Yevamot 87a (פז.) — the Talmud in English

b.

A kohen’s daughter who married an Israelite—

may not eat teruma,

because her marriage to a non-kohen disqualifies her from eating the teruma of her father’s household.

And even if

her

Israelite husband dies,

and

she

has a son from him—

she may not eat teruma,

because the son she has from the Israelite disqualifies her from her father’s teruma.

If she remarries and

marries a Levite—

she may eat maaser

because of her husband. The son she has from the Israelite whom she married first does not disqualify her from maaser.

However, she may not eat the teruma of her father’s household, because of the son she has from the Israelite, and she has also acquired an additional disqualification through her marriage to the Levite.

And even if

the

Levite dies,

and

she

has a son from him—

she may eat maaser

on account of her son from the Levite.

However, she may not eat the teruma of her father’s household, because of the son she has from the Israelite, and also because of the son she has from the Levite.

If she remarries and

marries a kohen,

when she has sons from the Israelite and from the Levite—

she may eat teruma.

This is so despite the fact that before her marriage to the kohen she had two sons from men who are “non-kohanim” with regard to teruma, and the sons are still alive.

And even if

her

kohen husband dies,

and

she

has a son from him—

she may eat teruma

by virtue of this son, even though initially she had two sons, from the Levite and from the Israelite, and they are still alive.

If her son

from

the

the

kohen

who had enabled her to eat teruma until now dies—

she may not eat teruma,

for the one who had enabled her to eat it has died.

And she may not eat even the teruma of her father’s household, since she has a son from a Levite and a son from an Israelite, who disqualify her.

But with regard to maaser, she may eat on account of her surviving son from the Levite, and the son she initially had from the Israelite does not disqualify her. And if

her son

also

from the Levite dies—

she may not eat maaser,

for the one who had enabled her to eat it has died.

However, she still may not eat the teruma of her father’s household, since the son from the Israelite is still alive and disqualifies her.

But if

also

her

son from the Israelite dies—

she

returns to her father’s household,

to eat his teruma.

And concerning this woman it is stated: “And she shall return to her father’s household, as in her youth;

from her father’s bread she shall eat.”

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: An Israelite woman who married a kohen. If he dies and she has a son from him, she may eat teruma. If she married a Levite, he died, and she has a son from him,

if her son from the Levite dies—

she may eat teruma.

And we raised a difficulty concerning this: Regarding what we learned in the Mishna—an Israelite woman who has a son from the kohen, who enabled her to eat teruma, and then married a Levite who is a “non-kohen” with regard to teruma, thereby becoming disqualified from teruma, and then her Levite husband, who is a “non-kohen” with regard to teruma, died—our Mishna teaches

that she returns and eats,

that she returns to eating teruma

on account of her son,

the kohen—

from where do we know this?

Rabbi Abba said that Rav said:

We learn this from a superfluous vav. The verse could have said

“bat”,

but the verse added the letter vav and said

“u-venat”,

in order to teach us this halakha through the superfluity.

As it is stated: “And the daughter of a kohen, if she becomes a widow or is divorced, and she has no offspring, shall return to her father’s household.”

The verse could have said: “The daughter of a kohen, if she becomes a widow.”

The addition of the letter vav comes to include a woman who eats on account of her son, teaching that she returns to eating teruma when the non-kohen whom she married dies, the one who had disqualified her from teruma.

We wondered:

According to whom

is our Mishna? Do you mean to say that our Mishna is

according to Rabbi Akiva, who expounds the vavs [who expounds the superfluity of the letter vav], and not according to the Sages, who do not expound the superfluity of the letter vav?!

[as one who expounds the extra letter vav], and not according to the Sages, who do not expound an extra vav?!

We answer:

Even if you say,

it is possible to say that our Mishna is

the Rabbis’

opinion. And the derivation is not from the superfluous letter vav, but

the entire

word—

“u-venat”—

is a superfluous verse. We learn this from the superfluity of the entire word.

We learn this from the fact that the entire word is extra.

For in the preceding verse it is written: “And the daughter of a kohen, if she becomes the wife of a non-kohen, she shall not eat of the sacred offerings.”

And it should have written afterward: “And if she becomes a widow,” without needing to say, “And the daughter of a kohen, if she becomes a widow,” since it is self-evident that the verse is speaking of a kohen’s daughter, as the preceding verse was speaking of a kohen’s daughter.

The Sages taught: A kohen’s daughter who married an Israelite,

when

she returns

to eating teruma after her husband’s death—

she

returns to

eating

teruma

that she used to eat in her father’s household.

But

she

does not return to eating the meat of

the

breast and thigh,

which are the kohanim’s portion of offerings of shelamim, which she used to eat in her father’s household, as the verse states: “And the breast of the waving and the thigh of the uplifting you shall eat, you and your sons and your daughters with you.”

The reason for this is that she was disqualified from eating them from the moment she married an Israelite. But if she has offspring from a kohen, she returns to eating the breast and thigh by virtue of her son, the kohen.

The Gemara now cites the words of five amoraim, who derive from five different interpretations of the verse the source for the fact that a kohen’s daughter does not return to eating the breast and thigh, but returns only to eating teruma.

The first derivation:

Rav Ḥisda said that Ravina bar Sheila said: What is the verse?

From where do we know from the verse that she does not return to her father’s household even with regard to the breast and thigh, but only with regard to teruma?

As it is stated: “And the daughter of a kohen, if she becomes the wife of a non-kohen—

she shall not eat of the teruma of the sacred offerings.”

It should have said: “She shall not eat of the sacred offerings,” and we would have understood on our own that the reference is to teruma, since the verse is speaking of teruma.

Rather, the addition of the word “teruma” teaches you:

Of that which is uplifted from the sacred offerings,

the breast and thigh, which are “uplifted” from the shelamim—

she shall not eat

ever.

For the fundamental meaning of the verse, “And the daughter of a kohen, if she becomes the wife of a non-kohen, she shall not eat of the teruma of the sacred offerings,” is to state that a woman who has relations with one who disqualifies her is disqualified from teruma.

However, had the verse come to teach us only this matter, it would have said: “She shall not eat of the sacred offerings.”

And since the verse added and said, “She shall not eat of the teruma of the sacred offerings,” we learn from here that there is another woman who does eat of the “sacred offerings” [teruma], but does not eat of the “teruma” of the sacred offerings.

And who is she? This is a kohen’s daughter who married an Israelite and whose husband died, and who returns to eating of the “sacred offerings” themselves, namely, teruma.

But she does not return to eating of the “teruma” of the sacred offerings, the breast and thigh that are uplifted from the sacred offerings, since she has been permanently disqualified from eating the breast and thigh.

The second derivation:

Rav Naḥman said

in the name of

Rabba bar Avuha that this is the reason she does not return to the breast and thigh:

Since the verse says, “And she shall return to her father’s household, as in her youth. From her father’s bread she shall eat,” and the verse did not say, “She shall eat her father’s bread,” the verse teaches:

only

“from bread,” from part of her father’s bread she shall eat,

but not all bread

of her father shall she eat—

excluding the breast and thigh,

which she does not return to eating, ever.

Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection

to Rav Naḥman’s words in the name of Rabba bar Avuha: From where do you know that this verse comes to say that she does not return to eating the breast and thigh?

Perhaps,

say

this instead: The verse, “From her father’s bread she shall eat,” did not come to exclude a kohen’s daughter from eating the breast and thigh. Rather, the verse comes to say:

excluding

the matter of

the annulment of vows

by her father—and to teach that if she was a na’ara, whose father annuls her vows, she does not return to him after she left his authority through her marriage to her husband, and this is unlike eating teruma, with regard to which she does return to him.

And this is how we expound it: “From her father’s bread she shall eat,” but not all of her father’s bread—the father cannot enable his daughter to eat of his bread if she vowed not to benefit from it, because once she marries she leaves his authority, and he can no longer annul her vows.

Rava

answered:

said

We do not need a special verse to teach that she does not return with regard to the annulment of vows, since

the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael already established

through reasoning, without a verse, that a na’ara who leaves her father’s authority through marriage to her husband does not again return to her father’s household with regard to the annulment of vows.

For the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

It is written in the passage concerning the annulment of vows, after the verse explained the law of the annulment of vows by her father and the law of the annulment of vows by her husband:

“And the vow of a widow or a divorced woman [who is no longer under her father’s authority from the time she married, and is no longer under her husband’s authority once she is divorced]—whatever she has forbidden upon herself

[who is no longer under her father’s authority once she has married, and is no longer under her husband’s authority once she has been divorced]—whatever she has prohibited to herself,”

shall stand against her.”

What is the meaning of this?

Why does the verse need to teach us that her vows shall stand? Who could annul them for her?

Is she not

already

removed from the category of

the annulment of vows by her

father,

once she has married, even if she is subsequently widowed or divorced by her husband?

And

likewise she is

removed

also

from the category of

the annulment of vows by her

husband,

since she has been divorced from him.

If so, who can annul her vows?

And why did the verse need to say, “Whatever she has forbidden upon herself shall stand against her”?

Rather,

the verse is not speaking at all of the vows of a woman who married and thereby left her father’s authority entirely, since she certainly does not return to her father’s authority even after she is widowed or divorced.

Rather, the verse is speaking of a na’ara who was widowed or divorced before her complete marriage, for example—

We learned in a Mishna in Ketubot 48a: A na’ara [or a minor] remains under her father’s authority until she enters her husband’s authority for marriage [that is, until she enters the wedding canopy for the purpose of marriage, so that she is transferred to her husband’s authority].

If the father hands over his betrothed daughter to the husband’s agents [who came to take her so that the husband would bring her under the wedding canopy], she is already under the husband’s authority [and he inherits her, and if he is a kohen he becomes impure for her, and he alone annuls her vows, without her father, as with a fully married woman].

If the father travels with the husband’s agents, or if the father’s agents travel with the husband’s agents, she remains under her father’s authority.

If the father’s agents hand her over to the husband’s agents, she is under the husband’s authority.

And the source for the law of “handing over to the husband’s authority” was derived there in the Gemara from the verses.

Thus, if the father handed over

his betrothed daughter

to the husband’s agents,

who came to take her in order to bring her under the wedding canopy,

or if

the

father’s agents handed her over to the husband’s agents,

and she entered his authority with regard to the annulment of vows,

and she was widowed or divorced on the way

to the husband, without being brought under the wedding canopy.

How do I regard her

now, after she has been widowed, with regard to the annulment of vows?

Do I regard her as belonging to

“her father’s household”—

a

na’ara

who is still considered to be in her father’s household, since she has not yet left his authority entirely, so that her father can now annul her vows?

Or

do I already regard her as belonging to

“her husband’s household,”

the

na’ara

of this man, like any other widow from a completed marriage, whose father cannot annul her vows?

Rather,

this verse comes

to tell you: Once she has left her father’s authority for even one moment,

even if this was not a complete departure, but merely that she was handed over by her father to her husband’s agents—

he can no longer

the father

annul her vows.

It is evident from Rabbi Yishmael’s words that in the passage concerning vows itself it has already been learned from the verse that a married na’ara does not return to her father for the annulment of vows. Therefore, we do not need an additional special verse to teach that the daughter does not return to her father’s household with regard to the annulment of vows.

Therefore, the verse “From her father’s bread she shall eat” is superfluous, and comes to say “from bread,” and not all bread, teaching that the daughter does not return to the breast and thigh.

The third derivation:

Rav Safra said,

this is the reason that the daughter does not return to her father’s household, after she marries and her husband dies, to eat the breast and thigh:

Since the verse says, “And she shall return to her father’s household, as in her youth,

from her father’s bread she shall eat,”

you have learned: She returns only to

bread

[that is, the teruma of grain],

and not

to

meat

of the breast and thigh.

The fourth derivation:

Rav Pappa said:

It can be learned that she does not return to eating the breast and thigh from the verse,

“From her father’s bread she shall eat”—

whose meaning is: She shall eat only

the bread acquired by her father,

teruma—

excluding the breast and thigh, which

are not acquired by her father, but

the priests receive them from the table of the Most High

.

Teruma is acquired by the kohanim as their actual property, and is not merely the remnants of the king’s table. But the remnants of sacred offerings are like “a gift from before God,” which are the remnants of His table, and are not the kohanim’s property.

The fifth lesson:

And Rava said:

From here it can be learned that she does not return to eating the breast and thigh, as it is stated:

“And the breast of the waving and the thigh of the offering—

you shall eat, you and your sons and your daughters with you.”

The verse teaches, by stating “with you,” that the daughters eat only

when

they are

with you [with their father the kohen], and not when they leave you, upon marrying their husbands.

[with the father, the kohen], but not when they leave you, through their marriage to their husbands.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The tanna

in a beraita said:

When she—

the daughter of a kohen who marries an Israelite—

returns to her father’s household

to eat teruma from him, she

returns

only

to teruma, but does not return to

eating the

breast and thigh

that she had eaten when she was in her father’s household.

But if she was an Israelite woman who had a son from a kohen, and she ate teruma, the breast, and the thigh by virtue of her kohen son, and she was subsequently disqualified from eating teruma, the breast, and the thigh through her marriage to a non-kohen, and her non-kohen husband died, and she returns

by virtue of her son

from the kohen, then she

returns to teruma and

even to the

breast and thigh.

For all five exclusions stating that she does not return apply only to a kohen’s daughter who returns without offspring from an Israelite, but not to one who eats by virtue of her kohen son.

Rav Mordekhai went

[went] and related

this teaching

of the

halakha

of Rav Adda bar Ahava

before

[in the presence of]

Rav Ashi.

He said,

Rav Ashi challenged him: But

from where is she derived?

From where do we derive that an Israelite woman who eats by virtue of her kohen son returns to eating teruma, the breast, and the thigh after her marriage to a non-kohen?—

We derive this

from

the superfluous word

“and the daughter” in the verse, “And the daughter of a kohen, if she becomes a widow or is divorced and returns to her father’s household.” This verse comes to include an Israelite woman who eats by virtue of her kohen son, so that her status is like that of a kohen’s daughter who returns to her father’s household when she has no offspring from an Israelite, as explained above at the beginning of the sugya!

And this very verse is the source for the return of a kohen’s daughter to eat teruma from her father’s household.

And since the law of an Israelite woman who eats teruma by virtue of her kohen son returning to eat teruma is derived from the same verse that teaches the return of a kohen’s daughter to her father’s household—

Is she superior,

the Israelite woman who eats by virtue of her son,

to her,

the kohen’s daughter who returns to her father’s household!? How can it be that an Israelite woman who eats by virtue of her kohen son returns to eat even the breast and thigh, whereas a kohen’s daughter who returns to her father’s household does not return to the breast and thigh!?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of the kohen’s daughter who eats on account of her father and returns to him,

exclusions are written,

teaching that she does not return to the breast and thigh.

But

here,

in the case of the Israelite woman who eats by virtue of her kohen son,

no exclusions are written.

For all five exclusions stated above, that a kohen’s daughter who returns to her father’s household may not eat the breast and thigh, were stated with regard to a kohen’s daughter who eats on account of her father, and were not stated with regard to an Israelite woman who eats by virtue of her kohen son.

We learned in the Mishna:

A kohen’s daughter who married an Israelite:

The law of yibbum applies only when the husband dies without children. But if he had children, his wife does not require yibbum.

And if a woman married one husband and had children from him, and afterward married another husband and had no children from him, her children from the first husband do not exempt her from yibbum.

With regard to this, the beraita states: The verse did not treat offspring from the first husband as offspring from the second.

And if the husband had children at the time of his death, and she was exempted from yibbum, and afterward the children died, she does not again become subject to yibbum.

With regard to this, the beraita states: The verse treated dead sons as living sons.

That is, with regard to exemption from yibbum: if he had children at the time of his death and they exempted his wife from yibbum, and afterward his sons died, it is considered as though his sons were still alive, and his wife does not again fall to yibbum.

It is written concerning the eating of teruma by a kohen’s daughter who marries an Israelite and whose husband dies or divorces her: “And the daughter of a kohen, if she becomes a widow or is divorced, and has no offspring, and returns to her father’s household as in her youth, she may eat of her father’s bread.”

The Sages taught:

The Sages expounded this verse as follows—

“And she returns to her father’s household”—

excluding

a kohen’s daughter who married an Israelite, whose husband died, and who is now

a shomeret yavam

to her husband’s Israelite brother.

Since she is bound to him, she cannot return to her father’s household, and therefore she may not eat teruma.

“As in her youth”—

when she is empty, as she was during her youth—

excluding

a kohen’s daughter who is

pregnant

by an Israelite, who may not eat teruma, since she is not empty as she was in the days of her youth, but is filled with an Israelite fetus.

The Gemara assumes two fundamental premises in the discussion that follows.

The first premise: A woman who has a son from her husband, and whose husband dies, continues to bear the name of her deceased husband [for example, she is called “the wife of a kohen”] until she marries another husband. At that point she bears the name of the second husband and not that of the first, and even if the second husband dies, she retains only the name of the second husband and not that of the first.

The second premise: If a woman has a son from her first husband, marries a second husband, and her second husband dies without children, it might have been thought that the son she has from her first husband is now considered to perpetuate the name of her second husband, and that the name of her second Israelite husband is therefore not erased, since she remains his widow with a son [although this is not the second husband’s son].

This premise is based on the first premise: only the name of her second husband applies to her, and not the name of her first husband. Therefore, it might have been thought that the name of her second husband is not erased, since her status is solely “the widow of the second husband,” and this widow has a son!

But the Torah comes and rejects this premise.

You might say: Why do I need a verse to disqualify a kohen’s daughter who is pregnant with an Israelite fetus, and to say that she may not eat teruma?

Is it not a matter that can be derived logically—

for from a kal va-chomer based on the law of yibbum, we can learn that an Israelite fetus prevents her from returning to her father’s household, and there is no need for a scriptural exposition to teach this law—

For if a woman married a first husband and bore him a son, and her first husband died, and she married a second husband, from whom she had no children, she requires yibbum.

We do not say that since this woman married a second husband and has a son [from the first husband], and the second husband died, leaving behind a wife with a son, it should be considered as though he left behind a wife with his own son, in which case she would not require yibbum.

Rather, a son who was actually his must remain; otherwise, the woman requires yibbum.

And now we can derive by a kal va-chomer from yibbum to teruma—

And if, in

yibbum, which is

a case in which the verse did not treat

the

offspring

that a woman has

from

her

first

husband as

as though

it were

offspring from

her

second

to exempt her

thereby

from yibbum,

For she is exempt from yibbum only if the second husband had a son. Yet the son she has from her first husband does not help exempt her from yibbum when her second husband dies, despite the fact that he left behind a wife who has offspring—

And nevertheless,

the verse treated

the

fetus as

a child.

For a yevama who was pregnant by her husband at the time of his death does not undergo yibbum while she is pregnant, since the fetus in her womb is considered as though her deceased husband has a son.

And if so, it follows by a kal va-chomer that an Israelite fetus should disqualify a kohen’s daughter from teruma—

For teruma is

a case in which the verse did treat

the

offspring from

the husband

first, as

though it were

offspring from

the husband

second,

who died without children, to

disqualify her from teruma.

For if a kohen’s daughter marries an Israelite and has a son from him, he disqualifies her from eating teruma, because he causes her to be considered as though she continues to be married to his father, the Israelite.

And if afterward she marries a second Israelite, it might have been thought that since she is now married to another man, she is no longer considered to be in the household of her first husband [as stated in the introduction above, where the Gemara assumed that marriage to the second husband has the power to completely annul her association with the first husband]!

Nevertheless, if her second Israelite husband dies without children, we do not say that since she is now the widow of her second husband, and she has no offspring from her second marriage, she returns from her marriage to the second husband to her father’s household to eat teruma.

Rather, we take into account the Israelite son she has from her first husband as though she had offspring from her second husband [as stated in the introduction, in the explanation of the Gemara’s second premise], and I do not apply to her the verse, “When she belongs to a foreign man, and has no offspring, and she returns to her father’s household”—

If so,

is it not the case that

if she has an Israelite fetus from her first Israelite husband, we

should treat

the

fetus that she carries from an Israelite

as

though she had an Israelite

child

already born,

which prevents her from eating teruma!?

And since it is possible to learn that a fetus is treated as a child by a kal va-chomer from yibbum, why were we required to learn it through an exposition of the verse!?

And we answer:

No!

It is not possible to learn the law of a fetus with regard to teruma from yibbum, because this kal va-chomer can be refuted. Therefore, the verse concerning teruma is needed to teach us that the fetus is treated as a child to disqualify her from teruma.

For the kal va-chomer can be rejected as follows:

What

comparison can I make between the law of a fetus with regard to teruma and the law of a fetus with regard to yibbum?

For the fact that

the verse treated

the

fetus as a child with regard to yibbum

is because—

For the verse treated

in the context of yibbum even

dead sons,

who died after she fell to yibbum,

as

though they were sons who were still

alive

.

For the yevama does not again become subject to her brother-in-law after his sons die.

But was

a fetus treated as a child with regard to teruma, where the verse did not treat

her

dead sons as

sons

alive!

For only living sons whom she has from the first Israelite disqualify her, but if the sons die, they are not treated as living; rather, she returns to her father’s household to eat teruma.

And since we cannot learn that a fetus disqualifies her by means of a kal va-chomer, therefore—

The verse states: “As in her youth”—

excluding a pregnant woman.

And the Gemara further explains:

And it was necessary to write “as in her youth,” to exclude

a kohen’s daughter who is

pregnant

by an Israelite, who is disqualified from teruma.

And it was necessary

also

to write “And the daughter of a kohen, if she becomes a widow or is divorced,

and has

no offspring, and returns to her father’s household”—

to

exclude offspring

from an Israelite, for the offspring disqualifies her.

Since

if the Merciful One had written only, “and has no offspring,”

I would say that it disqualifies her because

initially,

before the kohen’s daughter married an Israelite, she was

one body [one physical entity].

And

if

now, after she gives birth, she is

two bodies [two physical entities], and therefore she is disqualified.

But in the case of a pregnant woman, since

initially

she was

one body, and now,

while she is pregnant, she is also

one body—

I might say that she may eat.

I would say that she may eat teruma and is not disqualified.

Therefore, it is

necessary to state “as in her youth,” despite the fact that “and has no offspring” is written.