Yevamot 66a (סו.) — the Talmud in English

And likewise,

Pazi and Tovi

daughters of Rabbi Hiyya

the sisters [

They were twin sisters].

And we raise an objection:

But

if

women are not commanded

in the mitzva of procreation?!

But didn’t Rav Aḥa bar Ketina say that Rav Yitzḥak said: It happened with a certain woman, who

was

half a maidservant and half a free woman, and they compelled her master

to free her,

and they made her a free woman.

And it might have entered our minds that they compelled her master to free her just as the master of a slave who is half free is compelled to free him, since he cannot procreate.

He cannot marry a free woman because he is half a slave. Conversely, he cannot marry a maidservant, since he is half free [as we learned in Gittin, page 41].

And this proves that a woman, too, is commanded in the mitzva of procreation; for if not, why would they compel her master to free her?!

He said:

Rav

Naḥman bar Yitzḥak

explained: They did not compel her master to free her in order to enable her to fulfill the mitzva of procreation. Rather, since she was unable to marry,

they adopted a practice of treating her as hefker

and she made herself available to sinners; therefore, they compelled her master to free her, so that she would be able to marry.

We have completed the chapter “One Who Has Relations with His Yevama.”

Introduction

These are the

women disqualified

from marrying

a priest:

A High Priest is forbidden to marry a widow or a woman who has had intercourse.

As it is stated concerning the High Priest: “He shall not take a widow, a divorced woman, a profaned woman, or a prostitute; these he shall not take. Rather, he shall take a virgin from his people as a wife.”

All priests are forbidden to marry a divorced woman [and, by rabbinic decree, a woman released by halitza], a prostitute, or a profaned woman.

As it is stated: “They shall not take a prostitute or a profaned woman [the priests]. And they shall not take a woman divorced from her husband.”

The prostitute

mentioned in the Torah is any woman who had intercourse with a man whom she is forbidden to engage in intercourse with.

[According to Rashi, this is the accepted ruling. The tannaim disputed the matter above, on page 61.]

The profaned woman

mentioned in the Torah is a woman who had intercourse with one who is forbidden to her because of his priestly status [one of those disqualified from marrying into the priesthood], or one who was born from such intercourse.

A profaned man

disqualifies his wife through intercourse, as well as his subsequent offspring, who likewise become profaned.

And these are those who eat

of

teruma

in addition to priests:

A priest’s daughter eats teruma [and her eating is called “the eating of teruma of her father’s household,” meaning the teruma of her father’s household]. A priest’s daughter who marries an Israelite may not eat teruma. However, if she is widowed or divorced and has no offspring from him, she returns to eating the teruma of her father’s household. The details of this law are explained in the chapter before us.

A priest’s wife may eat teruma by Torah law as soon as she becomes betrothed, whereas by rabbinic decree she may eat it only once she marries.

A priest’s Canaanite male and female slaves, as well as a priest’s animal, may eat teruma.

An Israelite woman who marries a priest and has surviving offspring from him—even if the offspring was a non-priest or disqualified—allows her mother or grandmother to eat teruma, even when her husband is no longer alive. As it is stated: “But if a priest acquires a person, the acquisition of his money, they shall eat of his bread.” The Sages expounded: “They shall cause others to eat of his bread.”

The details of this law are explained in the chapter before us.

3.

Women disqualified from eating teruma:

Any woman who becomes profaned through intercourse with one disqualified from marrying into the priesthood may eat neither the teruma of her father’s household nor the teruma of her husband.

The later authorities were uncertain whether she may eat teruma on account of her son who is a priest.

Tosafot were uncertain whether a “prostitute” is disqualified from teruma, since she is equated with a profaned woman [see their comments on pages 35a and 44b]. Several early authorities hold that a prostitute is disqualified from teruma.

However, regarding Rashi’s view, the later authorities demonstrated that the designation “prostitute” in itself is insufficient to disqualify her from teruma.

The Torah further states: “And if a priest’s daughter is married to a non-priest, she shall not eat of the sacred teruma,” teaching that any woman who had intercourse with a man who is a non-priest and is disqualified to her may not eat teruma. The details of this law are explained in the chapter before us.

The Torah further states: “But when a priest’s daughter becomes a widow or divorced [from her husband, and when she married him she became disqualified from eating the teruma of her father’s household], and she has no offspring, and she returns to her father’s household as in her youth, she may eat of her father’s bread.”

The Sages derived from this verse that a woman may eat teruma only if she had intercourse with one with whom she can have valid betrothal and divorce. But if a woman had intercourse with one with whom betrothal cannot take effect, she may no longer eat teruma. The details of this law are explained in the chapter before us.

A priest’s daughter who has a son from an Israelite is disqualified from eating teruma.

As it is stated: “And if a priest’s daughter becomes a widow or divorced, and has no offspring, she shall return to her father’s household as in her youth.” Scripture teaches that if she has offspring who is not a priest, she may not eat teruma. The details of this law as well are explained in the chapter before us.

Mishna:

A widow

who married in violation of the prohibition

to a High Priest,

and likewise

a divorced woman or a woman released by halitza

who married in violation of the prohibition

to an ordinary priest,

and

she brought him

slaves that she brought with her to her husband’s home when she married—slaves that would be under his control as

“usufruct slaves” [

as the Mishna proceeds to explain].

And

slaves that would be under his control as

“iron-flock slaves” [

as the Mishna proceeds to explain].

Then the

usufruct slaves,

which belong to the woman,

may not eat teruma,

since she married him in violation of the prohibition; and the Gemara explains the reason.

Iron-flock slaves—

these

may eat

teruma by virtue of the husband, who is a priest [the continuation of the Mishna will explain what iron-flock slaves are and why the husband allows them to eat teruma].

And these are usufruct slaves: if they die—they

die for her [

she is the one who suffers the loss];

and if they increase in value—they

increase in value for her [

she is the one who benefits from the slaves’ improvement].

That is, the husband has no rights in these slaves except the right to their produce [use of the slaves and the right to their offspring], whereas the slaves themselves belong to the woman. The husband assumes no responsibility for the slaves themselves: if the slaves die, the woman suffers the loss, and the husband is not required to pay her their value. Similarly, if the slaves increase in value, she is the one who benefits from this, not he.

Since the slaves belong to her, and she herself cannot cause them to eat teruma because she has been disqualified,

even though

the husband, who is a priest,

is

the one who

is obligated to provide their sustenance,

nevertheless

these

slaves

may not eat teruma,

because the priest’s obligation to provide the slaves’ sustenance does not permit them to eat teruma.

And these are iron-flock slaves: if they die,

the slaves

die for him [

for the husband], and he must pay their value.

And if they increase in value,

the slaves, whether they improved or became more expensive,

increase in value for him.

That is, the value of the slaves is assessed at the time of the marriage, and the husband assumes responsibility for paying their value to the woman together with her marriage contract when he dies or divorces her.

This amount is fixed, whether or not the slaves still exist, and even if the property has depreciated. Conversely, if the slaves improved or became more expensive, the husband is not obligated to pay his wife more than the value at which the slaves were assessed at the time of the marriage.

And

since he is responsible for them—

these may eat teruma.

The Gemara will explain whether the reason the husband allows them to eat teruma is that, through his liability for them, the slaves are considered “the acquisition of his money,” or whether it is because they actually belong to him.

But

an Israelite woman [

who is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood]

who marries a priest and brings him slaves, whether

they were

usufruct slaves,

which belong to the woman while the husband receives their produce,

or iron-flock slaves,

which belong to him—

these may eat teruma.

The reason that the usufruct slaves, which belong to her, eat teruma despite her being an Israelite woman is that “a priest’s acquisition that acquired an acquisition may eat teruma.” For example, the wife of a priest or his slave, who acquired a slave as an “acquisition,” allows this “acquisition” to eat teruma as though it were the priest’s own acquisition, as the Gemara explains the source of this law.

And a priest’s daughter who marries an Israelite,

and thereby becomes disqualified from eating teruma, which she had eaten until then while in her father’s household,

and brings him slaves—

whether usufruct slaves or iron-flock slaves,

since neither the man nor the woman eats teruma—

these

slaves

may not eat teruma.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A widow who married a High Priest and brought him usufruct slaves—those slaves may not eat teruma.

The initial assumption was that the slaves of a disqualified woman who married a priest may not eat teruma because the woman became profaned when she had intercourse with the priest in violation of the prohibition.

Once she became profaned, she herself may not eat teruma. Therefore, her slaves may not eat teruma either.

We inquire:

And usufruct slaves may not eat teruma—

why?

Even if the slaves cannot eat teruma by virtue of the woman, since she herself became profaned—

nevertheless,

let [

let these slaves] be

like his acquisition,

that of the priest [such as his slave or wife],

who acquired

for himself

an acquisition, such as slaves, which the priest is entitled to cause to eat teruma as “the acquisition of his acquisition.”

Since the woman’s slaves have the right to eat teruma by virtue of the priest, as they are the acquisition of his acquisition, why should they be disqualified from eating teruma because of her profaned status?

And

as it is taught

in a beraita that a priest causes the acquisition of his acquisition to eat teruma:

From where is it derived that a priest who marries a woman and acquires slaves causes them to eat

the woman or the slaves

teruma?

As it is stated: “But if a priest acquires a person, the acquisition of his money—

he shall eat of it.”

And from where is it derived that a woman

of a priest, who is the acquisition of the priestly husband,

who acquired slaves,

that they too eat teruma?

And

likewise, from where is it derived that

his slaves

of the priest, which are his acquisition,

who acquired slaves

for themselves —

that they may eat

even the slaves of slaves

teruma?

As it is stated: “But if a priest acquires a person, the acquisition of his money—

he shall eat of it.”

The verse could have said: “But if a priest acquires a person—he shall eat of it.”

Rather, Scripture teaches that

an acquisition that acquired an acquisition

is

to eat

teruma.

You have therefore learned that a priest causes the acquisition of his acquisition to eat teruma. If so, what difference does it make that the acquisition itself is profaned and may not eat teruma? We answer: only

everyone who eats

teruma himself

causes

others to eat teruma.

But

whoever does not eat

teruma himself

does not cause

others to eat.

And this woman, who married a priest in violation of the prohibition and thereby became profaned, may not eat, and therefore does not cause others to eat.

The Gemara assumed that this principle applies to everyone who causes others to eat teruma: if he himself does not eat, he cannot cause others to eat teruma. Therefore, we ask:

Is that so?

Does one who may not eat not cause others to eat?

But

a priest

who is uncircumcised, and all those who are impure and may not eat, nevertheless

do

cause

their slaves to eat teruma, as we will learn below [70a]: An uncircumcised priest and all those who are impure may not eat teruma, but their wives and slaves may eat teruma!

We answer:

There—

their mouths hurt them!

It is their mouths that hurt and temporarily prevent them from eating teruma.

That is, they are merely in a state requiring correction, and are destined to be corrected and eat teruma. But a woman who becomes profaned has no remedy ever.

We nevertheless ask:

But what of a mamzer—

that is, an Israelite woman married a priest and bore a daughter; the daughter married a mamzer and bore a son, and then died, while the son is still alive. We learn below, on 69a, that if the mother eats teruma through his agency, since any woman who conceived from a priest and whose offspring or grand-offspring is alive eats teruma—even if he is an Israelite, and even if he is an Israelite mamzer—

he,

the grand-offspring himself,

does not eat

teruma, since he is a non-priest,

but

nevertheless

causes

his grandmother to eat teruma!

Rabina said—

he explained

Rabina

the Gemara’s resolution, “one who eats causes others to eat; one who does not eat does not cause others to eat”:

This principle was not stated regarding everyone who causes others to eat, but only:

“An acquisition

that itself

eats”

is what it

says, that it also causes others to eat. And this is what it means:

An acquisition

that itself

eats—

it

is

one that causes others to eat.

An acquisition

that does not eat—

does not cause others to eat.

And therefore: A woman—who is an acquisition—does not enable her slaves to eat teruma when she is a ḥalala, since she herself is not an “acquisition that eats.” But the offspring of the offspring of an Israelite woman married to a kohen does enable its maternal grandmother to eat teruma, even though it itself does not eat, since the offspring of an Israelite woman married to a kohen does not enable others to eat by virtue of being an acquisition.

And Rava said

to explain the reason for our Mishna—that the slaves of a widow who married a High Priest in a prohibited manner do not eat teruma under the principle of “the acquisition of a kohen that acquired an acquisition”—in a different manner:

By Torah law

indeed

they would eat

, since they are an acquisition that he acquired as an acquisition.

But it was the Sages who decreed concerning them

[concerning the slaves of a woman who married a kohen in a prohibited manner] that they should not eat teruma.

And the reason is:

so that she will say

this woman who married a kohen in a prohibited manner:

I do not eat

from my husband’s teruma, and even

my slaves do not eat

, in that case

she is a harlot

to him

[I am a harlot to my husband]. And

therefore he will come to divorce her

[her husband will divorce her], and he will not remain with her in a prohibited union.

Rav Ashi said

he too follows the position of Rava: By Torah law, the slaves can eat teruma under the principle of “the acquisition that he acquired as an acquisition,” and it was the Sages who prohibited the slaves from eating teruma, because of

a decree, lest she feed

her slaves even

after the death

of her husband, whereas once her husband dies there is no one who can enable them to eat teruma.

And we raise an objection:

But if that is so,

even

an Israelite woman

who is fit

and married a kohen should not enable

her slaves to eat teruma,

lest she feed

them even

after the death

, since what reason is there to decree this only with regard to an unfit Israelite woman who married a kohen?

Yet in our Mishna we learned: An Israelite woman who married a kohen and brought slaves to him, whether they are melog slaves and so on, may eat teruma!

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

Indeed, with regard to an Israelite woman who married a kohen, there is no fundamental basis for decreeing lest she come to feed them after death, when she again becomes a non-kohen woman, because she knows that after her husband’s death she will once again be unable to enable either herself or her slaves to eat teruma.

Rather, the primary decree of the Sages was

with regard to a widow who is the daughter of a kohen

[a kohen’s daughter] who married a High Priest [or a divorced woman who is the daughter of a kohen who married an ordinary kohen].

And because

if

she were to say: Her slaves eat teruma by virtue of her husband’s priesthood, even though she is a ḥalala,

the widow will come

to

teach

that it is permitted to enable her slaves to eat even after her husband’s death, by virtue of her own priestly status [since she has returned to her father’s household and eats teruma], and she will not be concerned that she has become a ḥalala, because she will say:

Behold,

originally,

before I married,

my slaves ate

teruma

from my father’s household

[from the teruma of my father’s household]; that is, since I myself ate because I was the daughter of a kohen, my slaves also ate teruma.

And even when

I married this one

[and when I married this man], and I became a ḥalala,

my slaves ate

teruma

from my husband’s household

[from my husband’s teruma].

And

if so,

now, having become widowed from my husband, although I myself do not eat, since I have become a ḥalala, nevertheless

I return to my original status

[I return to my former state], to enable my slaves to eat teruma. This is so even though I have become a ḥalala, since my status as a ḥalala did not prevent the slaves from eating when I was in my husband’s household.

But

she does not know that

originally, before she married, her slaves indeed ate teruma, because

she

had not rendered herself a ḥalala

[she was not a ḥalala].

Whereas

now she has rendered herself a ḥalala

[she has become a ḥalala], and she can no longer enable her slaves to eat teruma.

That is, she will not know how to distinguish between the two: When she was in her husband’s household, her status as a ḥalala did not prevent the slaves from eating; but now that they eat by virtue of her, her status as a ḥalala prevents her slaves from eating.

And therefore the Sages said that even while she is with her husband, when her status as a ḥalala does not disqualify her by law, this woman should not eat teruma.

And we explain:

This works with regard to a widow who is the daughter of a kohen

: It is reasonable to say that her slaves do not eat from her husband’s teruma.

But

a widow who is an Israelite woman—

what is there to say!?

What is the reason that her slaves should not eat teruma by virtue of her kohen husband, since she will not come to feed them after his death, when she returns to being a non-kohen woman like any other non-kohen woman?!

And we answer:

With regard to her widowhood—

the Sages did not distinguish.

Since with regard to a widow who is the daughter of a kohen it is appropriate to decree that her husband should not enable her to eat, the Sages did not distinguish, and they prohibited even the slaves of an Israelite widow from eating teruma by virtue of her kohen husband.

And for that same reason, the Sages prohibited all women who married a kohen in a prohibited manner, such as a divorcee or a ḥalutza who married an ordinary kohen.

It was stated: A woman who brought property into her husband’s household

[she brought him iron-flock assets, whose value he appraised when she brought them, and he undertook in her ketuba to pay her this appraised value when he dies or divorces her].

And when her husband divorced her, the utensils or land that she had brought were still in existence:

She,

the woman,

says: The utensils

that I brought—those very items—

I shall take,

according to the value of the obligation that you undertook toward me for them in my ketuba, and I do not take money.

And he,

the husband,

says:

Only

money will I give,

as I accepted upon myself in the appraisal as part of the ketuba obligation for your iron-flock assets; from then on they have been my responsibility, and they are mine, [Rashi], and I do not wish to give her the items themselves.

With whom does the law accord?