Yevamot 5b (ה:) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Rather, forever:

the first verse,

from the juxtaposition of the prohibition of diverse kinds with the mitzva of tzitzit, we learn that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition.

And it is available for an exegetical derivation even according to the Rabbis! Although according to their view, the phrase “wool and linen” is needed to teach that the prohibition of diverse kinds applies only to a garment of wool and linen,

because

if so,

if you say that this verse was not written to be available for deriving juxtaposed passages,

let the verse say: “You shall make yourself tzitzit,”

as the wording used by the verse in the passage of tzitzit.

The change in wording—

“twisted threads”

instead of “tzitzit” \-

why do I need it?

Conclude from this: it is available for an exegetical derivation,

to derive the juxtaposition of tzitzit and diverse kinds, and to learn from here that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition.

And we reject this: Behold,

this

expression “twisted threads” used by the verse was not written to be available for deriving the juxtaposition.

Rather,

it comes for the measure

of tzitzit;

it came

to teach:

For this is how the Sages expounded the expression “twisted threads”:

“A twisted thread,”

which consists of several threads wound together, is made of at least

two

threads—that is, it contains at least two threads wound together.

“Twisted threads,”

in the plural, as the verse says, “You shall make yourself twisted threads”—they are made of two twisted threads, with two threads in each twisted thread. Together they are

four

threads.

The Torah says: Insert the four threads into the hole in the corner of the garment, fold them on the two sides of the hole, and then there will be eight threads before you.

Make

from the eight threads

a twisted thread,

by having one of the threads wind around the other seven threads.

But do not make a twisted thread from the entire length of the threads.

Rather, make a twisted thread from only one-third of the length of the threads,

and

along the remaining length [of the two-thirds of the thread],

twist it

into a twisted thread—

from it!

Leave the remaining two-thirds of the length of the threads as separate threads, in the form of distinct “strands” emerging from the twisted thread and hanging beneath it.

And since the Torah used the expression “twisted threads” for this teaching, it was not written to be available for deriving the juxtaposition, and one cannot learn from it that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition.

The Gemara brings another derivation for expounding the juxtaposition from this verse:

Because

if so,

if you say that this verse was not written to be available for deriving the juxtaposition,

let the verse say: “You shall not wear wool and linen together”—

“together,”

which the verse added,

why do I need it?

Conclude from this: it is available for an exegetical derivation,

for the juxtaposition, to teach that the mitzva of tzitzit overrides the prohibition of diverse kinds.

And we challenge this:

But it is still needed to teach that two stitches constitute

a connection!

“Together” is still needed and is not superfluous. For from “together” we learn the measure for a connection between a wool garment and a linen garment, which is forbidden because of diverse kinds.

We learn from “together” that this is what the Torah said: If one inserts the needle with the thread twice into the garment, thereby joining the wool garment and the linen garment so that they are firmly connected “together,” this is the measure of a connection of diverse kinds that is forbidden.

And if one makes

only

one stitch,

inserting the needle once into the wool garment and the linen garment—

it is not

considered

a connection

with regard to diverse kinds, for this is not a proper connection but a temporary one, and it is not forbidden by Torah law.

And since “together” is not superfluous, it cannot serve as material available for deriving the juxtaposition!

Therefore, the Gemara brings another explanation of how to expound this verse as a juxtaposition:

If so,

that this verse was not written to be available for deriving the juxtaposition,

let the Merciful One write: “You shall not wear wool and linen together.”

“Diverse kinds,”

which the Merciful One added—

why do I need it?

Conclude from this: it is available

for deriving the juxtaposition.

But this derivation too can be rejected:

But it is still needed,

for it is still necessary to state “diverse kinds,” to teach that one is not liable for diverse kinds on a thread made of wool and linen

until

the thread of diverse kinds has been properly and thoroughly prepared from a mixture of wool and linen at every stage of making the thread.

A. It must be

combed

together.

The wool shorn from the sheep and the flax cut from the ground must be smoothed while mixed together—that is, they must be combed and smoothed together with a comb.

B. The thread must be

spun

from a mixture of wool and linen together.

C.

And

the thread of diverse kinds must be

woven,

woven into a garment.

For one is liable for diverse kinds only when they are in a woven garment [and not in a garment made of felt, such as wool and linen pressed together].

If so, “diverse kinds” is not available for deriving the juxtaposition, and from where do we know that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition!?

But the Gemara does not accept the rejection:

Rather,

this verse was indeed written both to be available for an exegetical derivation and to teach “combed, spun, and woven.”

And

all of it—

both its availability for deriving the juxtaposition and the teaching of “combed, spun, and woven”—

is derived from “diverse kinds”!

For the word “diverse kinds” is superfluous, in order to make it available for deriving the juxtaposition.

But if it had come only to be available for that derivation, it would not have been necessary to use the expression “diverse kinds”; rather, the verse could have said, “You shall not wear diverse kinds, wool and linen together.”

By using the expression “diverse kinds,” the verse also comes to teach an additional matter: the thread of diverse kinds must be “combed and spun” from mixed wool and linen, and “woven,” in a fabric.

Now, after the Gemara has answered the second question raised above [at the end of page 3a]—from where do we know that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition—the Gemara proceeds to clarify the answer to the first question: Why is there a need for the derivation from “upon her,” when a positive mitzva does not override a prohibition that entails karet!?

For indeed,

we have found

the source for this now,

that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a mere prohibition.

But that a positive mitzva should override

a prohibition that entails karet—

where have we found

where it

overrides,

until

it is necessary

to have a special teaching from the word

“upon her,”

to prohibit it,

so that the forbidden relation is not overridden by the mitzva of yibbum, despite the fact that it entails karet!?

And if you would say, let us derive it from

the mitzva of

circumcision,

which overrides the prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat, despite the fact that it entails karet.

This can be refuted:

What is distinctive about circumcision,

whose mitzva is a stringent mitzva,

as thirteen covenants were made concerning it!

For the covenant is mentioned thirteen times in connection with the mitzva of circumcision.

Therefore, only circumcision, by virtue of its stringency, overrides the prohibition against labor on Shabbat despite the fact that it entails karet!

And if you would say, let us derive it

from

the mitzva of the

Paschal offering,

whose slaughter overrides Shabbat.

This can be refuted:

What is distinctive about the

Paschal

offering,

which is stringent,

as

there is a punishment of

karet

for one who refrains from fulfilling the mitzva of offering the Paschal offering.

Can you say the same with regard to the mitzva of yibbum, where there is no punishment of karet for one who neglects it?

And if you would say, let us derive it

from

the

daily offering,

whose sacrificial service overrides Shabbat.

This can be refuted:

What is distinctive about the daily offering,

which is an important mitzva,

as

it is an offering

offered regularly,

every day.

Can you say the same with regard to the mitzva of yibbum, which is not performed regularly?

And we answer: Indeed,

from one

of the matters that override Shabbat,

it cannot be derived; it is impossible to learn from one of them that the mitzva of yibbum overrides a prohibition that entails karet.

But

let it come,

there is grounds to bring and learn that the mitzva of yibbum overrides the forbidden relation that entails karet—

from two,

from two matters that override Shabbat.

And we inquire:

Which

of these two matters

should it come from,

should it be derived from?

If

from circumcision and the Paschal offering,

it can be rejected:

as

both of them, when neglected, entail

karet!

If

from the Paschal offering and the daily offering,

it can be rejected:

as

both of them have

a need of the Most High,

for the altar!

If

from circumcision and the daily offering,

it can be rejected:

as they

both existed as mitzvot

before the Revelation,

at Mount Sinai.

This is a special importance, and therefore one cannot derive from these mitzvot with regard to mitzvot that did not exist before the Revelation.

And

this refutation applies only

according to the one who says: The offering that Israel sacrificed in the wilderness

existed even before the Revelation at Mount Sinai—

it was the daily offering!

[But according to the one who says that the offering Israel sacrificed in the wilderness was a pilgrimage offering, this is not a valid refutation.]

The Gemara adds that even from all three together one cannot derive the rule with regard to the mitzva of yibbum:

And from all of them,

from circumcision, the Paschal offering, and the daily offering together,

also

it is impossible to derive it,

as they all

existed

before the Revelation.

And now, since we have no source establishing that the positive mitzva of yibbum overrides the prohibition of a forbidden relation that entails karet, the first question concerning the statement of the beraita on page 3a returns and stands:

Why is there a need for the special derivation from “upon her” to teach that the sister of one’s wife does not undergo yibbum!?

After all, we should know this even without that derivation, since nowhere in the entire Torah do we find that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition that entails karet!

And the Gemara answers with a new explanation:

Rather,

therefore

it was necessary for “upon her” to exclude yibbum in the case of a forbidden relation:

Because

it might enter your mind to say, let it come,

I might have thought that we should come and derive that the mitzva of yibbum overrides the prohibition of the forbidden relation

from

the mitzva of

honoring one’s father and mother.

As it is taught in a beraita: Could it be that honoring one’s father and mother overrides Shabbat?

The verse states: [Leviticus 19]

“Every person shall fear his mother and his father, and

you shall observe My Shabbatot,” for I am the Lord!—

for I am the Lord!”— “

“I am the Lord”—and therefore

all of you,

the person, his father, and his mother—

are obligated in My honor,

and My honor is not overridden for the sake of honoring one’s father and mother.

Is that not so,

that the case under discussion is one in which

his father said to him:

Slaughter for me

on Shabbat, or

cook for me

on Shabbat?

And the verse comes to teach that the mitzva of honoring one’s father does not override Shabbat.

And the Gemara infers:

And the reason is that the Merciful One wrote, “You shall observe My Shabbatot,”

“I am the Lord”—

Had it not been so—

it would override

the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother would override the prohibition of labor on Shabbat, despite the fact that it is punishable by stoning!

The same should apply to the mitzva of yibbum: it should override a forbidden relation that entails karet.

Therefore, it was necessary to write “upon her” to exclude this, just as the verse “I am the Lord” was necessary to exclude honoring one’s father and mother from overriding labor on Shabbat.

And the Gemara rejects this:

No,

you cannot infer from here that had it not been for the verse “I am the Lord,” the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother would override labor on Shabbat, despite the fact that it is punishable by stoning.