Yevamot 87b — the Talmud in English

And if the Merciful One had written

only “like her youth,” to exclude

a pregnant woman,

I would have said:

Specifically this one does not eat, since

originally

the woman was

in herself

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empty,

an empty body,

but now

once she became pregnant, the woman becomes

a full body,

a full body, and therefore she is disqualified.

But

if

she has no offspring—

I would have said that offspring does not disqualify her, because

originally

she was

in herself

the woman’s

empty

body,

and

also

now,

when she gave birth,

the body

of the woman is now

empty,

empty.

And therefore,

say,

I would have said that

not

the offspring would disqualify its mother.

Therefore, it is

necessary

to state also “and she has no offspring,” together with “like her youth.”

Above, in the Gemara on page 87a, two distinctions were explained between being exempt from yibbum through a son and being disqualified from teruma through a son of an Israelite:

A.

Whether deceased sons are like living sons.

With regard to yibbum—

deceased sons are like living sons, to exempt her from yibbum.

Whereas

with regard to teruma—

the offspring of an Israelite disqualifies only when it is alive.

B.

Whether the child from the first husband is like a child from the second husband.

With regard to yibbum—

the child from the first is not like the child from the second, for she is exempt from yibbum only when she has a son from the second.

Whereas

with regard to teruma—

the offspring disqualifies whether the offspring was from her first marriage to an Israelite or from her last marriage to an Israelite.

The Gemara now brings several questions that Rav Yehuda of Daskarta asked Rava concerning these two distinctions, and also gives the answers to these questions.

And the Gemara gives

a sign

for the matter, as a mnemonic for the questions and answers of Rav Yehuda of Daskarta, which are explained below—

He said to him

Rav Yehuda of Daskarta, to Rava, the following questions and answers—

Two questions and answers:

It was not made, and it was made—

with regard to death.

And two more questions and answers:

It was made, and it was not made—

with regard to the child.

But the questions were not in this order, rather in a different order.

And the sign for the order of the questions and answers is:

Yibbum and teruma,

and again

yibbum and teruma—

a sign.

And thus

Rav Yehuda of Daskarta said to him

[a place name]

to Rava:

First he asked him two questions concerning the distinction between teruma and yibbum regarding “the dead like the living” [whose sign is “it was not made and it was made with regard to death”], with the first question being—“it was not made.”

It was not made the dead like the living with regard to yibbum,

rather, let it be said that if the sons whom she had at the time she fell to yibbum died, they are not considered like living sons, and from the time the sons died, the wife of the deceased must undergo yibbum or halitza.

And this may be learned

by a kal va-chomer

from teruma—for a daughter of a priest who has offspring from an Israelite is prevented by it from eating teruma. And when the Israelite offspring dies, she returns to eating teruma, even though she had already been disqualified from eating it because of the Israelite offspring.

And if so, the matter follows by a kal va-chomer—

And what in

teruma, which is

a domain in which

the verse

made the child from

the

first husband like

one who is

a child from

the husband

second—

to disqualify her from teruma.

For the name of her first Israelite husband no longer exists upon her, but only the name of her second Israelite husband. Nevertheless, she is disqualified from teruma even after the death of her second husband, because her son from the first is considered for this matter as though he were her son from the second, since her second husband left her with a wife and a son, with his name upon her.

And nevertheless

he did not make

the verse make sons for her

dead like

sons

living,

to disqualify her from teruma.

Yibbum, which is

a domain in which the verse did not make

the

child from

the husband

first like the child from

the husband

second, to exempt her from yibbum—

Is it not logical that it was not made

there sons

dead like

sons

living

to exempt her from yibbum, but that she should be obligated to undergo yibbum or halitza once the sons die?

And the answer is:

The verse states: “Its ways

of the Torah

are ways of pleasantness

they are.

And all its paths—

peace.”

And this woman, who had a son and did not become subject to a levir, went and married outside the levirate bond, and afterward her son died—if you now obligate her to perform halitza, she is thereby disgraced before her husband, since she is forbidden to him from the time the sons died until the time she performs halitza. It follows that she is forbidden to her husband because of her bond to another husband while she is living under him, and this is not the “ways of pleasantness” of the Torah.

Again he asked a second question: that the dead should be made like the living with regard to teruma. And we should equate the law of teruma with the law of yibbum, so that the dead are like the living:

And it was made the dead like the living with regard to teruma,

so that even if the offspring from the Israelite died, a daughter of a priest would not return to eating teruma,

by a kal va-chomer

from yibbum, where the son exempts her from yibbum even after his death—

And what in

yibbum, which is

a domain in which the verse did not make

the

child from

the husband

first like the child from

the husband

second, to exempt her from yibbum—

Nevertheless,

it made

there the verse sons

dead like

sons

living,

to exempt her from yibbum.

Teruma, which is

a domain in which

yes,

it made

there the verse

the child from

the husband

first like the child from

the husband

second, to disqualify her from teruma—

Is it not logical that it should be made

there sons

dead like

sons

living,

to disqualify her from teruma?!

And the answer is:

The verse states, “And a daughter of a priest, when she becomes a widow or divorced,

and she has no offspring.

And she shall return to her father’s house.”

And

this one,

behold, she has no

offspring now, and she returns to her father’s house.

The Gemara now brings the two questions and answers [“it was made and it was not made”] concerning the distinction in the child between yibbum and teruma:

The first question, “it was made” with regard to the child, is:

And it was made the child from

the husband

first like the child from

the husband

second with regard to yibbum,

and let it be said that if the woman married the first husband and had a son from him, and afterward married a second husband and had no son from him, she is exempt from yibbum,

by a kal va-chomer

from teruma, where we find that even a son from an Israelite whom she has from a previous marriage disqualifies her from eating teruma—

And what in

teruma, which is

a domain in which the verse did not make

there sons

dead like

sons

living with regard to teruma—

nevertheless,

it made

there the verse

the

child from

the husband

first like the child from

the husband

second—

to disqualify her from teruma.

Yibbum, which is

a domain in which the verse made

there sons

dead like

sons

living, with regard to yibbum—

is it not logical that it should be made

there the

child from

the husband

first like the child from

the husband

second

to exempt her from yibbum?!

The verse states, “and he has no son”,

the verse attached the son to the husband and not to the woman.

And behold, he has no

son—the second husband.

And the second question is “it was not made,” that is, conversely, that the law of teruma should be like the law of yibbum, so that the child from the first husband would not disqualify her:

And it was not made the child from

the husband

first like the child from

the husband

second with regard to teruma!

And let it be said that a daughter of a priest who married an Israelite and has a son from him, and afterward returned and married another Israelite and has no son from him, behold, she returns to eating teruma from her father’s house,

by a kal va-chomer

from yibbum, where the son from the earlier marriage does not exempt her from becoming subject to yibbum when her second husband dies without sons?!

And

what in

yibbum, which is

a domain in which

the verse made

there sons

dead like

sons

living, to exempt her from yibbum—

it did not make

there the verse the

child from

the husband

first like the child from

the husband

second

to exempt her from yibbum.

Teruma, which is

a domain in which the verse did not make

there sons

dead like

sons

living with regard to teruma—

is it not logical that it should not be made

in her the

child from

the husband

first like the child from

the husband

second, to disqualify her from teruma?

And the answer is:

The verse states, “And a daughter of a priest, when she becomes a widow or divorced, and

she has no

offspring, and she shall return to her father’s house.”

And

this one—

behold, she has

offspring, and therefore she does not return to her father’s house.

We will return to you, chapter “There Are Women Who Are Permitted.”

offspring, and therefore she does not return to her father’s house.

We have completed the chapter “There Are Women Permitted”

A. By the fundamental law, one witness is not believed to testify concerning a woman that her husband died, in order to permit her to marry, אלא only two witnesses, because “there is no matter of forbidden sexual relations for which fewer than two witnesses suffice”.

B. But the Sages were lenient, because of the enactment for abandoned wives, to believe one witness who testifies concerning the husband’s death.

And it was possible for the Sages to be lenient in this matter, even though according to Torah law testimony of two witnesses is required in order to permit a married woman to marry another man -

Because “from the severity with which you have made it stringent for her at the end [if the husband returns], you have made it lenient for her at the beginning” [by permitting her marriage on the basis of the testimony of one witness who testifies concerning her husband’s death].

That is, the Sages relied on the many stringencies that they imposed upon a woman who marries on the basis of one witness and afterward it became clear that her husband was alive, as is explained below in our Mishna: that the woman should marry on the basis of the witness only if she herself investigates carefully and conducts many examinations in order to verify the witness’s testimony, that indeed her husband died.

Mishna:

The woman whose husband went to an overseas country, and they came,

one witness came,

and they said to her: “Your husband has died!”

that one witness testified concerning her husband’s death, and the court permitted her to marry on the basis of his testimony.

And she married,

and went and married another man on the basis of his testimony -

and afterward her husband came,

and it became clear that she had married another husband at a time when she was a married woman -

the Sages made the matter stringent for her, since it now became clear that she had not investigated carefully at the outset whether her husband had indeed died before she married - and they imposed upon her the following stringencies:

A.

She must leave both this one and that one,

from both her husbands! Both from her first husband, the true one, who must now divorce her, and from her second husband, whose betrothal did not take effect with her, and to whom she is forbidden even after her first husband divorces her! Since the Sages made the matter stringent for her, judging her as a woman who willingly committed adultery while married, who is forbidden both to her husband and to the man with whom she committed adultery.

And although according to the law she is not forbidden like a woman who willingly commits adultery while married, for she is coerced, since she relied on the witness’s testimony and on her investigations, and they permitted her to rely on this - nevertheless, the Sages penalized her and made these stringencies apply to her, so that she would investigate properly before she married another husband.

And likewise, the foundation of most of the stringencies in the Mishna below is the penalty with which the Sages penalized her.

B.

And she requires a bill of divorce from this one and from that one

if she wishes to marry another.

From the first she requires a bill of divorce, since she is his wife. And from the second as well, whose betrothal did not take effect with her, she requires a bill of divorce before she marries another.

As long as a woman is under her husband, he is obligated to provide her sustenance [by Torah law or by an enactment of the Sages, and the tannaim disagreed about this].

Likewise, even after her husband dies, she is sustained from his property, because one of the conditions of the marriage contract is: “You shall sit in my house and be sustained from my property all the days of your widowhood,” until she marries a man.

All the property of a married woman is called “property of melog” [apart from the property that she brings to her husband as “iron-sheep property,” which becomes his property, and he accepts responsibility for the value of the property at the time she brings it to him, so that if he divorces her or dies before her, she has the right to collect from him the value of the property fixed at the time she brought it to him, whether the property decreases in value or increases in value, whether it remains in existence or is lost].

And the husband consumes the produce of the melog property by enactment of the Sages, while the body of the property belongs to the woman.

When he dies or divorces her, the principal returns to the woman.

And the Sages enacted that the husband is obligated to redeem the woman if she is taken captive [“her redemption”], and they enacted this obligation in exchange for his right to consume the produce.

If she brought him clothing as melog property, and the husband used it, he is not obligated to pay for the wear of the clothing caused by his use of the clothing, since the wear of the clothing is included in the produce. However, what remains of the clothing after it has been used is called “worn remnants,” and they return to the woman upon the husband’s death or when he divorces her.

If the husband dies or divorces her, the woman is entitled to collect from his property the marriage contract owed to her. If she was a virgin when he married her, he pays her two hundred zuz; and if she was a widow, she collects one maneh.

And likewise he pays her the value of the “iron-sheep property.” This payment too is among the “conditions of the marriage contract”.

C.

And she has no marriage contract,

even if the first husband transgressed and took her back after the second’s divorce, or the second transgressed and took her back after the first’s divorce.

D.

And not

the return of the

produce

that the first husband consumed, and likewise the second husband - from the time the second married her until the first returned.

And according to the fundamental law, the second should have returned it, since she was not his wife and it was theft in his possession; but they penalized the woman, making her lose this produce.

But what the second consumed after her first husband came, she takes from him.

E.

And not sustenance,

if she borrowed and ate when her first husband [or the second] was overseas.

F.

And not worn remnants [

the remnants of the clothing that the husband used lawfully as melog property, and which wore out after the husband used it].

All these she does not have,

not from

this husband

and not from

that husband

himself.

And if she took

them

from this one and from that one -

she must return them.

And we do not say: since she has already seized them, we will not remove them from her [Gemara].

G.

And the child -

is a mamzer from this one and from that one.

If she bore a son from the second husband before the first husband returned and divorced her - he is a mamzer by Torah law.

And if she bore a son from the first husband after she became forbidden to him - he is a mamzer by rabbinic law. H.

And neither this one nor that one may become impure for her

upon her death, if both her husbands were kohanim.

And even her first husband, who is her completely valid husband, does not become impure for her upon her death, unlike other women for whom the husband becomes impure, because a kohen does not become impure for his disqualified wife.

I.

And neither this one nor that one is entitled -

neither to what she finds, nor to the product of her hands, nor to the annulment of her vows,

and her law is not like that of other women, for whom the husband is entitled to all these; and this is a penalty imposed upon her, as will be explained in the Gemara.

J. And if

the woman was

a

daughter of Israel -

she is

disqualified from marrying into the priesthood,

like the law of a married woman who commits adultery while married, who is a “harlot” and disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

XI.

And

if she was a

daughter of a Levite -

she is disqualified

from

the tithe,

and in the Gemara below, 91a, this matter will be explained.

XII.

And

if she was a

daughter of a kohen -

she is disqualified

from teruma,

like the law of a married woman who committed adultery, who is disqualified from teruma.

XIII.

And the heirs of this one and the heirs of that one -

do not inherit her marriage contract,

as will be explained in the Gemara what “the marriage contract” mentioned here means.

XIV.

And if they died,

both of them before they gave a bill of divorce -

the brother of this one and the brother of that one perform chalitza and do not perform yibbum.

The brother of the first performs chalitza with her by Torah law, since she is the wife of his deceased brother, but he does not perform yibbum, by rabbinic law [and the reason will be explained in the notes below, 91a].

But the brother of the second must perform chalitza with her by rabbinic law, because the Sages made her as though she were also the wife of the second, as a stringency, even though she is not at all the wife of his deceased brother.

The Mishna now brings the words of three tannaim who disagree with the tanna kamma, each concerning a different detail -

Rabbi Yosei,

who disagrees with the words of the tanna kamma, who holds that she has no marriage contract from either this one or that one, and

says:

Her marriage contract -

is charged against the property of her first husband.

Rabbi Elazar,

who disagrees with the words of the tanna kamma, who holds that neither this one nor that one is entitled to what she finds, to the product of her hands, or to the annulment of her vows, and

says:

The first -

is entitled to what she finds, to the product of her hands, and to the annulment of her vows.

Rabbi Shimon,

who disagrees with the words of the tanna kamma, who holds that if they died, the brother of this one and the brother of that one perform chalitza and do not perform yibbum, and

says:

His intercourse or his chalitza with her from the brother of the first -

releases her co-wife!

That is: the brother of the first may even perform yibbum, if he wishes, and it is valid intercourse that releases even her co-wife, in accordance with the law of two yevamot who fell before one yavam, where the intercourse or chalitza of one of them releases the other.

And Rabbi Shimon likewise disagrees with the words of the tanna kamma, who holds that the child is a mamzer from this one and from that one, and says:

And the child is not a mamzer -

not from the first, even if the husband took her back after she became forbidden to him.

And likewise he is not a mamzer from the second, if he had intercourse with her after the first husband divorced her.

And Rabbi Shimon further said All that we said, that she must leave even the first, applies only when one witness came and the court permitted her to marry on the basis of the witness.

A woman who comes to marry on the basis of one witness requires a “ruling of the court” that they permit her to marry on the basis of it.

But a woman who marries on the basis of two witnesses does not need to resort to a “ruling of the court” in order to marry; it is sufficient that the court accept their testimony.

When are these words said, that they made the matter stringent for a woman who married another and whose husband then returned? In the case of one who married on the basis of one witness, through a ruling of the court that permitted her to marry.

But

if she married

on the basis of two witnesses, who came and said, “Your husband has died,” and these marriages are called marriages

“without the authority

of the court,” meaning that she did not need to receive a ruling of permission for these marriages, since two witnesses came.

And afterward her husband returned -

she is

permitted to return to him

to the first husband.

For that which she had relations with the second husband is considered like intercourse under compulsion, and her status is not like that of a woman who commits adultery willingly, who becomes forbidden to her husband.

For this woman did not have relations with her second husband because she wished to commit adultery during her first husband's lifetime, but because she relied upon the testimony of two witnesses.

However, with regard to liability for a sacrifice for the intercourse with the second husband, she is considered only as having acted unwittingly, and therefore she is obligated to bring a sin-offering. She is not judged, with regard to the sacrifice, as one under compulsion, since she should have waited until she carefully verified that her husband had indeed died, and not married, for it has now become clear that these witnesses are false witnesses, and all that permitted her to marry was in error.

However, if she married on the basis of a ruling of a court, which permitted her to marry on the testimony of one witness, she is exempt from bringing a sacrifice, because one who performs an action on the basis of a ruling of a court is considered under compulsion with regard to exemption from a sin-offering. And therefore -

if

she married on the basis of a court

, which permitted her and instructed her to marry on the basis of one witness -

she shall leave

her second husband,

and she is exempt from the sacrifice,

since an individual who acted on the basis of a “ruling of a court” is exempt from the sacrifice.

But if

she did not marry on the basis of

the permissive ruling of a

court,

but rather relied upon the testimony of the two witnesses -

she shall leave

her second husband,

and she is liable for a sacrifice,

and this is not compulsion, which exempts her from the sacrifice, because she should have waited and checked whether these were false witnesses.

And the Mishna concludes:

the power of the court is greater

that permits a woman to marry on the basis of one witness than [the power] of the testimony of two witnesses -

for

the court

exempts her

through “its ruling”

from the sacrifice!

And now the Mishna explains an additional halakha:

If

a court instructed her to marry,

the court having permitted her to marry,

and she went and acted improperly

[it will be explained in the Gemara whether she had intercourse in the manner of adultery without marrying, or whether she went and married someone whom she was forbidden to marry], and afterward her husband returned -

she is liable for a sacrifice!

Because

they did not permit her

the court

except to marry,

and not to act improperly. It follows that she did not have intercourse by virtue of the court's permissive ruling, and she is like one who relied upon the testimony of witnesses without a permissive ruling of a court, who is liable for a sacrifice.

Gemara:

It was newly established in our Mishna that one witness is reliable to testify concerning the death of a husband.

And in order to explain the reliability of one witness concerning the death of a husband, the Gemara first discusses the fundamental reliability of one witness, and deduces this from several mishnayot, as well as from our Mishna:

First proof:

Since it teaches in the latter clause,

in our Mishna, in the words of Rabbi Shimon:

“If she married without authorization

of the court -

she is permitted to return to him,”

and the meaning of “without authorization” is that she married

without authorization of the court,

the court did not instruct her with a permissive ruling,

but

she married

through witnesses,

relying upon their testimony, and she did not have a permissive ruling from the court that she should marry -

by implication

you learn

the first clause,

in which we learned: “They came and told her, ‘Your husband has died,’ and she married, and afterward her husband came - she shall leave this one and that one,” that it speaks of a woman who married

with the authorization of the court and through one witness -

apparently,

it is proven from the Mishna that

one witness is reliable

to permit her, since the court's permissive ruling was based upon the testimony of one witness.

The Gemara now assumes that one witness concerning the death of a husband is reliable, since the law of one who says, “Your husband has died,” is like the law of other testimony concerning prohibitions, in which one witness is reliable.

Second proof:

And we also learned

[below, 122a]:

They established

[they practiced]

that they would marry off

a woman on the basis of testimony concerning the death of her husband, even through the testimony of a

witness

testifying

from the mouth of

another witness.

That is, the witness testifying before us does not himself know that the woman's husband died, but heard this from one witness who told him so.

And

even if this was the testimony of a

woman,

testifying concerning the husband's death on the basis that she heard it

from the mouth of a woman

elsewhere.

And

even the testimony of a

woman,

testifying that she heard about the husband's death

from the mouth of a slave, and

even a woman testifying

from the mouth of a maidservant -

apparently,

it is proven also from this Mishna that

one witness is reliable

in prohibitions by Torah law, even to permit the prohibition of a married woman!

Third proof:

And we also learned

in tractate Kiddushin [65b]:

One witness says, “You ate forbidden fat,” and he says, “I did not eat” -

he is

exempt

from bringing a sin-offering.

And one should deduce:

the reason

that he is exempt from the sacrifice is

that

he contradicts the one witness and

says, “I did not eat.”

But if he remains silent,

if he is silent and does not contradict the one witness -

he is reliable

the witness to obligate him to bring a sacrifice for eating forbidden fat, and we are not concerned that perhaps he is bringing unconsecrated food into the Temple courtyard.

Apparently,

it is proven also from here that

one witness is reliable

in prohibitions by Torah law!

And after the Gemara proved this, it proceeds to discuss the source of this law:

From Torah law -

from where do we know

that one witness is reliable in prohibitions?

From this

as it was taught:

It is written in the section of the sin-offering: “And if one person sins unwittingly -

or

[if]

his sin becomes known to him

that he sinned, and he shall bring his offering, a female goat.”

And from the words of the verse, “or his sin becomes known to him,” it implies that it must become known to him, that his heart relies upon the matter,

and not that others inform him!

Therefore, if the person concerned contradicts the witness, he is not liable for a sin-offering.

One might have thought that even though he does not contradict him

[the person concerned does not contradict the witness] also

he would be exempt

from bringing a sacrifice until he brings the sacrifice of his own accord?

The verse states: “Or his sin becomes known to him,”

and the verse did not say, “or he knew.”

And from here you learn that if there was knowledge

in any event,

even through the testimony of others - the matter is considered known to him, and he is liable for a sacrifice.

And from now we must consider:

What are the circumstances,

in what manner does the beraita say, “One might have thought that even though he does not contradict him he would be exempt; the verse states, ‘or his sin becomes known to him in any event’”?

If you say that two came,

if you say that two witnesses came who said that this person ate forbidden fat,

and

he

does not contradict them.

It is impossible to say this. For if so -

the verse -

why do I need it!?

That is, why did the verse say “becomes known” and not “knew”? For even if the verse had said “knew,” it would likewise imply that knowledge through two witnesses whom he did not contradict is as though he himself knew with complete and clear knowledge!?

Rather, is it not

that the matter concerns a case in which only one

witness

came -

and this is a novel matter, for the verse needed to teach this novelty.

And

nevertheless,

because he does not contradict him -

the witness is reliable

the one witness to obligate him to bring a sin-offering, and we are not concerned that he will bring unconsecrated food into the Temple courtyard.

Infer from it: One witness is reliable

in prohibitions!

But the Gemara rejects this derivation:

And from where [is it] because the witness is reliable

[how do we know that we rely upon the witness's reliability] to obligate him to bring a sacrifice!?

Perhaps

perhaps it is

because he remains silent

the sinner and does not contradict him,

and silence is comparable to an admission.

But perhaps one witness himself is not reliable!

The Gemara adds that it can prove that the liability for the sacrifice is because his silence is considered an admission:

Know

that this is so, from this

as it teaches

in the

latter clause

of that beraita:

They said

to him,

“You ate forbidden fat,” and he says

“I did not eat” -

he is

exempt

from bringing a sin-offering.

Whereas

Rabbi Meir obligates

him to bring a sin-offering.

Rabbi Meir said:

Here is a

kal va-chomer

that two witnesses should be reliable for a sacrifice:

And if, when two brought him

witnesses

to a severe death,

for example, when they testified against him that he committed a transgression for which the court imposes the death penalty -

and is it possible that

they would not bring him

two witnesses

to a sacrifice, which is lenient?!

The Sages said

to Rabbi Meir:

What if he wishes to say, “I acted intentionally”!

That is, since if he had said, “I acted intentionally”

the witnesses would not contradict him in this, because they do not know whether he acted intentionally or unwittingly when he ate - this person would be exempt from the sacrifice, since there is no sacrifice for eating forbidden fat intentionally, but only for eating it unwittingly.

Therefore, even when he says, “I did not eat,” we interpret his words as follows: I did not eat unwittingly, but intentionally.