Yevamot 84a — the Talmud in English

Crossbred animals, a tereifa, one born by an unusual birth, a tumtum, and an androgynos

are completely disqualified, and

are neither consecrated nor consecrate

and he proceeds to explain it.

And he said:

he explained:

“They are not consecrated through substitution.”

That is to say, it is not necessary to say that if one consecrated them, they are not consecrated with bodily sanctity, but only with sanctity of value, like one who consecrated a date palm and like one who consecrates a blemished animal. Rather, even if one performed substitution with them [for in the case of a blemished animal, sanctity takes effect], they are not consecrated.

“And they do not consecrate through one who makes substitution,”

for if one exchanged their sanctity for another animal, their substitute is not sacred.

And we conclude:

infer from this

that according to Rabbi Eliezer, an androgynos is not consecrated.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Rabbi Eliezer says: One is liable to stoning on account of him, as on account of a male”:

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi said: “When I went to study Torah with Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua, his students gathered against me like the roosters of Beit Bukya”

[the roosters of that place are expert and sharp, and they do not allow a strange rooster among them],

“and they allowed me to learn only one thing in our Mishna,”

and it is:

“Rabbi Eliezer says: An androgynos”—

“one is liable to stoning on account of him, as on account of a male.”

We have returned to you, chapter “The Uncircumcised.”

After we learned in the preceding chapters the laws of the women who are permitted and forbidden to a husband and to a yavam, the tanna now brings a brief summary of those laws.

The first Mishna is divided into

three parts

and so it is divided in the order of the Mishnayot, into three Mishnayot:

The first part is a brief summary of the laws of the women who are permitted and forbidden by Torah law to a husband and to a yavam.

The second part is a brief summary of the laws of the women forbidden as “secondaries to forbidden relations,” by rabbinic law, to a husband and to a yavam.

And the third part is the laws of the ketubah of the women forbidden by rabbinic statements.

In the first part -

the tanna divides all the women

into four groups.

Mishna:

1.

There are

women who are

permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamin

by a prohibition of lav.

And the yavam does not perform yibbum with them; rather, he performs halitza for them.

2. And there are women who are

permitted

to marry

their yevamin.

And

this is so even though they had been

forbidden to their husbands!

3. And there are women who are

permitted to both these and those,

both to their husbands and to their yevamin.

4.

And

there are women who are

forbidden to both these and those.

And the tanna specifies four examples:

1. A High Priest and a widow.

2. A kohen and a halala.

3. A mamzer and a woman of fit lineage.

4. A man of fit lineage and a mamzeret.

And in each of the examples there are three of the four possibilities mentioned above:

1. Permitted to the husband and forbidden to the yavam.

2. Permitted to the yavam and forbidden to her husband.

3. Forbidden to this one and to that one.

Whereas “those permitted to both these and those” are all the other women.

These

are the women who are

permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamin:

1.

A common kohen who married

the widow,

who is permitted to a common kohen,

and he has a brother who is a High Priest,

to whom the widow is forbidden.

2.

A halal who married

a woman

of fit lineage,

and she became a halala through his intercourse,

and he has a brother

who is a

fit

kohen, who is forbidden to a halala.

3.

An Israelite who married

a daughter of Israel

of fit lineage,

and he has a mamzer brother,

who is forbidden to a woman of fit lineage.

4.

A mamzer who married

a mamzeret,

who is permitted to a mamzer,

and he has an Israelite brother

of fit lineage, who is forbidden to a mamzeret.

Likewise, there are other possibilities not mentioned here, such as the fifteen women who are forbidden relations, who are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamin, and such as when the yavam was one with crushed testicles, which were not mentioned here.

All these -

are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamin,

since those subject to prohibitions of lav rise only to halitza, and not to yibbum.

And these are permitted to their yevamin and forbidden to their husbands:

1.

A High Priest who betrothed

the widow,

who is forbidden to a High Priest,

and he has a brother who is a common kohen

who is permitted to a widow.

2. A

fit kohen who married a halala,

who is forbidden to a kohen,

and he has a halal brother

who is permitted to women disqualified for the priesthood.

3.

An Israelite who married a mamzeret,

who is forbidden to an Israelite of fit lineage,

and he has a mamzer brother

who is permitted to a mamzeret.

4.

A mamzer who married a daughter of Israel

of fit lineage, who is forbidden to a mamzer,

and he has an Israelite brother

of fit lineage.

All these -

are permitted to their yevamin and forbidden to their husbands.

And these are forbidden to both these and those:

1.

A High Priest who married the widow

and profaned her -

and he has a brother

who is also

a High Priest,

who is also forbidden to a widow and a halala -

or

he has a brother who is

a common kohen,

who is forbidden to a halala.

2. A

fit kohen who married a halala,

who is disqualified for a kohen,

and he has a brother

who is also a kohen,

of fit lineage.

3.

An Israelite

of fit lineage

who married a mamzeret,

who is forbidden to an Israelite,

and he has an Israelite brother

of fit lineage.

4.

A mamzer who married a daughter of Israel

of fit lineage, who is forbidden to a mamzer,

and he has a brother

who is also

a mamzer.

All these -

are forbidden to both these and those.

And

these

remaining all

women -

are permitted to their husbands and to their yevamin.

2.

The second part

of the Mishna: the tanna brings a brief summary of the laws relating to the law of “secondaries to forbidden relations,” which are prohibitions of kinship by rabbinic enactment, imposed upon women who are “secondaries” in their degree of relationship to the forbidden relations called “primary.”

For example, his mother’s mother, who is forbidden by rabbinic law: since his mother is forbidden to him by Torah law at the degree of relationship called “primary,” they decreed that his mother’s mother should be forbidden by rabbinic law, because she is a “secondary to a forbidden relation.”

And these are the laws of

secondaries

to forbidden relations, whose prohibition is

by rabbinic statements.

1. If the woman was

a “secondary” to the husband, but not

was

a secondary to the yavam -

then she is

forbidden to the husband and permitted to the yavam.

2. If the woman was

a secondary to the yavam but not a secondary to the husband -

then she is

forbidden to the yavam,

and permitted to the husband.

If the woman was

a secondary to this one and to that one -

then she is

forbidden to this one and to that one.

And now the tanna brings its

third

part of the Mishna, concerning the laws of the ketubah of the forbidden women.

Included in a ketubah are

monetary obligations and rights

between the husband and the wife.

Among the husband’s obligations in his wife’s ketubah -

to pay her two hundred zuz [for a virgin, and one hundred zuz for a non-virgin] if he dies or if he divorces her.

Likewise, obligations that the Sages obligated him as “conditions of the ketubah.”

For example: the husband is obligated to provide sustenance for his wife [and the tannaim disputed whether the obligation is from Torah law or rabbinic law].

And the Sages enacted that his widow should be sustained from his property and should also dwell in his house, even after his death, until she marries another man.

This matter is among the “conditions of the ketubah.” And even though this obligation was not written in the ketubah, the husband is obligated in it by the enactment of the Sages.

The ketubah also includes the property that the woman brings to her husband at the time of her marriage, and the husband’s undertakings toward her—to return it.

The property of the woman who marries her husband is divided into two types.

The first is

usufruct property.

The husband’s right is to consume the produce from all the woman’s property, as “usufruct property.”

That is, to consume the produce or profits of the property, or to make the ordinary use that is made of it.

For example, if the woman has land, the husband is entitled to consume its produce. And if she has capital, he is entitled to the profits of the capital. And if she has clothing [that is not clothing for her own dress], he is entitled to wear it even until the clothing wears out. And if she has slaves, he is entitled to employ them in the manner in which slaves are employed, even though prolonged use of them causes their bodies to deteriorate.

The Sages enacted the husband’s right to consume the produce of the woman’s property in exchange for the husband’s obligation to redeem the woman from captivity if she is taken captive.

The second type of property that the woman brings to her husband is

iron-flock property.

This property [according to the overwhelming majority of the early authorities] belongs to the husband upon their marriage.

However, at the time of the marriage its value is assessed, and the husband obligates himself as

a ketubah obligation

to return the

value

of the property according to its assessment at the time of the marriage, if he divorces her or if she is widowed from him.

But he is not obligated to return the property itself [apart from certain cases in which the woman can receive the property itself as payment because of “the enhancement of her father’s house”].

And the woman has a special right in this property: if the husband does not fulfill his obligation to return the money when he divorces her [or if he dies and the heirs do not pay her], she can collect her debt from this property,

as though it were her property,

and other creditors will not be able to collect from it.

And all this is included in the matter of the “ketubah”!

The Mishna now explains what are the laws of the ketubah of a woman forbidden to her husband by the prohibition of secondaries, by rabbinic statements.

She has no,

the “secondary” who marries her relative in violation of the prohibition -

no ketubah,

if he divorces her or if she is widowed from him, because the Sages penalized her for marrying in violation of the prohibition.

And he also does not pay her the equivalent of the “iron-flock property” that she brought to him.

Nor

the return of

the produce

of usufruct property that he consumed while she was married to him.

Nor sustenance.

Nor

does she take, when she leaves him, the

worn-out remnants

[wear of clothing] that remain from clothing that she brought to him as usufruct property when she married. For the Sages also penalized her concerning these, so that she should not collect them.

And

however,

the child

is hers

of fit lineage.

And they compel him to divorce

his wife who is forbidden to him.

In what matter are these words said? When the Sages penalized the woman who married in prohibition, when her marriage is forbidden because of “secondaries,” which is a prohibition from the words of the Scribes.

Since a matter that the Sages forbade requires strengthening more than words of Torah.

Or because, in a place where she is forbidden only by the words of the Scribes, it is she who entices the husband to marry her despite the prohibition [as this matter will be explained in the Gemara]; therefore they penalized her, so that she would lose her ketuba.

But if her marriage was forbidden by the Torah, the Sages did not need to penalize her—

either because words of Torah do not require strengthening,

or because, in a place where her marriage is forbidden by the Torah, it is the husband who entices her to marry him; therefore they obligated him to give her a ketuba, even though for prohibited marriages the Sages would not have instituted a ketuba [and these two reasons will be explained in the Gemara].

Accordingly—

a widow

who marries

a High Priest,

for she is forbidden to him by a Torah prohibition.

A divorcee and a halutza

who marry

an ordinary kohen.

A mamzeret and a netina

who marry

an Israelite.

A daughter of Israel

who marries

a netin or a mamzer.

All these—

they have a ketuba.

And they likewise have the other matters with which they penalized a “secondary,” as explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “These are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their levirs”—an ordinary kohen who married the widow, and he has a brother who is a High Priest:

And the Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the expression “married,” from which it is understood that the Mishna is not speaking of a High Priest who betrothed a widow, but specifically of a case in which the ordinary kohen married the widow and had intercourse with her, and then died, and the widow fell before his brother, the High Priest, when she was forbidden to him both by the prohibition of a widow and by the prohibition of a woman who has had intercourse, with regard to a High Priest—

What is the reason that he teaches

why did the tanna use in his words “an ordinary kohen who

married

a widow”?

Let him teach, “betrothed,

which is the language of betrothal. For it would likewise be possible to formulate it thus: “These are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their levirs: an ordinary kohen who betrothed a widow”!

For the widow of the ordinary kohen becomes forbidden to his brother, the High Priest, even if she was widowed after he betrothed her, because a widow is forbidden to a High Priest, including a widow from betrothal, even though she had not had intercourse!

And if you would say

perhaps you would say, to resolve this, that for this reason the tanna specifically stated “the ordinary kohen married” the widow and died, for then she falls before the High Priest, the levir, as a widow from marriage who is also a woman who has had intercourse, and only then may she not perform levirate marriage through the High Priest.

And we shall infer as follows:

the reason is that he married

the ordinary kohen married the widow, had intercourse with her, and through his marriage she became a woman who had had intercourse, and then he died—

for

then

she would be

the levir’s wife forbidden to the High Priest also by the prohibition of a

positive commandment concerning a woman who has had intercourse [“For only a virgin among his people shall he take as a wife”],

and

also by the negative commandment of

a

prohibition concerning a widow [“A widow, a divorcee, a profaned woman, or a harlot—these he shall not take”].

—

And a positive commandment does not override both a positive commandment and a negative commandment.

But

if the ordinary kohen only

betrothed

the widow [and she had been a widow from betrothal and had not had intercourse with her previous husband], and he died, so that she is not forbidden to the High Priest by the positive commandment concerning a woman who has had intercourse, but only by the negative commandment concerning a widow to a High Priest, then—

the positive commandment

of levirate marriage

comes and overrides

the

negative commandment

concerning a widow, and it is permitted for the High Priest to perform levirate marriage with her.

And therefore the tanna taught “married” specifically, and did not teach “betrothed.”

It is impossible to say this!

But the entire chapter

—behold, all the other examples in the Mishna, of the marriages of a fit man and a halala, a mamzer and a fit woman, and a mamzeret and a fit man, in which too the Mishna says that they are “forbidden to their levirs”— \-

only

a positive commandment and

opposite it

a negative commandment—it is!

For opposite the positive commandment of levirate marriage there stands only a negative commandment, without the combination of a positive-commandment prohibition with the negative commandment.

And

nevertheless,

the commandment does not come

the commandment

of a positive commandment

of levirate marriage

and override a negative commandment!

And therefore the Gemara brings another resolution: the tanna stated “married” and not “betrothed”—

because he needed to teach

for he intended to teach what is stated in the

latter clause—

“And these are forbidden both to these and to those”:

a High Priest who married the widow,

and he has a brother who is a High Priest or an ordinary kohen—his widow is forbidden even to his brother who is an ordinary kohen, because the High Priest made her a halala when he had intercourse with her in prohibition.

And in the latter clause, it is stated

specifically

if

he married

her, the High Priest, for only then is she forbidden to his brother, the ordinary kohen, since

he made her

he made her

a halala

through his intercourse with her.

But

if he only

betrothed

the widow, the High Priest, but did not marry her and did not have intercourse with her, and then died—

she is permitted to him,

his widow is permitted to his brother, the ordinary kohen.

And therefore

the tanna also

in

the first clause taught “married

and not “betrothed,” so that the students would not err and teach “betrothed” also in the latter clause.

And the Gemara questions this resolution:

And rather than he taught

in the place where the tanna taught “married” in the first clause, concerning “permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their levirs,”

because of

the

latter clause,

in order to say, “And these are forbidden both to these and to those”—

let him teach,

the tanna should teach “betrothed” in the first clause—

because of the middle clause

of our Mishna, in which the tanna taught, “And these are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands:

a High Priest who betrothed the widow, and he has an ordinary kohen as a brother.”

There, surely, the tanna must say specifically “betrothed”! For if the High Priest married her and had intercourse with her, he made her a halala, and she becomes forbidden to her levir.

And if so, the tanna should teach “betrothed” in the first clause, so that the students would not err and teach “married” also in the middle clause!?

And on the basis of this difficulty the Gemara retracts and says that the tanna need not go so far and teach “married” in the first clause because of the middle clause or because of the latter clause; rather, because of the halakha adjacent to it in the first clause itself, the tanna should have taught “married,” and not “betrothed.”

Rather,

for this reason the tanna stated “married” in the first clause—

because of “the daughter of the hut.”

The daughter of that “hut.” This is an expression of a parable, referring to those who dwell together in a hut, all of whom are called “the children of the hut.” And so too in our Mishna, several groups of halakhot are taught in it, and the halakhot found in the same group are called, by way of parable and rhetorical expression, “the daughters of the same hut.”

That is, the tanna taught “married” in the first clause because of the halakha taught next to it, in the first clause of the Mishna itself.

Because he needed to teach

in the first clause, since the tanna wished to teach, within the general category of “those permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their levirs,” also the law of

a halal who married a fit woman,

who is forbidden to his brother, the levir, who is a fit kohen.

And here the tanna was required to say “married.” For

the reason is that he married

therefore she is forbidden to his fit brother, because

he made her

the halal made his wife

a halala

through his intercourse with her, and therefore she is forbidden to his brother, who is a fit kohen.

But

if

he betrothed

the halal only, and did not have intercourse with her—

she is permitted to him,

she is permitted to her brother, the levir, for she is still fit for the priesthood, since she did not have intercourse with the halal.

And for this reason, he taught

also in the first clause of the first clause

“married.”

And now the Gemara comes to discuss an additional expression in that same halakha, in which we learned: “And these are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their levirs: an ordinary kohen who married the widow, and he has a brother who is a High Priest”:

And what is the reason that he teaches,

why did the tanna state “an ordinary kohen who married the

widow”?

Let him teach:

an ordinary kohen who married the

virgin,

and when he dies she becomes a widow. For this too is included within “permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir”!