ruling, that the brother of the first husband may perform yibbum, and that the offspring of the first husband is not a mamzer; and in these matters the halakha does not follow him. Therefore, it is impossible to say, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.”

No, that is not an answer, because

you should have said,

you should have said that

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon—

in the final clause.

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult

for Rav Huna, who said that Rav ruled this way!

Rav Sheshet said,

concerning the statement of Rav Huna in the name of Rav, who said that the halakha follows Rabbi Shimon in the case of a woman who married on the basis of witnesses, and that she is permitted to return to her first husband:

I say,

I am saying,

that when Rav was dozing and lying down, he stated this teaching.

I say that Rav said this matter while drowsing in a lying position

I say that Rav said this while he was lying down and dozing!

For from Rav’s saying that this is the

“halakha” \-

-

By implication

you learn

that the Rabbis disagree

with this and hold that she is forbidden to return to her first husband even if she married on the basis of two witnesses.

But how can this be said, since there is no one who disputes that if she married on the basis of two witnesses, she is permitted to return to her husband, because

what else could she have done?

And if so,

she was coerced!

What else could she have done after hearing from two witnesses that her husband had died? If so, she is coerced—so why should she be forbidden!?

Furthermore,

he may be challenged from that which

was taught in a baraita: With regard to all forbidden sexual relations that they said

are forbidden as an erva, and with whom betrothal does not take effect—

they do not require a bill of divorce from him,

not even by rabbinic decree [the meaning of this will be explained in the Gemara below, on page 94b].

Except for a married woman who married

on the basis of one witness who testified that her husband had died, and she was permitted to marry

on the basis of

the ruling of

the rabbinical court,

and it was discovered that her husband was alive.

In her case, the Sages required her to receive a bill of divorce from the second husband, despite the fact that he is not her husband, as explained in our Mishna, because of the concern that people might say: “This one divorced her and that one married her,” as explained in the Gemara above, on page 89a.

And it is proven from this baraita that only when she married

on the basis of

the ruling of

the rabbinical court—

does she require a bill of divorce

from the second husband.

But if she married

on the basis of

two

witnesses,

and she did not need to obtain permission through a ruling of the rabbinical court, since she was coerced,

she does not require a bill of divorce

from the second husband.

And just as they did not penalize her by requiring her to receive a bill of divorce from the second husband, since she relied on two witnesses, so too they should not penalize her by treating her like a woman who committed adultery willingly and forbidding her to return to her first husband.

And Rav Sheshet infers: This baraita, which holds that a woman who marries on the basis of two witnesses is considered coerced, and which does not impose upon her the stringencies imposed upon a woman who marries on the basis of one witness—

who

said it? Surely it was stated by the Rabbis!

For

if you say,

perhaps we should say that

Rabbi Shimon

is the one who stated it—

that cannot be said.

For according to Rabbi Shimon, even if she married on the basis of one witness,

on the authority of the rabbinical court—

does she require a bill of divorce

from the second husband!?

According to Rabbi Shimon, the Sages did not penalize her at all by requiring her to receive a bill of divorce from the second husband, even in a case in which they impose other penalties. For Rabbi Shimon is not concerned that people might say, “This one divorced her and that one married her,” as is demonstrated by the baraita that the Gemara now cites.

But was it not taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: They treated

their ruling—

like a man’s intentional act with a woman!

A man and a woman who married on the basis of the testimony of one witness who testified that the woman’s husband had died, and they did so according to the ruling of the rabbinical court, which ruled that she was permitted to marry on the basis of one witness alone: If it became clear that the ruling had been erroneous, because the husband returned, the Sages imposed stringencies upon them, treating them as though they had acted not inadvertently but intentionally; and the woman is forbidden to her husband, as is the law concerning a woman who deliberately commits adultery while married.

But if they did so

on the basis of

the testimony of two

witnesses—

like a man’s inadvertent act with a woman.

If the man married the woman on the basis of two witnesses, so that they did not need a “ruling of the rabbinical court” for this, it is as though the woman had been penetrated inadvertently and under coercion by the second man.

And it is proven from these words of Rabbi Shimon that

in either case,

whether it is the woman who married on the basis of one witness,

or in either case,

whether it is the woman who married on the basis of two witnesses—

she does not require a bill of divorce

from the second husband!

For he compares the distinction between one who marries on the basis of one witness and one who marries on the basis of two witnesses to the distinction between a married woman who commits adultery intentionally and one who is penetrated inadvertently.

According to this definition, she does not require a bill of divorce from the second husband under any circumstances, in accordance with the law of a woman who commits adultery while married, who does not require a bill of divorce from the man with whom she committed adultery.

Rather, is it not

since, according to Rabbi Shimon, even a woman who marries on the basis of one witness does not require a bill of divorce—that the earlier baraita, which distinguishes between a woman who marries on the basis of one witness, who requires a bill of divorce from the second husband, and a woman who marries on the basis of two witnesses, who does not require a bill of divorce from him—

is the opinion of the Rabbis.

And Rav Sheshet proves: The fact that according to the Rabbis she does not require a bill of divorce from the second husband when she married him on the basis of two witnesses is due to the reason I stated, that she was coerced, because “what else could she have done?”

And for this same reason she is also permitted to return to her first husband, even according to the Rabbis.

It is therefore necessarily the case that Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis did not disagree on this matter.

And this is difficult for Rav, who said, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,” implying that according to the Rabbis she is forbidden to return to her husband even if she married on the basis of two witnesses!

The Gemara rejects Rav Sheshet’s proof:

Actually,

that baraita, which distinguishes between one witness and two with regard to the bill of divorce, is stated only according to

Rabbi Shimon, but according to the Rabbis, even when she marries on the basis of two witnesses, she requires a bill of divorce from the second husband.

And Rabbi Shimon agrees with the Rabbis that when she marries on the basis of one witness, she requires a bill of divorce from the second husband; and this baraita is stated according to Rabbi Shimon.

And regarding your difficulty from Rabbi Shimon’s words in the second baraita—“They treated them according to their ruling”—which implies that according to Rabbi Shimon even a woman who marries on the basis of one witness does not require a bill of divorce from the second husband, this should not be difficult for you.

Do not raise this difficulty.

And resolve it

by emending that baraita and stating in it

as follows:

Rabbi Shimon says:

If

they acted according to their ruling,

that is, the woman married on the basis of one witness in accordance with the ruling of the rabbinical court—

like a man’s intention toward a woman.

She is like an unmarried woman whom a man intended to betroth, who requires a bill of divorce from him.

And

the same law applies:

she requires a bill of divorce

from the second husband.

But the woman who marries

on the basis of witnesses—

they treated her

as though there were no intention of a man toward a woman.

She is like an unmarried woman with whom a man had intercourse without the intention of betrothing her,

and she does not require a bill of divorce

from him.

And since Rabbi Shimon concedes that she requires a bill of divorce from the second husband when she marries on the basis of one witness, it is indeed possible to say that even the first baraita is stated according to Rabbi Shimon, and that he is the one who distinguishes between a woman who marries on the basis of one witness and one who marries on the basis of two witnesses.

But according to the Rabbis, there is no distinction between them in this regard, and in both cases she requires a bill of divorce from the second husband.

If so, it is possible to say that according to the Rabbis, a woman who marries on the basis of two witnesses is forbidden to return to her husband, just like a woman who marries on the basis of one witness. And this is what Rav said!

Rav Ashi said

as well that the first baraita, which says that a woman who marries on the basis of a ruling of the rabbinical court requires a bill of divorce from him, is stated only according to Rabbi Shimon, and not according to the Rabbis.

Since according to the Rabbis, even a woman who marries on the basis of two witnesses requires a bill of divorce from the second husband,

therefore it provides no proof for Rav Sheshet’s claim against Rav.

But Rav Ashi does not emend Rabbi Shimon’s words in the second baraita, as the Gemara emended them [that the comparison is to one who has intercourse with a woman with the intention of betrothing her and to one who has intercourse with a woman without the intention of betrothing her].

Rather, he leaves Rabbi Shimon’s words as they were originally understood, and the comparison to one who has intercourse with a woman adulterously “intentionally” and to one who has intercourse with a woman adulterously “inadvertently” remains in Rabbi Shimon’s words as is.

Rather, Rav Ashi explains, you cannot infer from this wording of Rabbi Shimon, which compares the status of a woman who marries on the basis of testimony to that of a woman who commits adultery, as though he thereby disagrees with the Rabbis and holds that she does not require a bill of divorce at all from the second husband, even when she marries on the basis of one witness, just as an adulterous woman does not require a bill of divorce from the man with whom she committed adultery.

Since that baraita states this only

with regard to the prohibition

concerning her husband,

it teaches

it, and not with regard to the bill of divorce from the second husband,

and this is what

Rabbi Shimon said in it:

They acted according to their ruling—

like a man’s intentional act with a woman [

with a married woman].

And she is forbidden to her husband.

They acted

on the basis of witnesses—

like a man’s inadvertent act with a woman.

And she is not forbidden to her husband.

But with regard to the bill of divorce, the baraita did not speak at all. Therefore, although the baraita compares this case to “intentional” action, she nevertheless requires a bill of divorce from the second husband.