Yevamot 84a (פד.) — the Talmud in English

Hybrids, tereifa animals, animals born by caesarean section, tumtum, and androgynos

are entirely disqualified, and

are neither consecrated nor able to consecrate

and the Gemara proceeds to explain this.

And he said

he explained:

Shmuel: They are not consecrated through temura.

That is, it is obvious that if one consecrates them, they do not acquire sanctity of the body, but only sanctity of value, like one who consecrates a date palm or one who consecrates a blemished animal. Rather, even if one performs temura with them—in which case sanctity takes effect with regard to a blemished animal—they are not consecrated.

Nor can they consecrate through the performance of temura,

for if one exchanges their sanctity for another animal, their temura does not become consecrated.

And we conclude:

This proves

that according to Rabbi Eliezer, an androgynos does not become consecrated.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says: One is liable to be stoned on account of him, as on account of a male:

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi said: When I went to study Torah with Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua, his students gathered against me like the chickens of Beit Bukya

The chickens of that place are expert and sharp, and they do not allow a strange chicken among them,

and they allowed me to learn only one matter in our Mishna,

namely:

Rabbi Eliezer says: An androgynos—

one is liable to be stoned on account of him, as on account of a male.

We have completed Chapter HaArel

After we studied in the preceding chapters the laws governing women who are permitted or forbidden to their husbands and to their yevamim, the tanna now presents a brief summary of those laws.

The first Mishna is divided into

three parts

(and it is divided in the order of the Mishnayot into three mishnayot):

The first part is a concise summary of the laws governing women who are permitted or forbidden by Torah law to their husbands and to their yevamim.

The second part is a concise summary of the laws governing women forbidden as “secondaries to forbidden relations” by rabbinic enactment, to their husbands and to their yevamim.

The third part concerns the ketuba of women forbidden by rabbinic enactment.

In the first part -

the tanna divides all women

into four groups.

MISHNA:

1.

There are

women who are

permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their yevamim

by a prohibition of the Torah.

The yavam does not perform yibbum with them; rather, he performs halitza with them.

2. And there are women who are

permitted

to marry

their yevamim.

And

this is so even though they had been

forbidden to their husbands!

3. And there are women

permitted to both

both to their husbands and to their yevamim.

4.

And

there are women

forbidden to both.

The tanna specifies four examples:

1. A High Priest and a widow.

2. A priest and a halala.

3. A mamzer and a woman of unblemished lineage.

4. A man of unblemished lineage and a mamzeret.

In each of the examples, there are three of the four possibilities listed above:

1. Permitted to the husband and forbidden to the yavam.

2. Permitted to the yavam and forbidden to the husband.

3. Forbidden to both.

The category “permitted to both,” however, includes all the other women.

These

are the women who are

permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their yevamim:

1.

A common priest who married

the widow,

who is permitted to a common priest,

and he has a brother who is a High Priest,

to whom the widow is forbidden.

2.

A hallel who married

a

woman of unblemished lineage,

thereby rendering her a halala through intercourse,

and he has a brother

who is a

fit

priest, who is forbidden to a halala.

3.

An Israelite who married

a daughter of Israel

of unblemished lineage,

and he has a mamzer brother,

who is forbidden to a woman of unblemished lineage.

4.

A mamzer who married

a mamzeret,

who is permitted to a mamzer,

and he has an Israelite brother

of unblemished lineage, who is forbidden to a mamzeret.

There are likewise other possibilities that are not mentioned here, such as the fifteen forbidden relations, who are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamim, and such as when the yavam was a wounded or crushed man, which are not mentioned here.

All these -

are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamim,

since those subject to prohibitions of the Torah do not enter into yibbum, but only into halitza.

And these are permitted to their yevamim and forbidden to their husbands:

1.

A High Priest who betrothed

the widow,

who is forbidden to a High Priest,

and he has a brother who is a common priest,

who is permitted to a widow.

2. A

fit priest who married a halala,

who is forbidden to a priest,

and he has a brother who is a hallel,

who is permitted to women disqualified from the priesthood.

3.

An Israelite who married a mamzeret,

who is forbidden to an Israelite of unblemished lineage,

and he has a mamzer brother,

who is permitted to a mamzeret.

4.

A mamzer who married a daughter of Israel

of unblemished lineage, who is forbidden to a mamzer,

and he has an Israelite brother

of unblemished lineage.

All these -

are permitted to their yevamim and forbidden to their husbands.

And these are forbidden to both:

1.

A High Priest who married the widow

and rendered her a halala -

and he has a brother

who is also

a High Priest,

who is likewise forbidden to both a widow and a halala -

or

he has a brother who is

a common priest,

who is forbidden to a halala.

2. A

fit priest who married a halala,

who is disqualified for a priest,

and he has a brother

who is also a priest,

of unblemished lineage.

3. An

Israelite

of unblemished lineage

who married a mamzeret,

who is forbidden to an Israelite,

and he has an Israelite brother

of unblemished lineage.

4.

A mamzer who married a daughter of Israel

of unblemished lineage, who is forbidden to a mamzer,

and he has a brother

who is also a

mamzer.

All these -

are forbidden to both.

And

the

rest of all

the women -

are permitted to their husbands and to their yevamim.

2.

The second part

of the Mishna presents a brief summary of the laws relating to “secondaries to forbidden relations,” which are prohibitions of kinship instituted by the Sages. They decreed that women who are “secondaries” in their degree of kinship to the forbidden relations, called the “primary” relations, are forbidden.

For example, his mother’s mother is forbidden by rabbinic enactment: since his mother is forbidden to him by Torah law as a “primary” degree of kinship, they decreed that his mother’s mother should also be forbidden by rabbinic enactment, because she is a “secondary to the forbidden relation.”

And these are the laws of

secondaries

to forbidden relations, whose prohibition is

by rabbinic enactment.

1. If the woman was

a “secondary” to the husband, but not

a

secondary to the yavam -

she is

forbidden to the husband and permitted to the yavam.

2. If the woman was

a secondary to the yavam but not a secondary to the husband -

she is

forbidden to the yavam,

and permitted to the husband.

If the woman was

a secondary to both -

she is

forbidden to both.

The tanna now presents

the third

part of the Mishna, concerning the laws of the ketuba of forbidden women.

The ketuba includes

financial obligations and rights

between the husband and wife.

Among the husband’s obligations under his wife’s ketuba -

to pay her two hundred zuz [for a virgin, and one hundred zuz for a non-virgin] if he dies or divorces her.

Likewise, there are obligations that the Sages imposed as “conditions of the ketuba.”

For example: the husband is obligated to provide his wife with food [and the tanna'im disagree whether this obligation is from the Torah or rabbinic].

The Sages also instituted that his widow is to be sustained from his property and may continue to live in his house even after his death, until she marries another man.

This is one of the “conditions of the ketuba.” Although this obligation was not written in the ketuba, the husband is obligated in it by rabbinic enactment.

The ketuba also includes the property that the woman brings to her husband at the time of her marriage, and the husband’s commitments to her to return it.

The property of a woman who marries her husband is divided into two categories.

The first is

usufruct property.

The husband’s right is to consume the produce of all the woman’s property, as nikhsei melog.

That is, to consume the produce or profits of the property, or to make the ordinary use of it.

For example, if the woman owns land, the husband is entitled to consume its produce. If she has capital, he is entitled to its profits. If she has clothing [that is not clothing she wears], he is entitled to wear it even until the garments wear out. If she has slaves, he is entitled to employ them in the manner in which slaves are employed, even though prolonged use causes their value to depreciate.

The Sages instituted the husband’s right to consume the produce of the woman’s property in exchange for the husband’s obligation to redeem his wife from captivity if she is taken captive.

The second type of property that the woman brings to her husband is

iron-flock property.

This property [according to the overwhelming majority of the Rishonim] belongs to the husband upon their marriage.

However, at the time of the marriage its value is assessed, and the husband undertakes, as

an obligation under the ketuba,

to return the

value

of the property according to its assessment at the time of the marriage if he divorces her or if she is widowed from him.

He is not, however, obligated to return the property itself [except in certain cases in which the woman can receive the property itself as payment because of “the enhancement of her father’s household”].

The woman has a special right in this property: if the husband does not fulfill his obligation to return the money when he divorces her [or if he dies and the heirs do not pay her], she may collect her debt from this property

as though it were her property,

and other creditors will not be able to collect from it.

All this is included in the subject of the ketuba!

The Mishna now explains the laws of the ketuba of a woman who is forbidden to her husband by the prohibition of a secondary, by rabbinic enactment.

She does not have,

a “secondary” who marries her relative in violation of the prohibition -

a ketuba,

if he divorces her or if she is widowed from him, because the Sages penalized her for marrying in violation of the prohibition.

Nor does he pay her the equivalent of the “iron-flock property” that she brought to him.

Nor

the return of the

produce

of the usufruct property that he consumed while she was married to him.

Nor sustenance.

Nor

does she receive, when she leaves him, the

worn remains

[the worn clothing] left from garments that she brought to him as usufruct property when she married. The Sages penalized her by preventing her from collecting even these.

And

however,

the child

is hers and

of unblemished lineage.

And they compel him to divorce

his wife, whom he is forbidden to have.

In what case is this statement said? It is when the Sages imposed a penalty on a woman who married in violation of a prohibition, when her marriage is forbidden because of a shniya, a secondary forbidden relation, whose prohibition is rabbinic,

since a matter prohibited by the Sages requires greater reinforcement than a matter prohibited by Torah law,

or because when she is forbidden only by rabbinic law, it is she who entices the husband to marry her despite the prohibition [as this matter will be explained in the Gemara], and therefore they penalized her by causing her to forfeit her ketuba.

But if her marriage was forbidden by Torah law, the Sages did not need to penalize her—

either because matters of Torah do not require reinforcement,

or because when her marriage is forbidden by Torah law, it is the husband who entices her to marry him. Therefore, they required him to give her a ketuba, even though the Sages would not have instituted a ketuba for a forbidden marriage [and these two reasons will be explained in the Gemara].

Accordingly—

a widow

who marries

a High Priest,

to whom she is forbidden by Torah law;

a divorced woman and a halutza

who marry

a common priest;

a mamzeret and a netina

who marry

an Israelite;

an Israelite woman

who marries

a natin or a mamzer—

all of these women

are entitled to a ketuba.

They are likewise entitled to the other things with which the Sages penalized a shniya, as explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: These women are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their yavamim: A common priest who married a widow, and he has a brother who is a High Priest:

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the wording “married,” which indicates that the Mishna is not speaking of a High Priest who betrothed a widow, but specifically of a case where the common priest married the widow and had relations with her, then died, and the widow fell before his brother, the High Priest, when she was forbidden to him both by the prohibition against a widow and by the prohibition against a woman who has had relations with a man who is forbidden to a High Priest—

What is the reason that it teaches,

why did the tanna use the wording “a common priest who

married

a widow”?

Let it teach: “betrothed,”

which is the language of betrothal. For it could likewise have taught: These women are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their yavamim: A common priest who betrothed a widow!?

For the widow of the common priest becomes forbidden to his brother, the High Priest, even if she was widowed after he betrothed her, since a widow is forbidden to a High Priest, including a widow from betrothal, even if she did not have relations with her husband!?

And if you would say,

perhaps one might resolve this by saying that the tanna specifically used the wording “the common priest married” the widow and died, in which case she falls before the High Priest as a widow from marriage who is also a woman who has had relations with a man, and only then may she not perform yibbum with the High Priest.

And we should infer as follows:

The reason is that he married

the widow, had relations with her, thereby making her a woman who had had relations through her marriage, and died—

for

then

she would be

forbidden to the High Priest also by the

positive commandment

of a woman who has had relations with a man: “For he shall take a virgin from among his people as a wife,”

and

also by the

negative commandment

forbidding a widow: “A widow, a divorced woman, a profaned woman, or a harlot—these he shall not take.”

And a positive commandment does not override both a positive commandment and a negative commandment.

But

if the common priest only

betrothed

the widow [and she had been widowed after betrothal and had not had relations with her previous husband], and he died, so that she is not forbidden to the High Priest by the positive commandment concerning a woman who has had relations with a man, but only by the negative commandment forbidding a widow to a High Priest, then—

the positive commandment

of yibbum

comes and overrides

the

negative commandment

concerning a widow, and it is permitted for the High Priest to perform yibbum with her.

Therefore, the tanna taught “married” specifically, and did not teach “betrothed.”

This cannot be said!

But the entire chapter,

all the other examples in the Mishna, involving the marriages of a fit man and a halala, a mamzer and a fit woman, and a mamzeret and a fit man, also state that they are “forbidden to their yavamim”— \-

only

a positive commandment and

opposite it

a negative commandment—that is all!

For opposite the positive commandment of yibbum there stands only a negative commandment, without the addition of a positive-commandment prohibition to the negative commandment.

And

nevertheless,

the positive commandment

of

yibbum

does not

come and override a negative commandment!

Therefore, the Gemara offers another answer: The tanna used “married” rather than “betrothed”—

because he needed to teach

what appears in the

final clause—

“And these women are forbidden both to these and to those”:

A High Priest who married a widow,

and he has a brother who is a High Priest or a common priest—the widow of the High Priest is forbidden even to his brother who is a common priest, because the High Priest made her a halala when he had relations with her in violation of the prohibition.

And in the final clause, it is

specifically

when

he married

her that she is forbidden to his brother, the common priest, since

he made her

a

halala

through his intercourse with her.

But

if the High Priest only

betrothed

the widow, but did not marry her or have relations with her, and died—

she is permitted to him,

his brother, the common priest.

Therefore,

the tanna also taught

in

the first clause “married”,

and not “betrothed,” so that the students would not mistakenly teach “betrothed” in the final clause as well.

The Gemara challenges this answer:

And rather than teaching,

in the place where the tanna taught “married” in the first clause, concerning “those who are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their yavamim,”

because of

the

final clause,

in order to say, “And these women are forbidden both to these and to those”—

let him teach,

the tanna should teach “betrothed” in the first clause—

because of the middle clause

of our Mishna, in which the tanna taught: “These women are permitted to their yavamim but forbidden to their husbands:

A High Priest who betrothed a widow, and he has a brother who is a common priest.”

And there, the tanna certainly needs to say “betrothed”! For if the High Priest married her and had relations with her, he made her a halala, and she becomes forbidden to the yavam.

If so, the tanna should teach “betrothed” in the first clause, so that the students would not mistakenly teach “married” in the middle clause as well!?

On the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts its answer and says that the tanna need not go so far as to teach “married” in the first clause because of the middle clause or because of the final clause. Rather, because of the halakha adjacent to it within the first clause itself, the tanna had to teach “married,” and not “betrothed.”

Rather,

the tanna used “married” in the first clause

because of “the daughter of the hut” (bat buketa).

The daughter of that “hut.” This is an expression based on an analogy, referring to those who live together in a hut, all of whom are called “the children of the hut.” Similarly, several groups of halakhot are taught in our Mishna, and the halakhot found in the same group are called, by way of analogy and rhetoric, “the daughters of the same hut.”

That is, the tanna taught “married” in the first clause because of the halakha taught immediately afterward, in the first clause of the Mishna itself.

Because he needed to teach

in the first clause, since the tanna wanted to include among “those who are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their yavamim” also the case of

a halal who married a fit woman,

who is forbidden to her brother, the yavam, who is a fit kohen.

Here too, the tanna had to say “married.” For

the reason is that he married,

and therefore she is forbidden to his fit brother, is

that he made

his wife, the halal,

a halala

through having relations with her, and therefore she is forbidden to his brother, who is a fit kohen.

But

if

he betrothed

her, the halal, only, and did not have relations with her—

she is permitted to him,

she is permitted to his brother, the yavam, since she is still fit to marry into the priesthood, as she did not have relations with the halal.

And for this reason, he also taught

in the first part of the first clause

“married.”

The Gemara now discusses another aspect of that same halakha, in which we learned: “These women are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their yavamim: A common priest who married a widow, and he has a brother who is a High Priest”:

And what is the reason that he teaches,

why did the tanna use the wording “a common priest who married the

widow”?

Let him teach:

A common priest who married a

virgin,

and when he dies she becomes a widow. This too is included in the category of “permitted to her husband but forbidden to her yavam”!