Yevamot 84b — the Talmud in English

And if you would say:

perhaps you will say to answer that

this tanai holds

in our Mishna, that since at the time of the marriage to the ordinary kohen she was not then forbidden to the High Priest [the levir] by the prohibition of a widow, it no longer makes a difference if she subsequently became a widow, and this tanai holds that

“the first marriage”

is what

“causes”

the levirate wife to fall to levirate marriage.

That is, the marriage by which his deceased brother married her is the cause of the falling to levirate marriage before the levir. For what the levir does by levirate marriage is a continuation of the marital bond of the deceased. And this marital bond came into being at the time of the deceased brother’s marriage.

And since at that time she was permitted to the levir, the High Priest, for she was still a virgin, therefore, when the ordinary kohen dies, his brother, the High Priest, can perform levirate marriage with her.

It is impossible to say this!

For

behold,

we learned in our Mishna:

a chalal who married a fit woman,

and he has a brother who is a valid kohen, she does not enter into levirate marriage, because she became disqualified through the intercourse of the chalal.

And we do not say: “The first marriage causes the falling!”

That is, we do not say that since at the time of the deceased’s marriage, before she had intercourse with the chalal, she was then permitted to the levir, she will no longer become forbidden to him.

And the same law applies: one cannot say concerning a High Priest before whom the wife of his brother who had intercourse falls, that she is permitted to him as one who had intercourse by virtue of “the first marriages cause the falling.”

And the question returns: Why did the tanai state “widow” and not “virgin”?

Therefore, the Gemara answers differently:

Indeed,

this that we learned “widow” and not “virgin”—

certainly

we learned it this way

because of the end, where he needed to teach

in the

end

of the Mishna the law: “And these are forbidden to these and to those:

a High Priest who married a widow, and he has a brother who is a High Priest or an ordinary kohen.”

And there

specifically a widow

is forbidden to the High Priest.

But a virgin—

she

is fit for him [

she is suitable for him].

For this reason he taught

also at the beginning of the Mishna

“widow.”

A. The Torah forbade the first two generations of Egyptian converts from entering the congregation of the Lord, and permitted the third generation and thereafter.

The first generation is called “an Egyptian of the first generation,” and this is the Egyptian convert himself.

The second generation, born from the Egyptian convert, is called “an Egyptian of the second generation.”

Their prohibition of the two generations is learned from the verse, “The third generation shall enter for them into the congregation of the Lord,” which teaches that until the third generation the Egyptians shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord.

And this prohibition applies both to Egyptian men and to Egyptian women, so that even an Egyptian woman of the first or second generation is forbidden to an Israelite.

But the third generation of an Egyptian has the status of a full Israelite.

B. An Egyptian of the first or second generation is permitted to an Egyptian woman of the first or second generation.

If his father was an Egyptian of the second generation and his mother an Egyptian of the first generation, Rabba bar bar Hana in the name of Rabbi Yohanan and Rav Dimi in the name of Rabbi Yohanan disputed above [78a] what the law of the son is.

According to Rabba bar bar Hana, he follows his father, and since his father is an Egyptian of the second generation, his son is an Egyptian of the third generation and is permitted to enter into the congregation.

But according to Rav Dimi, he follows the mother, and since the mother is an Egyptian of the first generation, her son is an Egyptian of the second generation and is forbidden to enter into the congregation.

C. The position of our passage is that “a congregation of converts is not called a congregation.” Therefore, a convert is permitted to an Egyptian woman of the first or second generation, and an Egyptian of the first or second generation is permitted to a female convert.

D. However, only the male or female convert themselves are not included in “the congregation of the Lord,” but the son or daughter of converts is “a full congregation of the Lord,” even if both the father and the mother were converts.

Rav Pappa challenged him [

Rav Pappa raised a difficulty against Rav Dimi in the name of Rabbi Yohanan]:

If that statement which, when Rav Dimi came, Rav Yohanan said [if the halakha is indeed in accordance with him],

that

an Egyptian of the second generation who married an Egyptian woman of the first generation—

her son

is an Egyptian

of the second generation.

Since he follows his mother. And since his mother is an Egyptian woman of the first generation, her son is an Egyptian of the second generation and is forbidden to enter into the congregation. He does not follow his father, who is of the second generation, to be of the third generation and to be permitted to enter into the congregation.

And if so,

let him also teach

in our Mishna another example, of an Egyptian and an Israelite woman, in which all the forms of the Mishna are present, such as:

an Egyptian of the second generation who married two

women

Egyptian women—

one

one

was an Egyptian woman

of the first generation, and

one

one

was an Egyptian woman

of the second generation.

And he had sons from

the woman who was

the first and

from the woman who was

the second,

and these sons are brothers through their father, but not through their mother!

One son from the first, who is an Egyptian of the second generation—according to Rav Dimi—and is forbidden to enter into the congregation.

And one son from the second, who is an Egyptian of the third generation, whose status is that of a full Israelite—

And in this manner all the forms of the Mishna are possible:

A.

If they married in their ordinary manner—

they are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their levirs.

If they married in the permitted manner, so that the Egyptian of the second generation, who is forbidden to enter into the congregation, married a woman like himself, an Egyptian woman of the second generation, who is permitted to him, and the Egyptian of the third generation, who is an Israelite, married an Israelite woman, who is permitted to him—

then their wives are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their levirs.

That is, the wife of the son of the first woman, who is an Egyptian of the second generation, is forbidden to his brother the levir, who is an Egyptian of the third generation. Since his status is that of an Israelite, and he is forbidden to an Egyptian woman, who is disqualified from entering into the congregation.

And likewise the wife of the son of the second woman, who is an Israelite woman, is forbidden to his first brother, who is an Egyptian of the second generation. B.

“And they are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands.” -

If I reverse it, and they marry!

That is, if the two brothers each married a woman who was not suitable for him.

For example, the son of the first woman, who is an Egyptian of the second generation, married an Israelite woman, who is suitable only for his brother, who is an Egyptian of the third generation and a full Israelite, but not for him, who is an Egyptian of the second generation.

And similarly, the son of the second woman, who is an Egyptian of the third generation and a full Israelite, married an Egyptian woman of the second generation, who is suitable only for his brother, who is an Egyptian of the second generation, and not for him, who is a full Israelite—

then the wives of each and every one of them are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands.

C.

“Permitted to these and to those”—

female converts.

For example, they both married female converts, since even an Egyptian of the second generation is permitted to marry a female convert, because “a congregation of converts is not called a congregation.” Thus the wives of each and every one of them are permitted to their husbands and permitted to their levirs.

D.

“Forbidden to these and to those”—

women incapable of procreation.

For example, the son of the first woman, who is an Egyptian of the second generation, married an Israelite woman incapable of procreation, who is forbidden to him and also forbidden to his levir, since a woman incapable of procreation does not fall to levirate marriage, and she is forbidden as the nakedness of a brother’s wife where there is no mitzva.

And since the rules of the Mishna also fit such a case, the difficulty arises: Why did the tanai not teach this form as well in our Mishna?!

And we answer:

The tanai taught some and omitted some.

The tanai taught several examples of these rules, but he did not teach all of them; rather, he omitted examples that he did not teach.

And we inquire about it:

What did he omit,

what additional example did the tanai omit,

that this omission

is the reason he also omitted this example?!

For it is not the way of the tanai to omit only one matter; rather, his way is to omit several matters. And if only one matter remained, he would teach it explicitly and would not “omit it.”

And we answer:

The tanai omitted

also

one with crushed testicles.

For all the forms in the Mishna are possible in his case as well, for example:

A. A valid man married an Israelite woman, and he has a brother with crushed testicles—the woman is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.

B. A man with crushed testicles married an Israelite woman, and he has a valid brother—the woman is forbidden to her husband and permitted to her levir.

C. A man with crushed testicles married an Israelite woman, and he has a brother with crushed testicles—the woman is forbidden to this one and to that one.

D. A man with crushed testicles married a female convert [who is permitted to one with crushed testicles, because “a congregation of converts is not called a congregation,” and all those disqualified from entering the congregation are permitted to her], and he has a valid brother or a brother with crushed testicles—the woman is permitted to this one and to that one.

The Gemara rejects this answer:

If it is because of one with crushed testicles—

it is not an omission

!

One with crushed testicles is not considered an omission of an additional example—

for he already taught those subject to negative commandments.

Since the tanai taught one example of those subject to negative commandments, he no longer needs to return and teach one with crushed testicles, who is also “one subject to negative commandments.”

But an Egyptian, whose prohibition is a positive-commandment prohibition, as it is written, “The third generation shall enter for them into the congregation of the Lord,” and from the positive statement you understand the negative one, that the first and second generations shall not enter for them into the congregation of the Lord—the tanai should have informed us that he is forbidden to his levir.

The Gemara wonders about the rejection of the answer:

Is it so—

does

those subject to negative commandments—

did he not also teach

one example of those subject to negative commandments in our Mishna,

and

nevertheless

he then taught again,

the tanai returned and taught an additional example?!

Did the tanai not return and teach, after he had already brought one example of “those subject to negative commandments,” another example of those subject to negative commandments?!

But he taught

first:

an ordinary kohen who married a widow.

She is forbidden to the levir who is a High Priest by a negative commandment, and through this he taught the law of “those subject to negative commandments.”

Nevertheless, the tanai again returned and taught another possibility involving those subject to negative commandments:

a chalal who married a fit woman,

and she became disqualified through his intercourse with her, and he died—for she too is “one subject to negative commandments,” since she is forbidden to his brother the levir, who is a valid kohen, by the negative-commandment prohibition of a woman disqualified from the priesthood.

And if so, the tanai should have returned and taught also the possibility of one with crushed testicles.

And from the fact that the tanai did not return to teach it, it is proven that the tanai did not teach all the possibilities, but only some of them, and omitted other possibilities that he did not teach.

It follows that the answer, “He omitted one with crushed testicles,” is a correct answer!

But the Gemara still rejects the answer: In truth, the tanai need not return and teach one with crushed testicles, since he already taught one example of those subject to negative commandments; therefore one cannot answer that the tanai omitted one with crushed testicles in addition to an Egyptian of the second generation.

And as for what you proved from the fact that the tanai returned and taught the law of a chalal who married a fit woman—that the tanai returns and teaches additional examples of those subject to negative commandments—this is no proof, because the tanai did not intend to bring an additional example of those subject to negative commandments.

Rather, that

particular

law of a chalal who married a fit woman

was necessary for him

the tanai

to inform us, that a fit woman is not forbidden to marry a chalal [even if she is the daughter of a kohen],

as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Women who are fit

were not warned

who are

fit

to marry into the priesthood [even priestly women]—not

to marry those disqualified

by disqualification, and to become disqualified through his intercourse with her.

And now the difficulty again arises: Why did the tanai not teach the matter of an “Egyptian,” in order to inform us that those subject to a positive-commandment prohibition do not enter into levirate marriage? For the tanai did not omit another matter that he did not teach even though he needed to teach it, and you cannot answer, “The tanai taught some and omitted some”!

And the Gemara answers that nevertheless one can say, “The tanai taught some and omitted some”:

But he taught a chalal who married a fit woman,

and she fell before a valid kohen, so that she is subject to a negative-commandment prohibition with regard to the levir,

and

nevertheless the tanai returned and taught the law of

an Israelite who married an Israelite woman and has a mamzer brother,

who is also subject to a negative-commandment prohibition with regard to the mamzer levir.

It follows that the tanai teaches and then returns and teaches another example of those subject to negative commandments, even when it contains no novelty, and if so, he should have informed us also about one with crushed testicles.

Rather, certainly, “the tanai taught some and omitted some.”

And we reject this:

This—

a mamzer, who is subject to a negative-commandment prohibition—

is also not a repeated teaching [

this is not a repetition in which the tanai teaches an additional example unnecessarily], for this example was taught specifically because of the second law, that there are women who are “permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands,” and to inform us that even where she is forbidden to her husband because of a mamzer, nevertheless she is permitted to her levir—

And this novelty was not learned from the preceding law, that of a woman disqualified with regard to a kohen.

He informed us

the tanai first of those subject to negative commandments, in the case of a woman disqualified with regard to a kohen, which is

a negative commandment that does not apply equally to all,

but only to kohanim. And even though she is forbidden to her husband, nevertheless she is permitted to her levir.

And

again

he informs us

the tanai about a mamzer, who is

subject to a negative commandment that applies equally to all,

and nevertheless, despite the fact that she is forbidden to her husband, she does not become forbidden to her levir.

But the tanai did not need to inform us about one with crushed testicles, since there is no additional novelty in his case beyond the law of a mamzer, which is also subject to a negative commandment that applies equally to all, and there is no “omission” here.

And again the difficulty arises: Why did the tanai not teach those subject to a positive-commandment prohibition, in the case of an Egyptian?!

And again the Gemara answers that nevertheless, one with crushed testicles is an omission.

For

but he taught

in our Mishna, after the tanai had already taught an example of those subject to negative commandments, that of a mamzer with an Israelite woman—

An Israelite who married a mamzeret, and he has an Israelite brother,

who is likewise forbidden by a negative commandment to perform yibbum with her. And there is no additional novelty in this example.

If so, the tanna should also have taught the law of a man with crushed testicles, despite there being no additional novelty in it.

Rather, is it not so,

behold,

learn from it:

the tanna did not teach the case of a man with crushed testicles, as he repeated and taught the case of an Israelite with a mamzeret, because

“he taught and omitted”,

and therefore the tanna also omitted the law of an Egyptian.

And we conclude: indeed

learn from it!

As to the body of the matter:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Qualified women were not warned against marrying disqualified men,

that is, men who are chalalim.

Let us say,

is it possible for us to say that

it supports him,

that there is support for him from our Mishna, in which we learned: “

And these are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yavamim” —

a chalal who married a qualified woman!

What, is it not so,

does the Mishna not speak of a

kohenet fit for him?

And what is “qualified”? —

Qualified for the priesthood!

That is, a daughter of a koen, who alone is “qualified” [suitable] to marry a koen, for it is not proper for a koen initially to marry an Israelite woman, but only a daughter of a koen.

You have therefore learned that although she is a daughter of a koen, she is permitted to marry a chalal.

And we reject this:

No,

not as you said, that the matter concerns a chalal who married a daughter of a koen.

Rather, the matter concerns a chalal who married

an Israelite woman.

And what is “qualified”? —

Qualified for

entering the

congregation.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

since the Mishna speaks of being qualified for the congregation and not for the priesthood, this is difficult:

When we learned concerning a chalal who married a qualified woman that he

has a “qualified” brother —

would this also

likewise

be explained as referring to a brother who is

qualified for the congregation!?

But if you explain it this way,

it follows from

your words

that he,

the deceased brother, the chalal, was

disqualified for the congregation!

But it is impossible that the matter concerns one disqualified for the congregation; rather, it concerns only a chalal, whose disqualification is only for the priesthood, and not for the congregation!

Rather, is it not so,

necessarily the Mishna speaks of the second brother, the “qualified” one, as being a

koen,

a qualified koen, who is not a chalal!

And from “he is a koen,

from the fact that the “qualified” one mentioned concerning the yavam is a qualified koen —

she

likewise, the “qualified” woman mentioned concerning the yevama is also

a kohenet

she is.

And it is proven from here that a kohenet is permitted to marry a chalal, and it supports Rav Yehuda.

And we reject this:

Is that necessarily so!?

Must I establish that the Mishna speaks of the same type of qualification in the yavam and in the yevama!?

For I can say —

This

“qualified” one concerning the yavam —

as it is,

according to the way I establish it, a qualified koen.

And

if

this,

the “qualified” woman concerning the yevama —

as it is,

according to the way we established it, she is qualified only for the congregation and not for the priesthood.

Ravin bar Nahman raised an objection

against the ruling of Rav Yehuda:

It is written concerning women disqualified for the priesthood [Leviticus 21:7]: “

A woman who is a prostitute or a chalala” —

they shall not take. “And a woman divorced from her husband” —

And a woman divorced from her husband—

they shall not take.”

The verse teaches,

by repeating and doubling its wording, “they shall not take” —

that the woman is warned by means of the man.

—

That is, just as the koen is warned not to marry disqualified women, so the woman is warned not to marry disqualified men.

And the Gemara assumed that the meaning of this teaching is that a qualified woman is forbidden to marry a disqualified man, and this is difficult for Rav Yehuda!

Rava said:

The verse did not come to inform us of the prohibition of disqualified men upon kohanim. Rather, it came to warn the disqualified woman, that she should not marry the qualified koen.

For

wherever he is warned

concerning her,

she

is also

warned

concerning him.

And wherever he is not warned

concerning her, such as a chalal marrying a daughter of a koen —

she too is not warned

not to marry him.

And we raise an objection:

But,

is it the case that a disqualified woman is warned not to marry the qualified koen —

does it emerge from here?

Is this law learned from “they shall not take”!? But this law

emerges from Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav —

it emerges,

is learned!

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

It is written [Numbers 5]:

“A man or a woman, when they commit any of all the sins of man” —

the verse equated a woman with a man with regard to all punishments

in the Torah [a negative-commandment prohibition and a karet prohibition]

that are in the Torah.

And since he is warned concerning her, she too is warned concerning him.

If so, necessarily “they shall not take” comes to teach that a qualified kohenet should not marry a disqualified man, and this is difficult for Rav Yehuda, who holds that qualified women were not warned against marrying disqualified men!? And we answer: In truth, “they shall not take” comes to warn the disqualified woman that she should not marry a qualified koen.

And the reason that we needed the teaching of “they shall not take,” and do not learn this from “a man or a woman,” is that —

If from that,

from the teaching of “a man or a woman” —

I would have thought

that even the woman was warned only concerning a

negative commandment that applies equally to all.

But a negative commandment that does not apply equally to all,

such as a woman disqualified for a koen,

not

was the woman warned concerning it.

Therefore the verse comes to teach us through “they shall not take” that even concerning a negative commandment that does not apply equally to all, the woman too was warned.