Yevamot 89a — the Talmud in English

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the last one gave her

the

last one,

who betrothed her but did not marry her,

a divorce document—

it did not disqualify her from the priesthood

on account of being a divorcee, since this is not a divorce document, because she had not been married to him.

By implication,

from what we learned—that she is not disqualified from the priesthood—we understand

that she does not require a divorce document,

that she does not require a divorce document even by rabbinic ordinance.

For if she required a divorce document,

for if indeed she required a divorce document—

why did it not disqualify her from the priesthood?

After all, this is no worse than the “scent of a divorce document,” which disqualifies her from the priesthood!?

Rather,

the Gemara explains the latter clause differently: it is stated there that if the second one betrothed her but did not marry her, she does not require a divorce document from him—

For this reason we do not require a divorce document in the

latter clause,

and we do not fear that people will say, “This one divorced her and this one betrothed her,” just as we require a divorce document from her in the first clause for this reason—

because

people say, when they see the second one release her without a divorce document, that surely the second one’s betrothal

the second one’s betrothal

was a mistaken betrothal [for example, where he betrothed her on condition that I am a priest, and it turned out that he was an Israelite], and for this reason he did not need to give her a divorce document, even though he betrothed her lawfully after the first one’s divorce [according to people’s understanding].

Suppose you say: In the

first clause—

where the second one married her—

also,

why do we require

a divorce document from the second one? After all,

people say, “The marriage was a mistaken marriage!”

Your answer: It is not comparable. For in the first clause

the Sages penalized her,

and we do not interpret the matter leniently, saying, “The betrothal was a mistaken betrothal”; rather, we fear that people will say, “It turns out that a married woman is released without a divorce document.”

And if you say:

In the latter clause also, let them penalize her!

For even in the latter clause, when the woman was betrothed but did not marry, we should have penalized her and feared that people would say that a married woman is released without a divorce document!?

This is not difficult, since the first clause is not comparable to the latter clause.

For

in the first clause, where she

married, and

she committed a transgression,

the woman committed a transgression, therefore

the Sages penalized her,

and we do not interpret the matter leniently.

But

in the latter clause, where she

was betrothed alone, and

did not commit a transgression—

the Sages did not penalize her,

and we interpret the matter leniently, saying that people will say, “The betrothal was a mistaken betrothal.”

We learned in the Mishna: And

she has no marriage contract

from either this one or that one:

The Gemara explains the reason that she has no marriage contract from the first one, even though he is her husband:

What is the reason the Sages instituted for her

a marriage contract? So that she would not be easy in his eyes to divorce;

whereas

this woman,

whom he is required to divorce, on the contrary,

should be easy in his eyes to divorce.

We learned in the Mishna:

She has neither produce, nor sustenance, nor worn-out articles:

The Gemara explains the reason:

The conditions of a marriage contract are considered like the marriage contract.

That is, just as they penalized her so that she would lose her marriage contract, so they penalized her so that she would lose everything defined as “the conditions of the marriage contract,” such as sustenance and clothing, which the husband is obligated to provide his wife.

And even though she has no marriage contract, nevertheless the husband is exempt from returning the produce of the usufruct property that he consumed.

This is so despite the fact that his entire right to consume the produce and to use her property without paying for the deterioration caused by using the property derives from a rabbinic ordinance, by which they instituted for him the right to consume produce and use usufruct property in exchange for his obligation to redeem her if she is taken captive [which is one of “the conditions of the marriage contract”].

And this woman, who has no conditions of the marriage contract, he is not obligated to redeem; and if so, apparently he should have returned the produce that he consumed, as well as the deterioration caused by using her property.

For the Sages penalized her so that her husband should not return to her the produce that he consumed, nor the “worn-out articles,” which are the deterioration suffered by the clothing or any other property as a result of his use of them.

We learned in the Mishna: And if she

took from this one and from that one—

she must return it:

And we raise the difficulty:

Is it obvious!?

And we explain:

Lest you say, since

she had already

seized it, we do not remove it from her [since she had already seized it, they did not decree that we remove it from her],

[since she had already taken possession, the Sages did not decree that we remove it from her],

it teaches us

that she must return even what she had seized.

We learned in the Mishna: And

the child is a mamzer

from this one and from that one:

We learned there

in tractate Terumot 2:2:

One may not separate teruma from the impure for the pure,

because of the loss to the priest.

And if he separated—

from the impure for the pure—

unintentionally—

his teruma is teruma.

But if he separated from the impure for the pure

intentionally—

he has accomplished nothing,

by rabbinic ordinance.

And we inquire concerning it:

What does “he has accomplished nothing” mean?

Rav Hisda said: He has accomplished nothing—

at all!

That is,

even that measure

[even that measure of produce that he separated, which by Torah law is complete teruma], the Sages removed the sanctity of teruma from it, and

it returns to its tevel status

[it returns to being tevel], as the reason is explained below.

Rav Natan bar Rabbi Oshaya said: He has accomplished nothing to rectify the remainder

that is pure,

but

that measure which he separated for teruma—

it is teruma,

and he gives it to a priest. The Gemara explains their dispute:

Rav Hisda—

did not say as Rav Natan bar Rabbi Oshaya—

For if you say

that the measure which he separated

is teruma—

sometimes he will be negligent and not separate.

There is concern that perhaps he will not separate another teruma to permit the pure remainder, since he sees that the teruma he separated is teruma.

The Gemara challenges Rav Hisda, who maintains, “He has accomplished nothing at all”:

What is different from that which we learned

in tractate Terumot [3:1]:

One who separates teruma from a cucumber, and it is found to be bitter,

one who separates

a watermelon, and it is found to be rotten—

it is

teruma,

and it does not return to its tevel status.

And he must separate again

in order to rectify the remainder.

And it is proven that we do not fear that perhaps he will be negligent and not separate in order to rectify the remainder!?

And the Gemara wonders at the challenge:

That Mishna is dealing with one who separates unintentionally, as we learned: “and it is found” to be bitter, “and it is found” to be rotten.

But is

unintentional like intentional—

can you compare them!?

Do you challenge from one who separated unintentionally in an improper manner against one who separated intentionally in an improper manner!?

After all, a distinction must be made:

One who separates

unintentionally did not commit a transgression.

We need not fear that if we say it is teruma, perhaps he will be negligent and not separate to rectify the remainder. For he is one who acted unintentionally and is not negligent, and therefore it is teruma.

But one who separates

intentionally—

has committed a transgression.

We must fear that if we say, “It is teruma, and he must separate again,” that person will be negligent, since he is suspect, and will not separate another teruma to rectify the remainder. Therefore the Sages said that his teruma should not be teruma at all. But the Gemara continues to challenge:

And we juxtapose

and challenge with the Mishna concerning one who separates

unintentionally

from the impure for the pure—

one

the words of the Mishna concerning one who separates

unintentionally

a cucumber and it is found to be bitter:

For

here—

in the case of one who separates from the impure for the pure—

it teaches

in the Mishna:

Unintentionally, his teruma is teruma,

and he does not even need to rectify the remainder.

Whereas

there,

concerning one who separates a cucumber and it is found to be bitter, where the case is one of unintentional action [“it is found”]—

it teaches

in the Mishna:

It is teruma, and he must separate again,

in order to rectify the remainder!?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of a cucumber that is found to be bitter,

the unintentional action is close to intentional

action,

for he should have tasted it.

He should have separated from a small amount of what he intended to separate, and tasted it to see whether it was fit to serve as teruma for the rest.

Therefore, although his status is that of one who acted unintentionally, so that there is no concern that perhaps he will be negligent, and the teruma that he separated is teruma, nevertheless he must rectify the remainder, since he is close to intentional action.

And the Gemara continues to challenge Rav Hisda:

And we juxtapose, according to Rav Hisda, the case of one who separates

intentionally

intentionally

from the impure for the pure,

against intentional action

in another Mishna, concerning another matter: for—

Here—

concerning one who separates from the impure for the pure—

it teaches: Intentionally, he has accomplished nothing.

Rav Hisda explained it to mean that it is not teruma at all, because we are concerned that he will be negligent and will not separate again.

Whereas

there,

in tractate Demai [5:10],

we learned:

One who separates from

produce that grew in a flowerpot

that is not perforated,

whose obligation of teruma is only rabbinic,

for

produce that grew in a

perforated flowerpot,

whose obligation of teruma is by Torah law—it is

teruma,

by rabbinic ordinance.

And he must separate again!

Since by Torah law this is separating from that which is exempt for that which is obligated, which is not teruma.

But challenge Rav Hisda: Why is it teruma? After all, there is concern that he will be negligent and will not separate again!?

And we answer:

With two vessels,

with grain that grew in two vessels, flowerpots, one perforated and the other not perforated—

he obeys,

the one who separated will accept the words of the Sages and obey them.

For if he is told: Since you separated from the grain that grew in the non-perforated flowerpot for the grain that grew in the perforated flowerpot, you must separate again in order to rectify the grain that grew in the perforated flowerpot, he will accept the statement, and will heed us even if he realizes that the teruma itself that he separated has not lost its sanctity. There is no need to decree lest he be negligent and not separate again.

But

with one vessel—

he does not obey!

In the impure and pure produce that grew in the same vessel, one perforated flowerpot, he will not heed us and separate again.

For when he is told that the impure teruma that he separated from the grain that grew in that flowerpot does not suffice to rectify the pure grain, but that he must give the impure teruma to a priest and also separate another pure teruma—he will not obey us; rather, he will give only the impure teruma to a priest.

And it is not specifically when the grain grew in the same vessel, but in any circumstance in which he does not see an essential difference between the teruma that he separated and the remainder that was left.

Therefore, it is preferable that the impure teruma return to its tevel status, and then he will again give pure teruma to a priest.

And now the Gemara challenges the position of Rav Natan bar Rabbi Oshaya, who disputes Rav Hisda:

And according to Rav Natan bar Rabbi Oshaya, who said, “One who separates from the impure for the pure intentionally,

the one who separates from the impure for the pure

has accomplished nothing

to rectify

the

remainder, but it is teruma,” and if the priest wishes, he may burn it immediately—

and if the kohen wishes, he may burn it immediately—