Yevamot 89a (פט.) — the Talmud in English

Even though

the latter

had

given her

a bill of divorce, after he betrothed her but did not marry her,

the bill of divorce—

does not disqualify her from marrying a priest

on account of divorce, since this is not a bill of divorce, as she was never married to him.

By inference,

from what we learned—that she is not disqualified from marrying a priest—we understand

that she does not require a bill of divorce,

as she does not require a bill of divorce even by rabbinic decree.

For if she required a bill of divorce,

for if she indeed required a bill of divorce—

why does it not disqualify her from marrying a priest?

For this is no less than “the fragrance of a bill of divorce,” which disqualifies her from marrying a priest!?

Rather,

the Gemara explains the latter clause differently. It teaches that if the second man betrothed her but did not marry her, she does not require a bill of divorce from him—

For this reason we do not require a bill of divorce in

the latter clause,

and we do not fear that people will say, “This one divorced her and that one betrothed her,” as we require a bill of divorce in the first clause for this reason—

because

people will say, when they see the second man take her out without a bill of divorce, that surely the second man’s betrothal

was

a mistaken betrothal [for example, he betrothed her on the condition that he was a priest, and it turned out that he was an Israelite], and for this reason he did not need to give her a bill of divorce, even though he betrothed her lawfully after the first man’s divorce [according to popular opinion].

Let us say: In

the

first clause—

where the second man married her—

also,

why do we require a bill of divorce from the second man? After all,

people will say that the marriage was mistaken!?

The answer is: The cases are not comparable. In the first clause,

the Sages imposed a penalty,

and we do not interpret the matter leniently by saying that people will say, “The betrothal was mistaken.” Rather, we fear that people will say: “A married woman has been found leaving without a bill of divorce.”

And if you say: In

the latter clause as well, let them impose a penalty!

For even in the latter clause, when the woman was betrothed but did not marry, we should have penalized her and feared that people would say that a married woman has left without a bill of divorce!?

This is not difficult, since the first clause and the latter clause are not comparable.

For in

the first clause, when she

married, she

committed a transgression,

the woman committed a prohibition, therefore

the Sages imposed a penalty upon her,

and we do not interpret the matter leniently.

But in

the latter clause, when she

was merely betrothed and

did not commit a transgression—

the Sages did not impose a penalty upon her,

and we interpret the matter leniently, saying that people will say: “The betrothal was mistaken.”

We learned in the Mishna: And

she has no marriage contract

from either one:

The Gemara explains why she has no marriage contract from the first man, even though he is her husband:

For what reason did the Sages institute

a marriage contract? So that it would not be easy in his eyes to divorce her;

whereas

this woman,

whom he is obligated to divorce, on the contrary,

will be easy in his eyes to divorce.

We learned in the Mishna:

She has neither the produce nor sustenance nor worn garments:

The Gemara explains the reason:

The conditions of a marriage contract are considered equivalent to the marriage contract itself.

That is, just as they penalized her by causing her to forfeit her marriage contract, so they penalized her by causing her to forfeit everything defined as “the conditions of a marriage contract,” such as sustenance and clothing, which the husband is obligated to provide his wife.

And although she has no marriage contract, the husband is nevertheless exempt from returning the produce of her malkog property that he consumed.

This is so even though his entire right to consume the produce and use her property without paying for the depreciation caused by his use derives from a rabbinic enactment, which granted him the right to consume produce and use malkog property in exchange for his obligation to redeem her if she were taken captive [which is one of “the conditions of a marriage contract”].

This woman, who has no conditions of a marriage contract, need not be redeemed by him; consequently, it would seemingly be necessary for him to return the produce he consumed, as well as the depreciation caused by his use of her property.

Nevertheless, the Sages penalized her by decreeing that her husband need not return either the produce he consumed or the “worn garments,” namely, the depreciation suffered by the clothing or any other property as a result of his use of it.

We learned in the Mishna: And if

she took from both this one and that one—

she must return it:

We raise an objection:

Is this not obvious!?

We explain:

Lest you say that, since she

had already

taken possession, we do not remove it from her

[since she had already taken possession, the Sages did not decree that we remove it from her],

it teaches us

that she must return even what she had taken possession of.

We learned in the Mishna: And

the offspring is a mamzer

from both this one and that one:

We learned there

in tractate Terumot (2:2):

One may not separate teruma from impure produce for pure produce,

because of the loss to the priest.

And if he separated

from impure produce for pure produce

unintentionally—

his teruma is teruma.

But if he separated from impure produce for pure produce

intentionally—

he has accomplished nothing,

by rabbinic law.

We inquire: What is meant by

“he has accomplished nothing”?

Rav Ḥisda said: He has accomplished nothing—

absolutely nothing!

That is,

even that measure

[even that measure of produce that he set aside, which by Torah law is fully valid teruma], the Sages removed the sanctity of teruma from it, and

it returns to its untithed status

[it again becomes untithed produce], as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

Rav Natan bar Rabbi Oshaya said: He has accomplished nothing in order to rectify the

pure

but

that measure that he set aside as teruma

is teruma,

and he gives it to a priest. The Gemara explains their dispute:

Rav Ḥisda—

did not state his opinion in accordance with Rav Natan bar Rabbi Oshaya—

For if you say

that the measure he set aside

is teruma—

there are times when he will act negligently and not separate,

as there is concern that he will not separate other teruma to permit the pure remainder, since he sees that the teruma he separated is valid.

The Gemara raises an objection against Rav Ḥisda, who holds that “he has accomplished nothing at all”:

What is different from that which we learned

in tractate Terumot (3:1):

One who separates teruma from a cucumber, and it is found to be bitter,

one who separates

a watermelon, and it is found to be rotten—

this is

teruma,

and it does not return to its untithed status.

And he should separate teruma again

in order to rectify the remainder.

This proves that we do not fear that he will act negligently and fail to separate teruma to rectify the remainder!?

The Gemara questions this objection:

That Mishna is dealing with one who acted unintentionally, as we learned: “It is found to be bitter,” and “it is found to be rotten.”

But can

an unintentional act be compared to an intentional act

!?

Can you raise a difficulty from one who unintentionally separated improperly against one who intentionally separated improperly!?

After all, the cases can be distinguished:

One who separates

unintentionally does not commit a transgression.

There is no reason to fear that if we say that it is valid teruma, he will act negligently and fail to separate in order to rectify the remainder. He acted unintentionally, not negligently; therefore, it is valid teruma.

But one who separates

intentionally—

is committing a transgression.

There is reason to fear that if we say, “It is teruma, and he should separate again,” that person, who is suspected of acting negligently, will fail to separate another teruma to rectify the remainder. Therefore, the Sages said that his teruma is not teruma at all. But the Gemara continues to challenge this:

And juxtapose

we have a contradiction between the Mishna’s statements concerning one who separates in

an unintentional

manner from impure produce for pure produce—

one

statement of the Mishna concerning one who separates in

an unintentional

manner a cucumber that is found to be bitter:

For

here—

in the case of one who separates from impure produce for pure produce—

it teaches

in the Mishna:

If he acted unintentionally, his teruma is teruma,

and he does not even need to rectify the remainder.

Whereas

there,

in the case of one who separates a cucumber that is found to be bitter, which is also an unintentional act [“it is found”]—

it teaches

in the Mishna:

It is teruma, and he should separate again,

in order to rectify the remainder!?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of a cucumber that is found to be bitter,

the unintentional act is close to intentional,

as

he should have tasted it.

He should have separated from a small portion of what he intended to separate and tasted it to see whether it was fit to be teruma for the remainder.

Therefore, although his status is that of one who acted unintentionally, and there is no concern that he will act negligently, and the teruma he separated is valid, he must nevertheless rectify the remainder, since his act was close to intentional.

The Gemara continues to challenge Rav Ḥisda:

And juxtapose, according to Rav Ḥisda, the case of one who intentionally separates

from

impure

produce for pure produce with

an intentional act

in another Mishna and concerning another matter, for:

Here—

in the case of one who separates from impure produce for pure produce—

it teaches: If he acted intentionally, he has accomplished nothing.

Rav Ḥisda explained that it is not teruma at all, because we fear that he will act negligently and not separate again.

Whereas

there,

in tractate Demai (5:10),

we learned:

One who separates teruma from

produce that grew in an

unperforated

planter, whose obligation of teruma is only rabbinic,

for

produce that grew in a

perforated

planter, whose obligation of teruma is by Torah law—this is

teruma,

by rabbinic law.

And he should separate again!

Since by Torah law this is separating from produce exempt from teruma for produce obligated in teruma, which does not constitute teruma.

This is difficult for Rav Ḥisda: Why is it teruma? Surely there is concern that he will act negligently and not separate again!?

And we answer:

With two vessels,

with produce growing in two vessels, planters, one perforated and the other unperforated—

he will obey,

the one who separated will accept the Sages’ words and obey them.

If he is told: Since you separated from produce that grew in an unperforated planter for produce that grew in a perforated planter, you must separate again in order to rectify the produce that grew in the perforated planter, he will accept this instruction and heed us, even if he discovers that the teruma itself that he separated has retained its sanctity. There is no need to decree that he might act negligently and fail to separate again.

But

with one vessel—

he will not obey!

In the case of impure and pure produce that grew in the same vessel, one perforated planter, he will not heed us and separate again.

For when he is told that the impure teruma he separated from the produce that grew in that planter does not rectify the pure produce, and that he must both give the impure teruma to a priest and separate another, pure teruma, he will not obey us; rather, he will give the impure teruma alone to the priest.

And this applies not specifically when the produce grew in the same vessel, but in any case where he does not perceive a substantial difference between the teruma he separated and the remainder that was left.

Therefore, it is preferable that the impure teruma return to its untithed status, after which he will separate pure teruma and give it to a priest.

The Gemara now raises a difficulty according to Rav Natan bar Rabbi Oshaya, who disagrees with Rav Ḥisda:

And according to Rav Natan bar Rabbi Oshaya, who said, “One who intentionally separates from impure produce for pure produce

does not accomplish anything

to rectify

the

remainder,

but it is teruma,”

and if the priest wishes, he may burn it immediately—