Yevamot 90a (צ.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Ḥisda raised another difficulty from the continuation of the beraita, where we learned:

“And she eats teruma on his account.”

But if a court cannot stipulate so as to uproot a matter of Torah law, then since according to Torah law she is a zarah and may not eat teruma, the Sages did not have the authority to uproot the Torah law and permit her to eat teruma!

Rabba rejected this: Indeed, she does not eat teruma forbidden by Torah law; rather, when they said “and she eats teruma on his account,” they meant

rabbinic teruma,

such as teruma from produce that grew in an unperforated flowerpot, which is not teruma according to Torah law and which non-priests are permitted to eat.

A. When a non-priest inadvertently eats teruma, he must set aside ordinary produce as payment for the teruma, in the quantity that he ate; this produce becomes teruma, and he gives it to the priest from whom he ate. This produce is called “payment for teruma.” If he ate teruma intentionally, he pays the priest even with money [the view of most of the Rishonim. However, Maimonides, in Chapter 10 of Terumot, disagrees].

B. If the teruma belonged to the non-priest—for example, if a non-priest inherited teruma from his maternal grandfather, who was a priest, and ate it—he sets aside ordinary produce as payment for the teruma, takes it for himself, and sells it to a priest at the value of teruma.

C. The Gemara in Pesaḥim [32a] was uncertain regarding the basis on which he sets aside produce as payment for the teruma: Is it according to the monetary value of the teruma that he ate, in which case it is called “he pays according to the value”? Or is it according to the quantity of teruma that he ate—for example, if he ate a kav, he pays a kav—in which case it is called “he pays according to measure”? The Gemara there explains a practical difference resulting from this uncertainty when the value of the teruma changed between the day he ate it and the day he came to pay, and the Rishonim disagreed as to the accepted halakha.

Ta shma,

Rav Ḥisda brought an additional proof that the Sages can uproot a matter of Torah law:

From that which was taught in a beraita:

If he ate

a non-priest

impure teruma

inadvertently, he

pays with pure ordinary produce.

And it becomes teruma, and is given to the priest from whom he ate the teruma [and the continuation of the Gemara explains that this is not in fact the law, since why should he pay with pure ordinary produce?].

If he nevertheless

paid with impure ordinary produce—

Sumakhos said in the name of Rabbi Meir:

If he paid

inadvertently

with impure ordinary produce, thinking that it was pure, then

his payment is valid.

But if he paid with impure ordinary produce

intentionally,

knowing that it was impure—

his payment is not valid

at all, because this is a penalty. He must pay again with other ordinary produce, which becomes teruma [this is the initial understanding].

And the Sages say: In both this case and that case, his payment is valid,

and it becomes teruma and the property of the priest. If the priest betrothed a woman with it, she is betrothed.

But he must pay again with pure ordinary produce,

as a penalty, and it does not become teruma [Rashi, Gittin 54a].

And we raised the following objection

to the words of Sumakhos: Why, if he paid with impure ordinary produce

intentionally—

knowing that the ordinary produce was impure—

is his payment not valid,

and why do we penalize him?

Even if he knows that it is impure, what element of “intentional” is present here? After all, he intended to make a proper payment, and

may blessing come upon him!

For

the Israelite

ate from him [

from the priest]

something that is not fit for him

even

during his period of impurity [

he ate impure teruma, which is not fit for a priest to eat even during his period of impurity], since impure teruma is forbidden to eat.

But he does pay

the priest with impure ordinary produce, which is

something fit for him during his period of impurity [

impure ordinary produce is fit for him during his period of impurity; but during his period of purity it is not fit for him, since he does not wish to become impure].

And Rava said,

in explanation,

and some say it was another authority [

this is the name of the Sage who explained it]:

The text is incomplete, and this is what it teaches:

If he ate impure teruma—

he pays with anything whatsoever.

Whether impure ordinary produce or pure ordinary produce.

But if

he ate pure teruma—

he pays with pure ordinary produce.

And if

he paid with impure ordinary produce

for the pure teruma that he ate—

Sumakhos said in the name of Rabbi Meir: If he acted inadvertently—

his payment is valid.

Intentionally—

his payment is not valid.

And the Sages say: Whether inadvertently or intentionally—

his payment is valid.

But he must pay again with pure ordinary produce.

Rav Ḥisda proves from this:

But here,

when he ate pure teruma,

according to Torah law, his payment is fully valid,

even when he pays with impure ordinary produce.

It follows

that

according to Torah law,

if he betroths a woman with them [

with the payment he received],

the priest

has effected her betrothal, since they belong to him.

And

nevertheless

the Sages said,

according to Sumakhos in the name of Rabbi Meir, that if he paid intentionally,

his payment is not valid, and

thereby

we release a married woman to the world [

we permit a married woman to everyone].

And this is the uprooting of a matter of Torah law!? Rabba rejected this:

What is meant by

“intentionally,

his payment is not valid,” as Rabbi Meir says—

It does not mean that the produce does not become the priest's property.

Rather,

the Israelite must

pay again

additional

pure ordinary produce [

he must pay again with additional pure ordinary produce].

We object:

If so, Sumakhos—

is identical to the Sages!

For they too said: “His payment is valid, but he must pay again with pure ordinary produce”!?

He said—

that is,

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika,

explained: There is no dispute between Sumakhos and the Sages as to whether his payment is entirely valid or not.

Rather, everyone agrees that he must pay again with pure ordinary produce; they disagree only as to whether he is penalized and required to do so even when he acted inadvertently.

According to Sumakhos in the name of Rabbi Meir, he is penalized only when he acted intentionally.

But according to the Sages, he is penalized even when he acted inadvertently—

they penalized inadvertence on account of intentional action—

that is the difference between them,

between Rabbi Meir and the Sages.

Rav Ḥisda raised another difficulty against Rabba, who holds that the Sages do not have the authority to uproot a matter of Torah law:

Ta shma,

from that which was taught in a beraita:

The blood

of a sacrifice

that became impure, and he sprinkled it

on the altar

inadvertently —

it is accepted [

on the basis of the verse “for acceptance for them before the Lord”; if this was a sin-offering, his sin was atoned for and he need not bring another sacrifice].

But if he sprinkled the impure blood

intentionally—

it is not accepted,

and he must bring another sacrifice in order to attain atonement.

But here, according to Torah law, the blood is accepted,

the impure blood sprinkled on the altar by virtue of the tzitz of the High Priest, which effects acceptance for the impurity of sacrifices—

as it was taught: For what does the tzitz effect acceptance?—

For the blood, the flesh, and the fats [

the sacrificial portions]

that became impure, whether inadvertently or intentionally, whether under duress or willingly,

whether belonging to an individual or to the community —

and

nevertheless

the Sages say that it is not accepted,

but he must bring another sacrifice.

And

it follows that he

again [

he returns]

brings ordinary property into the Temple courtyard,

if this is a sin-offering or a guilt-offering, since one may designate such an offering only if he has sinned and is obligated to bring it, and not after his sin has already been atoned for!

This demonstrates that the Sages do have the authority to uproot a matter of Torah law!?

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is meant by “it is not accepted,” as he says—

to permit the meat to be eaten [

the sprinkling of the blood ordinarily permits it to be eaten].

But as for the owners—

they have attained atonement through it,

and he need not bring another sacrifice; consequently, there is no issue of ordinary property in the Temple courtyard.

We nevertheless question this:

Ultimately, the eating of the meat is uprooted [

the mitzva of eating sacrificial meat is uprooted].

And

after all,

it is written

in the Torah as a positive mitzva to eat the sacrifices:

“And they shall eat them through whom atonement was effected,”

the verse teaches

that

the priests eat, and the owners attain atonement.

And if you say that the meat may not be eaten, you have uprooted a mitzva from the Torah!?

He said to him,

Rabba said to Rav Ḥisda:

The case of refraining from action is different.

For it is not an uprooting. And this is like eating meat, concerning which the Sages said, “Sit and refrain from action”—it is not an uprooting.