Yevamot 87a — the Talmud in English

b.

A daughter of a priest who married an Israelite—

she may not eat teruma,

because her marriage to a non-priest disqualifies her from eating teruma from her father’s household.

And even if

her Israelite husband dies,

the Israelite husband,

and

there is

a son she has from him—

she may not eat teruma,

because the son she has from the Israelite disqualifies her from her father’s household teruma.

She returned and

married a Levite—

she may eat tithe because of her husband. And the son she has from the Israelite, whom she married first, does not disqualify her from the tithe.

But she does not eat her father’s household teruma, because of the son she has from the Israelite, and an additional disqualification was added to her because of her marriage to the Levite.

And even if

her

Levite

husband dies,

and

there is

a son she has from him—

she may eat tithe

on account of her son from the Levite.

But she does not eat her father’s household teruma, because of the son she has from the Israelite, and likewise because of the son she has from the Levite.

She returned and

married a priest,

when she has sons from the Israelite and from the Levite—

she may eat teruma.

This is so even though before her marriage to the priest she had two sons from men who are “non-priests” with regard to teruma, and the sons still exist.

And even if

her priest husband dies,

the priest husband,

and

there is

a son she has from him—

she may eat teruma

by virtue of this son, even though initially she had two sons, from the Levite and from the Israelite, and they still exist.

Her son died

who belonged to this woman

from

the

priest,

who had enabled her until now to eat teruma—

she may not eat teruma,

for the one who had enabled her to eat has died.

And she may not eat even her father’s household teruma, for she has a son from a Levite and a son from an Israelite, who disqualify her.

But with regard to tithe, she may eat on account of her surviving son from the Levite, and the son whom she initially had from the Israelite does not disqualify her. And if

her son died

also

from the Levite—

she may not eat tithe,

for the one who had enabled her to eat has died.

But she still may not eat her father’s household teruma, for the son from the Israelite still exists, and he disqualifies her.

But if

also

her

son from the Israelite dies—

she

returns to her father’s household,

to eat his teruma.

And concerning this one it is said: “And she shall return to her father’s household as in her youth,

from her father’s bread she may eat.”

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: An Israelite woman who married a priest. He died, and she has a son from him; she may eat teruma. She married a Levite, and he died, and she has a son from him.

Her son from the Levite died—

she may eat teruma.

And we raised an objection concerning it: This matter that we learned in the Mishna—an Israelite woman who has a son from the priest, and he enabled her to eat teruma, and afterward she married a Levite who is a “non-priest” with regard to teruma, and she was disqualified from teruma, and afterward her Levite husband, who is a “non-priest” with regard to teruma, died—which we learned in our Mishna,

that she returns and eats,

that she returns to eat teruma

because of her son,

the priest—

from where do we know it?

Rabbi Abba said that Rav said:

We learn this from an extra letter vav. The verse could have said

“daughter,”

but the verse added the letter vav and said

“and daughter,”

in order to teach us this halakha from the extra letter.

As it is stated: “And a daughter of a priest, when she becomes a widow or a divorcee, and she has no offspring—she shall return to her father’s household.”

And it could have said: “A daughter of a priest, when she becomes a widow.”

The addition of the letter vav comes to include the woman who eats on account of her son, that she returns to eat teruma when the non-priest whom she married dies, who had disqualified her from teruma.

And we ask:

According to whom

is our Mishna? Do you wish to say that our Mishna is

according to Rabbi Akiva, who expounds the vavs [who expounds the extra letter vav], and not according to the Sages, who do not expound the extra letter vav!?

[as one who expounds the extra letter vav], and not according to the Sages, who do not expound an extra vav?!

And we answer:

Even if you say,

it is possible to say that our Mishna

is the Rabbis

. And the derivation is not from the extra letter vav, but

the whole,

the entire word

“and daughter”—

it is an extra verse.

And we learn this from the excess of the entire word.

For in the preceding verse it is written: “And a daughter of a priest, when she becomes the wife of a non-priest, she may not eat of the sacred teruma.”

And it should have written afterward: “And when she becomes a widow,” and it would not have been necessary to say “and a daughter of a priest, when she becomes a widow,” since it is self-evident that the verse is speaking of a daughter of a priest, as the verse was speaking of a daughter of a priest previously.

The Sages taught:

A daughter of a priest who married an Israelite,

when she returns

to eat teruma after the death of her husband—

she

returns to

the eating of

teruma

that she used to eat in her father’s household.

But

she

does not return to eating the meat of

breast and thigh,

the breast and the thigh,

which are the priests’ portion of peace-offerings, which she used to eat in her father’s household, as the verse said: “And the breast of the waving and the thigh of the gift you shall eat, you and your sons and your daughters with you.”

And the reason for the matter is that she was disqualified from eating them from the moment she married an Israelite. But if she has offspring from a priest, she returns and eats the breast and the thigh through the power of her priestly son.

The Gemara now brings the words of five amoraim, who derive from five different interpretations of the verse the source for the fact that a daughter of a priest does not return to eating the breast and the thigh, but only to eating teruma.

The first derivation:

Rav Hisda said that Ravina bar Sheila said: What is the verse?

From where do we know from the verse that she does not return to her father’s household even for the breast and the thigh, but only for teruma?

As it is stated: “And a daughter of a priest, when she becomes the wife of a non-priest—

she may not eat of the teruma of the sacred things.”

And it should have written: “She may not eat of the sacred things,” and we would have known on our own that the intention is teruma, since the verse is speaking of teruma.

Rather, the addition of the word “teruma” comes to teach you:

Of what is raised up from the sacred things,

the breast and the thigh, which are “raised up” from the peace-offerings—

she may not eat

ever.

For the principal meaning of the verse, “And a daughter of a priest, when she becomes the wife of a non-priest, she may not eat of the teruma of the sacred things,” is to say that a woman who has relations with one who disqualifies her is disqualified from teruma.

However, if the verse had come to teach us only this matter, it would have said: “She may not eat of the sacred things.”

And since the verse added and said, “She may not eat of the teruma of the sacred things,” we must learn from here that there is another woman who does eat of the “sacred things” [teruma], but does not eat of the “teruma” of the sacred things.

And who is she? This is a daughter of a priest who married an Israelite and her husband died, for she returns to eat of the “sacred things” themselves, namely, teruma.

But she does not return to eat of the “teruma” of the sacred things, the breast and the thigh raised up from the sacred things, since she has been permanently disqualified from eating the breast and the thigh.

The second derivation:

Rav Naḥman said

in the name of

Rabba bar Avuha,

this is the reason that she does not return to the breast and the thigh:

Since the verse said, “And she shall return to her father’s household as in her youth; from her father’s bread she may eat,” and the verse did not say, “She may eat her father’s bread,” the verse teaches:

Only “from bread,” from part of her father’s bread, may she eat,

but not all bread

of her father may she eat—

excluding the breast and the thigh,

from which she does not return to eat, ever.

Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection against

the words of Rav Naḥman in the name of Rabba bar Avuha: From where do you know that this verse comes to say that she does not return to eating the breast and the thigh?

And perhaps,

say

this: The verse “From her father’s bread she may eat” did not come to exclude a daughter of a priest from eating the breast and the thigh; rather, the verse came to say:

excluding

the matter of

the annulment of vows

by the father—and to teach that if she was a na’ara, whose father annuls her vows, she does not return to him after she left his authority through her marriage to her husband, and she is unlike the eating of teruma, in which she does return to him.

And this is how we expound it: “From her father’s bread she may eat,” but not all her father’s bread—for the father cannot permit his daughter to eat his bread if she vowed herself forbidden from it, because from the moment she marries she leaves his authority, and he can no longer annul her vows.

Said

in answer

Rava:

We do not need a special verse to teach that she does not return for the annulment of vows, since

the school of Rabbi Ishmael’s tanna already established

from reasoning and without a verse that a na’ara who leaves her father’s authority through marriage to her husband does not again return to her father’s household for the annulment of vows.

For the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught:

It is written in the section of the annulment of vows, after the verse explained the law of the annulment of vows by her father and the law of the annulment of vows by her husband:

“And the vow of a widow and a divorcee [who is no longer under her father’s authority from the time she married, and is no longer under her husband’s authority from the time she was divorced]—everything that she prohibited upon herself

[who is no longer under her father’s authority once she has married, and is no longer under her husband’s authority once she has been divorced]—whatever she has prohibited to herself,”

shall remain upon her.”

What does the verse come to teach?

Why does the verse need to teach us that her vows shall remain? And who can annul them for her?

Is she not

herself

removed from the category of

the annulment of

a father,

once she has married, even if she was widowed or divorced from her husband?

And

likewise she is

removed

also

from the category of

the annulment of

a husband,

since she was divorced from him.

If so, who will annul them for her?

And why did the verse need to say, “Everything that she prohibited upon herself shall remain upon her”?

Rather,

the verse is never coming to teach us about the vows of a woman who married and left her father’s authority entirely, since she certainly does not return to her father’s authority even after she is widowed or divorced.

Rather, the verse speaks of a na’ara who was widowed or divorced before her complete marriage, for example—

We learned in the Mishna in Ketubot 48a: A na’ara [or a minor] always remains under her father’s authority until she enters her husband’s authority for marriage [that is, until she enters the wedding canopy for the purpose of marriage, so that she is delivered into her husband’s authority].

If the father delivered his betrothed daughter to the husband’s agents [who came to take her so that the husband could bring her under the wedding canopy], she is already under the husband’s authority [and he inherits from her, and if he is a priest he becomes impure for her, and he alone annuls her vows without the father, as a married woman].

If the father went with the husband’s agents, or if the father’s agents went with the husband’s agents, she is still under the father’s authority.

If the father’s agents delivered her to the husband’s agents—she is under the husband’s authority.

And the source for the law of “delivery into the husband’s authority” was derived there in the Gemara from the verses.

Thus, if the father delivered

his betrothed daughter

to the husband’s agents,

who came to take her in order to bring her under the wedding canopy,

or if they delivered

her,

the father’s agents to the husband’s agents,

and she entered his authority with regard to the annulment of vows,

and she was widowed or divorced on the way

to the husband, and he did not bring her under the wedding canopy.

How do I read concerning her

now, after she has been widowed, with regard to the annulment of vows?

Do I read concerning her

“the household of the father” of

this

na’ara,

who is still considered to be found in her father’s household, since she has still not left his authority entirely, and the father should now annul her vows?

Or

do I already read concerning her

“the household of her husband,”

the

na’ara of this man?

And she is like any other widow from a complete marriage, whose father does not annul her vows?

Rather,

this verse comes in order

to tell you: Once she has left the father’s authority for even one hour,

even though this was not a complete departure, but only that she was delivered by the father into the hands of her husband’s agents—

he can no longer

the father

annul her vows.

And it is proven from Rabbi Ishmael’s words that in the section of vows itself it has already been learned from the verse that a married na’ara does not return to her father for the annulment of vows; if so, we do not need another special verse to teach us that the daughter does not return to her father’s household with regard to the annulment of vows.

Therefore, the verse “From her father’s bread she may eat” is superfluous, and comes to say “from bread,” and not all bread, to teach that the daughter does not return to the breast and the thigh.

The third derivation:

Rav Safra said,

this is the reason that the daughter does not return to her father’s household, after she married and her husband died, to eat the breast and the thigh:

Since the verse said, “And she shall return to her father’s household as in her youth,

from her father’s bread she may eat,”

you have learned: She returns only to the

bread

[that is, grain teruma],

and not

to the

meat

of the breast and the thigh.

The fourth derivation:

Rav Pappa said:

It is possible to learn that she does not return to eating the breast and the thigh from the words of the verse,

“From her father’s bread she may eat”—

whose meaning is: Only

bread acquired by her father,

teruma, may she eat—

excluding the breast and the thigh, which

are not acquired by her father, but

the priests receive them from the table of the Most High

the priests.

For teruma is acquired by the priests as their actual property, since it is not the remnants of the king’s table. But the remnants of sacred offerings are like “a gift from before God,” which are the remnants of His table, and they are not the property of the priests.

The fifth lesson:

And Rava said:

From here it is to be learned that she does not return to eating the breast and thigh, for it is stated:

“And the breast of the waving and the thigh of the teruma

you shall eat, you and your sons and your daughters, with you.”

The verse teaches by the word “with you” that the daughters eat only

when

they are

with you

[with the father, the kohen], but not when they leave you, through their marriage to their husbands.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: A beraita

was taught:

When she—

a daughter of a kohen who marries an Israelite—

returns to her father’s house

to eat of his teruma, she

returns

only

to teruma, and does not return to

eating

the breast and thigh

which she used to eat when she was in her father’s house.

But if she was an Israelite woman who had a son from a kohen, and she ate, by virtue of her kohen son, teruma and the breast and thigh, and afterward became disqualified from eating teruma and the breast and thigh through her marriage to a non-kohen, and her non-kohen husband died, and she returns

on account of her son

from the kohen, she

returns

to teruma and

also to the breast and thigh.

For all five exclusions stating that she does not return were said only concerning a daughter of a kohen who returns without offspring from an Israelite, but not concerning one who eats on account of her kohen son.

Rav Mordekhai went

[walked]

and said this

to

teaching

of Rav Adda bar Ahava

before

[in the presence of]

Rav Ashi.

He said,

Rav Ashi raised an objection to him: But

from where is it derived?

From where do we derive concerning the Israelite woman who eats by virtue of her kohen son that she returns to eat teruma and the breast and thigh after her marriage to a non-kohen?

We derive this

from

the surplus of the word

“and the daughter

in the verse, “And the daughter of a kohen, when she becomes a widow or divorced, and she has no offspring, and she returns to her father’s house.” For this verse comes to include the Israelite woman who eats by virtue of her kohen son, so that her law is like that of a daughter of a kohen who returns to her father’s house when she has no offspring from an Israelite, as explained above at the beginning of the discussion!

And this very verse is the source for the return of a daughter of a kohen to eat from the teruma of her father’s house.

And since the law of the return to eating teruma of the Israelite woman who eats on account of her kohen son is derived from that same verse which teaches about the return of a daughter of a kohen to her father’s house—

Is she superior to her,

the Israelite woman who eats on account of her son,

than her,

the daughter of a kohen who returns to her father’s house!? How can it be that the Israelite woman who eats by virtue of her kohen son returns to eat even the breast and thigh, whereas a daughter of a kohen who returns to her father’s house does not return to the breast and thigh!?

And we answer:

There,

with regard to the daughter of a kohen who eats because of her father and returns to him,

exclusions are written,

which teach that she does not return to the breast and thigh.

But

here,

with regard to the Israelite woman who eats on account of her kohen son,

exclusions are not written.

For all five exclusions stated above, that a daughter of a kohen who returns to her father’s house should not eat the breast and thigh, were stated concerning a daughter of a kohen who eats because of her father, and were not stated concerning an Israelite woman who eats by virtue of her kohen son.

We learned in the Mishna:

A daughter of a kohen who married an Israelite:

The law of levirate marriage applies only when the husband dies without sons, but if he had sons, his wife does not require levirate marriage.

And if a woman married one husband and had sons from him, and afterward married another husband and did not have sons from him, her sons from the first do not exempt her from levirate marriage.

And below, the beraita calls this, with regard to this matter: The verse did not make offspring from the first for her like offspring from the second.

And if her husband had sons at the time of his death, and she was exempted from levirate marriage, and afterward the sons died, she does not again become one who requires levirate marriage.

And the beraita calls this, with regard to this matter: The verse made dead sons for her like living sons.

That is, with regard to exemption from levirate marriage: if he had sons at the time of his death, and they exempted his wife from levirate marriage, and afterward his sons died, the matter is considered as though his sons were still alive, and his wife does not again fall to levirate marriage.

It is written concerning the eating of teruma by a daughter of a kohen who marries an Israelite and whose husband dies or divorces her: “And the daughter of a kohen, when she becomes a widow or divorced, and she has no offspring, and she returns to her father’s house as in her youth, from her father’s bread she shall eat.”

The Sages taught:

The Sages expounded this verse as follows:

“And she returns to her father’s house”—

excluding

a daughter of a kohen who married an Israelite, whose husband died, and who is now

a levirate widow

to her husband’s Israelite brother.

Since she is bound to him, she cannot return to her father’s house, and therefore she does not eat teruma.

“As in her youth”—

when she is empty, as during the time of her youth—

excluding

a daughter of a kohen who is

pregnant

by an Israelite, who does not eat teruma, since she is not empty as in the days of her youth, but is full of an Israelite fetus.

The Gemara assumes in the discussion below two foundational assumptions.

One assumption: a woman who has a son from her husband, and the husband dies, continues to bear the name of her deceased husband through the son [for example, she is called “the wife of a kohen”] until she marries another husband; then the name of the second is upon her, and not the name of the first, and even if the second also dies, only the name of the second remains upon her, and not that of the first.

A second assumption: a woman who has a son from a first husband and marries a second husband, and her second husband dies without sons, it might have been said that the son she has from her first husband is now considered to continue the name of the second husband upon her, and that the name of her second husband has not been erased from Israel, since she remained his widow with a son [although this is not the son of the second husband].

And this assumption is based on the first assumption, that only the name of her second husband is upon her, and not the name of her first husband; therefore it might have been said that the name of her second husband has not been erased, since her designation is “the widow of the second” alone, and this widow has a son!

Rather, the Torah came and rejected this assumption.

Lest you say: Why do I need a verse to disqualify the daughter of a kohen who is pregnant with an Israelite fetus and to say that she does not eat teruma?

Is it not a matter of logical derivation,

for from a kal va-chomer based on the law of levirate marriage we can learn this law: that an Israelite fetus prevents her from returning to her father’s house, and there is no need for an exposition from the verse to learn this law—

For if a woman married a first husband and bore him a son, and her first husband died, and she married a second husband, and she had no sons from the second husband, she requires levirate marriage.

And we do not say: Since this woman married a second husband and has a son [from the first husband], and the second husband died and now left behind a woman with a son, the matter should be considered as though he left behind a woman with his son, and she does not require levirate marriage.

Rather, a son from him himself must remain, and if not, the woman requires levirate marriage.

And now we should derive by a kal va-chomer from levirate marriage to teruma:

And just as in

levirate marriage, which is

a case in which the verse did not make

the

offspring

that the woman has

from

her

first

husband

like

the

offspring from

her

second

husband,

thereby

to exempt her from levirate marriage.

For she is exempt from levirate marriage only if there was a son of the second husband. But the son she has from her first husband does not help to exempt her from levirate marriage when her second husband dies, despite the fact that he left behind a wife who has offspring.

And nevertheless,

the verse made

the

fetus

like a born child.

For a levirate widow who was pregnant by her husband at the time of his death does not undergo levirate marriage as long as she is pregnant, because the fetus’s existence in her womb is considered as though her deceased husband has a son.

And if so, it is all the more so that the Israelite fetus should disqualify the daughter of a kohen from teruma—

For teruma is

a case in which the verse did make

the

offspring from

the

first husband like

the one who is

offspring from

the

second husband,

who died without sons—

to disqualify her from teruma.

For if a daughter of a kohen marries an Israelite and has a son from him, he disqualifies her from eating teruma, because he causes her to be considered as though she continues to be married to his father, the Israelite.

And if afterward she marries a second Israelite, it might have been said that since she is now married to another person, she is no longer considered to be in the house of her first husband [as stated in the introduction above, that the Gemara assumed that marriage to the second husband has the power to completely cancel her affiliation with the first husband]!

And nevertheless, if her second Israelite husband dies without sons, we do not say: Since she is now the widow of her second husband, and from her second marriage she has no offspring, she returns from the marriage to her second husband to her father’s house to eat teruma.

Rather, we take into account her Israelite son whom she has from her first husband, as though she has offspring from the second husband [as stated in the introduction, in explanation of the Gemara’s second assumption], and I do not apply to her, “When she becomes the wife of a non-kohen, and she has no offspring, and she returns to her father’s house”—

If so,

is it not a matter of logical derivation that

if she has an Israelite fetus from her first Israelite husband,

we should make

the

fetus

that she has in her body from an Israelite

like

an Israelite son

born,

who prevents her from eating teruma!?

And since it is possible to learn the law that the fetus is like a born child by a kal va-chomer from levirate marriage, why was it necessary to learn it by an exposition from the verse!?

And we answer:

No!

It is not possible to learn the law of the fetus with regard to teruma from levirate marriage, because there is a refutation of this kal va-chomer. Therefore the verse concerning teruma is needed to teach us that the fetus has the status of a born child, to disqualify her from teruma.

For the kal va-chomer can be rejected as follows:

What is there to say,

how can I compare the law of a fetus with regard to teruma to the law of a fetus with regard to levirate marriage?

For the fact that

the verse made

the

fetus like a born child with regard to levirate marriage

is because—

For the verse made

even sons in levirate marriage

who died,

who died after the woman fell to levirate marriage—

like

sons who are still

alive

.

For the levirate widow does not again become required to marry the levir after the death of his sons.

But does one

make a fetus like a born child with regard to teruma, where the verse did not make

sons

who died like

sons

who are alive!

For only living sons whom she has from the first Israelite disqualify her, but if the sons died, their status is not like that of the living; rather, she returns to her father’s house to eat teruma.

And since we cannot learn that the fetus disqualifies by a kal va-chomer, therefore—

The verse states: “As in her youth”—

excluding a pregnant woman.

And the Gemara adds and explains:

And it was necessary to write “as in her youth,” to exclude

a daughter of a kohen who is

pregnant

by an Israelite, who is disqualified from teruma.

And it was necessary

also

to write “

And the daughter of a kohen, when she becomes a widow or divorced,

and she has no offspring,

and she returns to her father’s house”—

to exclude offspring

from an Israelite, for the offspring disqualifies her.

Since

if the Merciful One had written “and she has no offspring”

alone, I would say that it disqualifies her because

initially,

before the daughter of a kohen married an Israelite, she was

one body

[a single body].

And

if

now, when she has given birth, she is

two bodies, she is

two bodies

[two bodies]. And therefore she is disqualified.

But concerning a pregnant woman, since

even

initially

she was

one body, and now,

when she is pregnant, she too is

one body—

I might say that she may eat.

I would say that she eats teruma and is not disqualified.

Therefore

it is necessary

to state “as in her youth,” despite the fact that “and she has no offspring” is written.