Yevamot 67a (סז.) — the Talmud in English

who said that since it is lacking collection, the consecration takes effect and the woman’s lien lapses— follows his own reasoning [follows his own method]! For Rava said: Consecration, leavened bread—

and emancipation remove an item from a lien.

Consecration removes an item from a lien: For example, if one designated his ox as apotiki for his creditor and consecrated it for the altar—which is bodily sanctity—the creditor’s lien is removed.

Leavened bread removes an item from a lien: For example, one who designated his leavened bread as apotiki for a gentile creditor, while it remained in the Jew’s possession; when the sixth hour of the eve of Passover arrived, the gentile’s lien was removed, since the leavened bread did not actually belong to the gentile. Therefore, the Jew is obligated to destroy it.

Emancipation removes an item from a lien: For example, if one designated his slave as apotiki for another person and then emancipated him, the slave is emancipated and the lender’s lien is removed.

Rav Yehuda said:

A woman who

brought in to him—

to her husband, as nichsei tzon barzel—

two vessels worth

one thousand zuz, and

their value increased—

the vessels—

and they stood at

a value of

two thousand

zuz.

That profit resulting from the increase in value belongs to the husband, as we learned in our Mishna with regard to nichsei tzon barzel: “And if they increased in value, the increase is his.” Consequently, he is required to give her only one thousand zuz out of the two thousand, corresponding to the value of the property when she brought it to him—

One

of the vessels that she brought in, now worth one thousand zuz—the woman

takes it as part of her ketובה—

as payment of the responsibility for the nichsei tzon barzel that her husband assumed in her ketובה.

And one

of the vessels that she brought in—that is, the second vessel, also worth one thousand zuz, but exceeding the debt her husband owes her—she has the right to

pay money

to her husband according to the value of the second vessel,

and

she shall

take it,

against her husband’s will,

because of “the enhancement of her father’s house.”

And we raise an objection:

What does Rav Yehuda teach us

in this statement?!

Is it the law that

“the enhancement of her father’s house”—

belongs to her,

so that she is entitled to take it by paying for it?!

And

Rav Yehuda already stated this once [that is, Rav Yehuda already stated it above]?!

for Rav Judah already said it above ]?!

And we answer:

Lest you say: This applies—

that she is entitled to take her vessel because of “the enhancement of her father’s house”—

when it comes to taking it as part of her ketובה [when the value of the vessels corresponds to what she is entitled to by virtue of the responsibility he assumed for them in her ketובה].

when the value of the vessels corresponds to what is due to her by virtue of the responsibility that he accepted for them in her marriage settlement ].

But paying money and taking it,

meaning, giving money and taking property whose value exceeds the monetary value of the property she brought to him, one might have said that

Rav Yehuda did not

say that she can pay money and take it.

He teaches us

that Rav Yehuda teaches that even property whose value exceeds what she is entitled to according to the sum for which she brought it to him—she may pay for it and take the property that she brought from her father’s house!

Mishna:

A daughter of Israel who married a kohen

and bore him sons,

and he died,

her husband,

and left her pregnant—

then

her slaves shall not eat [

the nichsei tzon barzel slaves that she brought to her husband]— which his sons will inherit—

teruma,

despite the fact that they are slaves belonging to his sons, who are kohanim—

because of the share of the fetus

in those slaves, since the fetus lacks the power to enable them to eat [as the Gemara will explain], and therefore they may not eat teruma at all.

Because

the fetus

located in its mother’s womb:

a.

Disqualifies

its mother, a daughter of a kohen who married an Israelite and whose husband died, from returning to her father’s house to eat teruma, just as a born son disqualifies her from returning, as the verse states: “And a daughter of a kohen, if she becomes a widow or divorced, and has no offspring, and she returns to her father’s house as in her youth; she may eat of her father’s bread.”

You learn from this that if she has offspring, even if it is only a fetus, she may not return to her father’s house.

b.

But does not enable

its mother, a daughter of Israel who married a kohen and whose husband died, to eat teruma.

This is unlike a born son, who enables his mother, a daughter of Israel, to eat teruma, as the verse states: “And when a kohen acquires a person, the acquisition of his money, he may eat of it; and those born in his house, they may eat of his bread.” The Sages interpreted this as: “They shall enable her to eat of his bread,” teaching that when a daughter of Israel marries a kohen and bears him a son, she eats teruma on his account.

And just as the fetus, the kohen’s son, does not enable its mother, who is a daughter of Israel, to eat teruma, so too the kohen fetus does not enable its slaves to eat teruma,

the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

The Sages said to him,

to Rabbi Yosei:

Since you testified to us concerning a daughter of Israel

who married

a kohen,

that the slaves inherited by the kohen’s sons do not eat teruma, since the fetus, the kohen’s son, also has a share in the slaves and cannot enable them to eat—

if so,

even a daughter of a kohen

who married

a kohen, and he died and left her pregnant, her slaves shall not eat

the teruma [her nichsei tzon barzel slaves, which are the slaves of her husband’s sons]

because of the share of the fetus,

which cannot enable its slaves to eat teruma.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A daughter of Israel who married a kohen, and he died and left her pregnant, her slaves shall not eat teruma because of the share of the fetus:

They raised a dilemma before them:

Is

the reason for Rabbi Yosei

that the fetus does not enable her

because he maintains

that Rabbi Yosei maintains:

a fetus in the womb of a non-kohen woman —

is a non-kohen?

Or perhaps

there is another reason that it does not enable: only a

born child

is the one who

enables

to eat teruma, but a fetus

that has not been born—

does not enable

the slaves?

What is the practical difference? In the case of a fetus in the womb of a kohen woman

[a daughter of a kohen who is pregnant by a kohen], if it enables its slaves to eat.

If you approach the matter according to the principle “a fetus in the womb of a non-kohen woman is a non-kohen,” then this fetus, in the womb of a kohen woman, is a kohen, and it does enable them to eat teruma.

But if you approach the matter according to the principle “a born child enables, but one who has not been born does not enable,” even a fetus in the womb of a kohen woman cannot enable them to eat.

What

is Rabbi Yosei’s reason?

Rabba said: This is Rabbi Yosei’s reason: He maintains that a fetus in the womb of a non-kohen woman is a non-kohen.

Rav Yosef said: A born child enables; one who has not been born does not enable.

They raised an objection

to Rav Yosef, who explained that Rabbi Yosei’s reason is “a born child enables; one who has not been born does not enable,” from a beraita that we learned:

The Sages said to Rabbi Yosei: Since you testified to us concerning a daughter of Israel married to a kohen,

that her slaves do not eat teruma because of the share of the fetus—

A daughter of a kohen

who is pregnant

by a kohen—

what

is the law: may the slaves eat teruma?

He said to them,

Rabbi Yosei:

This one [

a daughter of Israel married to a kohen]

I heard

concerning its prohibition.

But

this one,

this [

a daughter of a kohen pregnant by a kohen]

I did not hear

concerning its prohibition, but rather concerning permitting the slaves to eat teruma.

And now this is difficult:

Granted, if you say

that Rabbi Yosei’s reason is that

“a fetus in the womb of a non-kohen woman is a non-kohen,”

it is well;

this is what he said to them

Rabbi Yosei:

“This one I heard, and this one I did not hear!”

For with regard to a daughter of a kohen married to a kohen, you cannot disqualify the slaves from eating teruma for this reason, since the fetus is not in the womb of a non-kohen woman but in the womb of a kohen woman.

But if you say

that Rabbi Yosei’s reason is

“a born child enables; one who has not been born does not enable,”

this is difficult:

What does Rabbi Yosei mean by “This one I heard, and this one I did not hear”? And yet

After all,

it is she—

the same! [

For the two cases are entirely the same]!?

And we conclude:

The matter remains difficult!

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This

that we learned in our Mishna—that when one dies and leaves a fetus, the fetus acquires the slaves, and since the fetus lacks the power to enable them to eat, the slaves are disqualified from eating teruma—

is the statement of Rabbi Yosei

they are.

But the Sages say:

The fetus has no share in the slaves. And therefore:

If

he has—

the deceased father of the fetus—

sons,

then the slaves

eat on account of the sons,

since the fetus has no share in them.

And even if

he has no sons,

the slaves

eat on account of

the

brothers

of the deceased, who inherit him when he has no sons. And even if

he has no

deceased

brothers,

the slaves

eat on account of the entire family.

The Gemara analyzes Shmuel’s wording:

“This”

is the statement of Rabbi Yosei,

and

it implies that

he does not hold

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei; rather, he agrees with the Sages, who maintain that a fetus does not acquire property—

But Shmuel said to Rav Hana of Baghdad

the master of aggada

“Go and bring me ten men

go out and bring me ten men,

so that I may tell you in their presence

so that I can tell you in front of them, and the matter will become public through them—the halakha that

one who grants property to a fetus, the fetus acquires it!”

This indicates that according to Shmuel, it is even possible to grant property to a fetus. And all the more so, in the case of an inheritance that comes automatically, the fetus acquires it [Ritva]!

And we answer:

Rather,

this is what Shmuel said:

“This”

is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

And

Shmuel himself

holds

in accordance with this opinion.

And we raise a difficulty: Is that so?

What is Shmuel teaching us

by saying this?

That the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yosei?!

Do they disagree?

Do the Sages in fact disagree with him and fail to concede his point?

But Rabbi Zakkai said

according to the reading in the Bach:

“This is testimony: Rabbi Yosei testified in the name of Shemaya and Avtalyon, and the Sages conceded to him,”

the Sages.

Rav Ashi

explained:

Did it teach, “and the Sages accepted"

the opinion from him?

And

the wording is

“the Sages conceded to him,”

which is what

it teaches,

meaning:

his reasoning is compelling

to Rabbi Yosei, but they do not concede the legal ruling to him.

The Sages taught:

a. A priest who had slaves that his wife brought to him upon their marriage, and he died, and

left sons,

and his wife was not pregnant,

these

melog slaves, and

those

tzon barzel slaves

eat

teruma.

The melog slaves, which belong to her, eat by virtue of her status, since she eats teruma by virtue of her sons whom she has from her priest husband.

The tzon barzel slaves, which belong to the sons, eat by virtue of the sons’ status.

b. If

he left her pregnant

and did not leave sons,

neither these nor those eat.

The melog slaves, which belong to her, do not eat teruma, since she herself does not eat teruma. The fetus she has from her priest husband does not enable her to eat teruma, because a fetus does not enable others to eat.

The tzon barzel slaves do not eat teruma, because the fetus acquires a share in the slaves, and it cannot enable them to eat, since a fetus does not enable others to eat.

c. If

he left sons and left her

also

pregnant:

The melog slaves,

which belong to her,

eat in the manner in which she eats,

by virtue of her sons whom she has from her priest husband.

But

the tzon barzel slaves will not eat

teruma,

because of the fetus’s share, for the fetus disqualifies but does not enable,

the statement of Rabbi Yosei,

as was explained in our Mishna.

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, says in the name of his father: A daughter enables others to eat,

but

a son does not enable others to eat,

and his statement will be explained later in the sugya.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says:

Although a fetus acquires property, and a fetus does not enable its slaves to eat, nevertheless:

If he left

male sons

along with the fetus, then

all of them will eat

the slaves

all

both the tzon barzel slaves and the melog slaves.

The melog slaves will eat in the manner in which she eats, by virtue of her sons.

The tzon barzel slaves will eat, because we attribute the matter to the assumption that the fetus has no share in its father’s inheritance, as will be explained later in the sugya.

But if he left only daughters

females

with the fetus, then the tzon barzel slaves, which belong to the daughters,

will not eat

by virtue of them, because

perhaps the fetus will prove to be male, and the daughters have no

inheritance

at all in place of a son,

while the fetus itself cannot enable others to eat, since a fetus does not enable others to eat.

And we raise a difficulty:

Why particularly

did he state that the slaves do not eat by virtue of the daughters because of

“perhaps the fetus will prove to be male

and the daughters have no inheritance at all in place of a son”?

It could be inferred from this, that

even if

female

is the fetus, it

also disqualifies

the slaves from eating teruma, since the fetus too has a share in the slaves, and a fetus does not enable others to eat, as they said in the Mishna, that the slaves do not eat because of the fetus’s share?!

And we answer:

“One matter, and furthermore”

he said.

One matter: a female also disqualifies,

even if we knew that the fetus was female [and therefore her sisters have a share in the slaves]; nevertheless, the fetus’s share disqualifies them from eating teruma.

And furthermore,

it is possible that the daughters have no share in the slaves at all, because

perhaps the fetus will prove to be male, and the daughters have no inheritance at all in place of a son.

And now the Gemara explains what Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai said: “The males will all eat.”

We inquire: Is it so that when there are male sons,

they

will eat

the tzon barzel slaves’ teruma?!

But there is a fetus!

If so, we should say: Perhaps the fetus will prove to be male, and it has a share in the slaves, thereby disqualifying them from eating teruma?!

And we answer:

He holds,

Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: