Yevamot 67a — the Talmud in English

For Rava said: Consecration, leaven, ![](pamud.bmp "

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and emancipation remove [property] from a lien.

Consecration removes [property] from a lien: for example, if he designated his ox as an apotiki for his creditor, and consecrated it for the altar, which is bodily sanctity, his creditor’s lien is removed.

Leaven removes [property] from a lien: for example, one who designated his leaven as an apotiki for his gentile creditor, and it is lying in the possession of the Jew, and the sixth hour of the eve of Passover arrived—the gentile’s lien is removed, since the leaven did not actually belong to the gentile; therefore, the Jew is obligated to destroy it.

Emancipation removes [property] from a lien: for example, if he made his slave an apotiki for his fellow and emancipated him, he is emancipated, and the lender’s lien is removed.

Rav Judah said:

A woman who

brought to him

for her husband, as nichsei tzon barzel,

two vessels worth

one thousand

zuz, and their value increased,

the vessels,

and they stood at

a value of

two thousand

zuz.

And that profit from the increase in value belongs to the husband, as we learned in our Mishna concerning nichsei tzon barzel: “And if they increased, they increased for him.” It follows that he is obligated to give her from the two thousand only one thousand zuz, as was the value of the property at the time when she brought it to him—

One

of the vessels that she brought, worth today one thousand zuz—the woman

takes it as part of her marriage settlement,

as payment of the responsibility for the nichsei tzon barzel that her husband accepted upon himself in her marriage settlement.

And one

of the vessels that she brought, that is, the second vessel, also worth one thousand zuz, but it is in excess of the debt that her husband owes her—the woman has the right that she shall

give money

to her husband according to the value of the second vessel,

and

shall

take it,

against her husband’s will,

because of “the enhancement of her father’s household.”

And we challenge this:

What is he informing us

Rav Judah by this statement?!

Is it the law that

“the enhancement of her father’s household”

is hers,

that she is entitled to take it by payment?!

And

Rav Judah already said it once [

for Rav Judah already said it above ]?!

And we answer:

You might say: These matters—

that she is entitled to take her vessels because of “the enhancement of her father’s household”—

are where it comes to taking them as part of her marriage settlement [

when the value of the vessels corresponds to what is due to her by virtue of the responsibility that he accepted for them in her marriage settlement ].

But giving money and taking,

to give money and take property that does not come to her according to the monetary value of the property that she brought to him, one might have said that

not

did Rav Judah say that she can pay money and take them.

He informs us

Rav Judah that even property whose value exceeds what is due to her according to the sum that she brought to him—she can pay for it and take the property that she brought to him from her father’s household!

Mishna:

An Israelite woman who married a priest

and bore him sons,

and he died,

her husband,

and left her pregnant—

then

her slaves shall not eat [

iron-flock slaves that she brought to her husband ]— for his sons will inherit them—

teruma,

despite the fact that they are slaves of his sons, the priests—

because of the share of the fetus,

in those slaves, for the fetus does not have the power to cause them to eat [as it explains further], and therefore they do not eat teruma at all.

According to the fact

that the fetus

found in its mother’s womb:

a.

disqualifies

its mother, a priest’s daughter—who married an Israelite and her husband died—from returning to her father’s household to eat teruma, just as a born son disqualifies her from returning, as the verse states: “And a priest’s daughter, when she becomes a widow or divorced, and she has no seed, she shall return to her father’s house as in her youth; she shall eat of her father’s bread.”

You have thus learned that if she has offspring, even if it is only a fetus, she does not return to her father’s household.

b.

But it does not cause

its mother, an Israelite woman who married a priest and her husband died, to eat teruma.

And it is not like a born son, who causes his Israelite mother to eat teruma, as the verse states: “And when a priest acquires a person, the acquisition of his money, he shall eat of it; and those born in his house, they shall eat of his bread.” And the Sages expounded: “They shall cause [others] to eat of his bread!”—to teach you that an Israelite woman who married a priest and bore him a son, she eats teruma because of him.

And just as the fetus, the son of a priest, does not cause his mother, who is an Israelite woman, to eat teruma, so the priestly fetus does not cause his slaves to eat teruma,

the words of Rabbi Yosei.

They said to him

the Sages to Rabbi Yosei:

Since you have testified to us concerning an Israelite woman

who married

a priest

that the slaves inherited by the priest’s sons do not eat teruma, since the fetus, the priest’s son, also has a share in the slaves, and he cannot cause them to eat—

if so,

even a priest’s daughter

who married

a priest, and he died, and left her pregnant, her slaves shall not eat [

her iron-flock slaves, which are her husband’s sons’ slaves ]

teruma, because of the share of the fetus,

which cannot cause his slaves to eat teruma.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: An Israelite woman who married a priest, and he died and left her pregnant, her slaves shall not eat teruma because of the share of the fetus:

They raised a dilemma before them:

Is

the reason of Rabbi Yosei

that the fetus does not cause [her or them] to eat is

because he holds

Rabbi Yosei:

a fetus in the womb of a non-priestly woman —

is a non-priest.

Or perhaps

there is another reason that he does not cause [them] to eat, for only

a born child

is one who

causes [others] to eat

teruma, but a fetus

that is not born—

does not cause [others] to eat

the slaves?

What is the practical difference? Concerning a fetus in the womb of a priest’s daughter [

a priest’s daughter who became pregnant by a priest ], whether he causes his slaves to eat.

If you approach it according to the law of “a fetus in the womb of a non-priestly woman is a non-priest,” then this fetus in the womb of a priest’s daughter is a priest, and therefore he causes [them] to eat teruma.

But if you approach it on the basis of “a born child causes [others] to eat, one who is not born does not cause [others] to eat,” even a fetus in the womb of a priest’s daughter cannot cause [them] to eat.

What

is the reason of Rabbi Yosei?

Rabba said: This is the reason of Rabbi Yosei: for he holds, a fetus in the womb of a non-priestly woman is a non-priest.

Rav Yosef said: A born child causes [others] to eat; one who is not born does not cause [others] to eat.

He challenged

Rav Yosef, who explained the reason of Rabbi Yosei as “a born child causes [others] to eat; one who is not born does not cause [others] to eat,” from a beraita that we learned:

They said to Rabbi Yosei: Since you have testified to us concerning an Israelite woman married to a priest

that her slaves shall not eat teruma because of the share of the fetus—

A priest’s daughter

who is pregnant

by a priest—

what

is the law: shall the slaves eat teruma?

He said to them

Rabbi Yosei:

This [

an Israelite woman married to a priest ]

I heard

for prohibition.

But

however

this [

a priest’s daughter pregnant by a priest ]

I did not hear

for prohibition, but rather to permit the slaves to eat teruma.

And now this is difficult:

Granted, if you say

that the reason of Rabbi Yosei is that

“a fetus in the womb of a non-priestly woman is a non-priest,”

that is well:

this is what he said to them

Rabbi Yosei:

“This I heard, and this I did not hear!”

For in the case of a priest’s daughter [pregnant] by a priest, you cannot disqualify them from eating teruma on this basis, since it is not a fetus in the womb of a non-priestly woman, but in the womb of a priest’s daughter.

But if you say

that the reason of Rabbi Yosei is because of

“a born child causes [others] to eat; one who is not born does not cause [others] to eat,”

it is difficult:

What is meant by “This I heard, and this I did not hear

” that Rabbi Yosei said?! After all,

it—

is it! [

after all, it is entirely one matter ]!?

And we conclude:

It is difficult!

Rav Judah said in the name of Samuel: This

that we learned in our Mishna: one who died and left a fetus, the fetus acquires the slaves, and since the fetus does not have the power to cause them to eat, the slaves are disqualified from eating teruma—

is the statement of Rabbi Yosei

they are.

But the Sages say:

the fetus has no share in the slaves. And therefore:

If

he has—

the father of the fetus who died—

sons,

then the slaves

eat because of the sons,

since the fetus has no share in them.

And even if

he has no sons,

the slaves

eat because of

the

brothers

of the deceased, who inherit him when he has no sons. And even if

he has no

the deceased

brothers,

the slaves

eat because of the entire family.

And the Gemara analyzes Shmuel’s wording:

“This”

is the statement of Rabbi Yosei,

and

it implies that

he does not hold

with Rabbi Yosei, but rather with the Sages, who hold that a fetus does not acquire [property]. -

But Shmuel said to Rav Hana of Baghdad [

the master of aggada ]:

Go, bring me ten [

go out and bring me ten men ],

so that I may say it to you in their presence [

so that I may tell you in their presence, and the matter will become public through them ]—the law that

one who grants acquisition to a fetus acquires!

Thus, according to Shmuel, it is possible even to grant acquisition to a fetus. And all the more so in an inheritance that comes automatically, the fetus has acquisition [Ritva]!

And we answer:

Rather,

this is what Shmuel said:

“This”

is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

And

Shmuel himself

holds

this way.

And we are perplexed: And

what is Shmuel teaching us

?

That the Sages disagree with Rabbi Yosei?!

Do they disagree?

Do the Sages really disagree with him and did not concede to him?

But Rabbi Zakkai said [

in the Bach ]:

“This is testimony: Rabbi Yosei testified in the name of Shemaya and Avtalyon, and the Sages conceded to him”

.

Said

he answered

Rav Ashi: Is it taught, “and the Sages accepted”

from him?

And

indeed,

“the Sages conceded to him”

is what it

teaches,

to say:

that his reasoning is plausible

—that of Rabbi Yosei—but they do not concede to him with regard to the law.

The Sages taught:

a. A kohen who had slaves that his wife brought to him at her marriage, and he died, and

left sons,

and his wife is not pregnant,

these [

melog slaves ], and

these [

tson barzel slaves ]

eat

teruma.

The melog slaves, which belong to her, eat by virtue of her, for she eats teruma by virtue of the sons she has from her kohen husband.

The tson barzel slaves, which belong to the sons, eat by virtue of the sons.

b.

If she was left pregnant

and he did not leave sons,

neither these nor those eat.

The melog slaves, which belong to her, do not eat teruma, since she herself also does not eat teruma, because the fetus she has from her kohen husband does not cause her to eat teruma, for a fetus does not cause [others] to eat.

The tson barzel slaves do not eat teruma, because the fetus has acquisition in the slaves, and it cannot cause them to eat, for a fetus does not cause [others] to eat.

c.

He left sons, and she was left

also

pregnant:

The melog slaves

that belong to her

eat in the manner in which she eats,

by virtue of the sons she has from her kohen husband.

But

the tson barzel slaves will not eat

teruma,

because of the fetus’s share, for the fetus disqualifies and does not cause [others] to eat,

the statement of Rabbi Yosei,

as was explained in our Mishna.

Rabbi Yishmael son of Rabbi Yosei says in the name of his father: A daughter causes [others] to eat,

but

a son does not cause [others] to eat,

and his statement will be explained further in the course of the sugya.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai says:

Even though a fetus has acquisition, and a fetus does not cause its slaves to eat, nevertheless:

If he left

male

sons together with the fetus, then

they shall eat

the slaves,

all of them [

both the tson barzel slaves and the melog slaves ].

The melog slaves shall eat in the manner in which she eats, by virtue of her sons.

The tson barzel slaves shall eat, because we attribute it to the fact that the fetus has no share in its father’s inheritance, as will be explained further in the course of the sugya.

But if he left only

female

daughters together with the fetus, then the tson barzel slaves, which belong to the daughters,

shall not eat

by virtue of them, because

perhaps the fetus will be found to be male, and the daughters have

no inheritance

at all in place of the son,

and he himself cannot cause [others] to eat, for a fetus does not cause [others] to eat.

And we raise an objection:

Why specifically,

why did he state as the reason that the slaves do not eat by virtue of the daughters that it is because of

“perhaps the fetus will be found to be male

and the daughters have nothing in place of the son”?

Let it emerge from the fact that

even if

female

is the fetus, it

also disqualifies

the slaves from eating teruma, for even the fetus has a share in the slaves, and a fetus does not cause [others] to eat, as they said in the Mishna, that the slaves do not eat because of the fetus’s share?!

And we answer:

“One thing, and furthermore”—

he is saying.

One thing: a female also disqualifies,

and even if we knew that it was female [and therefore its sisters have a share in the slaves], nevertheless the fetus’s share disqualifies them from eating teruma.

And furthermore,

it is possible that the daughters have no share at all in the slaves, because

perhaps the fetus will be found to be male, and the daughters have nothing in place of the son.

And now the Gemara explains what Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai said: “The males shall eat, all of them”;

And we inquire about it: When there are

male

sons,

shall the tson barzel slaves eat teruma?!

But there is a fetus!

If so, we should say: Perhaps the fetus will be found to be male, and it has a share in the slaves, and disqualifies them from eating teruma?!

And we answer:

He holds

Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: