Yevamot 66b (סו:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Yehuda said:

The law accords with her,

and she takes her utensils.

And Rabbi Ami said: The law accords with him,

and he gives her money, while she does not take the utensils.

And the Gemara explains their reasoning:

Rav Yehuda said: The law accords with her,

because

on account of “the enhancement of her father’s household”

it belongs to her!

[Some hold that it is actually hers, while others say that she has the right to collect it.

Rabbi Ami,

who

said that the law accords with him,

held

since the Master said,

in our Mishna, concerning the slaves that she brought to him as iron-flock assets:

If they die,

the slaves that she brought to him as iron-flock assets,

they die for him, and if they increase

the slaves, after they appreciate or become more valuable,

the increase is his.

And

since he is liable

the husband

for their responsibility,

they may eat

the slaves from the teruma of their master, the kohen [see the additional explanation in the notes ].

Rav Safra said: Does it teach, “and they are his”?

For

“since he is liable for their responsibility”

is what

it teaches! And in any event—

they are not his

[see the additional explanation in the notes ].

And we raise an objection:

And

if

whenever the master is liable

the master

for their responsibility,

of the slaves,

do they eat

the slaves

teruma?

Can it be that because the husband bears liability for them, the slaves eat teruma, even though they are not his? And since we learned, “iron-flock slaves may eat,” you learn from this that they are his.

And did we not learn

in a Mishna in tractate Terumot that a kohen’s liability for a slave or an animal is not considered “an acquisition purchased with his money” that enables them to eat teruma:

As we learned:

An Israelite who rented a cow from a kohen may feed it vetches of teruma.

But

a kohen who rented a cow from an Israelite, even though its food is incumbent upon him

[upon the kohen],

may not feed it vetches of teruma!

Since with regard to teruma it is necessary that the animal be “an acquisition purchased with his money,” and this animal is not an acquisition purchased with the money of the kohen who rented it, but belongs to its non-kohen owner [see the additional explanation in the notes ].

And we inquire about this:

Can you really say so—do you think that the proof you brought is a proof?! For

although indeed

even though

despite the fact that

the renter is liable

the renter

for theft and loss —

for accidents, depreciation, and diminution

[Rashba]

of its value—

is he liable!?

Is the renter liable for the animal if it is subject to an unavoidable accident, loses weight, or declines in value, as the husband is liable for iron-flock assets?!

And if so, you cannot prove from this Mishna that liability of the sort borne by the husband for iron-flock assets enables them to eat teruma; we can say that the slaves eat teruma because of the husband’s liability, while in any event the iron-flock assets are not his.

That—

a husband who is liable for his iron-flock assets—

is comparable only to the final clause

of that Mishna in tractate Terumot:

An Israelite who appraised

[with the right-facing letter shin]

a cow from a kohen

[he accepted liability for the cow even in cases of accident, loss of weight, and diminution in value ],

may not feed it vetches of teruma,

because they are considered his property and not the kohen’s.

But a kohen who appraised a cow from an Israelite may feed it vetches of teruma,

because they are considered his property.

You have therefore learned: Whoever assumes complete liability enables them to eat teruma, and here too our Mishna can be explained in this manner; nevertheless, they are not his.

Rabba and Rav Yosef sat

[the later authorities: “sat”]

at the conclusion of Rav Naḥman’s lecture

[after Rav Naḥman’s lecture],

and they sat and said

[they sat and said]:

A beraita was taught in accordance with Rav Yehuda, and a beraita was taught in accordance with Rabbi Ami.

A beraita was taught in accordance with Rabbi Ami,

that iron-flock assets are considered his property, and necessarily, if she comes to take her utensils, the law does not accord with her:

The Torah says: “When a man strikes the eye of his slave or the eye of his maidservant and destroys it, he shall set him free for his eye. And if he knocks out the tooth of his slave or the tooth of his maidservant, he shall set him free for his tooth.”

Iron-flock slaves—

go free through tooth and eye at the hand of the man.

For if the husband is the one who injured the slave and knocked out his tooth or eye, the slave goes free.

But not at the hand of the woman,

for if the woman is the one who injured them, they do not go free.

This proves that iron-flock slaves belong to the husband, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami [see the additional explanation in the notes ].

A beraita was taught in accordance with Rav Yehuda,

that the law accords with her:

As it was taught: A woman

who brought property into her husband’s household

[iron-flock assets appraised in her ketuba]—

If the husband wishes to sell

the assets,

he may not sell them,

so that if he divorces her she will be able to take her utensils, in accordance with Rav Yehuda’s opinion.

And not only that, but even if he brought in for her

the husband

property of his own,

which he himself brought and accepted upon himself like iron-flock assets, even with regard to these assets,

if the husband wishes to sell

the assets,

he may not sell them!

And because, even with regard to these assets, the woman has the right to take those utensils that he introduced, despite the fact that in their case she does not have the claim of the right to receive “the enhancement of her father’s household.”

If both of them sold,

the husband or the wife, the nikhsei tzon barzel,

for sustenance [

for food ] -

This incident occurred before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and he said: The husband takes it from the purchasers.

That is to say: It is unnecessary to state that when he sold them without her knowledge, and he then died or divorced her, she takes her utensils from the purchasers; rather, he takes them from the purchasers immediately as well, since at the time of the sale it is not a certain sale, as perhaps he will die during her lifetime, and his sale will consequently be void [the Rashba in his understanding of Rashi]. And when she sold them, the husband certainly takes them, since they belong to him.

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda.

He said

he challenged

Rava challenged Rav Naḥman: But it was taught in a beraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami,

as the Gemara cited above?!

And Rav Naḥman answered him:

Although a beraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami, the reasoning of Rav Yehuda is more compelling, because of “the enhancement of her father’s household.”

There was a certain woman who brought her husband a silk cloak as part of her marriage contract [

A certain woman included a silk garment as nikhsei tzon barzel in her marriage contract].

He died [

her husband died].

The orphans took it and spread it over the deceased [

the orphans took the cloak and spread it over the deceased]. And the shrouds of the deceased are forbidden for benefit.

Rava said: The deceased acquired it:

the deceased “acquired” the cloak, because the orphans spread it over him, making it as though it were his!

That is to say, once the orphans spread the cloak over the deceased, it becomes forbidden for benefit.

And this is not considered a case of a person rendering something belonging to another forbidden to that other person, which he has no power to do.

He said

challenged

Nanai, son of Rav Yosef, son of Rava, Rav Kahana:

But Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda,

who said that the cloak belongs to the woman and not to the orphans; so how could the orphans render forbidden for benefit a garment that does not belong to them?!

He said to him

Rav Kahana said to Nanai:

Does Rav Yehuda not concede that

although the law is on her side, nevertheless this garment is still

lacking collection

by her? And as long as she has not collected the cloak from the orphans, it is not hers [or it is not considered to be in her possession]; she has only “a lien alone” upon the cloak!

The proof that the cloak is still not hers [or that it is not yet in her possession, since

if it were stolen

[if the cloak were stolen from the orphans], would

the heirs not be obligated to pay

[would the orphans not be obligated to pay her for the cloak]?!

For if you would say that it is already in her possession, even without collection, then why did the husband’s liability for its value not immediately lapse at the time of his death?

And

since if it were stolen—

the heirs would be obligated to pay,

then

it is in their possession

of the heirs

and remains there,

until she collects it from them.

And since the cloak is in the orphans’ possession, the “consecration” by which the orphans consecrated it [that is, the prohibition for benefit that the orphans imposed upon the object] comes and removes the woman’s lien from the cloak, and the heirs give her the value of the cloak .

And the Gemara explains:

Rava,

who said that since it is lacking collection, the consecration takes effect and the woman's lien is removed -

And the Gemara explains:

Rava,