Yevamot 85b — the Talmud in English

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they penalized him,

the husband, that he should give

the ketubah.

That is to say, they did not penalize the woman by depriving her of the ketubah; rather, he gives her a ketubah as is given to every woman.

For even though they penalized the woman forbidden as a “second” wife, that she should forfeit the ketubah, there they penalized her specifically because, if she would not have a ketubah, she would leave the husband and depart from him.

But here, even if she has a ketubah, she will leave him and depart, because since he becomes disqualified through her, there will be quarrelling between them.

And the same law applies when she becomes disqualified through him.

And for what reason did they say: “second wives

to those forbidden as erva,” whose prohibition is

from the words of the Sages -

they have no ketubah?

Because he is fit and she is fit,

and it follows that she will not leave him and depart if she has a ketubah.

And wherever he is fit and she is fit -

they penalized her

the woman, that she should forfeit

the ketubah,

so that because of this she will leave him and depart.

Rabbi says

another reason:

For

these -

a widow to a High Priest and a divorcee to an ordinary priest - are forbidden by

words of the Torah. And the

words of the Torah do not require strengthening

through a penalty.

But

if

these -

“second wives” - their prohibition is from

the words of the Sages. And the words of the Sages require strengthening ...

Another

reason

to explain

the distinction between second wives and a widow and a divorcee:

A High Priest who marries a widow, or an ordinary priest who marries a divorcee -

this is

this one, the husband is the one who

accustoms her

to these marriages.

For she certainly does not entice him to marry her, since there is disqualification through the marriage. Rather, he is the one who entices her to marry him [as will be explained], and therefore they did not penalize her.

But

if it is with the prohibition of second wives -

this is

the woman is the one who

accustoms him

to marry her, and therefore they penalized her.

For since she herself does not become disqualified, and her offspring does not become disqualified, through marriage to second wives, and she loses nothing through the marriage, it is reasonable to assume that she is the one who entices him to marry her, because more than the man wants to marry, the woman wants to be married. And therefore they penalized her. But where she or her offspring become disqualified, she does not entice him, and the enticement to marry through transgression is to be attributed to him.

The Gemara now wonders who is the tanna who said in the beraita

“another matter” -

Who teaches it?

Who is the tanna who said this reason of “another matter”? Did Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar say it, or Rabbi?

And the Gemara brings a dispute concerning this -

There are those who say:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is the one who

taught it.

teaches it.

And he is stating “for what reason”

by saying “another matter,” and this is what he said -

For what reason did they say

with regard to a widow to a High Priest and a divorcee and a chalutza to an ordinary priest, that although also

he is disqualified and

also

she is disqualified,

nevertheless

they penalized him

specifically, that he should give

the ketubah,

and they did not penalize her by making her forfeit her ketubah? -

Because he accustoms her

and not she.

For if he becomes disqualified, she refrains from enticing him to marry her, since he does not desire this.

And if she becomes disqualified, she is not interested in this marriage, which causes her disqualification.

And since she does not accustom him, they do not penalize her; rather, her law is like that of the other women.

And for what reason

did they say: second wives, since

he is fit and she is fit,

therefore

did they penalize her with regard to the ketubah? -

Because she accustoms him.

But

there are those who say:

Rabbi is the one who

is the one who

teaches it

as the additional reason.

And Rabbi said this because he explained the reason for the distinction between a prohibition from the Torah, in which they did not penalize, and a rabbinic prohibition, in which they did penalize, by saying that the words of the Torah do not require strengthening, whereas the words of the Sages require strengthening.

And

from now on, the law of a

chalutza,

who has a ketubah, is what

is difficult to him

to Rabbi -

But the prohibition of

запрет

a chalutza

to a priest is only a

rabbinic prohibition!

And according to Rabbi, a rabbinic prohibition requires strengthening, like “second wives,” to penalize her,

and

why

does she have

the chalutza

a ketubah!?

And therefore,

he returned and

and

said another reason for the distinction:

another reason for the distinction:

Since

with regard to a chalutza to a priest,

he disqualifies her

the priest

from teruma,

by

a rabbinic decree,

for the Sages ordained that a chalutza who marries a priest becomes disqualified from eating teruma, therefore the law of a chalutza disqualified from teruma by rabbinic decree is equal to the law of those disqualified by the Torah, and not to the law of those disqualified because of “second wives,” by rabbinic decree. For also with chalitza there is a distinction between it and second wives on account of the reason -

“This one accustoms her, and this one accustoms him.”

For the distinction between Torah prohibitions, in which they did not penalize, and rabbinic prohibitions, in which they did penalize, is because in a case of disqualification she does not accustom him, and therefore they did not penalize her. And only with a Torah prohibition is there disqualification, but not with a rabbinic prohibition.

But a chalutza to a priest becomes disqualified from teruma by rabbinic decree. And since she becomes disqualified, she does not accustom him, and therefore she has a ketubah even when her disqualification is only rabbinic.

And now the Gemara explains

what is there,

what practical halakhic difference there is

between

the reason of

Rabbi

and the reason of

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar?

And the Gemara brings several possibilities in which there is a difference between the two reasons:

The first practical difference:

Rav Hisda said: A mamzeret and a netina to an Israelite -

there is a difference between them:

The one who says,

Rabbi, who stated the reason concerning a widow and a divorcee that they were not penalized because it is a

Torah prohibition, and the words of the Torah do not require strengthening,

and Torah law does not require reinforcement,

then

this -

a mamzeret and a netina to an Israelite -

also

is forbidden to him by

the Torah, because the words of the Torah do not require strengthening, and therefore she has a ketubah.

According to the one who says,

The one who says,

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who stated that the reason they did not penalize her by making her forfeit her ketubah in the case of a widow and a divorcee to a priest is

because he accustoms her

and not she, because she is not interested in such a marriage since she becomes disqualified or her offspring becomes disqualified -

This applies specifically to a widow and a divorcee, whose marriage causes her disqualification from teruma and causes her offspring to become chalalim.

But

this,

a mamzeret and a netina, who does not become more disqualified through her marriage to an Israelite than the disqualification she already possesses -

she accustoms him,

and therefore she should be penalized by making her forfeit her ketubah. But the Gemara challenges:

And according to Rabbi Eliezer

who disputes Rabbi Tarfon - see note 5,

who says,

Rabbi Eliezer, that even a mamzer who married a maidservant

is a slave and a mamzer -

According to his view, what practical difference is there between Rabbi and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar?

Then she does not accustom him at all!?

For she does not accustom him at all, since his offspring becomes disqualified through her.

And according to his view - what is the practical difference between Rabbi and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar?

And therefore the Gemara brings a second practical difference:

Rather, Rav Yosef said: One who takes back his divorcee

after she married another, and the other husband divorced her, for she is forbidden to him, as it is stated: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot return to take her, to be his wife, after she has been defiled” -

there is a difference between them!

The one who says,

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who said that they did not penalize a widow and a divorcee because the prohibition is from

the Torah,

then

this -

one who takes back his divorcee -

also

is a

Torah prohibition, and they did not penalize her, because a Torah prohibition does not require strengthening.

because he induces her,

And the one who says,

Rabbi, who said

because he accustoms her,

then

this -

one who takes back his divorcee after she married -

she is the one who

And she too does not become disqualified from teruma through intercourse with him, as explained above, on 69a.

accustoms him,

for it is not applicable here to say that he becomes disqualified, because this does not concern a priest who becomes disqualified from service on account of marrying women through transgression, but an ordinary person.

And she too does not become disqualified from teruma through his intercourse with her, as explained above, on 69a.

And her offspring too does not become disqualified, for this is not among the disqualifications of the priesthood.

And there is no disqualification of a mamzer either, because there is no mamzer from those liable for prohibitions.

And the Gemara asks:

And according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that there is a mamzer

even

from those liable for prohibitions,

then since her offspring becomes disqualified,

she does not accustom him and does not

do

anything

to entice him to marry her as a wife!

And according to the view of Rabbi Akiva - what practical difference is there between Rabbi and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar!?

Rather,

the Gemara brings a third practical difference:

Rav Pappa said:

an unmarried

non-virgin

who married

a High Priest, who is subject only to the positive commandment “for only a virgin from his people shall he take as a wife,” a virgin and not a non-virgin - this is where

by Torah law -

there is a difference between them:

The one who says

that they do not penalize because it is

from the Torah -

this,

a non-virgin to a High Priest -

also

is a

Torah prohibition, and we should not penalize her.

because he induces her -

But

if

the one who says

that the distinction is

because he accustoms her -

this -

she accustoms him,

for she does not become disqualified through him.

For a chalala is not among those subject to the positive commandments of the priesthood.

And for this reason her offspring too does not become disqualified through chalalut.

And neither is there a mamzer, for Rabbi Akiva said only, “There is a mamzer from those liable for prohibitions,” but not from those liable for a positive commandment.

And the Gemara continues to challenge:

And according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, who says: There is a chalal

even

from those liable for a positive commandment, and she and her offspring become disqualified, this should be difficult:

B. But if her husband has intercourse with her, thereby violating the prohibition against having intercourse with his wife suspected of adultery, she no longer drinks the water, since drinking it will not help examine her. It is stated: “And the man shall be free of iniquity,” which teaches that only when the husband is free of iniquity do the waters examine his wife. But if the husband is not free of iniquity, the waters do not examine his wife.

Then she does not accustom him at all!

And according to his view, what practical difference is there between Rabbi and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar?!

a. If a husband warned his wife not to seclude herself with a certain man, and she secluded herself with him after he warned her, she is called a “woman of suspected infidelity,” and she is forbidden to her husband forever, until she drinks the “waters of the suspected woman,” and he performs with her the entire procedure stated in the passage concerning the suspected woman, in order to examine whether she is pure or impure.

And she is likewise forbidden, until they give her to drink, to the man with whom she secluded herself, to the priesthood, and to teruma, as “and she became defiled” is stated three times in the passage concerning the suspected woman, and the Sages explained: one for the husband, one for the man with whom she secluded herself, and one for teruma.

b. But if her husband had intercourse with her, transgressing the prohibition against having intercourse with his wife who is a suspected woman, she no longer drinks the water, because drinking it will not help to examine her. For it is stated, “and the man shall be free of iniquity”; the verse teaches that only when the husband is free of iniquity do the waters examine his wife. But if the husband is not free of iniquity, the waters do not examine his wife.

c. A woman who has intercourse with her husband before drinking does not become a zona, since her prohibition is only the positive-commandment prohibition of “and she became defiled,” except according to the view of Rabbi Matya ben Heresh.

d. If the husband of the suspected woman dies before he manages to give her to drink, she does not drink. And Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed whether in such a situation she is entitled to a ketubah, and we hold according to Beit Hillel, that she forfeits her ketubah.

Rather,

the Gemara brings a fourth practical difference:

Rav Ashi said: One who takes back his wife suspected of infidelity -

there is a difference between them,

whether she has a ketubah from her husband.

For example, he warned her, and she secluded herself after his warning, whereby she became forbidden to him. And he first sent her away, but had not yet divorced her, and then took her back.

The one who says

that the distinction is because this one is

from the Torah

and that one is rabbinic -

this,

here,

also

is a

Torah prohibition. For from the moment she secluded herself, she became forbidden to him by the Torah, and therefore she has a ketubah.

And the one who says

that the distinction is

because he accustoms her—

this

here

she

is the one who

accustoms him,

because she is not disqualified through this intercourse.

And we raise an objection:

But according to Rabbi Mattia ben Heresh, who says, even

in a case where

her husband went to make her drink, and had intercourse with her on the way—

he made her a zonah,

and it follows that through her returning to him she is disqualified from the priesthood by the law of a zonah, and if so,

this one does not accustom him, and nothing at all!

For she does nothing to accustom him, since she does not wish to become disqualified.

And although she has already become disqualified from the priesthood and from teruma by the law of “and she became defiled” until she drinks, nevertheless, she could have drunk and become pure. But now, when he has intercourse with her on the way and makes her a zonah, she becomes disqualified from the priesthood by the law of a zonah forever.

And if so, according to the view of Rabbi Mattia ben Heresh, what difference is there between them?

Rather,

the Gemara brings a fifth practical difference:

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: A definite sota

[a married woman who committed adultery]—

there is a difference between them

as to whether she has a ketuba from her husband.

For the one who says it is by Torah law—this too is by Torah law.

For she is forbidden to her husband from what is stated in the passage of the sota, “and she was not seized,” meaning that she was not forced against her will; and Scripture teaches that if she was not forced, she is forbidden.

And likewise she is forbidden according to the Sages [who dispute Rabbi Yosei ben Kippar, above, 11b] from the verse, “Her first husband who sent her away may not again take her to be his wife, after she has been defiled,” for they expound it as a prohibition by a negative commandment applying to a woman who committed adultery while married to her husband.

And the one who says, because he accustoms her—here, she accustoms him. For from the moment she committed adultery, she has already become disqualified from the priesthood by the law of a zonah, and this intercourse adds no disqualification to her.

Mishna:

It has already been explained in the preceding chapters that—

A. An Israelite woman who was married to a kohen, or who has surviving offspring from the kohen [whether through marriage or through adultery, and the kohen died, leaving behind his offspring from her]—she eats teruma.

And by Torah law, from the time she became betrothed to a kohen, she eats teruma.

Rather, the Sages decreed that the woman should not eat teruma until she marries, because of the concern that she might give her brothers and sisters who are with her mother in the house of their Israelite father to drink from her cup of wine of teruma, or because of the concern that a blemish might be found in her, and her betrothal would be found to have been a mistaken betrothal.

B. A kohen’s daughter eats teruma as long as she is in her father’s house. But if she becomes betrothed to an Israelite, she no longer eats teruma.

And likewise, if she has surviving offspring from the Israelite [whether she married an Israelite and left a son, or through adultery]—he disqualifies her from eating the teruma of her father’s house.

C. A kohen’s daughter whose Israelite husband died, and the offspring whom she has from the Israelite also died—she returns to her father’s house to eat teruma.

D. The fetus has the status of one born only for the purpose of disqualifying a kohen’s daughter who is pregnant by an Israelite.

But it does not have the status of one born for the purpose of enabling an Israelite woman who is pregnant by a kohen to eat.

E. An Israelite woman who is a “waiting levirate widow” for a levir who is a kohen—the kohen levir does not enable her to eat teruma.

But a kohen’s daughter who is a “waiting levirate widow” for a levir who is an Israelite—he disqualifies her from the teruma of her father’s house.

A.

An Israelite woman

who is

betrothed to a kohen,

or an Israelite woman who is

pregnant by a kohen,

or who is

a waiting levirate widow for a kohen.

The kohen does not have the power to enable her to eat teruma as long as the kohen has not married her.

And likewise, her fetus, the kohen, does not enable her to eat teruma as long as he has not been born.

And likewise, a kohen’s daughter to an Israelite—

who is betrothed to him, or who is pregnant by him, or who is his waiting levirate widow.

He disqualifies her from eating the teruma of her father’s house.

And therefore, none of these women—

shall eat teruma.

B.

An Israelite woman betrothed to a Levite, pregnant by a Levite, or a waiting levirate widow for a Levite—

she shall not eat the first tithe—for neither the power of the Levite’s betrothal, nor the power of the Levite fetus, nor the power of the Levite levir has the ability to enable the Israelite woman to eat the tithe.

And likewise

the same law applies to

a Levite’s daughter to an Israelite.

A Levite’s daughter betrothed to an Israelite, or pregnant by him, or who is his waiting levirate widow—

she too

shall not eat the tithe

first, because they disqualify her from the tithe of her father’s house.

C.

A Levite’s daughter betrothed to a kohen, pregnant by a kohen, or a waiting levirate widow for a kohen—

she shall eat neither teruma nor the tithe, because the kohen disqualifies her from the tithe, and he does not have the power to enable her to eat teruma.

And likewise

the same law applies to

a kohen’s daughter to a Levite.

A kohen’s daughter betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant by him, or who is his waiting levirate widow—

she

shall eat neither teruma nor the tithe

first.

Because the Levite disqualifies her from teruma, and he does not have the power to enable her to eat the tithe.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: An Israelite woman betrothed to a Levite, pregnant by a Levite, or a waiting levirate widow for a Levite. And likewise, a Levite’s daughter to an Israelite—she shall not eat the tithe:

And we are astonished: What difference does it make that the Levite’s betrothal, or the Levite fetus, or the Levite levir does not enable her to eat the tithe?

And

why should this woman not

be

like a woman

“non-priest,”

who has no connection whatsoever to a Levite, and nevertheless eats the tithe!

For does a woman who is

“non-priest”—

does she not eat

the first tithe?

After all, the first tithe is permitted for consumption to non-priests!

Rav Nahman said in the name of Shmuel:

Whose is this,

our Mishna according to whom?—It is according to the view of

Rabbi Meir.

For he says, the first tithe is forbidden

for consumption

to non-priests.

But a Levite’s daughter who did not become betrothed to a non-priest, and has no fetus from a non-priest, and is not his waiting levirate widow, and likewise an Israelite woman married to a Levite or who has offspring from the Levite—

she eats the tithe, in the manner that these women eat teruma.

And therefore we learned: An Israelite woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant by a Levite, or a waiting levirate widow for a Levite, who is entirely a non-priest, and likewise a Levite’s daughter to an Israelite, who is already connected to a non-priest—shall not eat the tithe.

But if an Israelite woman marries a Levite or has offspring from him, and likewise a Levite’s daughter who has not become connected at all to an Israelite—she eats the tithe.

For it was taught,

as we find in a beraita, that Rabbi Meir holds that the first tithe is forbidden for consumption to non-priests: