Yevamot 88a — the Talmud in English

And since, according to the Rabbis, even two witnesses do not bring him to a sacrifice if he contradicts them and says, “I did not eat,” this difficulty arises:

The first clause

[when one witness came and the person concerned did not contradict him] -

what is the reason the Rabbis obligate

him to bring a sacrifice?

For from the fact that Rabbi Meir and the Sages dispute only in the latter clause, it follows that they do not dispute in the first clause, and even the Rabbis agree in the first clause?!

If you say,

if we say as you said,

because he is reliable

the one witness, and not because of his silence -

it is impossible to say this. For -

but two

two witnesses who testify

in general,

not concerning liability for a sacrifice, are [such that]

even though

the person concerned

contradicts them -

they

the witnesses

are reliable.

And

nevertheless, here, concerning liability for a sacrifice,

the Rabbis exempt

him if he contradicts them, since it is possible to interpret his contradiction as meaning that he intended to say, “I acted intentionally,” and therefore he is exempt from a sacrifice.

If so, how can the witness be reliable - even when he does not contradict him - unless it is because of the silence of the person concerned? For perhaps he acted intentionally?!

Rather, is it not

necessarily

because

of this that the witness is reliable in the first clause to obligate him to bring a sacrifice: because

he remained silent

the person concerned,

and silence is comparable to an admission!

And since the Gemara proved that the witness's reliability concerning liability for a sacrifice for eating forbidden fat derives from the silence of the liable person, which is like an admission, this source for the reliability of one witness in prohibitions is rejected.

Rather,

the fact that the Sages made one witness reliable in testimony concerning a woman whose husband died, is not learned from the verse; rather, his reliability is

logical reasoning

alone

it is!

Just as it is the case,

as it is obvious to us that he is reliable to testify

concerning a piece

that is

possibly forbidden fat and possibly ordinary fat, and he came,

that if

one witness comes and says, “It is clear to me that it is ordinary fat,” he is reliable,

the witness, and it is permitted to eat it on his word. And just as he is reliable to permit the prohibition of forbidden fat, so is he reliable to permit the prohibition of a married woman.

The Gemara rejects the comparison between the reliability of one witness concerning a piece whose status as forbidden fat or ordinary fat is uncertain and the reliability of one witness's testimony concerning the death of a husband.

Are they comparable

how can the reliability of testimony concerning the death of a husband be compared with the reliability of testimony that a piece is ordinary fat and not forbidden fat!?

For there are two significant distinctions between testimony permitting an uncertain matter to be eaten and testimony permitting a married woman to marry outside her marriage:

The first distinction:

There,

with a piece that is possibly forbidden fat and possibly ordinary fat -

the prohibition has not been established

[the matter about which he testifies is not presumed prohibited], and therefore one witness is reliable concerning it.

But

here,

concerning one witness who says, “Your husband has died,”

the prohibition of a married woman has been established

[she stands under the presumption of the prohibition of a married woman]. And from where do we know that one witness is reliable to remove her from her presumption!?

The second distinction:

And

further, it is established for us that

“there is no matter involving forbidden sexual relations with fewer than two [witnesses]”,

so how can one witness be believed to say that her husband died, in order to permit her to marry?!

And therefore,

this—

the testimony of one witness regarding a woman’s testimony—

is comparable only to a piece

that was established in our eyes

as

being

certainly forbidden fat, and there came [

and there came]

one witness and said: I am certain

that this piece was a piece

of permitted fat!—

He is not believed

to remove it from its presumption of prohibition and permit it for consumption.

And the Gemara answers and rejects the comparison of a woman’s testimony to a piece of fat that was established as prohibited:

Are they comparable?

Testimony concerning a piece that was established to be forbidden fat, to remove it from its presumption of prohibition and say that it is permitted fat, and testimony concerning a woman, that her husband died!? But there is—

There,

in the case of a piece of fat that was established as forbidden fat,

even if one hundred come—

they are not believed!

For even if one hundred witnesses come and say of something that is certainly forbidden fat that it is permitted fat, they will not be believed.

But

here,

in the case of a woman’s testimony,

since when two come they are believed [

since if two witnesses come and say that her husband died, they will be believed to permit her and remove her from her presumption of prohibition], therefore we should say that the testimony of one witness

also—

should be believed.

Is it not

like

the case of untithed produce,

where one witness testified concerning it that it had been tithed, and the produce is now prepared and permitted for consumption, despite the fact that previously it had the presumption of untithed produce?

And likewise

consecrated property, and

likewise

konamot [

a person forbids a particular thing to himself by saying, “This thing shall be a konam to me,” and “konam” is a designation for an offering, and his intention is to say: This thing shall be forbidden to me as an offering is forbidden to me]—

where one witness testified concerning them that the person who consecrated or vowed regarding them had gone to a Sage to be released from them, and they were permitted, he is believed, even though the prohibition had an established presumption.

But the Gemara asks:

This untithed produce—

which you said one witness is believed concerning, to say that it had been tithed—

what are the circumstances?

If

the untithed produce is

his [

if it is his untithed produce], there is no proof from here that one witness is believed regarding prohibitions even when the prohibition had an established presumption.

For here is different,

because it is in his power to rectify it,

since it is his, and he can separate the tithe from it; therefore he is believed to say that it has been tithed, and you cannot compare it to a woman’s testimony.

Rather,

if you say that from untithed produce

belonging to another,

which belongs to another person, you come to learn that one witness is believed concerning it to say that it has been tithed—

there is still a difficulty:

What does he hold,

the answerer who derived the law of a woman’s testimony that her husband died from untithed produce, from consecrated property, and from konamot?

If he holds that

the one who

separates tithes from his own produce for that of his fellow does not require the owner’s consent,

then there is no proof from this that one witness is believed concerning another person’s untithed produce to say that it had been tithed even where the prohibition had an established presumption, since his credibility is

because it is in his power to rectify it.

And if he holds that

the one who separates tithes from his own produce for that of his fellow

requires the owner’s consent,

and it is not in the power of another to rectify it,

and

one witness

said, “I know concerning it that it was rectified”—

that itself—

from where do we know

that the witness is believed, since the prohibition had an established presumption?!

And the proof from

consecrated property

also

is difficult:

If

it is speaking of consecrated property of

sanctity of monetary value,

which can be redeemed, you cannot prove from this that one witness is believed where the prohibition had an established presumption, because here it is different [whether he consecrated it or another consecrated it], for the reason that he is believed is

because it is in his power to redeem it.

And

if

it is speaking of consecrated property of

intrinsic sanctity [

consecrated offerings, sacrifices], which cannot be redeemed, there is still a difficulty:

If

it is speaking of consecrated property

belonging to him,

where the witness is the one who consecrated the sacrifice, you cannot prove from this that one witness is believed where the prohibition had an established presumption, because here it is different

because it is in his power to seek release from it [

it is in the power of the person who consecrated it to seek release from his consecration and uproot it retroactively].

Rather,

if you say that it is speaking of consecrated property

belonging to another [

which was consecrated by another person],

and

the one witness

said, “I know concerning it that its owner sought release from it” [

I know that the owner of the sacrifice sought release from his consecration], this too is difficult, for—

that itself—

from where do we know

that one witness is believed to testify in this manner, since the prohibition had an established presumption?!

And the proof from

konamot

also

is subject to a difficulty:

If he holds that

there is

“sacrilege with konamot, and sanctity of monetary value descends upon them” [

sanctity of monetary value descends upon the thing that he forbade by means of a konam], and they are considered like consecrated property for the Temple treasury, since he said, “This thing is a konam to me” —

If so, there is no proof from here that one witness is believed even where the prohibition had an established presumption, because here it is different

because it is in his power to redeem it,

the konam from its consecrated status.

And if he holds that

there is

“no sacrilege with konamot”

because “konam” is the language of a vow and not the language of consecration,

and

only

a mere prohibition is placed upon his shoulders [

and the thing is not consecrated with the sanctity of the Temple treasury, but is merely a vow-prohibition]—

there is still a difficulty:

If it belongs to him—

where the witness is the one who made the vow—there is no proof from here that one witness is believed, because here it is different

because it is in his power to seek release from it [

it is in his power to seek release from the vow].

Rather,

if you say that he is testifying concerning a konam

belonging to another, and said: “I know that its owner sought release from it” [

I know that the person who made the vow sought release from his vow], there is a difficulty:

that itself,

that one witness is believed to testify in this manner—

from where do we know it?

Rather,

Rabbi Zeira said:

The reason the Sages believed one witness regarding a woman’s testimony is not that this is testimony concerning a prohibition, regarding which one witness is believed. For here the prohibition had an established presumption, and it is a matter involving forbidden sexual relations.

Rather, this is why the Sages believed one witness:

Because of the severity with which you treated her at the end,

you were lenient with her at the beginning!

Since when it becomes clear that her husband is still alive, the Sages imposed many stringencies upon her, as we learned in our Mishna—

therefore the Sages were able to enact that testimony concerning the husband’s death should be believed even from one witness. For since she is concerned that perhaps the husband will come and she will be so thoroughly ruined, she will not marry until she carefully examines whether the husband indeed died.

The Gemara now asks about the basis of the enactment granting credibility to one witness regarding the husband’s death:

Let them neither impose stringency nor be lenient!

Why did the Sages impose all these stringencies upon her, and thereby make it possible to believe one witness? Let them not impose stringency upon her, and let them not believe one witness—what of it?!

And we answer:

Because of the plight of a woman whose husband is absent—

the Sages were lenient with her

to rely even on one witness. And the Sages relied on this leniency because of the severity with which they treated her at the end.

We learned in the Mishna: “A woman whose husband went to a country overseas, and they came and said to her, ‘Your husband has died,’” “

she shall leave this one and that one”:

Rav said: They taught

in our Mishna that the woman shall leave her second husband

only

when she

married on the testimony of one witness.

But

if she

married on the basis of two witnesses,

then even if her first husband came—

she shall not leave

her second husband.

They mocked

Rav

in the West [

in the Land of Israel they laughed at Rav’s statement]: But

a man came and is standing [

the husband came and is standing before us alive and well],

and

if

you say that she shall not leave

her second husband?!

And the Gemara explains Rav’s statement:

It is necessary—

this is referring to a case

where we do not know him

as the husband [we do not recognize him as actually being her husband], and therefore she shall not leave.

And we ask:

If we do not know him—

even

one witness

who says that her husband died—

why should she leave

when a man whom we do not recognize as her husband arrives?!

And we answer:

It is necessary,

in a case such as

two came and said: “We were with him from the time he left until now” [

when the husband came and brought with him two witnesses who testified that they had been with him from the time he went to the country overseas until now],

and it is you who do not recognize him [

you do not recognize him as her husband].

As it is written: “Joseph recognized his brothers, but they did not recognize him.”

And

with regard to this

Rav Hisda said: This teaches that Joseph left

the land of Canaan

without a beard having formed, and came

and met his brothers in Egypt when he was

with a beard having formed,

and therefore they did not recognize him.

And since two witnesses testify before us that he is indeed her husband, they are believed to contradict the testimony of one witness.

But to contradict the testimony of two witnesses—since the court does not recognize the husband—they are not believed to remove her from her second husband, to whom she has already been married.

And the Gemara asks: Even though you cannot fully believe the later witnesses, since there are two witnesses contradicting them and saying that her husband indeed died, nevertheless

in the end—

is it not two against two?!

That is: You cannot completely nullify the testimony of the latter because of the testimony of the former, and they are nevertheless believed at least to make the matter uncertain.