Yevamot 87b (פז:) — the Talmud in English

And if the Merciful One had written

only “according to her youth,” to exclude

a pregnant woman,

I would say:

It is specifically this woman who does not eat, since

at first

the woman was

gufa!

empty, an empty body,

an empty body,

but now,

once she became pregnant, the woman becomes

a full body,

a filled body, and therefore she is disqualified.

However,

if

she has no offspring,

I would say that offspring does not disqualify her, because

at first,

she was

an empty body

of the woman,

empty,

vacant,

and

even

now,

when she gives birth,

the body

of the woman is now

empty,

vacant.

Therefore,

I would say,

I would say that

the

offspring would not disqualify its mother.

Consequently,

it is necessary

to state also “and she has no offspring,” together with “according to her youth.”

Earlier, in the Gemara on the first side of the page, two distinctions were explained between exemption from yibbum through a son and disqualification from teruma through a son from an Israelite:

a.

Whether deceased sons are equivalent to living sons.

With regard to yibbum

deceased sons are equivalent to living sons, to exempt her from yibbum.

Whereas

with regard to teruma,

offspring from an Israelite disqualify her only when they are alive.

b.

Whether a child from the first husband is equivalent to a child from the second husband.

With regard to yibbum,

a child from the first husband is not equivalent to a child from the second, since she is exempt from yibbum only when she has a son from the second husband.

Whereas

with regard to teruma,

the offspring disqualify her whether they came from her first marriage to an Israelite or from her last marriage to an Israelite.

The Gemara now presents several questions that Rav Yehuda of Maskarta asked Rava concerning these two distinctions, and he also provided the answers to these questions.

The Gemara gives

a mnemonic

for the matter, to remember the questions and answers of Rav Yehuda of Maskarta, which are explained below—

He said to him,

Rav Yehuda of Maskarta said to Rava the following questions and answers—

Two questions and answers:

“It was not made, and it was made”—

in death.

And two further questions and answers:

“It was made, and it was not made”—

with regard to the child.

But the questions were not arranged in this order; rather, they were arranged differently.

The mnemonic for the order of the questions and answers is:

Yibbum and teruma, and again

and then

yibbum and teruma—

a mnemonic.

And so

Rav Yehuda of Maskarta said to him

(the name of a place)

to Rava:

First he asked him two questions concerning the distinction between teruma and yibbum with regard to “the deceased being equivalent to the living” [whose mnemonic is “it was not made and it was made, in death”], the first question being “it was not made.”

“The deceased were not made equivalent to the living with regard to yibbum,”

rather, let it be said that if the sons she had at the time she fell to yibbum died, they are not considered equivalent to living sons, and from the time the sons die, the wife of the deceased becomes subject to yibbum or halitza.

And this may be derived

by a kal va-chomer

from teruma—for a daughter of a kohen who has offspring from an Israelite is prevented by them from eating teruma. And when the Israelite offspring die, she returns to eating teruma, although she had already been disqualified from eating it because of the Israelite offspring.

If so, the matter follows by a kal va-chomer—

And if with regard to

teruma, which is

a case in which

the verse

made the child from

the

first husband equivalent to

what would be

a child from

the

second husband—

to disqualify her from teruma.

For the name of her first Israelite husband no longer applies to her; only the name of her second Israelite husband applies to her. Nevertheless, she is disqualified from teruma even after the death of her second husband, because her son from the first husband is considered for this purpose as though he were her son from the second husband, since her second husband left her as a woman with a husband’s name and a son while his name applied to her.

And nevertheless,

the verse did not make

the sons in her case

the deceased equivalent to

sons

who are living,

to disqualify her from teruma.

With regard to yibbum, which is

a case in which the verse did not make

the child

from

the

first husband equivalent to a child from

the

second husband, to exempt her from yibbum—

is it not logical that it was not made

there that sons

who are deceased be equivalent to

sons

who are living,

to exempt her from yibbum? Rather, she should be obligated to undergo yibbum or halitza once the sons die—

And the answer is:

The Torah states: “Its ways

of the Torah

are ways of pleasantness

”.

“And all its paths—

peace.”

As for this woman, who had a son and therefore was not subject to yibbum, and went and married someone outside the levirate bond, and afterward her son died—if you were to obligate her now to undergo halitza, she would thereby be disgraced before her husband, since she would be forbidden to him from the time her son died until she underwent halitza. Thus, she would be forbidden to her husband because of her bond to another husband while she is living under his roof, and this is not “the ways of pleasantness” of the Torah.

He then asked a second question: that the deceased should be made equivalent to the living with regard to teruma.

And let us equate the law of teruma with the law of yibbum, so that the deceased are equivalent to the living:

“And the deceased were made equivalent to the living with regard to teruma,”

so that even if the offspring from the Israelite died, the daughter of the kohen would not return to eating teruma,

by a kal va-chomer

from yibbum, where the son exempts her from yibbum even after his death—

And if with regard to

yibbum, which is

a case in which the verse did not make

the child

from

the

first husband equivalent to a child from

the

second husband, to exempt her from yibbum—

nevertheless,

it made

there the sons

who are deceased equivalent to

sons

who are living,

to exempt her from yibbum.

With regard to teruma, which is

a case in which it

indeed

made

the verse

the child from

the

first husband equivalent to a child from

the

second husband, to disqualify her from teruma—

is it not logical that it should be made

there that the sons

who are deceased be equivalent to

sons

who are living,

to disqualify her from teruma?!

And the answer is:

The Torah states: “

And a daughter of a kohen, when she becomes a widow or a divorcee,

and she has no offspring,

she shall return to her father’s house.”

And

this

—behold, she has no

offspring now, and she returns to her father’s house.

The Gemara now presents the two questions and answers [“it was made and it was not made”] concerning the distinction between yibbum and teruma with regard to the child:

The first question, “it was made” with regard to the child, is:

“And the child from

the

first husband [was made] equivalent to a child from

the

second husband with regard to yibbum,”

and let it be said that if the woman married her first husband and had a son from him, and then married a second husband and had no son from him, she should be exempt from yibbum,

by a kal va-chomer

from teruma, where we find that even a son from an Israelite whom she had from an earlier marriage disqualifies her from eating teruma—

And if with regard to

teruma, which is

a case in which the verse did not make

deceased sons

equivalent to

living sons

with regard to teruma—

nevertheless,

it made

the verse

the child from

the

first husband equivalent to a child from

the

second husband—

to disqualify her from teruma.

With regard to yibbum, which is

a case in which the verse made

sons

who are deceased equivalent to

sons

who are living, with regard to yibbum—

is it not logical that it should make

the

child from

the

first husband equivalent to a child from

the

second husband,

to exempt her from yibbum?!

The Torah states, “And he has no son”:

the verse attributed the son to the husband, not to the woman.

And behold, he has no

son—the second husband has no son.

The second question is “it was not made,” that is, conversely, that the law of teruma should be like the law of yibbum, so that the child from the first husband would not disqualify her:

“And the child from

the

first husband [was] not made equivalent to a child from

the

second husband with regard to teruma!”

And let it be said that when a daughter of a kohen married an Israelite and had a son from him, and then returned and married another Israelite, from whom she had no son, she should return to eating teruma from her father’s household,

by a kal va-chomer

from yibbum, where the son from the earlier marriage does not exempt her from becoming subject to yibbum when her second husband dies without sons?!

And

if with regard to

yibbum, which is

a case in which the verse made

sons

who are deceased equivalent to

sons

who are living, to exempt her from yibbum—

it did not make

the verse

the

child from

the

first husband equivalent to a child from

the

second husband,

to exempt her from yibbum.

With regard to teruma, which is a case in which the verse did not make

sons

who are deceased equivalent to

sons

who are living with regard to teruma—

is it not logical that it should not make

the

child from

the

first husband equivalent to a child from

the

second husband,

to disqualify her from teruma?

And the answer is:

The Torah states: “

And a daughter of a kohen, when she becomes a widow or a divorcee, and offspring

she has none,

she shall return to her father’s house.”

And

this

—behold, she has

offspring, and therefore she does not return to her father’s house.

We have completed you, chapter “There Are Women Who Are Permitted.”

A. As a matter of basic law, one witness is not believed to testify that a woman's husband has died, in order to permit her to marry; only two witnesses are sufficient, because “there is no matter concerning forbidden sexual relations that is established by fewer than two witnesses.”

B. However, because of the enactment for the sake of agunot, the Sages were lenient and accepted the testimony of one witness who testifies that the husband has died.

The Sages had grounds to be lenient in this matter, even though, according to Torah law, testimony of two witnesses is required in order to permit a married woman to marry another man—

For “because of the severity with which you treated her at the end [if the husband returns], you were lenient with her at the beginning” [by permitting her to marry on the basis of the testimony of one witness who testifies that her husband has died].

That is, the Sages relied on the numerous stringencies they imposed upon a woman who marries on the basis of one witness and it subsequently becomes clear that her husband is alive. As will be explained below in our Mishna, a woman may marry on the basis of the witness only if she is herself meticulous and conducts numerous investigations to verify the witness's testimony that her husband has indeed died.

Mishna:

A woman whose husband went overseas, and they came,

one witness came,

and they said to her: “Your husband has died!”

That is, one witness testified that her husband had died, and the court permitted her to marry on the basis of his testimony.

And she married,

she went and married another man on the basis of his testimony—

And afterward her husband came,

and it became clear that she had married another husband while she was still a married woman—

The Sages imposed stringencies upon her, since it now became clear that she had not investigated sufficiently at the outset whether her husband had indeed died before she married, and they imposed upon her the following stringencies:

1.

She must leave both,

both of her husbands! She must leave her first, true husband, who must now divorce her, and she must also leave her second husband, whose betrothal to her was not effective, and to whom she is forbidden even after her first husband divorces her! This is because the Sages imposed the stringency of treating her as a woman who willingly committed adultery while married, who is forbidden both to her husband and to the man with whom she committed adultery.

Although, as a matter of law, she is not forbidden in the manner of a woman who willingly commits adultery while married, since she acted under duress, having relied on the witness's testimony and on her own investigations, and since she was permitted to rely on them, nevertheless the Sages penalized her and imposed these stringencies upon her, so that she would investigate properly before marrying another husband.

Likewise, the basis of most of the stringencies in the Mishna below is the penalty imposed upon her by the Sages.

2.

And she requires a bill of divorce from both,

if she wishes to marry another man.

She requires a bill of divorce from the first, since she is his wife. And she also requires a bill of divorce from the second, although his betrothal to her was not effective and she is not his wife, before she marries another man.

As long as a woman is married, her husband is obligated to provide her with sustenance [by Torah law or by rabbinic enactment; the tannaim disagree concerning this].

Likewise, even after her husband dies, she is sustained from his property, because one of the conditions of the ketובה is: “You shall reside in my house and be sustained from my property throughout the entire period of your widowhood [you shall reside in my house and be sustained from my property throughout the entire period of your widowhood],” until she marries a man.

All the property that a married woman brings into the marriage is called nikhsei melog [apart from property that she brings to her husband as nikhsei tzon barzel. Such property becomes his property, and he assumes responsibility for the value of the property at the time she gives it to him. If he divorces her or dies before her, she has the right to collect from him the value of the property established at the time she brought it into the marriage, whether the property has depreciated or appreciated, whether it still exists or has been lost].

The husband is entitled, by rabbinic enactment, to consume the fruits of nikhsei melog, while the substance of the property belongs to the woman.

When he dies or divorces her, the principal returns to the woman.

The Sages enacted that the husband must redeem his wife if she is taken captive [“her redemption”], and they instituted this obligation in exchange for his right to consume the fruits.

If she brought clothing to him as nikhsei melog and the husband used it, he is not required to pay for the wear caused by his use of the clothing, since the wear of the clothing is included among the fruits. However, what remains of the clothing after it has been used is called bela'ot, and it returns to the woman when the husband dies or when he divorces her.

If the husband dies or divorces her, the woman is entitled to collect from his property the ketובה due to her. If she was a virgin when he married her, he pays her two hundred zuz; and if she was a widow, he pays her a maneh.

He also pays her the value of the nikhsei tzon barzel. This payment too is among the conditions of the ketובה.

3.

And she has no ketובה,

even if the first husband transgressed and took her back after the second husband divorced her, or the second transgressed and took her back after the first husband divorced her.

4.

Nor

the return of the

fruits

that the first husband consumed, and likewise those that the second husband consumed from the time he married her until the first husband returned.

As a matter of basic law, the second husband should have returned them, since she was not his wife and they were stolen property in his possession. However, the Sages penalized the woman by making her forfeit these fruits.

But whatever the second husband consumed after her first husband returned, she collects from him.

5.

Nor sustenance,

if she borrowed money and ate, when her first husband [or second husband] was overseas.

6.

Nor worn-out garments

[the remnants of the clothing that the husband used in accordance with the law of nikhsei melog and that became worn after his use of it].

She has none of all these things,

neither from

one

husband nor from

the other

husband.

And if she took

them

from both,

she must return them.

We do not say: Since she has already seized them, we will not take them from her [Gemara].

7.

And the child—

is a mamzer by both.

If she bore a son to the second husband before the first husband returned and divorced her, he is a mamzer by Torah law.

And if she bore a son to the first husband after she became forbidden to him, he is a mamzer by rabbinic law. 8.

Neither one nor the other may become impure for her

when she dies, if both of her husbands are kohanim.

Even her first husband, who is fully her husband, may not become impure for her when she dies, unlike other women for whom a husband may become impure, because a kohen may not become impure for his disqualified wife.

9.

Neither one nor the other has rights—

neither to her lost property, nor to her earnings, nor to annul her vows,

and her status is not like that of other women, for whose lost property, earnings, and vows the husband has rights. This is a penalty imposed upon her, as will be explained in the Gemara.

10. And if

the woman was

a

daughter of Israel—

she

is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood,

like a married woman who commits adultery while married, who is a “zona” and is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

11.

And

if she was a

daughter of a Levite—

she

is disqualified from

the tithe,

and the Gemara below, 91a, will explain this matter.

12.

And

if she was a

daughter of a kohen—

she

is disqualified from teruma,

like a married woman who commits adultery, who is disqualified from teruma.

13.

And the heirs of this one and the heirs of that one—

inherit her ketובה,

as will be explained in the Gemara what “ketובה” means here.

14.

And if they died,

both of them, before they gave her a bill of divorce—

the brother of this one and the brother of that one perform halitza and do not perform yibbum.

The brother of the first husband performs halitza with her by Torah law, since she is the wife of his deceased brother, but he does not perform yibbum with her by rabbinic law [the reason will be explained in the notes below, 91a].

The brother of the second husband, by contrast, must perform halitza with her by rabbinic law, because the Sages treated her stringently as though she were also the second husband's wife, even though she is not the wife of his deceased brother at all.

The Mishna now cites the statements of three tannaim who disagree with the first tanna, each concerning a different detail—

Rabbi Yosei,

who disagrees with the first tanna, who holds that she has no ketובה from either one,

and says:

Her ketובה—

from the property of her first husband.

Rabbi Elazar,

who disagrees with the first tanna, who holds that neither one has rights to her lost property, her earnings, or the annulment of her vows,

and says:

The first—

has rights to her lost property, her earnings, and the annulment of her vows.

Rabbi Shimon,

who disagrees with the first tanna, who holds that if they died, the brother of this one and the brother of that one perform halitza but do not perform yibbum,

and says:

Her intercourse or her halitza with the brother of the first—

exempts her rival wife!

That is, the brother of the first husband may even perform yibbum with her, if he wishes, and it is valid intercourse that exempts her rival wife as well, as in the case of two yevamot who fall before a yavam, where the intercourse or halitza of one of them exempts the other.

Rabbi Shimon likewise disagrees with the first tanna, who holds that the child is a mamzer by both, and says:

And the child is not a mamzer—

not by the first husband, even if the husband took her back after she became forbidden to him.

Nor is he a mamzer by the second husband if he had relations with her after the first husband divorced her.

Rabbi Shimon further said All that we said—that she must leave even the first husband—applies only when one witness came and the court permitted her to marry on the basis of the witness.

A woman who comes to marry on the basis of one witness requires an “authorization of the court” permitting her to marry on the basis of his testimony.

But a woman who marries on the basis of two witnesses does not need an “authorization of the court” in order to marry; it is sufficient that the court accept their testimony.

When do these words apply—that the stringencies concerning a woman who married another man and whose husband then returned apply when she married on the basis of one witness, with the authorization of the court permitting her to marry?

But

if she married

on the basis of two witnesses who came and said, “Your husband has died,” and this marriage is called a marriage

“without the authorization

of the court,” meaning that she did not need to receive authorization to marry in this case, since two witnesses had come—

And afterward her husband returned -

she is

permitted to return to him

the first husband.

Because her relations with the second husband are considered comparable to relations under duress, and she is not subject to the law of a woman who commits adultery willingly and thereby becomes forbidden to her husband.

For this woman did not have relations with her second husband because she wished to commit adultery while married, but because she relied upon the testimony of two witnesses.

However, with regard to liability to bring an offering for her relations with the second husband, she is considered only an inadvertent sinner, and therefore she is obligated to bring a sin-offering. She is not considered coerced with regard to the offering, since she should have waited until she had carefully verified that her husband had indeed died, rather than marrying; for it has now become clear that these witnesses were false witnesses, and that her entire permission to marry had been based on an error.

But if she married on the basis of a ruling of the court, which permitted her to marry on the testimony of one witness, she is exempt from bringing an offering, because one who acts on the basis of a ruling of the court is considered coerced with regard to exemption from a sin-offering. Therefore -

if

she married on the basis of the court

, which permitted and instructed her to marry on the testimony of one witness -

she must leave

her second husband,

and she is exempt from the offering

, since an individual who acted on the basis of a ruling of the court is exempt from the offering.

But if

she did not marry on the basis of

a permissive ruling of the

court

, but relied upon the testimony of the two witnesses -

she must leave

her second husband,

and she is obligated to bring an offering

, since this is not a case of coercion that exempts her from the offering: she should have waited and determined whether these were false witnesses.

The Mishna concludes:

The power of the court is greater

when it permits a woman to marry on the testimony of one witness than the testimony of two witnesses -

in that

the court

exempts her

by its ruling

from the offering!

The Mishna now explains an additional halakha:

If

the court instructed her to marry

, meaning that the court permitted her to marry,

and she went and acted improperly

[the Gemara will explain whether this means that she engaged in forbidden relations without marrying, or that she went and married someone whom she was forbidden to marry], and afterward her husband returned -

she is obligated to bring an offering!

Because

they did not permit her

the court

except to marry

, and not to act improperly. It follows that her relations were not undertaken by virtue of the court’s permissive ruling; she is therefore like one who relied upon the testimony of witnesses without a court’s permissive ruling, and she is obligated to bring an offering.

Gemara:

Our Mishna establishes that one witness is deemed credible to testify concerning the death of a husband.

To explain the credibility of one witness regarding the death of a husband, the Gemara first discusses the fundamental basis for the credibility of one witness, deducing it from several mishnayot and also from our Mishna:

First proof:

As it is taught in the latter clause

, in the statement of Rabbi Shimon in our Mishna:

“If she married without the authorization

of the court -

she is permitted to return to him

,” and “without authorization” means that she married

without the authorization of the court

, meaning that the court did not issue a permissive ruling instructing her to marry,

but

she married

on the testimony of witnesses

, relying on their testimony, without a court’s permissive ruling that she should marry -

by inference

you learn that the

first clause

, which states: “They came and told her, ‘Your husband died,’ and she married, and afterward her husband came - she must leave both this one and that one,” is speaking of a woman who married

with the authorization of the court and on the testimony of one witness

. Apparently

, the Mishna demonstrates that

one witness is deemed credible

to permit her, since the court’s permissive ruling was based on the testimony of one witness.

The Gemara now assumes that one witness concerning the death of a husband is credible, since the law of one who says, “Your husband died,” is like the law governing other testimony concerning prohibitions, in which one witness is deemed credible.

Second proof:

And we also learned

[below, 122a]:

It was established

[i.e., it became customary]

to marry women

on the basis of testimony concerning the death of the husband, even when the testimony was given by an

individual witness

testifying

on the basis of another witness

.

That is, the witness testifying before us does not know himself that the woman’s husband died; rather, he heard it from another witness who told him so.

And

even if this testimony was given by a

woman

, who testified concerning the husband’s death on the basis that she had heard it

from another woman

.

And

even the testimony of a

woman

who testified that she had heard of the husband’s death

from a slave, and

even a woman who testified

on the basis of a maidservant -

Apparently

, this Mishna too demonstrates that

one witness is credible

with regard to Torah prohibitions, even to permit the prohibition of a married woman!

Third proof:

And we also learned

in tractate Kiddushin [65b]:

If one witness says, “You ate forbidden fat,” and he says, “I did not eat it”

-

he is exempt

from bringing a sin-offering.

And one should infer:

The reason

that he is exempt from the offering is

that

he contradicts the one witness and

says, “I did not eat it.”

But if he remains silent

, if he does not contradict the one witness -

the witness is credible

to obligate him to bring an offering for eating forbidden fat, and we are not concerned that he may be bringing an ordinary non-sacred offering into the Temple courtyard.

Apparently

, this too demonstrates that

one witness is credible

with regard to Torah prohibitions!

After the Gemara has demonstrated this, it proceeds to discuss the source of this law:

From the Torah

from where do we know

that one witness is credible with regard to prohibitions?

From that

which is taught

: It is written in the passage concerning a sin-offering: “And if any person sins unwittingly -

or

[if]

his sin is made known to him

which he committed, and he shall bring his offering, a female goat.”

From the wording of the verse, “or his sin is made known to him,” it follows that it must become known to him, so that his heart relies upon the matter,

and not that others inform him!

Therefore, if the person himself contradicts the witness, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering.

Perhaps even if he does not contradict him

[the person does not contradict the witness], he

should be exempt

from bringing an offering until he himself becomes aware of the matter and brings the offering?

The verse states: “Or his sin is made known to him

,” and the verse did not say, “or he knew.”

From here you learn that if there was knowledge

in any manner

, even through the testimony of others, the matter is considered known to him, and he is liable to bring an offering.

We must now consider:

What are the circumstances

under which the beraita says, “Perhaps even if he does not contradict him he should be exempt; the verse states, ‘or his sin is made known to him in any manner’”?

If you say that two came

, meaning, if you say that two witnesses came and said that this person ate forbidden fat,

and

he

does not contradict them.

This cannot be said. For if so -

why do I need the verse

at all?

That is, why did the verse say “made known” rather than “knew”? Even if the verse had said “knew,” it would likewise have implied that knowledge conveyed by two witnesses whom he did not contradict is equivalent to his own complete and clear knowledge!?

Rather, is it not

speaking of a case in which only one

witness

came?

This is a novel matter, for the verse was needed to teach it.

And

nevertheless,

because he does not contradict him

the witness is credible

to obligate him to bring a sin-offering, and we are not concerned that he may bring an ordinary non-sacred offering into the Temple courtyard.

This proves that one witness is credible

with regard to prohibitions!

But the Gemara rejects this derivation:

And from where

do we know that it is because the witness is credible

perhaps

it is

because he remains silent

, the sinner not contradicting him,

and silence is comparable to an admission.

It is possible that one witness in and of himself is not credible!

The Gemara adds that it can prove that the liability to bring the offering is due to his silence, which is considered an admission:

Know

that this is so, from that

which is taught

in the

latter clause

of that beraita:

They said

to him,

“You ate forbidden fat,” and he says

“I did not eat it”

-

he is exempt

from bringing a sin-offering.

But

Rabbi Meir obligates

him to bring a sin-offering.

Rabbi Meir said:

Here is a

kal va-homer

that two witnesses should be credible with regard to an offering:

And if, when two

witnesses

brought him to a severe death

, for example, they testified that he committed a transgression for which the court imposes execution -

surely

they should not bring him

two witnesses

to an offering, which is less severe?!

The Sages said

to Rabbi Meir:

What if he wishes to say, “I acted intentionally

”?

That is, since if he were to say, “I acted intentionally” - the witnesses would not contradict him in this, because they do not know whether he acted intentionally or unwittingly when he ate - this person would be exempt from the offering, since there is no offering for eating forbidden fat intentionally, but only for eating it unwittingly.

Therefore, even when he says, “I did not eat it,” we interpret his words as meaning: I did not eat it unwittingly, but intentionally.