Yevamot 88b — the Talmud in English

And the one who cohabited with her -

is subject to a provisional guilt-offering,

as is the law of anyone who inadvertently transgresses a prohibition for which one is liable to a sin-offering: if it is uncertain whether he transgressed the prohibition, he is liable to a provisional guilt-offering—?!

And

Rav Sheshet said:

here it is speaking

of a case where she married one of her witnesses,

who says, “It is certain to me that her husband died,” and therefore he is exempt from a provisional guilt-offering.

But there is still cause for wonder:

she,

the woman,

herself -

is subject to a provisional guilt-offering,

for she does not know which of the witnesses is telling the truth—?!

And we answer:

when she says

the woman also,

“It is certain to me,”

through identifying signs that her husband gave me, that he is no longer alive, and my heart does not trouble me. A provisional guilt-offering applies only to one whose heart troubles him.

And we raise an objection concerning this:

if so,

that it is speaking when she herself says, “It is certain to me

what is the point of stating it,”

what novelty is there in the matter!? But surely:

even Rabbi Menahem son of Rabbi Yosei -

who holds in the beraita [below, immediately afterward] that when two witnesses oppose two witnesses, she must leave even if she already married and says, “It is certain to me”—

did not say

this

except when

first

witnesses

who said that her husband had not died came and contradicted the first witnesses who had said that her husband had died,

and afterward she married.

But

if

she married

first on the basis of two witnesses who permitted her,

and

only

afterward witnesses came

who said that her husband had not died—

he did not say

that she must leave.

And if so, what novelty is there in Rav’s statement that she does not leave? After all, this woman married before the witnesses who contradicted the first ones, who had testified to her husband’s death, came.

For it was taught:

Two

witnesses

say: He died,

the husband,

and two say: He did not die,

the husband.

Or

two say: She was divorced,

the woman,

and two say: She was not divorced—

she may not marry.

And if she married -

she need not leave.

Rabbi Menahem son of Rabbi Yosei says: She must leave.

Rabbi Menahem son of Rabbi Yosei said: When do I say, “She must leave”? -

When witnesses came and afterward she married.

But,

if

she married

on the basis of witnesses who testified that her husband had died,

and

only

afterward witnesses came -

she need not leave.

And we answer:

when Rav said this, he too meant -

when witnesses came.

That is, after witnesses testified that her husband had died, the husband came before us, and two witnesses testified that he indeed was the husband,

and afterward she married.

And Rav came

to exclude the view of Rabbi Menahem son of Rabbi Yosei,

who holds that in such a case she must leave; rather, Rav ruled that the halakha follows the Sages who disagreed with him, and they hold that even in such a case she need not leave.

And some say

to explain Rav’s words according to their plain meaning: she first married, and afterward her husband came, and therefore she need not leave.

And regarding your difficulty: if so, what is the point of stating it? It is not a difficulty!

For

the reason Rav says she need not leave is specifically that she married and afterward witnesses came.

But

But if witnesses came and afterward she married -

she

must leave.

And

in accordance with whom

are Rav’s words? -

In accordance with Rabbi Menahem son of Rabbi Yosei.

And this is what Rav teaches us.

Rava raised an objection

against Rav’s words from what was taught:

From where is it derived that if he does not wish

the kohen to sanctify himself and to separate himself from impurity and from prohibited women,

we drive him away

the kohen—sanctify him against his will?!

The verse therefore says: “And you shall sanctify him,”

“for he offers the bread of your God”—sanctify him

against his will.

And Rava proves:

What are the circumstances?

In what case is the beraita speaking?

For if the kohen wishes to transgress a definite prohibition, or even a doubtful prohibition, no verse is needed for this, since it is obvious that he is compelled and prevented from transgressing a prohibition—

Rather, certainly, it is speaking of a case where witnesses came and said that her husband had died, and the woman married a kohen on their testimony. And afterward witnesses came and said that her husband had been alive at the time when this kohen cohabited with her, and now he has died; but she became a zona when she was penetrated, and she is forbidden to a kohen. And her kohen husband did not wish to divorce her.

If you say,

if it is said that it is speaking in a case

where she did not marry one of her witnesses, and

even

did not say, “It is certain to me”,

that my husband died—

It is impossible to say this. For—

does

it need to be stated that we drive him away,

that we compel the kohen to divorce her?!

After all, she is a doubtful zona, and it is obvious that he is compelled to do so!

Rather, is it not

speaking here in a case

where she married one of her witnesses and said, “It is certain to me”?

And Rava proves: nevertheless,

it teaches: “We drive him away.”

Thus,

it is demonstrated from this beraita that

we remove her

we take her out

from him,

even when she married one of her witnesses and claims, “It is certain to me that my husband died,” and contrary to Rav, who holds that if she married before the witnesses came, she need not leave when she married one of her witnesses and says, “It is certain to me”—?!

And we answer:

the prohibition applying to the priesthood is different.

And if you wish, say: What is the meaning of “We drive him away”? -

The intention is not that the court should remove him and separate him from a woman whom he has already married.

Rather, it is like a case where witnesses came and said that her husband had died, and they permit her to marry, and the Torah said:

“Drive him away through witnesses!”

The court is obligated to trouble itself to seek witnesses who will contradict the first ones who permitted her, in order to sanctify the kohen so that he will not marry her. For if he marries her and cohabits with her while her husband is still alive, she will become forbidden to him forever as a zona, and we require “And you shall sanctify him.” But once she has married, she need not leave.

And if you wish, say:

here, in the beraita, it is speaking

when witnesses came

who contradicted the witnesses of the death,

and afterward she married, and

according to

Rabbi Menahem son of Rabbi Yosei it is

who says: since the witnesses came first, she must leave. And Rav also agrees with this.

Rav Ashi

disagrees with the entire preceding discussion, which explains Rav’s words, “If she married on the basis of two witnesses, she need not leave,” as referring to her second husband. And

he says:

What is the meaning of “she need not leave” that Rav says? -

She need not leave her first permitted status

to her husband.

For if she married another husband on the basis of two witnesses, and afterward her husband came, we do not say, “She must leave this one and that one,” as they said when she married on the basis of one witness. Rather, she is permitted to return to being permitted to her first husband as she had been, since they imposed the penalty of saying “she must leave” only when she married on the basis of one witness.

And we raise an objection to Rav Ashi’s explanation of Rav’s words:

Rav already said it once [

he had already said this, so why did he need to say it again]?!

For we learned

in our Mishna: Rabbi Shimon says, if she

married [

on the basis of witnesses]

without permission [

of the court],

she is permitted to return to him,

her first husband.

And

concerning this

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: This is the halakha,

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

And we answer:

one was stated by implication from the other.

Rav did not say it twice; rather, he stated one teaching, and from it we learned his second teaching, for everything amounts to one matter.

Shmuel said: They taught

in our Mishna that she must leave her second husband

only when she does not contradict him,

the witness who testifies that her husband is alive.

But if she contradicts him,

the woman,

she need not leave

her second husband.

And the Gemara asks:

With what are we dealing?

If you say

if it is said

with two,

that there are two witnesses testifying about the man standing before us that he is her husband, and contradicting the first witness who testified that her husband had died—

It is certainly impossible to say this.

For

when she contradicts him -

what does it amount to [

what benefit is there in her contradiction], and is she trustworthy more than two witnesses, so how could Shmuel say: “But if she contradicts him—she need not leave”?!

Rather,

necessarily, it is speaking

with

one

witness

alone, who testified about the man standing before us that he is her husband, and she contradicts him, saying: “This is not my husband,” and therefore she need not leave—

This too is difficult, for you should infer from here:

The reason is that she contradicts him,

the woman contradicting the witness; therefore she need not leave her second husband,

but if she remained silent -

she must leave?!

But Ulla said: Everywhere that the Torah believed

one witness -

there are two here,

witnesses.

And the statement of one has no standing in the presence of two!

And if so, even if she remained silent, how is the witness who testifies that her husband is alive trusted to contradict the witness whom the Sages trusted to testify that her husband had died, when the witness who permitted her is like two, since she married on his word,

and the statement of one does not stand in the place of two?

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With disqualified witnesses [

and for example, there were two women] who testify about the man standing before us that he is her husband, and contradict the first witness who testified that her husband had died. And if she had not contradicted them, they would have been trusted to remove her from her husband,

and in accordance with Rabbi Nehemiah,

as will be explained below—

But if she denies the other two women, and says that this is not her husband, the testimony of the women is entirely nullified, and even without the first witness [who also denies them].

For every person is reliable concerning himself with regard to prohibitions, in a matter that is clear to him, unless there is valid testimony that contradicts his words.

And since the words of the witnesses testifying concerning the man standing before us that he is her husband have been nullified, she is again permitted to marry on the basis of the first witness, who testifies concerning the death of her husband.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Nehemiah says: Wherever the Torah made one witness reliable

there is no law of testimony in the matter, for even one witness is reliable in it; therefore disqualified witnesses are reliable like valid witnesses, and

follow the majority of views.

And

it is not necessary [to say] that if two disqualified witnesses testified against one disqualified witness, they follow the majority of views, but even

they made two women concerning one man [

against one valid witness]

like two men concerning one man,

and the two are reliable.

Therefore, even with two women testifying against one man, and even if she has already married on his word, follow the majority, and they are reliable.

Accordingly, if she does not deny the women, they are reliable to remove her from her husband, against the one valid witness who testifies concerning the death of her husband, even though she has already married on his word.

And if you wish, say: Wherever there comes

one

valid witness from the outset,

at the beginning, and she married on his word, then

even a hundred women

testifying against him—

are considered like one witness!

And just as if one witness had come first, the second witness would not have been reliable to deny the first witness, on whose word she had already married, as Ulla said: Wherever the Torah made one witness reliable, here he is like two, and the words of one have no standing in the place of two—

so even a hundred women are nothing in relation to the first witness, since the Sages made him reliable like two, once she married on his word.

And

here, concerning Rav’s words, who said: If she does not deny the testimony, she must leave—

in what case are we dealing?—

In a case where a woman came at the outset

and testified that her husband had died [and she is reliable, for even a disqualified person is valid to testify in a place where one valid witness is sufficient], and the woman married on her word. And when two women came and contradicted the first, you should follow the majority of views to remove her from her husband, since the woman who came to marry is not denying them.

And explain Rabbi Nehemiah’s [statement] in this way,

for this is what Rabbi Nehemiah said [and he did not say: They made two women concerning one man like two men concerning one man]—

Rabbi Nehemiah says: Wherever the Torah made one witness reliable,

even disqualified persons are reliable,

and follow the majority of views.

And they made two women concerning one woman like two men concerning one man

to make the two women more reliable than the one woman, even though the woman had already married on the word of the first.

But two women concerning one man—

are considered like half and half!

There is no law of “majority of views” here, but it is as though one witness came against the first witness; and in such a case the first, on whose word she married, would be reliable, and not the second, as Ulla said.

We learned in the Mishna:

She requires a bill of divorce from this one and from that one:

And we raise an objection:

Granted, from

the

first husband you require a bill of divorce [she requires a bill of divorce] in order to marry another, since she is entirely his wife.

But, from

her

second husband—

why

does she require a bill of divorce in order to marry another? After all, his intercourse

is merely promiscuous intercourse,

since his betrothal did not take effect, because she is a married woman; so why does she require a bill of divorce from the second one?!

Rav Huna said:

The Sages required her to receive a bill of divorce from the second one, because of

a decree: lest people say

that the event did not happen in this way, that she married the second after she heard of her husband’s death, for they see that the husband is alive before us.

Rather, they will say that this is what happened:

This one divorced [her first husband],

and this one married [her second husband] his fellow’s divorcee after him,

and if he removes her without a bill of divorce,

it turns out that a married woman is leaving without a bill of divorce.

The Gemara expresses astonishment at this explanation:

If so, the final clause

of our Mishna [which is taught below, on folio 92a]

which teaches

in it:

They said to her, “Your husband has died,” and she became betrothed,

but she had not yet entered the wedding canopy with the second,

and afterward her husband came—

behold, she is

permitted to return to him,

to her first husband, for she did not commit promiscuous intercourse, nor was she close to promiscuous intercourse, since she did not marry.

And it implies that she does not require a bill of divorce from the second, but returns to the first immediately.

And according to your words, that you are concerned lest people say—

there too

she should require a bill of divorce from the second, because

let us say [that people will say]:

This one divorced, and this one became betrothed! And it turns out that a married woman is leaving without a bill of divorce.

And we answer:

She always requires a bill of divorce

from the second, and afterward returns to the first, because of “lest people say.”

And we raise an objection to this:

If so, since you are concerned lest people say, and therefore you require her to receive a bill of divorce from the second when he betrothed her, they will come to say: The first divorced, and the second betrothed her, and afterward the second divorced her, and

this one is found,

the first whom she returned to—

taking back his divorcee after she had become betrothed,

which is forbidden to him?!

And we answer: Our Mishna is

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben Kippar, who said:

only

from the marriage

of the other

is

she forbidden

to return to her first husband, his divorcee.

But

from the betrothal

of the other—behold, she is

permitted

to return.

But we still raise an objection:

Now, from the fact that the final clause teaches [there, on folio 92a]:

But

from the betrothal

of another man, she is

permitted

to return.

But we still object:

For since the latter clause teaches

[there, on page 92a]: