Yevamot 90b (צ:) — the Talmud in English

He said to him

Rav Ḥisda said to Rabba:

I wanted to challenge you further

I would like to raise another difficulty against you:

From

an uncircumcised man

who underwent circumcision, as Beit Hillel said: “One who separates from the foreskin is like one who separates from a grave,” and he requires sprinkling on the third and seventh days. Therefore, a convert who converted on the eve of Pesaḥ is considered impure and does not bring the Pesaḥ offering, since he still requires sprinkling. This sprinkling is only rabbinic, and nevertheless the Sages uprooted from him the mitzva of bringing the Pesaḥ offering, which he is obligated to perform by Torah law.

And from

sprinkling.

An impure person who requires sprinkling with water of the ḥatat, the Sages prohibited sprinkling him on Shabbat because of shevut, and they upheld their words even when he required sprinkling in order to become pure for the Pesaḥ offering. Thus, the Sages uprooted a matter of Torah law.

And

from

the circumcision knife

that, if it was necessary to bring it on Shabbat through courtyards, roofs, and enclosures—from one person’s courtyard to another’s, and likewise from roof to roof and from enclosure to enclosure, or from a courtyard to a roof or enclosure—which the Sages prohibited carrying through, the Sages upheld their words, and the Torah mitzva of circumcision is thereby uprooted.

And from

a linen sheet

with

ritual fringes

for, by Torah law, one may attach woolen ritual fringes to it, since the Torah permitted kilayim with ritual fringes; but the Sages decreed that one may not attach them, as a preventive decree on account of a night garment, which is not obligated in ritual fringes, lest one attach them to that garment as well.

Thus, the Sages uprooted a Torah mitzva.

And

from

the rams of Shavuot

that were slaughtered on Shabbat not for their own sake—for we maintain that they are valid as shelamim, except that they did not count toward the obligation of the rams of Shavuot. The Sages said: One may not sprinkle the blood, since the shevut concerning sprinkling blood was permitted to be overridden only in the case of the rams of Shavuot, and not in the case of ordinary shelamim. It follows that the Sages uprooted three positive commandments: (a) the mitzva of sprinkling the blood; (b) the mitzva of burning the sacrificial portions; and (c) the mitzva of eating the meat.

And

from

the shofar and lulav

on Shabbat, when the Sages uprooted the mitzva because of the concern that one might carry them four cubits in the public domain—thus, the Sages uprooted a Torah mitzva.

However,

now that you have taught us: “Passive inaction is not considered uprooting”—

all

the difficulties I wanted to raise

also

can be answered, since

“they involve passive inaction”,

and they are not difficulties against your position that the Sages do not have the power to uproot a matter of Torah law.

But

come and hear

another proof:

It is written in the Book of Devarim, chapter 18, concerning a true prophet’s instruction to alter a matter of Torah law—

“To him”

to the true prophet—

“you shall hearken.”

The verse teaches that

even if he tells you

the prophet:

“Transgress one of all the mitzvot in the Torah, such as Eliyahu on Mount Carmel,”

who instructed the people to offer a sacrifice on an altar at a time when private altars were prohibited, involving the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard and the punishment of karet for offering outside—

everything—

for the moment.

Only when the prophet instructs one to alter a matter of Torah law as a temporary measure

shall you heed him.

And we answer:

There it is different, as it is written: “To him you shall hearken.”

We nevertheless ask:

Can we derive from it

that, based on the law of a true prophet, a court can uproot a matter of Torah law everywhere, even through active conduct!?

And we answer:

For the purpose of making a protective fence

to establish a safeguard and enactment, as in the case of Eliyahu on Mount Carmel, who thereby turned the Children of Israel away from idolatry—

there it is different.

Come and hear

another proof:

A husband who sent a bill of divorce to his wife and wished to revoke it before it reached the woman’s possession would originally convene a court and revoke it in their presence, without informing the woman.

Rabban Gamliel instituted that they should not do so, for the sake of the betterment of the world, because sometimes the woman would not know that the bill of divorce had been revoked, and she would go and marry another man, and her children from him would be mamzerim.

And if, nevertheless,

he revoked it

the husband revoked it before a court and not in the woman’s presence—after Rabban Gamliel’s enactment—then this bill of divorce is

revoked; this is the statement of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He cannot—

after Rabban Gamliel’s enactment—

neither revoke it nor add to its condition

without the woman’s presence, for

if so, what force does the court’s enactment have—

which instituted that it may not be revoked except in the woman’s presence—

if it is not effective?

But here, by Torah law the bill of divorce is revoked

when the agent gives it to the woman, for until the bill of divorce reaches the woman’s possession, the husband can revoke it. As it is stated: “And he shall write for her a document of severance, and he shall give it into her hand”; until the bill of divorce reaches her hand, it is not a bill of divorce.

And because of “what force does the court

have if it is not effective,” the Sages validated the bill of divorce, and

are we thereby permitting a married woman to everyone!?

And we answer:

When one betroths

a woman, he

betroths her on the understanding of the Sages

he makes his betrothal conditional upon the will of the Sages, for at the time of betrothal he says that he betroths her as a wife “in accordance with the law of Moshe and Israel.”

And the Sages annulled—

through this bill of divorce, which is not a bill of divorce by Torah law—

the betrothal,

and they rendered the money that the husband gave her for the sake of betrothal a gift, for the property declared ownerless by a court is ownerless.

Ravina

challenged

Rav Ashi: It is understandable if he betrothed her with money,

for it is reasonable to say that the Sages retroactively rendered his money a gift.

But if

he betrothed her through intercourse—

what

annulment

can be said to exist,

for his intercourse with her, which he performed for the sake of betrothal—what did the Sages render it!?

He said to him

Rav Ashi [this is Rashi’s version] said to Ravina: Since he made his betrothal conditional upon the will of the Sages,

the Sages rendered

through this bill of divorce

his intercourse

which he performed for the sake of betrothal like

intercourse for licentious purposes

retroactively.

Come and hear

another proof:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: I heard that a court administers lashes

lashes,

and imposes punishments,

the death penalty, even

not according to the Torah.

And not

that they intend

to transgress the words of the Torah

by inventing a liability for death for one who is not liable,

but

because of a temporary need they may do so, in order

to make a protective fence for the Torah.

And there was an incident involving a man who rode a horse on Shabbat—

which is only a rabbinic prohibition of shevut—

in the days of the Greeks,

when the people were lax in transgressions, because they saw the distress of Israel, as the Greeks imposed decrees upon them, and the mitzvot were regarded with contempt in their eyes.

And they brought him before the court and stoned him,

as a full desecrator of Shabbat—

not because he deserved this, but

because

the time required it,

for the people were lax in transgressions.

And again, there was an incident involving a man who had intercourse with his wife

had intercourse with his wife

beneath a fig tree,

which is an exposed location,

and they brought him before the court and flogged him—

not because he deserved this, but

because

the time required it,

for they were lax with regard to forbidden sexual relations.

And we answer:

For the purpose of making a protective fence, it is different.

We learned in the Mishna:

Neither the first nor the second renders her impure:

And we explain:

From where do we derive this?

That is, the second husband certainly does not render her impure, since she is not his wife; but for what reason does the first husband not render her impure, as with other women whose husbands, being kohanim, render themselves impure for them?

For it is written:

“Say to the kohanim, no one shall render himself impure for a dead person among his people,

except for his close relative.”

And the Master said: “His close relative”—

this is his wife.

And it is written

further in that passage:

“He shall not render himself impure as a husband among his people, to profane himself”—

The verse teaches that

there is a husband who renders himself impure

for his wife,

and there is a husband who does not render himself impure

for her.

How so? He renders himself impure for his valid wife,

for the phrase “his close relative” applies to her,

but he does not render himself impure for his invalid wife,

since he is subject to the command “Arise and remove her,” and she is forbidden to him, as the wife of a kohen who was raped is forbidden to her husband.

We further learned in the Mishna that she is penalized—

neither the first nor the second is entitled to her found property:

The Gemara explains what the penalty is in the fact that the first husband is not entitled to her found property as other husbands are:

For

for what reason did the Sages say

why did the Sages say

that a woman’s found property belongs to her husband?—

So that he will not develop hatred toward her

so that he will not hate her, since he provides her with support while she does not give him her found property. But

here—

since the Sages instructed him to divorce her—

let him develop hatred and hatred

toward her, so that he will divorce her.

We further learned in the Mishna: Neither the first nor the second is entitled

to the proceeds of her labor:

The Gemara explains why the first husband is not entitled to the proceeds of her labor as other husbands are:

For

for what reason did the Sages say that the proceeds of her labor belong to her husband?

The reason is

because she eats support,

since the husband provides her support.

But

here, since she has no support,

the woman receives none, as we learned: “Nor support”; therefore,

the proceeds of her labor are not his,

the proceeds of her labor do not belong to the husband.

We learned in the Mishna:

And he may not annul her vows:

The Gemara explains the reason that the first husband cannot annul her vows as an ordinary husband can annul his wife’s vows, and what penalty this entails for her:

For what reason did the Torah say

why did the Torah say that the

husband may annul

vows involving affliction of the soul, such as “I will not bathe” or “I will not adorn myself,” —

so that she will not become repulsive

to her husband.

But

here,

since he is obligated to remove her—

let her become repulsive and repulsive.

We learned in the Mishna:

If she was an Israelite woman, she becomes disqualified from the priesthood: