Yevamot 88b (פח:) — the Talmud in English

And the one who has intercourse with her -

stands liable for an uncertain guilt-offering,

as is the law concerning anyone who unwittingly transgresses a prohibition for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering: If it is uncertain whether he transgressed, he is liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering?!

And

Rav Sheshet said:

Here the case is

for example, when she married one of her witnesses,

who says, “It is clear to me that her husband died,” and therefore he is exempt from an uncertain guilt-offering.

And there is still reason to wonder:

She—

the woman—

herself—

stands liable for an uncertain guilt-offering,

as she does not know which of the witnesses is telling the truth?!

And we answer:

When she says,

the woman also,

“It is clear to me”

through identifying signs that her husband gave her, that he is not alive, and my heart has no misgivings. An uncertain guilt-offering is brought only by one whose heart has misgivings.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if the case is one in which she herself says, “It is clear to me,”—

what is this teaching us?

What novelty is there in the matter? For:

Even Rabbi Menahem bar Rabbi Yosei—

who holds in the beraita [below, immediately afterward] that when two witnesses are contradicted by two witnesses, she must leave even if she has already married and says, “It is clear to me”—

said

this

only when

first

witnesses

who said that her husband had not died came and contradicted the first witnesses, who had said that her husband had died,

and afterward she married.

But

if she

married

first, on the basis of two witnesses who permitted her to do so,

and

only

afterward witnesses came

who said that her husband had not died—

he did not say

that she must leave.

If so, what novelty is there in Rav’s statement that she need not leave? This woman married before the witnesses who contradicted the first witnesses, who had testified that her husband had died, came.

As it was taught:

Two

witnesses

say: “He died,”

the husband,

and two say: “He did not die,”

the husband.

Or,

two say: “She was divorced,”

the woman,

and two say: “She was not divorced”—

she may not marry.

And if she married—

she need not leave.

Rabbi Menahem bar Rabbi Yosei says: She must leave.

Rabbi Menahem bar Rabbi Yosei said: When do I say, “She must leave”—

when the witnesses came and afterward she married.

But,

if she

married

on the basis of witnesses who testified that her husband had died,

and

only

afterward witnesses came—

she need not leave.

And we answer:

When Rav said this, as well, he meant

when the witnesses came.

That is, after witnesses testified that her husband had died, the husband came before us, and two witnesses testified that he was indeed the husband,

and afterward she married.

And Rav came

to exclude the position of Rabbi Menahem bar Rabbi Yosei,

who holds that in such a case she must leave; rather, Rav ruled that the halakha is in accordance with the Sages who disagreed with him and hold that even in such a case she need not leave.

Some say that Rav’s words should be explained according to their simple meaning: She married first, and afterward her husband came, and therefore she need not leave.

And regarding the difficulty raised against you: If so, what is this teaching us?

It is not a difficulty!

For

it is specifically because she married and afterward the witnesses came that Rav says she need not leave.

But

if the witnesses came and afterward she married—

she

must leave.

And

in accordance with whom

are Rav’s words?

In accordance with Rabbi Menahem bar Rabbi Yosei.

And this is what Rav teaches us.

Rava raised an objection against Rav’s words from that which was taught:

to Rav’s words from what is taught in a beraita:

From where is it derived that if a

koen does not wish to sanctify himself and separate from impurity and from disqualified women,

they force him—

they sanctify the koen against his will?!

The verse states: “And you shall sanctify him,

for he offers the bread of your God”—sanctify him

against his will.

And Rava proves:

What are the circumstances?

What case is the beraita discussing?

If the koen wishes to transgress a definite prohibition, or even a doubtful prohibition, this verse is not necessary, since it is obvious that he is compelled and prevented from transgressing a prohibition—

Rather, it must certainly be discussing a case in which witnesses came and said that her husband had died, and the woman married a koen on their testimony. Then witnesses came and said that her husband had been alive at the time this koen had intercourse with her, and that he has now died; but she became a zona when he had intercourse with her, and she is forbidden to a koen. The koen, her husband, did not wish to divorce her.

If you say,

if we say that the case is one

where she did not marry one of her witnesses, and

even

did not say, “It is clear to me”

that my husband died—

It cannot be said so. For—

does it

need to be stated that they force him—

that they compel the koen to divorce her!?

She is, after all, a woman of uncertain zona status, and it is obvious that he is compelled to do so!

Rather, is it not that the case is

necessarily one

where she married one of her witnesses, and said, “It is clear to me”?

And Rava proves: Nevertheless,

it teaches: “They force him.”

Apparently,

the beraita proves that

they remove her

from

him,

even when she married one of her witnesses and claims, “It is clear to me that my husband died,” contrary to Rav, who holds that if she married before the witnesses came, she need not leave when she married one of her witnesses and says, “It is clear to me”?!

And we answer:

The prohibition of the priesthood is different.

And if you wish, say: What does “They force him”

mean? It does not mean that the court removes him and separates him from a woman whom he has already married.

Rather, it is a case in which witnesses came and said that her husband had died, and they permitted her to marry, and the Torah said:

“Force him through witnesses!”

The court is obligated to trouble itself to seek witnesses who will contradict the first witnesses who permitted her, in order to sanctify the koen so that he will not marry her. For if he marries her and has intercourse with her while her husband is still alive, she will become forbidden to him forever as a zona, and “And you shall sanctify him” is required. But once she has married, she need not leave.

And if you wish, say:

Here, the beraita is speaking

when witnesses came

who contradicted the witnesses testifying to the death,

and afterward she married, and

according to the opinion of

Rabbi Menahem bar Rabbi Yosei it is—

who says: Since the witnesses came first, she must leave. And Rav agrees with this.

Rav Ashi

disagrees with the entire preceding discussion, which explains Rav’s statement, “If she married on the basis of two witnesses, she need not leave,” as referring to leaving her second husband.

And he says:

What does Rav mean when he says, “She need not leave”?

She need not leave her first permitted status

with her first husband.

For if she married another husband on the basis of two witnesses, and afterward her first husband came, we do not say, “She must leave this one and that one,” as was said when she married on the basis of one witness. Rather, she is permitted to return to her first husband and again be permitted to him as she had been. This is because the penalty of saying “She must leave” was imposed only when she married on the basis of one witness.

And we challenge Rav Ashi’s interpretation of Rav’s words:

Rav already said this once

[he already said so, so why did he need to say it again]?!

As we learned

in our Mishna: Rabbi Shimon says, if she

married

[on the basis of witnesses]

without permission

[of the court],

she is permitted to return to him

her first husband.

And

concerning this

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: This is the halakha

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

And we answer:

One statement was inferred from the other.

Rav did not say it twice. He stated one ruling, and from it we learned his second ruling, since they both amount to the same matter.

Shmuel said: They taught

in our Mishna that she must leave her second husband

only when she does not contradict him,

the witness who testifies that her husband is alive.

But if she contradicts him,

the woman—

she need not leave

her second husband.

And the Gemara asks:

What are the circumstances?

If you say,

if we say

that there are two witnesses,

who testify that the man standing before us is her husband, and they contradict the first witness who testified that her husband had died—

This certainly cannot be said.

For

when she contradicts him—

what does it accomplish

[what benefit is there in her contradiction]? Is she more credible than two witnesses? How, then, could Shmuel say: “But if she contradicts him, she need not leave”?!

Rather,

the case must be one involving

one

witness

alone,

who testified that the man standing before us is her husband, and she contradicts him, saying: “This is not my husband”; therefore she need not leave—

This too is difficult, for you should infer from here:

The reason is that she contradicts him,

the woman contradicting the witness, and therefore she need not leave her second husband;

but if she remained silent—

she must leave?!

But Ulla said: Wherever the Torah gave credibility to

one witness—

there are considered to be two

witnesses.

And the statement of one has no standing in the presence of two!

If so, even if she remained silent, how can the witness who testifies that her husband is alive be believed to contradict the witness whom the Sages deemed credible to testify that her husband had died? The witness who permitted her is like two, since she married on his testimony,

and the statement of one has no standing in the presence of two?

And we answer:

What are the circumstances here? It is a case involving witnesses disqualified from testimony

[for example, two women] who testify that the man standing before us is her husband and contradict the first witness who testified that her husband had died. If she had not contradicted them, they would be believed to remove her from her husband,

and in accordance with Rabbi Nehemiah,

as will be explained.

But if she denies the other two women and says that this is not her husband, the testimony of the women is completely nullified, even without the first witness [who also denies them].

This is because every person is trustworthy regarding himself in matters of prohibition when the matter is clear to him, unless there is valid testimony that contradicts his words.

And once the statements of the witnesses testifying that the man standing before us is her husband have been nullified, she is again permitted to marry on the basis of the first witness, who testifies to her husband's death.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Neḥemya says: Wherever the Torah deemed one witness trustworthy,

there is no law of testimony in the matter, since even one witness is trustworthy regarding it. Therefore, disqualified witnesses are trustworthy like qualified witnesses, and

one follows the majority of opinions.

And

it is not necessary to say that when two disqualified witnesses testify against one disqualified witness, one follows the majority of opinions; rather, even

they treated two women regarding one man [

against one qualified witness]

as two men regarding one man,

since the two are trustworthy.

Therefore, even in the case of two women testifying against one man, and even if she has already married on his testimony, one follows the majority, and they are trustworthy.

Accordingly, if she does not deny the women, they are trustworthy to remove her from her husband, against the one qualified witness who testifies to her husband's death, even though she has already married on his testimony.

And if you wish, say instead: Wherever there came

there came

a qualified witness initially,

from the outset, and she married on his testimony, then

even one hundred women

who testify against him—

are considered like one witness!

Just as, if one witness had come first, the second witness would not be trustworthy to contradict the first witness, since she had already married on his testimony—as Ulla said: Wherever the Torah deemed one witness trustworthy, it is as though there are two witnesses here, and the statement of one does not stand in place of two—

so too, one hundred women are of no account against the first witness, since the Sages granted him the status of two witnesses once she married on his testimony.

And

here,

with regard to Rav's statement, that if she does not deny the testimony, she must leave her husband—

What are we dealing with?—

with

a case in which a woman came initially

and testified that her husband had died [and she is trustworthy, since even a disqualified woman is qualified to testify in a case in which one qualified witness is accepted], and the woman married on her testimony. When two women came and contradicted the first woman, one should follow the majority of opinions and remove her from her husband, since the woman who came to marry does not deny them.

And Rabbi Neḥemya's statement should be understood as follows:

for this is what Rabbi Neḥemya said [and he did not say: “They treated two women regarding one man as two men regarding one man”]—

Rabbi Neḥemya says: Wherever the Torah deemed one witness trustworthy,

even disqualified witnesses are trustworthy,

and one follows the majority of opinions.

And they treated two women regarding one woman as two men regarding one man,

so as to trust the two women more than the one woman, even though the woman had already married on the basis of the first woman's testimony.

But two women regarding one man—

are considered like half and half!

There is no principle here of “majority of opinions”; rather, it is as though one witness came against the first witness. In such a case, the first witness, on whose testimony she married, would be trustworthy, and not the second, as Ulla said.

We learned in the Mishna:

She requires a bill of divorce from this one and from that one:

And we raise a difficulty:

Granted, fro

m the first husband

you require a bill of divorce [

she requires a bill of divorce in order to marry another, since she is his fully married wife].

But, fro

m her

second husband—

why

does she require a bill of divorce in order to marry another? After all, his intercourse with her

was merely promiscuous intercourse,

since his betrothal did not take effect, because she is a married woman. Why, then, does she require a bill of divorce from the second husband?!

Rav Huna said:

The Sages required her to receive a bill of divorce from the second husband because of

a decree, lest people say

that the incident did not occur in this manner—namely, that she married the second husband after hearing of her husband's death—for they see that the husband is alive before us.

Rather, they will say that this is what happened:

This one divorced [

her first husband]

and this one married [

her second husband married his fellow's divorcee after him,

and

if the second husband sends her away without a bill of divorce,

it will turn out that a married woman leaves without a bill of divorce.

The Gemara is astonished by this explanation:

If so, the latter clause

of our Mishna [taught below, on folio 92a]

which teaches

in it:

They said to her, “Your husband died,” and she became betrothed,

and she had not yet entered the wedding canopy with the second husband,

and afterward her husband came—

she is

permitted to return to him,

to her first husband, since she did not commit adultery and was not even close to doing so, as she had not married.

This implies that she does not require a bill of divorce from the second husband; rather, she immediately returns to the first.

But according to you, since you are concerned about “lest people say”—

there too

she should require a bill of divorce from the second husband, because

let us say [

that people will say]:

“This one divorced her, and that one betrothed her! And it will turn out that a married woman leaves without a bill of divorce.”

And we answer:

In fact, she requires a bill of divorce

from the second husband, and afterward she returns to the first, because of “lest people say.”

We raise an objection to this:

If so,

since you are concerned that people will say this, and therefore require her to receive a bill of divorce from the second husband when he betrothed her, they will come and say: “The first husband divorced her, the second betrothed her, and then the second divorced her,” and

it will turn out that this one,

the first husband who took her back,

is taking back his divorcee after she became betrothed,

which is prohibited to him?!

And we answer: Our Mishna is

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben Kippur, who said:

Only

from marriage

to another man

is it prohibited

for his divorcee to return to her first husband.

But

from betrothal

to another man—she is

permitted

to return.

But we are still puzzled:

But since the latter clause teaches [

there, on folio 92a]: