Yevamot 5a — the Talmud in English

And we raised an objection to this:

This is satisfactory according to the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael—

who says that everywhere that the term “garment” is stated, it refers only to a garment of wool or linen; it is properly superfluous to state “a garment and linen,” in order to expound juxtaposed passages and permit kilayim in tzitzit.

But

according to the Rabbis,

who hold that everywhere that “garment” is stated, it includes all types, and “wool or linen,” which is stated with regard to kilayim, is not superfluous, because it is needed to say that there is kilayim only with wool and linen—

from where do they derive

that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition? And we answer:

They derive it from “his head”,

which is stated in the passage concerning the shaving of the leper.

As it was taught:

It is stated in the passage concerning the leper who was healed of his affliction [Leviticus 14:9]:

“And it shall be on the seventh day that he shall shave all his hair.

His head, and his beard, and his eyebrows.

And all his hair he shall shave.”

And the beraita expounds this verse:

“His head”

which is stated with regard to the leper, after Scripture had already obligated him [at the beginning of the verse] to shave all his hair—

what does it come to teach?

For what purpose did Scripture again specify the obligation to shave the hair of his head, after it had already commanded him to shave all his hair?

Since it is stated [Leviticus 19]:

“You shall not round the corner of your head.”

And the meaning of this prohibition is that it is forbidden to shave the corners of the head, so that the remaining hair of the head at the crown of the head should not appear like a circle [surrounded].

I might understand that the leper also is included,

so that it would be forbidden for him to shave the corners of his head.

The verse therefore says

with regard to the leper: “

his head

and his beard and his eyebrows, and all his hair he shall shave.” And this teaches us that the positive commandment of shaving the leper overrides the prohibition of rounding the head.

And the Gemara adds:

And this tanna holds

that

the rounding

of hair

“of the entire head”

also

is called rounding.

That is, this is not merely a prohibition of “rounding”; rather, it is a prohibition against shaving the corners in every circumstance, even when he shaves all the hair of the head.

For there are those who hold that the prohibition is specifically to shave the corners of the head and leave hair on the upper part of the head in a circular form. But if he removes all the hair, and no hair in the form of a circle remains on the upper part of the head, there is no prohibition in this.

But the leper must shave all the hair of his head. And if we say that there is no prohibition against shaving the corners while shaving all the hair of the head, there is no proof from here that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

And since we have learned from here that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, it was therefore necessary to state “upon her,” to say that the mitzva of yibbum does not override the prohibition of a forbidden sexual relationship.

And the Gemara rejects this, saying that this is not a good source for the overriding of a positive commandment over a prohibition, because

it can be refuted: What is distinctive about the prohibition of “rounding”? It is a prohibition that does not apply equally to all!

It is a “weak” prohibition, since it does not apply to women, for they were not prohibited from rounding the hair of their heads. Therefore it is overridden by the force of a positive commandment. But there is no proof from it that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition that applies equally to all.

But with regard to the prohibition of forbidden sexual relationships, the woman too is warned, just as the man is, and it is a prohibition that applies equally to all. If so, the question returns: for what purpose was “upon her” necessary?

The Gemara brings another source for the principle that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition:

Rather, it is derived from “his beard”,

which is stated in the verse above, concerning the shaving of the leper, after Scripture obligated him to shave all his hair.

As it was taught [Leviticus 14]:

“His beard”—

what does it come to teach?

Why did Scripture again specify the shaving of the beard, after it had already commanded him to shave all his hair?

Since it is stated

with regard to the prohibition against shaving the corners of the beard, which is stated concerning priests, but from it we also learn with regard to Israelites [Leviticus 21]:

“And the corner of their beard they shall not shave.”

I might understand that a leprous priest also is included,

so that he would be forbidden to shave his beard.

The verse therefore says, “his beard.”

The positive commandment of shaving the leper comes and overrides the prohibition against shaving the beard.

And if

the mitzva of shaving the beard of the leper

is not applicable to the prohibition

of shaving the beard

that does not apply equally to all,

since it does not apply to women—and this we have already learned from “his head”—

apply it to the prohibition that applies equally to all,

that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

And therefore “upon her” was necessary, to say that the positive commandment of yibbum does not override the prohibition of a forbidden sexual relationship.

And we refute this:

Still,

the verse concerning the shaving of the beard is not superfluous in order to teach, by the principle of “if it is not applicable here, apply it elsewhere,” that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, because

it was necessary

to teach this with regard to the leprous priest himself.

For

it might enter your mind to say

that a positive commandment does not override a prohibition in the shaving of the beard of leprous priests.

Since

priests are different, since Scripture increased additional mitzvot for them,

of the priesthood, their mitzvot are more stringent. Therefore,

even a prohibition that does not apply equally to all,

such as the prohibition against shaving the beard, even though it does not apply to women,

does not override

the positive commandment of shaving the leper.

Therefore,

it teaches us

“his beard,” which is stated concerning the shaving of the leper,

that it does override!

And since “his beard” was needed for this teaching, we have no source for the principle that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition that applies equally to all!

And the question returns: for what purpose was “upon her” necessary?

And the Gemara says that we have a source expounded in another beraita.

Rather, it is derived from

the exposition of

“his head,”

for

the following

tanna expounded it.

As it was taught: “his head,”

which is stated concerning the shaving of the leper, after Scripture obligated him to shave all his hair—

what does it come to teach?

See the Ritva, who found Rashi’s interpretation here extremely difficult; see his version and explanation.

Since it is stated

concerning priests [Numbers 6]:

“A razor shall not pass over his head.”

I might understand that the leper and the nazirite also are included?

That is, a leper who was healed of his leprosy, who has a mitzva to shave, and he is a nazirite, who is forbidden to shave during the days of his naziriteship.

Therefore the verse says

“his head.”

And we learn from here that the positive commandment of the shaving of the leper overrides the prohibition of shaving the hair of the nazirite. And the shaving of the nazirite is a prohibition that applies equally to all, for its prohibition applies both to a man and to a woman.

But Rashi explains that it is referring to the mitzva of shaving of the leper when he is healed, or of the nazirite at the completion of his naziriteship, when there is a mitzva to shave all the hair of his head; thus, the mitzva of shaving of the leper, or of the nazirite, overrides the prohibition of rounding his head.

And the prohibition of rounding the head is a prohibition that does not apply equally to all, since it is not stated concerning women; therefore, the teaching is by “if it is not applicable here”:

If “his head” is not applicable to a prohibition that does not apply equally to all, since we have already learned it from “his beard”—apply it to a prohibition that applies equally to all.

And we reject this:

It can be refuted

with regard to this derivation:

What is distinctive about the leprous nazirite?

His prohibition against shaving is a lenient prohibition, since

there is

the nazirite

in the possibility of inquiry!

For he can have his vow of naziriteship inquired into, and his naziriteship will be annulled retroactively. And one cannot learn from here that the positive commandment of yibbum should override the prohibition of forbidden sexual relationships, which is a stringent prohibition concerning which inquiry is impossible.

And the proof that one cannot learn from the shaving of the nazirite is:

For if you do not say so,

but rather learn from the nazirite,

this principle that we hold, that a positive commandment does not override a prohibition and a positive commandment—

let us learn it from the nazirite,

that a positive commandment overrides even a positive commandment and a prohibition!

For the nazirite is commanded not to shave both by the positive prohibition, “He shall be holy; he shall let the growth of the hair of his head grow,” and by the prohibition of “you shall not.”

And if we learn from him that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, we could learn for every place that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition and a positive commandment. But we hold that a positive commandment does not override a prohibition!

Rather, with regard to the nazirite, for what reason do we not learn from him,

since

it can be refuted

with regard to learning from him:

What is distinctive about the nazirite, whose prohibition is lenient,

since there is

the nazirite

in the possibility of inquiry

concerning his nazirite vow? Therefore, a positive commandment overrides in his case even a positive commandment and a prohibition.

If so,

here too it can be refuted

with regard to learning from the nazirite that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition: What is distinctive about the nazirite,

since there is the possibility of inquiry,

and therefore, because of its leniency, a positive commandment overrides a prohibition in his case.

Can you say this with regard to the prohibition of forbidden sexual relationships, concerning which there is no possibility of inquiry, and in its case a positive commandment does not override a prohibition?