Yevamot 84b (פד:) — the Talmud in English

But if you should say:

perhaps one might propose in resolution that

this tanna

in our Mishna holds that since at the time of her marriage to the ordinary kohen she was not yet prohibited to the High Priest [the yavam] by the prohibition against a widow, it makes no difference that she subsequently became a widow; and this tanna holds that

“the first marriage”

is what

“causes”

the yevama to become subject to yibbum.

That is, the marriage into which his deceased brother took her is the cause of her becoming subject to yibbum before the yavam. For the yavam’s levirate marriage to her is a continuation of the deceased husband’s marital bond, and that bond came into being at the time of the deceased brother’s marriage.

And since at that time she was permitted to the yavam, the High Priest, as she was still a virgin, therefore, when the ordinary kohen dies, his brother, the High Priest, may perform yibbum with her.

It is impossible to say this!

For

indeed

we learned in our Mishna:

If a ḥalal married a woman fit for the priesthood,

and he has a brother who is a properly qualified kohen, she may not enter into yibbum, because she was disqualified through intercourse with the ḥalal.

And we do not say: “The first marriage causes her to become subject to yibbum!”

That is, we do not say that since at the time of the deceased husband’s marriage, before she had intercourse with the ḥalal, she was permitted to the yavam, she would not subsequently become prohibited to him.

The same applies to a High Priest before whom the wife of his brother who died after having intercourse becomes subject to yibbum: one cannot say that she is permitted to him despite being a woman who had intercourse, on the basis of the principle that the first marriage causes her to become subject to yibbum.

The question therefore returns: Why did the tanna mention a widow rather than a virgin?

The Gemara therefore resolves the matter differently:

Indeed,

the fact that we learned “widow” and not “virgin”

certainly

was stated

because of the latter clause, which he wanted to teach,

in the

latter clause

of the Mishna, the halakha: “And these women are prohibited to both these and those:

A High Priest who married a widow, and he has a brother who is a High Priest or an ordinary kohen.”

And there

specifically a widow

is prohibited to the High Priest.

But a virgin—

she

is fit for him [

she is suitable for him].

For this reason the tanna taught

also at the beginning of the Mishna

“widow.”

A. The Torah prohibited the first two generations of Egyptian converts from entering into the congregation of the Lord, and permitted the third generation and thereafter.

The first generation is called an “Egyptian of the first generation,” meaning the Egyptian convert himself.

The second generation, born to the Egyptian convert, is called an “Egyptian of the second generation.”

The prohibition of these two generations is derived from the verse: “The third generation shall enter into the congregation of the Lord,” which teaches that until the third generation, Egyptians may not enter into the congregation of the Lord.

This prohibition applies both to Egyptian men and to Egyptian women, so that an Egyptian woman of the first or second generation is also prohibited to an Israelite.

But an Egyptian of the third generation has the status of a full-fledged Israelite.

B. An Egyptian of the first or second generation is permitted to marry an Egyptian woman of the first or second generation.

If his father was an Egyptian of the second generation and his mother an Egyptian of the first generation, Rabba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rav Dimi in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan disputed above [78a] what the status of the son is.

According to Rabba bar bar Ḥana, he follows his father, and since his father is an Egyptian of the second generation, his son is an Egyptian of the third generation and is permitted to enter into the congregation.

According to Rav Dimi, however, he follows his mother, and since his mother is an Egyptian of the first generation, her son is an Egyptian of the second generation and is prohibited from entering into the congregation.

C. The approach of our sugya is that “the congregation of converts is not called a congregation.” Therefore, a convert may marry an Egyptian woman of the first or second generation, and an Egyptian of the first or second generation may marry a female convert.

D. However, only the convert or female convert themselves are not included in “the congregation of the Lord.” Their son or daughter, by contrast, is a full-fledged member of “the congregation of the Lord,” even if both the father and the mother were converts.

Rav Pappa attacked him [

Rav Pappa raised a difficulty against Rav Dimi in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan]:

If this statement that, when Rav Dimi came, he said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan

[if the halakha is indeed in accordance with him], that

when an Egyptian of the second generation marries an Egyptian woman of the first generation,

her son

is an Egyptian

of the second generation,

because he follows his mother. Since his mother is an Egyptian woman of the first generation, her son is an Egyptian of the second generation and is prohibited from entering into the congregation. He does not follow his father, who is of the second generation, so as to be of the third generation and permitted to enter into the congregation.

And if so,

let him also teach

in our Mishna an additional example, involving an Egyptian and an Israelite woman, in which all the categories of the Mishna apply, for example:

An Egyptian of the second generation married two

women,

Egyptian women—

one

one

was an Egyptian woman of the

first, and

one

one

was an Egyptian woman of the

second generation.

And he had sons by

the

first

woman and by the

second

woman, and these sons are paternal brothers but not maternal brothers!

One son, from the first woman, is an Egyptian of the second generation—according to Rav Dimi—and is prohibited from entering into the congregation.

And one son, from the second woman, is an Egyptian of the third generation and has the status of a full-fledged Israelite—

and in this way all the categories of the Mishna are possible:

A.

If they married in the usual manner—

they are permitted to their husbands and prohibited to their yavamim.

If they married in the permitted manner, with the Egyptian of the second generation, who is prohibited from entering into the congregation, marrying a woman like himself, an Egyptian woman of the second generation, who is permitted to him, and the Egyptian of the third generation, who is an Israelite, marrying an Israelite woman, who is permitted to him—

the wives of these men are permitted to their husbands but prohibited to their yavamim.

That is, the wife of the son of the first woman, who is an Egyptian of the second generation, is prohibited to his brother, the yavam, who is an Egyptian of the third generation. Since he has the status of an Israelite, he is prohibited to an Egyptian woman, who is disqualified from entering into the congregation.

Likewise, the wife of the son of the second woman, who is an Israelite woman, is prohibited to his first brother, who is an Egyptian of the second generation. B.

And “they are permitted to their yavamim and prohibited to their husbands.” \-

If you reverse the cases and marry them!

That is, if the two brothers each married a woman who was not suitable for him,

for example, the son of the first woman, who is an Egyptian of the second generation, married an Israelite woman, who is suitable only for his brother, who is an Egyptian of the third generation and a full-fledged Israelite, but not for him, who is an Egyptian of the second generation;

and, for example, the son of the second woman, who is an Egyptian of the third generation and a full-fledged Israelite, married an Egyptian woman of the second generation, who is suitable only for his brother, who is an Egyptian of the second generation, but not for him, who is a full-fledged Israelite—

the wives of each of them are permitted to their yavamim and prohibited to their husbands.

C.

“They are permitted to both these and those”—

female converts.

For example, if both brothers married female converts, since even an Egyptian of the second generation is permitted to marry a female convert, as “the congregation of converts is not called a congregation.” Consequently, the wives of both men are permitted to their husbands and permitted to their yavamim.

D.

“They are prohibited to both these and those”—

women incapable of bearing children.

For example, the son of the first woman, who is an Egyptian of the second generation, married an Israelite woman incapable of bearing children, who is prohibited to him and also prohibited to his brother, the yavam, since a woman incapable of bearing children does not become subject to yibbum, and she is prohibited as the nakedness of a brother’s wife where there is no mitzva.

Since the categories of the Mishna apply in such a case as well, the difficulty arises: Why did the tanna not also teach this case in our Mishna?!

And we answer:

The tanna taught some cases and omitted others.

The tanna taught several examples of these categories, but did not teach all of them; rather, he omitted other cases that he did not teach.

We inquire concerning this:

What did he omit,

which additional example did the tanna omit,

that this omission

is the reason he also omitted this example?!

For it is not the tanna’s practice to omit only a single matter; rather, it is his practice to omit several matters. If only one matter remains, he teaches it explicitly and does not “omit it.”

And we answer: The tanna also

omitted

the case of

a man with crushed testicles.

All the categories of the Mishna could apply to him as well, for example:

A. A properly qualified man married an Israelite woman, and he has a brother with crushed testicles: she is permitted to her husband and prohibited to her yavam.

B. A man with crushed testicles married an Israelite woman, and he has a properly qualified brother: she is prohibited to her husband and permitted to her yavam.

C. A man with crushed testicles married an Israelite woman, and he has a brother with crushed testicles: she is prohibited to both this one and that one.

D. A man with crushed testicles married a female convert [who is permitted to a man with crushed testicles, because “the congregation of converts is not called a congregation,” and all those disqualified from entering the congregation are permitted to her], and he has a brother who is properly qualified or who also has crushed testicles: she is permitted to both this one and that one.

The Gemara rejects this resolution:

If it is because of the man with crushed testicles—

it is not an omission

!

The case of a man with crushed testicles is not considered an omitted additional example,

for the tanna already taught the category of those liable for negative commandments.

Once the tanna taught one example of those liable for negative commandments, he need not repeat and teach the case of a man with crushed testicles, who is also included among “those liable for negative commandments.”

But an Egyptian, whose prohibition is a positive commandment, as it is written, “The third generation shall enter into the congregation of the Lord”—from the positive formulation you infer the negative, that those of the first and second generations may not enter into the congregation of the Lord—the tanna should have taught us that he is prohibited to his yavam.

The Gemara is astonished at the rejection of the resolution:

Is it so

that

those liable for negative commandments—

did he not teach

one example of those liable for negative commandments in our Mishna,

and

nevertheless

then teach again,

with the tanna returning to teach an additional example?!

Did the tanna not return and teach, after he had already brought one example of “those liable for negative commandments,” another example of those liable for negative commandments?!

But he taught

first:

An ordinary kohen who married a widow.

She is prohibited by a negative commandment to the High Priest yavam, and thereby he taught the law of “those liable for negative commandments.”

Nevertheless, the tanna then returned and taught another case of those liable for negative commandments:

A ḥalal who married a woman fit for the priesthood,

who became disqualified through intercourse with him and he died—for she too is included among those liable for negative commandments, since she is prohibited to his brother, the properly qualified kohen yavam, by the prohibition against a woman disqualified from the priesthood.

If so, the tanna should likewise have returned and taught the case of a man with crushed testicles.

From the fact that the tanna did not return and teach it, it is proven that the tanna did not teach all the possible cases, but only some of them, and omitted other cases that he did not teach.

It follows that the resolution “he omitted the case of a man with crushed testicles” is a valid resolution!

But the Gemara still rejects the resolution: In fact, the tanna need not return and teach the case of a man with crushed testicles, since he had already taught one example of those liable for negative commandments. Therefore, one cannot resolve the omission by saying that the tanna omitted the case of a man with crushed testicles in addition to the Egyptian of the second generation.

And as for what you proved from the fact that the tanna returned and taught the case of a ḥalal who married a woman fit for the priesthood—that the tanna returns and teaches additional examples of those liable for negative commandments—that is not proof, because the tanna did not intend to bring an additional example of those liable for negative commandments.

Rather,

that particular

case of a ḥalal who married a woman fit for the priesthood

was necessary for him

the tanna

to teach us, that a woman fit for the priesthood is not prohibited from marrying a ḥalal [even if she is the daughter of a kohen],

that a qualified woman is not forbidden to marry a ḥalal—even if she is the daughter of a kohen—

as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Women who are fit

to marry into the priesthood

were not warned—

even women of priestly lineage—against

marrying those disqualified

by their status as ḥalalim and becoming disqualified through intercourse with them.

The difficulty now returns: Why did the tanna not teach the matter of an Egyptian, in order to teach us that those liable for a positive commandment do not enter into yibbum? After all, the tanna did not omit any additional matter that he needed to teach but failed to teach, and you cannot resolve this by saying, “The tanna taught some cases and omitted others”!

The Gemara answers that nevertheless one can say, “The tanna taught some cases and omitted others”:

But he taught the case of a ḥalal who married a woman fit for the priesthood,

and she became subject to yibbum before a properly qualified kohen, although she is prohibited to the yavam by a negative commandment,

and

nevertheless the tanna returned and taught the case of

an Israelite who married an Israelite woman and has a mamzer brother,

who is likewise prohibited to the yavam, the mamzer, by a negative commandment.

Thus the tanna teaches and then repeats an additional example of those liable for negative commandments, even where it contains no novel element. If so, he should also have taught the case of a man with crushed testicles.

Rather, certainly: “The tanna taught some cases and omitted others.”

And we reject this:

This—

the mamzer, who is liable for negative commandments—

is also not a repetition by the tanna [

this is not a repetition in which the tanna teaches an additional unnecessary example], because this example was taught specifically because of the second category, concerning women who are “permitted to their yavamim and prohibited to their husbands,” to teach us that even when she is prohibited to her husband because he is a mamzer, she is nevertheless permitted to her yavam—

and this novel point was not learned from the preceding case of a woman disqualified to a kohen.

For he taught us

first the case of those liable for negative commandments, with a woman disqualified to a kohen, which is

a negative commandment that does not apply equally to all,

but only to kohanim. And although she is prohibited to her husband, she is nevertheless permitted to her yavam.

And

again

the tanna teaches us

the case of a mamzer, which is

a negative commandment that applies equally to all,

and nevertheless, although she is prohibited to her husband, she does not become prohibited to her yavam.

But the tanna did not need to teach us the case of a man with crushed testicles, since it adds no novel element beyond the case of a mamzer, which is also a negative commandment that applies equally to all; therefore, there is no “omission” here.

The difficulty therefore returns: Why did the tanna not teach those liable for a positive commandment, in the case of an Egyptian?!

The Gemara again answers that nevertheless, the case of a man with crushed testicles is an omission.

For

he taught

in our Mishna, after the tanna had already taught the example of those liable for negative commandments involving a mamzer and an Israelite woman—

An Israelite who married a mamzeret, and has an Israelite brother,

who is likewise forbidden by a negative mitzva to perform levirate marriage with her. There is no additional novelty in this example.

If so, the tanna should also have stated the law concerning a petzu'a daka, despite the fact that it contains no additional novelty.

Rather, no,

indeed

this proves:

the tanna did not repeat the case of a petzu'a daka as he repeated the case of an Israelite with a mamzeret because

“the tanna states some cases and omits others”,

and therefore the tanna also omitted the law concerning an Egyptian.

And we conclude: Indeed,

this proves it!

The text itself:

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Fit women were not warned against marrying disqualified men,

that is, men who are ḥalalim.

Let us say,

may we say that

it supports him,

that our Mishna provides support for him, as we learned: “

And these women are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their yevamim” —

a ḥalal who married a fit woman!

What, is it not the case

that the Mishna is speaking of

a kohenet who is fit for him?

And what is the meaning of “fit”? —

Fit for the priesthood!

That is, a daughter of a kohen, who alone is “fit” [appropriate] to marry a kohen, since it is not proper for a kohen to marry an Israelite woman ab initio, but only a daughter of a kohen.

You have therefore learned that even though she is a daughter of a kohen, she is permitted to marry a ḥalal.

And we reject this:

No,

it is not as you said, that the case is one of a ḥalal who married a daughter of a kohen.

Rather, the case is one of a ḥalal who married

an Israelite woman.

And what is the meaning of “fit”? —

Fit for

entry into the

community.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if the Mishna is speaking of fitness for entry into the community and not of fitness for the priesthood, this is difficult:

When we learned, concerning the law of a ḥalal who married a fit woman, that he

has a “fit” brother —

does this

likewise

mean that the brother is

fit for entry into the community!?

But if you interpret it in this manner,

it follows from

your words

that he,

the deceased brother, the ḥalal, was

disqualified from entry into the community!

Yet it is impossible that the reference is to someone disqualified from entry into the community; it can refer only to a ḥalal, whose disqualification is only with regard to the priesthood and not with regard to entry into the community!

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that the Mishna is speaking of the second brother, the “fit” one, who is

a kohen

who is fit, as he is not a ḥalal!

And from the fact that “he” is a kohen,

from the fact that the “fit” one mentioned with regard to the yavam is a fit kohen—

she

likewise, the “fit woman” mentioned with regard to the yevama, is also

a kohenet

.

It is thus proven from here that a kohenet is permitted to marry a ḥalal, and this supports Rav Yehuda.

And we reject this:

Is that necessarily so!?

Am I required to establish that the Mishna is speaking of the same type of fitness with regard to the yavam and the yevama!?

For I can say:

This “fit” one with regard to the yavam

—

as it is found,

according to the way I establish it, refers to a fit kohen.

And

if

this, the “fit” woman with regard to the yevama,

—

as it is found,

according to the way we established it, refers to one who is fit only for entry into the community and not for the priesthood.

Ravin bar Naḥman raised an objection

to Rav Yehuda’s ruling:

It is written concerning women disqualified from the priesthood [Leviticus 21:7]: “

A woman who is a zona or a ḥalala” —

they shall not take. “

And a divorced woman from her husband” —

they shall not take.”

The verse teaches

by repeating and doubling the expression “they shall not take”

that the woman is also warned by the prohibition applying to the man.

—

that the woman is warned on account of the man. That is, just as the kohen is warned not to marry disqualified women, so the woman is warned not to marry disqualified men.

The Gemara initially understood this derivation to mean that a fit woman is forbidden to marry a disqualified man, which is difficult for Rav Yehuda!

Rava said:

The verse did not come to teach that disqualified men are forbidden to kohenot. Rather, it came to warn the disqualified woman that she must not marry a fit kohen.

For

wherever he is warned

concerning her,

she

too is

warned

concerning him.

And wherever he is not warned

concerning her, such as a ḥalal who marries a daughter of a kohen,

she too is not warned

not to marry him.

And we raise an objection:

But

if a disqualified woman is warned not to marry a fit kohen,

is this derived from here?

Is this law learned from “they shall not take”? But this law

is derived from Rav Yehuda said that Rav —

it is derived

, it is learned!

As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and likewise the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael:

It is written [Numbers 5]:

“A man or a woman, when they commit any of the sins of man” —

the verse equated a woman with a man with regard to all punishments

[a prohibition involving a negative mitzva and a prohibition carrying karet ]

in the Torah.

And since he is warned concerning her, she is also warned concerning him.

If so, necessarily, “they shall not take” comes to teach that a fit kohenet must not marry a disqualified man, which is difficult for Rav Yehuda, who holds that fit women were not warned against marrying disqualified men! And we answer: Actually, “they shall not take” comes to warn the disqualified woman that she must not marry a fit kohen.

And the reason we require the derivation from “they shall not take,” rather than learning this from “a man or a woman,” is that—

Had it been derived from that,

from the derivation of “a man or a woman” —

one might have thought

that even the woman was warned only with regard to

a negative mitzva that applies equally to all.

But a negative mitzva that does not apply equally to all,

such as a woman disqualified from marrying a kohen,

no,

a woman would not be warned against violating it.

Therefore, the verse states “they shall not take” to teach us that even with regard to a negative mitzva that does not apply equally to all, the woman too is warned.