Yevamot 90b — the Talmud in English

He said to him

Rav Ḥisda to Rabba:

I wanted to raise another difficulty before you

[I would have liked to raise another difficulty before you]:

From

an uncircumcised man

who circumcised, and Beit Hillel said: “One who separates from the foreskin is like one who separates from the grave,” and requires sprinkling on the third and seventh days. Therefore, a convert who converted on the eve of Passover is like one who is impure, and does not bring the Paschal offering, since he still requires sprinkling; and this sprinkling is only rabbinic, yet, nevertheless, the Sages uprooted from him the mitzva of offering the Paschal offering, to which he is obligated by Torah law.

And from

sprinkling.

One who is impure and requires sprinkling from the water of purification, they do not sprinkle upon him on Shabbat because of shevut, and the Sages upheld their words even when he required sprinkling in order to become pure for the Paschal offering. Thus, the Sages are found to have uprooted a matter from the Torah.

And

from

the circumcision knife

of circumcision: if they needed to bring it on Shabbat through courtyards, roofs, and enclosures [from one person’s courtyard to another’s courtyard, and likewise from roof to roof, and from enclosure to enclosure, and from a courtyard to a roof or an enclosure], where the Sages prohibited carrying, the Sages upheld their words, and the mitzva of circumcision from the Torah is thereby uprooted.

And from

a linen sheet

of linen

with tzitzit,

for by Torah law one may place woolen tzitzit upon it, since the Torah permitted mixed kinds in tzitzit; but the Sages decreed that one should not place them upon it, as a decree because of a night garment, which is not obligated in tzitzit, lest he place them upon that garment as well.

Thus, the Sages have uprooted a mitzva from the Torah.

And

from

the sheep of Shavuot

that one slaughtered on Shabbat not for their sake: for we hold that they are valid as peace-offerings, except that they do not count as fulfilling the obligation of the sheep of Shavuot. And the Sages said: He should not sprinkle the blood, for the shevut of sprinkling blood was permitted to be set aside only with regard to the sheep of Shavuot, and not with regard to ordinary peace-offerings. It follows that the Sages uprooted three positive commandments: a. the positive commandment of sprinkling the blood; b. the positive commandment of burning the sacrificial portions; c. the positive commandment of eating the meat.

And

from

the shofar and the lulav

on Shabbat: the Sages uprooted the mitzva because of “lest he carry it four cubits in the public domain.” Thus, the Sages have uprooted a mitzva of Torah law.

However,

now, since you have taught us: “sit and do nothing” is not considered uprooting—

all

the difficulties that I wanted to raise

also

can be answered, because

“they are ‘sit and do nothing,’”

and they are not difficulties against your position that the Sages do not have the power to uproot a matter from the Torah.

But

come and hear

another proof:

It is written in the Book of Deuteronomy [chapter 18], concerning the instruction of a true prophet to change a matter from the Torah—

“To him

to the true prophet—

you shall hearken.”

The verse teaches that

even if he tells you

the prophet:

“Transgress one of all the commandments of the Torah, such as Elijah on Mount Carmel,”

who instructed them to offer a sacrifice on a private altar at a time when private altars were prohibited, and there was here the prohibition of slaughtering outside [the Temple] and karet for offering outside—

Everything—

for the occasion.

Only if the prophet instructed one to change a matter from the Torah as a temporary directive,

he must be heeded.

And we answer:

“There it is different, for it is written: ‘To him you shall hearken.’”

And we still ask:

“And let us derive from it”

[let us learn from the law of the true prophet] that everywhere a court may uproot a matter from the Torah, even through “arise and do”!?

And we answer:

“For making a protective fence around a matter”

[to make a fence and an enactment], as with Elijah on Mount Carmel, who thereby brought Israel back from idolatry—

it is different.

Come and hear

another proof:

A husband who sent a bill of divorce to his wife and wished to revoke it before it reached the woman’s hand would initially convene a court and revoke it before them, and would not inform the woman.

And Rabban Gamaliel enacted that they should not do so, for the betterment of the world, because sometimes the woman does not know of the revocation of the bill of divorce, and goes and marries another man, and her children from him are mamzerim.

And if, nevertheless,

he revoked it

the husband before a court and not before the woman—after Rabban Gamaliel’s enactment—this bill of divorce is

revoked, the words of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: He cannot—

after Rabban Gamaliel’s enactment—

neither revoke it nor add to its condition

without the woman, for

if so, what power does the court have—

which enacted that he may revoke it only before the woman—

that is effective.

But here, by Torah law the bill of divorce is revoked

which the agent gives to the woman, since until the bill of divorce reaches the woman’s hand the husband can revoke it. For it is stated: “And he shall write for her a scroll of severance” and “he shall place it in her hand”; until the bill reaches her hand, it is not a bill of divorce.

And because of “what power does the court

have that is effective,” the Sages validated the bill of divorce, and

are we thereby permitting a married woman to everyone!?

And we answer:

One who betroths

a woman

betroths her with the understanding of the Sages

[he makes his betrothal dependent upon the understanding of the Sages], since at the time of betrothal he says that he betroths her as a woman “according to the law of Moses and Israel.”

And the Sages uprooted—

through this bill of divorce, which is not a bill of divorce by Torah law—

the betrothal,

and made the money that the husband gave her for the sake of betrothal a gift, since “the ownerlessness declared by a court is ownerlessness.”

He said

in astonishment

to him, Ravina to Rav Ashi: This works if he betrothed her with money,

for it can properly be said: the Sages retroactively made his money a gift.

But

if he betrothed her through intercourse—

what

uprooting

can be said to exist,

for his intercourse, by which he had intercourse with her for the sake of betrothal—what did the Sages make it!?

He said to him

[Rashi’s version] Rav Ashi to Ravina: Since he made his betrothal dependent upon the understanding of the Sages,

the Sages made

through this bill of divorce

his intercourse,

the husband’s intercourse that was for the sake of betrothal, like

promiscuous intercourse

retroactively.

Come and hear

another proof:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: I heard that a court strikes

lashes,

and punishes

with the punishment of death, even

not according to the Torah.

And not

that they intend

to transgress the words of the Torah

by inventing a liability for death for one who is not liable,

but

because of the need of the hour they can do this, in order

to make a safeguard for the Torah.

And there was an incident involving a certain man who rode a horse on Shabbat—

which is only a rabbinic prohibition of shevut—

in the days of the Greeks,

when they were then licentious in transgressions, because they saw the oppression of Israel: the Greeks were imposing decrees upon them, and the commandments had become despised in their eyes.

And they brought him to the court, and stoned him

as one who fully desecrates Shabbat—

not because he was fit for this, but

because

the hour required it,

for they were licentious in transgressions.

And again there was an incident involving a certain man who had intercourse with his wife

[had intercourse with his wife]

beneath a fig tree,

which is an exposed place,

and they brought him to the court, and flogged him—

not because he was fit for this, but

because

the hour required it,

for they were licentious regarding forbidden sexual relations.

And we answer:

“Making a protective fence around a matter is different.”

We learned in the Mishna:

“Neither this one nor that one renders her impure.”

And we explain:

“From where do we know it?”

That is to say: the second husband certainly does not render her impure, since she is not his wife; but why does the first not render her impure, as with other women, whose husbands, being priests, render themselves impure for them?

For it is written: “

Say to the priests, to a person he shall not render himself impure among his people.

Except for his relative who is close to him.”

And the Master said: “His relative”

—this is his wife.

And it is written

further in that passage:

“He shall not render himself impure, as a husband among his people, to profane himself”—

The verse teaches that

there is a husband who renders himself impure

for his wife,

and there is a husband who does not render himself impure

for her.

How is this so? He renders himself impure for his fit wife,

for we apply to her “his relative,”

but he does not render himself impure for his disqualified wife,

since he stands under the command “arise and remove her,” and she is disqualified for him, for a priest’s wife who was violated is forbidden to her husband.

We further learned in the Mishna that they penalize her—

“Neither this one nor that one is entitled to her found object”:

And the Gemara explains what the penalty is in the fact that the first husband is not entitled to her found object as are other women:

For

what is the reason the Sages said

[for what reason did the Sages say] that

a woman’s found object belongs to her husband?—

so that he should not come to hate her

[so that he should not hate her], since he provides her with sustenance while she would not give him her found object. But

here—

since the Sages instructed him to divorce her—

let him come to hate her, and hate

her, so that he will divorce her.

We further learned in the Mishna: Neither this one nor that one is entitled

to her handiwork:

And the Gemara explains why the first husband is not entitled to her handiwork as are other women:

For

what is the reason the Sages said that her handiwork belongs to her husband?

The reason is

because she eats sustenance,

the husband providing sustenance.

But

here, since she has no sustenance,

the woman, and as we learned: “Nor sustenance,” therefore

her handiwork is not his,

her handiwork does not belong to the husband.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And he does not annul her vows”:

And the Gemara explains the reason that the first husband does not annul her vows, as an ordinary husband annuls his wife’s vows, and what penalty this entails for her: for

what is the reason the Torah said

[for what reason did the Torah say] that

the husband annuls

vows involving affliction, such as “I shall not wash” or “I shall not adorn myself,” —

so that she should not become repulsive

to her husband.

But

here,

since he is obligated to remove her—

let her become repulsive and repulsive.

We learned in the Mishna:

“If she was an Israelite woman, she is disqualified from the priesthood”: