Yevamot 88a (פח.) — the Talmud in English

And since, according to the Rabbis, even two witnesses do not bring him to liability for an offering when he contradicts them and says, “I did not eat it,” the following difficulty arises:

The first clause

[when one witness came and the person did not contradict him] -

For what reason do the Rabbis obligate

him to bring an offering?

For since Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagreed only in the latter clause, it follows that they did not disagree in the first clause, and that even the Rabbis agree with regard to the first clause?!

If you say

, as you said, that it is

because the one witness is credible

, and not because of his silence -

this cannot be said. For -

but two

witnesses who testify

in general

, in a matter other than liability for an offering, are

even though

the person himself

contradicts them

they

, the witnesses,

are credible.

And

nevertheless, here, with regard to liability for an offering,

the Rabbis exempt him

when he contradicts them, since his contradiction can be interpreted as meaning, “I acted intentionally,” and therefore he is exempt from an offering.

If so, how can the witness be credible even when he does not contradict him, unless it is because of the person’s silence? For perhaps he acted intentionally?!

Rather, is it not

necessarily

because

of this that the witness is credible in the first clause and obligates him to bring an offering: because he

remained silent

the person himself,

and silence is comparable to an admission!

Once the Gemara has demonstrated that the witness’s credibility in imposing liability for an offering for eating forbidden fat derives from the liable person’s silence, which is considered an admission, this source for the credibility of one witness with regard to prohibitions is rejected.

Rather

, the fact that the Sages deemed one witness credible in testimony concerning a woman whose husband died is not derived from a verse; rather, his credibility is

a matter of reasoning

in general

it is!

Just as

it is self-evident to us that he is credible to testify

concerning a piece

that is

possibly forbidden fat and possibly ordinary fat, and he came

, meaning, if

one witness came and said, “It is clear to me that it is ordinary fat,” he is credible

, and it is permitted to eat it on his testimony. And just as he is credible to permit the prohibition of forbidden fat, so he is credible to permit the prohibition of a married woman.

The Gemara rejects the comparison between the credibility of one witness concerning a doubtful piece, whether it is forbidden fat or ordinary fat, and the credibility of one witness testifying concerning the death of a husband.

Are these cases comparable

? How can the credibility of testimony concerning the death of a husband be compared to the credibility of testimony that a piece is ordinary fat and not forbidden fat?!

There are, after all, two significant distinctions between testimony permitting a doubtful item to be eaten and testimony permitting a married woman to marry outside her husband’s household -

The first distinction:

There

—in the case of a piece that is possibly forbidden fat and possibly ordinary fat—

the prohibition has not been established

[the matter about which he testifies is not presumed forbidden], and therefore one witness is credible concerning it.

But

here, with regard to one witness who says, “Your husband died,”

the prohibition of a married woman

has been established

[she is presumed subject to the prohibition of a married woman]. From where, then, do we know that one witness is credible to remove her from her presumptive status?!

The second distinction:

And

further, we have established that

“there is no matter concerning forbidden sexual relations [that can be established] with fewer than two [witnesses]”,

so how can one witness be believed when he says that her husband died, thereby permitting her to marry?!

Therefore,

this—

the testimony of one witness in the case of a woman—

is comparable only to a piece

that has been established in our eyes

as

being

certainly forbidden fat, and there comes [

one]

witness and says: I am certain

that this piece is a piece

of ordinary fat!—

He is not believed

to remove it from its presumptive status of prohibition and permit it to be eaten.

The Gemara answers and rejects the comparison between testimony concerning a woman and a piece of forbidden fat that had been established as prohibited:

Is it comparable

to testimony concerning a piece that had been established as forbidden fat, to remove it from its presumptive status of prohibition and say that it is ordinary fat, and testimony concerning a woman, that her husband died?! After all—

There,

in the case of a piece that had been established as forbidden fat,

even if one hundred come—

they are not believed!

For even if one hundred witnesses come and say concerning something that is certainly forbidden fat that it is ordinary fat, they will not be believed.

But

here,

in the case of testimony concerning a woman,

since when two come they are believed [

since if two witnesses come and say that her husband died, they are believed to permit her and remove her from her presumptive status of prohibition], therefore we should say that the testimony of one

witness—

he too should be believed.

Is there anything

like

a case of tevel,

where one witness testified concerning it that its tithes had been separated, and the produce is now properly prepared and permitted to be eaten, despite the fact that previously it had the presumptive status of tevel, which is prohibited?

And similarly

consecrated property, and

likewise

konamot [

a person prohibits a particular thing to himself by saying, “This thing shall be konam to me”; konam is a designation for an offering, and his intention is to say: This thing shall be forbidden to me just as an offering is forbidden to me]—

where one witness testified concerning them that the person who consecrated or vowed concerning them had sought a ruling regarding them and they had been released, he is believed, even though the prohibition had been established.

But the Gemara asks:

This tevel—

which you said one witness is believed concerning, to say that its tithes had been separated—

what are the circumstances?

If

the tevel

belongs to him [

if it is his tevel], this cannot prove that one witness is believed with regard to prohibitions even when the prohibition has been established.

For here is different,

because it is in his power to rectify it,

since it belongs to him and he can separate tithes from it. Therefore he is believed to say that its tithes have been separated, and you cannot compare this to testimony concerning a woman.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that you are deriving this from

another person’s

tevel, which belongs to someone else, and that one witness is believed concerning it to say that its tithes have been separated—

the difficulty still remains:

What does he hold,

the one who answered, who derived the law of testimony concerning a woman whose husband died from tevel, consecrated property, and konamot?

If he holds

that one who

separates teruma from his own produce for his fellow’s produce does not require the owner’s consent,

then this cannot prove that one witness is believed concerning another person’s tevel to say that its tithes have been separated even where the prohibition has been established, since his reliability is

because it is in his power to rectify it.

And if he holds

that one who separates teruma from his own produce for

his fellow’s produce requires the owner’s consent,

and it is not in the power of another person to rectify it,

and

one witness says,

“I know that he rectified it”—

that itself—

from where do we know

that the witness is believed, since the prohibition has been established?!

And the proof from

consecrated property

also

is difficult:

If

it is referring to consecrated property possessing

sanctity of value,

which can be redeemed, you cannot prove from this that one witness is believed where the prohibition has been established, because here it is different [whether he consecrated it or someone else consecrated it], for the reason he is believed is

because it is in his power to redeem it.

And

if

it is referring to consecrated property possessing

intrinsic sanctity [

the offerings of the altar, which cannot be redeemed], the difficulty still remains:

If

it is referring to consecrated property that

belongs to him,

and the witness is the one who consecrated the offering, you cannot prove from this that one witness is believed where the prohibition has been established, because here it is different

because it is in his power to seek a ruling concerning it [

the one who consecrated it can seek a ruling concerning his consecration and uproot it retroactively].

Rather,

perhaps you will say that it is referring to consecrated property

belonging to another [

that was consecrated by someone else],

and

the one witness said:

“I know that its owner sought a ruling concerning it” [

I know that the owner of the offering sought a ruling concerning his consecration]. This too is difficult, for—

that itself—

from where do we know

that one witness is believed to testify in this manner, since the prohibition has been established?!

And the proof from

konamot

also

can be challenged:

If he holds

that

“there is sacrilege with regard to konamot, and sanctity of value descends upon them” [

sanctity of value descends upon the thing that he prohibited by means of a konam, and they are considered like offerings for Temple maintenance, since he said, “Let this thing be konam to me”]—

If so, this cannot prove that one witness is believed even where the prohibition has been established, because here it is different

because it is in his power to redeem it,

the konam from its consecrated status.

And if he holds

that

“there is no sacrilege with regard to konamot”

because konam is the language of a vow and not the language of consecration,

and

it is merely

a prohibition that he has placed upon himself [

and the thing does not possess the sanctity of offerings for Temple maintenance; it is merely a vow-prohibition]—

the difficulty still remains:

If it belongs to him—

the witness is the one who made the vow—then this cannot prove that one witness is believed, because here it is different

because it is in his power to seek a ruling concerning it [

it is in his power to seek a ruling concerning the vow].

Rather,

perhaps you will say that he is testifying concerning a konam

belonging to another, and says: “I know that its owner sought a ruling concerning it” [

I know that the person who made the vow sought a ruling concerning his vow]; the difficulty is:

that itself,

that one witness is believed to testify in this manner—

from where do we know?

Rather,

Rabbi Zeira said:

The reason the Sages believed one witness in testimony concerning a woman is not that this is testimony concerning a prohibition, in which one witness is believed. For here the prohibition has been established, and it is a matter concerning forbidden sexual relations.

Rather, this is why the Sages believed one witness:

By virtue of the stringency with which you have burdened her at the end,

you have eased matters for her at the beginning!

Since when it becomes clear that her husband is still alive, the Sages imposed many stringencies upon her, as we learned in our Mishna—

therefore the Sages were able to institute that testimony concerning the husband’s death may be accepted even from one witness. For, because she fears that perhaps her husband will come and she will be so severely disgraced, she will not marry until she carefully investigates whether the husband has indeed died.

The Gemara now challenges the basis of the ordinance establishing the reliability of one witness concerning the husband’s death:

Let them neither impose stringency nor ease matters!

Why did the Sages impose all these stringencies upon her, thereby making it possible to believe one witness? Let them not impose stringency upon her, and let them not believe one witness; what difference would it make?!

And we answer:

Because of the plight of a woman whose husband is missing—

the Sages eased matters for her

to rely even upon one witness. And the Sages relied on this leniency on account of the stringency that they imposed upon her at the end.

We learned in the Mishna: “A woman whose husband went overseas, and people came and told her, ‘Your husband has died,’”

must leave both this one and that one:

Rav said: They taught

in our Mishna that the woman must leave her second husband

only

when she

married on the testimony of one witness.

But

if she

married on the basis of two witnesses,

then even if her first husband comes—

she need not leave

her second husband.

They mocked

Rav’s opinion

in the West [

in the Land of Israel they mocked Rav’s statement]:

A man has come and is standing here [

the husband has come and is standing before us, alive and well],

and

if

you say that she need not leave

her second husband?!

The Gemara explains Rav’s statement:

It is necessary

to state this

when we do not recognize him

as the husband [we do not recognize him as in fact being her husband], and therefore she need not leave.

And we ask:

If we do not recognize him—

even

on the testimony of one witness

who says that her husband died—

why must she leave

when a man whom we do not recognize as her husband arrives?!

And we answer:

It is necessary

to state this in a case

where two came and said: “We were with him from the time he left until now” [

when the husband came and brought two witnesses who testified that they had been with him from the time he went overseas until now],

and it is you who do not recognize him [

you do not recognize him as her husband].

As it is written: “Joseph recognized his brothers, but they did not recognize him.”

And

concerning this

Rav Hisda said: This teaches that Joseph left

the land of Canaan

without a beard having grown, and came

and encountered his brothers in Egypt when he was

with a full beard,

and therefore they did not recognize him.

Since two witnesses testify before us that he is indeed her husband, they are believed to contradict the testimony of one witness.

But to contradict the testimony of two witnesses, since the court does not recognize the husband, they are not believed to remove her from the second husband to whom she has already been married.

The Gemara wonders: Even though you cannot completely believe the latter witnesses, since there are two witnesses contradicting them and saying that her husband indeed died, nevertheless

ultimately—

is it not a case of two against two?!

That is, you cannot completely nullify the testimony of the latter witnesses because of the testimony of the earlier witnesses; at the very least, they are believed to render the matter uncertain.