Yevamot 85a — the Talmud in English

But behold

the prohibition

of impurity

of a koen to a corpse,

is a prohibition that does not apply equally to all, and according to the Gemara’s answer, we should have said that it is impossible to prohibit women who are daughters of koanim from becoming impure through contact with a corpse, because it is written: “Whether a man or a woman

”—

And

nevertheless, only from the

reason

that the daughters of Aharon were explicitly excluded from this prohibition,

for the Merciful One wrote: “Say to the koanim, the sons of Aharon: For a soul, he shall not become impure among his people,” and the verse teaches:

“the sons of Aharon, and not the daughters of Aharon”

—

only for that reason were the daughters of Aharon excluded from it.

If not so,

had the daughters of Aharon not been explicitly excluded

I would have thought

that

women

who are daughters of koanim

are obligated

not to become impure through contact with their relatives.

And

what is the reason

that the verse needed to exclude them?

No;

is it not

because of

the teaching

of Rav Yehuda

said Rav,

who holds that one should learn from the verse “whether a man or a woman” that the Torah equated the laws of the man and the woman?

And from here you learn that even a prohibition that does not apply equally to all, such as the prohibition of the koanim to become impure through contact with corpses, is included in the teaching “whether a man or a woman, when they commit any of the sins of man”

! And we answer:

No.

It is not as you said, that without the exclusion from “the sons of Aharon” we would have prohibited even a woman who is a daughter of a koen from becoming impure through contact with a corpse because it is written “whether a man or a woman.” Since it is a prohibition that does not apply equally to all, such a prohibition is not included in “whether a man or a woman”

. Rather, for this the verse needed to exclude her from the prohibition of impurity through contact with a corpse, through the exclusion “the sons of Aharon” —

because

we

would have

learned,

that is, we would have learned to prohibit impurity through contact with a corpse even for women who are daughters of koanim, despite the fact that it is a prohibition that does not apply equally to all,

from “They shall not take”.

For it implies that the Torah equated the woman with the man regarding the prohibition of priesthood, even though it is a prohibition that does not apply equally to all.

And we would have said that the Torah prohibited even a woman who is a daughter of a koen with the prohibition of impurity, although it is a prohibition that does not apply equally to all. Therefore, the verse needed to exclude the daughter of a koen from the prohibition of impurity through contact with a corpse.

There are those who say:

In truth, conceptually we have no reason to distinguish between a prohibition that does not apply equally to all and a prohibition that does apply equally to all. Nevertheless, the prohibition of

taking

a woman of disqualified priestly lineage [“They shall not take”], which also applies to women,

was necessary for him

to teach us, for we cannot learn this from “whether a man or a woman”

— because

it might enter your mind

I would have thought

to learn

that the taking of a woman of disqualified priestly lineage should be learned

from

the prohibition of

impurity

of a koen.

And I would have said: just as regarding impurity through contact with a corpse, women who are daughters of koanim are not admonished against it, because the prohibition of impurity through contact with a corpse is a prohibition that does not apply equally to all, and therefore the Torah did not admonish women concerning it—

so too, women who are disqualified from the priesthood would not be admonished not to marry a fit koen, since this prohibition is a prohibition that does not apply equally to all—

therefore

it teaches us “They shall not take,” that women disqualified from the priesthood are also admonished not to marry fit koanim.

“They shall not take”: women unfit for the priestly status are also warned not to marry fit kohanim.

Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, happened to come to

the city

of Shakhzunvo, the place of Rav Idi bar Avin

[they came to the city of Shakhzunvo, the place of Rav Idi bar Avin].

They asked them,

the residents of the place asked Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: whether

were admonished

women who are

fit

not

to marry men of disqualified lineage, or not

were women admonished concerning this?

Rav Pappa said to them: You have learned it

We have learned the solution to your problem in an explicit Mishna in tractate Kiddushin, at the beginning of the tenth chapter, “Ten Lineages”—they were not admonished!

For this is what we learned there in the Mishna:

Ten

types of

“lineages arose from Babylonia”,

when the exiles came up from Babylonia with Ezra the Scribe, at the end of the Babylonian exile.

Koanim, Levites and Israelites, disqualified koanim, converts and freed slaves

[freed slaves],

and mamzerim, netinim

[Gibeonites whom Joshua assigned to be woodcutters and drawers of water, whose law was explained above, 79a],

a shetuki and an asufi

[they are doubtful mamzerim, and are explained there in the Mishna].

And this is their law concerning marriage with one another:

a.

Koanim, Levites, Israelites—

are permitted to marry one another.

b.

Levites, Israelites, disqualified koanim, converts, freed slaves—

are permitted to marry one another.

But koanim are prohibited from marrying women who are disqualified koanim, converts, or freed maidservants.

c.

Converts, freed slaves

[freed slaves, who are included in the community of converts and are not called the community of the Lord],

mamzerim, netinim, a shetuki and an asufi—

are permitted to marry one another.

And Rav Pappa was precise:

But a woman who is a daughter of a koen may marry a disqualified koen,

for she is permitted to marry him—

it does not teach

this in that Mishna. And it is proven that even women who are daughters of koanim are prohibited from marrying disqualified koanim.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to him,

to Rav Pappa: You cannot prove from this Mishna, because:

The tanna does not enumerate all the types of lineage that are permitted to one another, but only

where these marry from those and those marry from these

[where the males of one type marry females of the other type, and males of the second type marry females of the first type], such as Levites and Israelites, for Levites marry Israelite women, and Israelites marry Levite women—only those

it teaches

in the Mishna as being permitted to one another!

But

a koen, since if he wanted to marry a disqualified woman

[if he wanted to marry a disqualified woman]

she would be prohibited to him,

while only a woman who is a daughter of a koen is permitted to marry a disqualified koen—

it does not teach

him in this Mishna.

Therefore, one cannot bring proof from this Mishna that a woman who is a daughter of a koen is prohibited from marrying a disqualified koen.

Afterward,

they came—

Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua—

before

before

Rav Idi bar Avin.

He said to them,

Rav Idi bar Avin:

Children!

[an appellation for children of the house of study]

This is what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Fit women were not admonished against marrying men of disqualified lineage!

We learned in the Mishna:

secondary relationships according to the words of the Scribes—

she has no ketuba:

The people

of the place called

“Biri” asked Rav Sheshet:

The yevama was prohibited with the prohibition of a

“secondary relationship” to the husband, and

however

not

prohibited with the prohibition of a

secondary relationship to the yavam, and the yavam performed yibum with her and died—does she

and the levir performed yibbum with her and then died—does she

have a ketuba from the yavam, or not?

And the Gemara explains the sides of the doubt:

Should we say:

since the master said

[in the Mishna above, 38a],

her ketuba

of the yevama, when the yavam dies or divorces her after performing yibum with her, is not collected from the property of the yavam, because a wife was granted to him by Heaven, and he is not liable for her ketuba, but the liability for the ketuba is only

upon the property of her first husband,

the deceased brother of the yavam—

and this woman, who was prohibited to her first husband because she was a secondary relationship, cannot collect a ketuba from the property of her first husband, and if so

she has none,

she has no ketuba at all.

Or perhaps: since

every yevama,

if she has none,

if she has no possibility of collecting her ketuba

from

the property of her

first husband

[when no property of the deceased brother remained],

the Rabbis ordained for her

that she collect her ketuba

from the second

[from the property of the yavam, after he performed yibum with her and died or divorced her], so that she should not be easy in his eyes to divorce—if so, this woman too

has

a ketuba from the yavam, for she too has no ketuba from her first husband.

Rav Sheshet said to them,

to the people of Biri:

You have learned it,

we have learned the solution to your question in an explicit beraita:

For it was taught:

Her ketuba

of every yevama is

upon the property of her first husband.

And if she was

prohibited as a

“secondary relationship” to the husband—then

even

from

the

yavam,

to whom she is permitted,

she has no

ketuba.

Indeed, the problem is resolved from the beraita. However, the wording of the beraita, “even from the yavam she has none,” still requires explanation—for

by implication

this statement that this woman, who is prohibited to her husband with the prohibition of a “secondary relationship,” does not receive a ketuba even from the yavam, although she is permitted to him, because she was prohibited to her husband—you learn

that there is

another woman

who has

a ketuba

from the yavam!

That is, a woman who was permitted both to her husband and to the yavam.

But this is difficult: in the first clause of the beraita it was said that her ketuba is only upon the property of her first husband, and she does not receive a ketuba from the yavam!?

And we answer:

The beraita is deficient

in its wording,

and this is what it teaches

in it:

Her ketuba

of every yevama is

upon the property of her first husband.

And

however,

if she has none,

if she has no possibility of collecting the ketuba

from

the property of her

first husband—

the Sages ordained for her

that she should have a ketuba

from

her

second husband,

the yavam.

But

if she was

prohibited because of

“a secondary relationship to the husband”—then

even from the yavam she has none

even from the levir she has no

ketuba.

We learned in the Mishna: A widow married to a High Koen, a divorcee or a halutza married to an ordinary koen, a mamzeret or a netina married to an Israelite, and an Israelite woman married to a netin or a mamzer—these women have a ketuba:

Rabbi Elazar asked Rabbi Yohanan:

A widow

who was married

to a High Koen,

and likewise

a divorcee and a halutza

who was married

to an ordinary koen—

do

they have sustenance

from the husband,

or do they not have sustenance

from the husband?

And the Gemara discusses what Rabbi Elazar’s problem was:

What are the circumstances?

In what matter was Rabbi Elazar uncertain whether they have sustenance or not?

If you say that she is sitting beneath him

[if he was uncertain while she is living under his authority], and she demands that the court decree sustenance for her from now onward —there is no room for such a doubt!

For this woman’s remaining under her husband is prohibited. And all the time that she remains under him

the

command

“Arise and take out

the woman from beneath you

” stands

against her husband!

And since he is commanded to take her out so that she should not remain beneath him, how can it be that

she has sustenance

[that he must provide for her]!?

And we answer:

It is necessary;

this is what Rabbi Elazar was asking:

It concerns a case such as

where he went

[the husband alone]

to an overseas country,

and at that time she is not remaining beneath him, he is not then violating a prohibition, and he is not in a situation in which he is commanded, “Arise and take her out.”

And she borrowed

money from another person in order to purchase food for herself,

and ate.

And when her husband returned, she demanded money from him in order to repay the loan she had taken for the cost of the food that she ate while he was in the overseas country.

And the doubt is:

What?

Must her husband give her money so that she can repay the loan she took for her food, at a time when she was not remaining beneath him in a prohibited manner?

And the Gemara explains the sides of the doubt: should we say: since

food

that the husband is obligated to provide for the woman is

among the conditions of the ketuba.

And

since she has a ketuba

[since this woman has a ketuba despite her prohibition to her husband]—

she has

from him also

food

[at a time when he is not violating a prohibition by keeping her beneath him].

Or perhaps:

only

the ketuba,

because

its

purpose is

to take and depart

[the ketuba that she takes is intended to enable her to leave her husband], therefore

she has

[she has it] so that she may leave from beneath him.

But

food, if we obligate him to provide it for her, there is concern

that she may remain with him,

lest she delay with him

[lest she remain with him further] if he gives her food, and he is commanded, “Arise and take her out”; therefore it is reasonable that

she does not

[there is no]

have

food from him.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan answered Rabbi Elazar’s question:

she does not have

food!

And the Gemara is astonished:

But it was taught: She has

food!?

And we answer:

When that was taught

that she has food—it was taught

after death

of the husband. She sits in his house and is sustained from his property until she marries another man, since after his death there is no impediment to her remaining in his house and eating from his property.

There is one who says

[there is one who says] that this is how

he said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan answered Rabbi Elazar:

It was taught: She has

food.

And we ask:

“Arise and take her out”

stands

against him, so how is it possible that he should be obligated to give her food!? And the Gemara is astonished at the rejection of Rabbi Yohanan’s words:

But if so, it was taught

explicitly in a beraita, in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan, that

she has

food!?

And we answer:

When that was taught,

that she has food—it was taught

after death

of the husband.

The Sages taught:

If the woman was

a widow

married

to a High Koen,

or

a divorcee or a halutza married to an ordinary koen—

they penalized her husband, since he is the one who induced her to marry him, as will be explained. Therefore, he does not have the rights that a husband has in his wife’s property. Therefore—

she has a ketuba

from him when he divorces her or dies, as we learned in our Mishna. And they did not penalize her by causing her to forfeit her ketuba, as they penalized a woman prohibited to her husband with the prohibition of “secondary relationships” according to the words of the Scribes.

And she has reimbursement for

produce

from usufruct property that her husband consumed.

For the Sages granted the husband the right to consume the produce of his wife’s property in exchange for the obligation with which they obligated him, to redeem her if she were taken captive.

But this woman, whom he is not obligated to redeem if she is taken captive, since he cannot keep her as his wife when he redeems her—for the phrase “and I will restore you to myself as a wife” does not apply to her [I will restore you to myself, to be my wife]—he has no right to consume the produce. And if he consumed it, he is obligated to return all the produce that he consumed.

And she has

food—

after the husband’s death, as the Gemara explained above.

And she has reimbursement for

worn garments.

He must return to her both the worn garments themselves that remain and the amount that he must pay her for the difference between complete garments and the worn garments.

Because it was prohibited for him to use them, since his marriage was through a transgression.

And she is disqualified

from eating teruma, for she was profaned through intercourse with a koen among those disqualified from the priesthood.

And her offspring

too is

disqualified

[a halal].

And they compel him to take her out

because she is prohibited to him.

But if the woman was prohibited to her husband because of

secondary relationships,

which are

according to the words of the Scribes,

then they penalized her, and therefore—

she does not have

neither

a ketuba, neither produce, neither food, nor worn garments.

And she is fit, and her offspring is fit.

And

however—

they compel him to take her out

because she is prohibited to him.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Why did they say

that

a widow married to a High Koen has a ketuba,

and they penalized him to pay her ketuba even though he has no marital rights in her, and did not penalize her by preventing her from receiving her ketuba, as they penalized her in the case of secondary relationships according to the words of the Scribes?

Because

through these marriages

he

becomes

disqualified

for the Temple service, as we learned in Bekhorot: A koen who marries women through a transgression is disqualified for the Temple service until he vows to derive no benefit from her.