Yevamot 85b (פה:) — the Talmud in English

And wherever he is disqualified and she is disqualified -

they penalized him,

the husband, by requiring him to give

a ketuba.

That is, they did not penalize the woman by denying her a ketuba. Rather, he must give her a ketuba, as is given to every woman.

For although they penalized a woman forbidden as a “secondary relation,” causing her to forfeit her ketuba, that applies specifically there, because if she does not have a ketuba, she will leave the husband and depart from him.

But here, even if she has a ketuba, she will leave him and depart, because since he is disqualified on account of her, there will be strife between them.

And the same is true when she becomes disqualified on account of him.

And for what reason did they say: “Secondary relations

to forbidden relations,” whose prohibition is

by rabbinic enactment -

they do not have a ketuba?

Because he is fit and she is fit,

and it follows that she will not leave him and depart if she has a ketuba.

And wherever he is fit and she is fit -

they penalized her

the woman, causing her to forfeit

the ketuba,

since because of this she will leave him and depart.

Rabbi

gave another reason:

For

these -

a widow married to a High Priest or a divorcée married to an ordinary priest - are forbidden by

Torah law. And

Torah law does not require reinforcement

by means of a penalty.

But

if

these -

“secondary relations” - whose prohibition is

by rabbinic enactment. And rabbinic enactments do require reinforcement ...

Another

reason

to explain

the distinction between secondary relations and a widow or divorcée:

A High Priest who marries a widow, or an ordinary priest who marries a divorcée -

this

[this is the case], the husband is the one who

induces her

to enter this marriage.

For she certainly does not persuade him to marry her, since the marriage causes disqualification. Rather, he is the one who persuades her to marry him [as will be explained], and therefore they did not penalize her.

But

in the case of secondary relations -

this is the case,

the woman is the one who

induces him

to marry her, and therefore they penalized her.

Since she herself is not disqualified, nor is her offspring disqualified, through a marriage involving secondary relations, and she loses nothing through the marriage, it is reasonable to assume that she is the one who persuades him to marry her, for the woman desires to marry even more than the man desires to marry her. Therefore, they penalized her. But where she or her offspring becomes disqualified, she does not persuade him, and the persuasion to enter a forbidden marriage is attributed to him.

The Gemara now considers who is the tanna who said in the beraita

“another reason” -

Who taught it?

Who is the tanna who stated this reason of “another reason”? Was it Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar who stated it, or Rabbi?

The Gemara presents a dispute concerning this -

Some say:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is the one who

taught it.

And he stated “what is the reason”

[when he said “another reason”], and this is what he said -

What is the reason they said

that in the case of a widow married to a High Priest, or a divorcée or a halutza married to an ordinary priest, although

he is also disqualified and

also

she is disqualified,

nevertheless

they penalized him

specifically, requiring him to give

a

ketuba,

and they did not penalize her by causing her to forfeit her ketuba? -

Because he induces her

and not she him.

For if he becomes disqualified, she refrains from persuading him to marry her, since he does not desire to do so.

And if she becomes disqualified, she has no interest in this marriage, which causes her disqualification.

And since she does not induce him, she is not penalized; rather, her status is like that of other women.

And what is the reason

they said that in the case of secondary relations, since

he is fit and she is fit,

therefore

they penalized her by denying her a ketuba? -

Because she induces him.

But

some say:

Rabbi

is the one who

taught it

as the additional reason.

Rabbi stated this because he explained the reason for the distinction between a Torah prohibition, for which they did not impose a penalty, and a rabbinic prohibition, for which they did impose a penalty, by saying that Torah law does not require reinforcement, whereas rabbinic enactments require reinforcement.

And

now, the rule concerning a

halutza,

who has a ketuba, is what

is difficult to understand

for Rabbi -

But the prohibition against a

halutza

marrying a priest is only a

rabbinic prohibition!

And according to Rabbi, a rabbinic prohibition requires reinforcement, like “secondary relations,” so that she should be penalized;

and

why

does she have

the halutza

a ketuba!?

Therefore,

he returned

and

stated

another reason for the distinction:

Since

in the case of a halutza married to a priest,

he disqualifies her

the priest

from teruma,

by

rabbinic enactment,

as the Sages enacted that a halutza who marries a priest becomes disqualified from eating teruma, the status of a halutza disqualified from teruma by rabbinic enactment is therefore equivalent to that of women disqualified by Torah law, and not to that of women disqualified because of secondary relations, which is also rabbinic. For in the case of a halutza as well, the distinction from secondary relations can be made on the basis of the reason -

“This one induces her, and that one induces him.”

For the distinction between Torah prohibitions, for which no penalty was imposed, and rabbinic prohibitions, for which a penalty was imposed, is that where there is disqualification, she does not induce him and therefore was not penalized. And there is disqualification only in a Torah prohibition, not in a rabbinic prohibition.

But in the case of a halutza married to a priest, she becomes disqualified from teruma by rabbinic enactment. Since she becomes disqualified, she does not induce him; therefore, she has a ketuba even though her disqualification is only rabbinic.

The Gemara now explains

what difference is there,

what practical halakhic difference exists

between

the reason of

Rabbi

and the reason of

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar?

The Gemara offers several possibilities in which there is a difference between the two reasons:

The first practical difference:

A mamzeret or a netina married to an Israelite -

there is a difference between them:

According to the one who says,

Rabbi, who stated as the reason in the case of a widow or divorcée that she was not penalized because the prohibition is

by Torah law,

and Torah law does not require reinforcement,

then

this -

a mamzeret or a netina married to an Israelite -

also

is forbidden to him by

Torah law, since Torah law does not require reinforcement, and therefore she has a ketuba.

According to the one who says,

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who stated that the reason she was not penalized by causing her to forfeit her ketuba in the case of a widow or divorcée married to a priest is

because he induces her

and not she him, since she has no interest in such a marriage because she or her offspring becomes disqualified -

this applies specifically to a widow or divorcée, whose marriage causes her disqualification from teruma and causes her offspring to become halalim.

But

this -

a mamzeret or a netina - does not become more disqualified through her marriage to an Israelite than she already is -

she induces him,

and therefore she should be penalized by causing her to forfeit her ketuba.

But the Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Eliezer

[who disagrees with Rabbi Tarfon - see note 5],

who said that Rabbi Eliezer holds that even a mamzer who married a maidservant

is a slave and a mamzer -

Then she does not induce him at all!?

The fact is that she does not induce him at all, since his offspring becomes disqualified through her.

According to his view, what practical difference is there between Rabbi and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar?

Therefore, the Gemara presents a second practical difference:

Rather, Rav Yosef said: One who remarries his divorcée

after she married another man and the other husband divorced her, as she is forbidden to him, as it is stated: “Her first husband, who sent her away, may not take her back to be his wife after she has been defiled” -

there is a difference between them!

According to the one who says,

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who said that a widow or divorcée was not penalized because the prohibition is

by Torah law,

then

this -

the one who remarries his divorcée -

also

has a

prohibition that is

by Torah law, and she was not penalized, since a Torah prohibition does not require reinforcement.

And according to the one who says,

Rabbi, who said

because he induces her,

then

this -

one who remarries his divorcée after she married another -

she

is the one who

induces him,

for it is not applicable here to say that he becomes disqualified, since this is not a case of a priest who becomes disqualified from service because he married women in violation of a prohibition, but rather of any man.

And she too does not become disqualified from teruma through intercourse with him, as explained above, on 69a.

Nor does her offspring become disqualified, since this is not one of the disqualifications of priesthood.

And there is no disqualification of a mamzer here either, since a mamzer does not result from those liable for lavin.

The Gemara asks:

And according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that there is a mamzer

even

from those liable for lavin, since her offspring becomes disqualified,

then she does not induce him and does not

do

anything

[anything] to persuade him to marry her!

According to Rabbi Akiva's view, what practical difference is there between Rabbi and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar!?

Rather,

the Gemara presents a third practical difference:

Rav Pappa said:

An unmarried woman who had intercourse

and then married

a High Priest,

for the only prohibition involved is the positive commandment, “Only a virgin from his people shall he take as a wife”—a virgin, and not one who had intercourse -

there is a difference between them:

According to the one who says

that no penalty is imposed because the prohibition is

by Torah law -

this -

a woman who had intercourse and married a High Priest -

also

has a prohibition that is

by Torah law, and we should not penalize her.

But

if

according to the one who says

that the distinction is

because he induces her -

this -

she induces him,

for she does not become disqualified through him.

For a woman who had intercourse is not among those disqualified by the positive commandments of priesthood.

And her offspring likewise does not become disqualified on account of halal status for this reason.

Nor is the offspring a mamzer, since Rabbi Akiva said only, “There is a mamzer from those liable for lavin,” but not from those liable for a positive commandment.

The Gemara continues to raise difficulties:

And according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, who says: There is a halal

even

from those liable for a positive commandment,

and she and her offspring become disqualified, this is difficult: Then she does not induce him at all!

According to his view, what practical difference is there between Rabbi and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar?!

A. A woman whose husband warned her not to seclude herself with a particular man, and she secluded herself with him after he warned her, is called a “woman suspected of adultery,” and she is forbidden to her husband forever, until she drinks the “bitter waters,” and he performs all the procedure stated in the passage concerning a woman suspected of adultery in order to examine whether she is pure or impure.

She is likewise forbidden, until she drinks, to the man with whom she secluded herself, to the priesthood, and to teruma, as the term “and she becomes defiled” is stated three times in the passage concerning a woman suspected of adultery, and the Sages interpreted them as follows: one refers to the husband, one to the man with whom she secluded herself, and one to teruma.

B. But if her husband has intercourse with her, thereby violating the prohibition against having intercourse with his wife suspected of adultery, she no longer drinks the water, since drinking it will not help examine her. It is stated: “And the man shall be free of iniquity,” which teaches that only when the husband is free of iniquity do the waters examine his wife. But if the husband is not free of iniquity, the waters do not examine his wife.

C. A woman with whom her husband has intercourse before she drinks does not thereby become a zona, since her prohibition is only the positive-commandment prohibition of “and she becomes defiled,” except according to Rabbi Matya ben Heresh.

D. If the husband of the woman suspected of adultery dies before he has managed to make her drink, she does not drink. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed whether she is entitled to a ketuba in this situation, and the established halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel, that she forfeits her ketuba.

Rather,

the Gemara presents a fourth practical difference:

Rav Ashi said: One who remarries his wife suspected of adultery -

there is a difference between them,

whether she has a ketuba from her husband.

For example, he warned her, and she secluded herself after his warning, thereby becoming forbidden to him. He initially sent her away but had not yet divorced her,

and then remarried her.

According to the one who says

that the distinction is because one prohibition is by Torah law and the other is rabbinic - this,

here,

also

is a prohibition

that is

by Torah law. For from the moment she secluded herself, she became forbidden to him by Torah law; therefore, she has a ketuba.

And according to the one who says

that the distinction is

because he accustoms her to him—

this

here,

she

is the one who

accustoms him to her,

because she is not disqualified by this intercourse.

And we challenge this:

But according to Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash, who says that even

in a case where

her husband went to have her drink, and had intercourse with her on the way—

he has rendered her a zona,

and consequently, through her returning to him, she is disqualified from marrying a kohen by virtue of being a zona; if so,

she does not accustom him to her, and nothing at all!

She does nothing to accustom him to her, since she does not want to become disqualified.

Although she had already been disqualified from marrying a kohen and from eating teruma by the law of “and she became impure” until she drinks, nevertheless, she could have drunk and become purified. But now, when he has intercourse with her on the way and renders her a zona, she is permanently disqualified from marrying a kohen by virtue of being a zona.

And if so, according to Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash, what difference is there between them?

Rather,

the Gemara brings a fifth practical difference:

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: A definite sota

—a married woman who committed adultery—

is the difference between them,

whether she is entitled to a marriage contract from her husband.

For according to the one who says that the prohibition is by Torah law, this case too is by Torah law.

For she is forbidden to her husband as stated in the passage concerning the sota: “and she was not seized,” meaning that she was not raped against her will; and the verse teaches that if she was not raped, she is forbidden.

And she is likewise forbidden according to the Rabbis [who disagree with Rabbi Yosei ben Kippa, above, 11b], based on the verse: “Her first husband who sent her away may not again take her to be his wife, after she has been defiled.” They expound this as a prohibition לאו against a woman who committed adultery while married.

And according to the one who says that it is because he accustoms her to him, here she is the one who accustoms him to her. For from the moment she committed adultery, she was already disqualified from marrying a kohen by virtue of being a zona, and this intercourse adds no further disqualification to her.

Mishna:

It was already explained in the preceding chapters that—

a. An Israelite woman who marries a kohen, or who has surviving offspring from a kohen [whether through marriage or through adultery, and the kohen died, leaving behind his offspring from her]—she may eat teruma.

By Torah law, from the time she becomes betrothed to a kohen, she may eat teruma.

However, the Sages decreed that a woman may not eat teruma until she marries, due to the concern that she might give her brother or sister, who are staying with their Israelite mother in their father’s home, wine from her teruma cup, or due to the concern that a blemish might be found in her, rendering her betrothal a mistaken betrothal.

b. A kohen’s daughter may eat teruma as long as she is in her father’s home. But if she becomes betrothed to an Israelite, she may no longer eat teruma.

And likewise, if she has surviving offspring from the Israelite [whether she married an Israelite and bore a son, or through adultery]—he disqualifies her from eating the teruma of her father’s household.

c. If a kohen’s daughter’s Israelite husband dies, and the offspring she has from the Israelite also dies, she returns to her father’s home to eat teruma.

d. An embryo has the status of a child only for the purpose of disqualifying a kohen’s daughter who is pregnant by an Israelite.

But it does not have the status of a child for the purpose of enabling an Israelite woman who is pregnant by a kohen to eat teruma.

e. An Israelite woman who is awaiting levirate marriage to a kohen brother-in-law—the kohen brother-in-law does not enable her to eat teruma.

But a kohen’s daughter who is awaiting levirate marriage to an Israelite brother-in-law—the latter disqualifies her from the teruma of her father’s household.

a.

An Israelite woman

who is

betrothed to a kohen,

or an Israelite woman who is

pregnant by a kohen,

or who is

awaiting levirate marriage to a kohen.

The kohen has no power to enable her to eat teruma as long as the kohen has not married her.

And likewise, her unborn child, who is the kohen’s, does not enable her to eat teruma as long as he has not been born.

And likewise, a kohen’s daughter who is betrothed to an Israelite—

whether she is betrothed to him, pregnant by him, or awaiting levirate marriage to him—

he disqualifies her from eating the teruma of her father’s household.

Therefore, none of these women—

may eat teruma.

b.

An Israelite woman betrothed to a Levite, pregnant by a Levite, or awaiting levirate marriage to a Levite—

she may not eat first tithe, because the betrothal to the Levite, the unborn child who is a Levite, or the Levite brother-in-law has no power to enable the Israelite woman to eat tithe.

And likewise

the same law applies to

a Levite’s daughter betrothed to an Israelite.

A Levite’s daughter who is betrothed to an Israelite, pregnant by him, or awaiting levirate marriage to him—

she too

may not eat tithe

first tithe, because they disqualify her from the tithe of her father’s household.

c.

A Levite’s daughter betrothed to a kohen, pregnant by a kohen, or awaiting levirate marriage to a kohen—

she may eat neither teruma nor tithe, because the kohen disqualifies her from tithe, and he has no power to enable her to eat teruma.

And likewise

the same law applies to

a kohen’s daughter betrothed to a Levite.

A kohen’s daughter betrothed to a Levite, pregnant by him, or awaiting levirate marriage to him—

she

may eat neither teruma nor tithe

first tithe,

because the Levite disqualifies her from teruma, and he has no power to enable her to eat tithe.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: An Israelite woman betrothed to a Levite, pregnant by a Levite, or awaiting levirate marriage to a Levite; and likewise, a Levite’s daughter betrothed to an Israelite—she may not eat tithe:

And we raise the following difficulty: What difference does it make that the Levite’s betrothal, the Levite fetus, or the Levite brother-in-law does not enable her to eat tithe?

And

why should

she be

this woman like a woman who is

a “zarah”,

who has no connection whatsoever to a Levite, and nevertheless may eat tithe?

For a woman who is

a “zarah”—

does she not eat

first tithe?

After all, first tithe is permitted for consumption by non-Levites!

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel:

Whose view is this,

according to whom is our Mishna? It is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Meir.

For he says: First tithe is forbidden

to be eaten

by non-Levites.

But a Levite’s daughter who was not betrothed to a non-Levite, who has no fetus from a non-Levite, and who is not awaiting levirate marriage to one, and likewise an Israelite woman married to a Levite or who has offspring from the Levite—

she may eat tithe, just as these women may eat teruma.

Therefore, we learned: An Israelite woman betrothed to a Levite, pregnant by a Levite, or awaiting levirate marriage to a Levite, who is entirely a zarah, and likewise a Levite’s daughter betrothed to an Israelite, who is already connected to a non-Levite—may not eat tithe.

But if an Israelite woman marries a Levite or has offspring from him, and likewise a Levite’s daughter who has not become connected to an Israelite at all—she may eat tithe.

As it was taught,

as we find in a beraita, that Rabbi Meir holds that first tithe is forbidden for consumption by non-Levites: