Yevamot 4b — the Talmud in English

This proves that it is free for exposition.

To be free for the exposition of semukhim, to juxtapose “A man shall not take his father’s wife” with “He shall not uncover his father’s wing.” And to teach us concerning the woman raped by his father, that she too is forbidden.

And concerning tzitzit also,

Rabbi Judah holds that in the Book of Deuteronomy one expounds semukhim, and learns from here that the positive commandment of tzitzit overrides the prohibition of kilayim, for those same two reasons:

If you wish, say: because it is demonstrated,

and if you wish, say: because it is free.

And the Gemara explains the demonstration and the “free” wording:

If you wish, say: because it is demonstrated:

For if so,

if Scripture did not come to teach from the juxtaposition,

the Merciful One should have written it

“You shall make for yourself twisted threads”

in the passage of tzitzit.

For what halakhic purpose did He write it here?

Necessarily, in order to teach from the juxtaposition of tzitzit to kilayim that the positive commandment of tzitzit overrides the prohibition of kilayim.

And if you wish, say: because it is free:

Since,

after all,

it already says, “And a garment of diverse kinds, shaatnez, shall not come upon you.”

And if so, this that it repeated and wrote here,

“You shall not wear shaatnez,”

why do I need it?

This proves that it is free.

And from the superfluity of the verse, one must expound the juxtaposition of tzitzit to shaatnez, for Scripture came to teach that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

And the Gemara rejects this: The verse “You shall not wear shaatnez” is not free!

For

these

two verses concerning shaatnez

are both necessary,

and neither of them is superfluous for the purpose of the exposition of semukhim.

For had the Merciful One written

only “And a garment of diverse kinds, shaatnez,

shall not come upon you,” we would have said

that

every manner of putting on

a garment of shaatnez

the Merciful One prohibited.

And even garment merchants,

who sell garments of kilayim and place them on their shoulders merely as a sample, or carry them on their bodies in order to transfer them from place to place, but do not intend to derive benefit from the garment’s warmth, would be forbidden to put them upon their bodies.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote, “You shall not wear shaatnez.”

And by the fact that the Torah used the expression “wearing,” it teaches that not every putting of a garment of shaatnez upon the body was prohibited, but only putting it on

similar to “wearing”

a garment,

which has

in wearing it

benefit

of warmth, and not merely putting a garment upon the body, which serves only for the purpose of displaying or carrying the garment.

And

likewise, on the other hand:

if the Merciful One had written

only

“You shall not wear

shaatnez,”

we would have said that specifically “wearing”

is forbidden, since

its benefit is considerable,

for it involves abundant benefit, and it was prohibited.

But putting it on

for a short time, for the purpose of displaying it, or carrying the garment in order to transfer it, where there is no abundant benefit in this,

not

was it prohibited, and it would then also be permitted to intend to derive benefit from the garment.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote, “It shall not come upon you,”

teaching that even slight benefit from putting it on is forbidden when one intends to derive it.

And since both verses are needed, there is again no verse free from which to expound semukhim. If so, how did we say that Rabbi Judah expounds semukhim concerning kilayim and tzitzit, since the verse of shaatnez is free to teach about the exposition of semukhim?!

And we answer: There are still superfluous words in the verse of shaatnez, and by means of their superfluity one can expound semukhim.

For

if so,

since we need the verse “You shall not wear shaatnez” to permit the putting on of shaatnez by garment merchants,

the Merciful One should write only, “You shall not wear shaatnez,”

and this would suffice for us to know from here that putting it on by garment merchants is permitted.

“Wool and linen,”

which Scripture added—

why do I need it?

After all, it is obvious that shaatnez consists only of a mixture of wool and linen:

Since,

after all,

He wrote

the Merciful One

“And a garment of diverse kinds, shaatnez, shall not come upon you.”

And since the verse used the word “garment,” it is obvious that the intention is shaatnez made from a mixture of wool and linen.

For

and

this is

what was taught in the school of

Rabbi Ishmael:

Since garments are mentioned in the Torah

in several places

without qualification,

without Scripture specifying to you what they are made of,

and Scripture specified it in one of them,

in the matter of afflictions, that it is

“wool and linen,”

then

also every

place in which Scripture said merely “garment” refers to a garment of

wool and linen.

And since the first verse, concerning putting it on, already revealed by saying “And a garment of diverse kinds, shaatnez, shall not come upon you,” that the shaatnez mentioned in the Torah is a garment made of wool and linen—

if so,

“wool and linen,” which the Merciful One wrote

in the second verse, [“You shall not wear shaatnez, wool and linen together”]—

why do I need it?

This proves

that the addition of the words “wool and linen”

is free

for expounding semukhim.

But the Gemara still raises an objection:

And still,

still

it was necessary

also to state “wool and linen,” and these two words are not free for the exposition of semukhim.

For

it might enter your mind to say: the putting on

of a garment of diverse kinds upon one’s shoulders alone

is

that with regard to which only a garment of shaatnez made of wool and linen was prohibited, since

its benefit is not considerable,

for there is no abundant benefit in putting a garment upon one’s shoulders. Therefore the Torah prohibited there not all types of mixtures, but only those of wool and linen.

But wearing

a garment,

whose benefit is considerable,

for the benefit of wearing is abundant, we would have said that

every

mixture of

two kinds the Merciful One prohibited,

and not only wool and linen.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote “

You shall not wear shaatnez,

wool and linen.”

To teach you that even in wearing, the Torah prohibited only a garment of wool and linen, and not a mixture of two other kinds.

And since “wool and linen” is needed for this clarification, it is not superfluous for the exposition of semukhim. The objection returns to its place: We have nothing superfluous in the verse “You shall not wear shaatnez” from which we can expound semukhim!

And we answer:

If so,

if it is said that “wool and linen” was included in the verse “You shall not wear shaatnez” in order to teach that even in wearing only wool and linen, and not other kinds, are forbidden,

let the verse be silent concerning it,

concerning “wool and linen” in the verse “You shall not wear shaatnez,”

and let it come

and let it be learned that wearing is forbidden only with wool and linen by the gezerah shavah of

“shaatnez, shaatnez,” from the putting-on

where only wool and linen are forbidden [based on the principle that everywhere the word “garment” is stated, it refers only to wool and linen].

Now the Gemara comes to discuss that upon which we relied on the teaching of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, who says that everywhere “garment” means one of wool and linen, in order to say that “wool and linen,” mentioned concerning kilayim adjacent to the commandment of tzitzit, is superfluous, so as to expound semukhim from it and permit kilayim in tzitzit.

And we inquire about it:

And

according to

the teaching of the school of Rabbi Ishmael,

upon whom we relied to say that there is a superfluity of “wool and linen,”

the reason is that the Merciful One wrote

the superfluous expression

“wool and linen,”

and therefore we expound semukhim to permit kilayim in tzitzit.

Had this not been so, we would have said that the Merciful One prohibited kilayim in tzitzit.

For the implication is that without this superfluity, a positive commandment would not override a prohibition in tzitzit.

And

this is astonishing:

Is it not written

in Numbers 15,

“And they shall make for themselves tzitzit upon the corners of their garments”?

And

after all,

the teaching of the school of Rabbi Ishmael

already taught above the rule that

all garments

are wool and linen.

If so, “the corners of their garments” mentioned here include also linen garments.

And the Merciful One said: Make it for him,

make for the linen garment tzitzit dyed with the color

tekhelet.

And the thread of

the thread of

tekhelet

must necessarily be made of

wool

—[wool]—

itself

[and is therefore permitted in the linen garment]!

And the Gemara explains the necessity that the thread of tekhelet is made of wool:

And from where do we know that tekhelet is “wool”?

We must learn this from the garments of the priests, which are made only of wool and linen, and not of other kinds.

And we find among one of the garments [the trousers] that the Torah said to make it of linen, which is white.

By this the Torah revealed that the other colors in the priestly garments [such as tekhelet and purple] are made of wool.

As it is stated: “Linen trousers—fine twined linen.”

And it is known that “linen” means “flax,” because flax grows in separate stalks, without branching stems.

And from

“fine linen”

which

is flax,

it necessarily follows that

the tekhelet

mentioned in the priestly garments

is wool

wool,

indeed!

And since we have proof from the priestly garments that tekhelet is wool, and concerning tzitzit the Torah said “upon the corners of their garments,” we know from there that it is permitted to place wool threads in a linen garment.

If so, there is no need for the teaching of the juxtaposition between kilayim and tzitzit, and there is no need for the superfluity of “wool and linen” in order to expound semukhim!

And we answer: Nevertheless,

it was necessary

to have the teaching of semukhim.

For

it might enter your mind to say

as follows,

as

it was

said

by

Rava!

For Rava raised

a difficulty, saying that there is apparently a contradiction in the words of Scripture:

On the one hand,

it is written, “And they shall place upon the tzitzit of

“And place on the ritual fringe

the corner,

a thread of tekhelet.”

And “the tzitzit of the corner” means that the tzitzit threads must be made of the same

kind

from which the

corner

of the garment is made!

Accordingly, if the corner of the garment is made of silk, the tzitzit thread must be made of silk.

And

on the other hand,

it is written, “You shall not wear wool and linen together—You shall make for yourself twisted threads,” and the implication is that the twisted threads of tzitzit should be made of

“You shall not wear wool and linen together; you shall make twisted threads for yourself,” which implies that the twisted threads of the ritual fringe should be made of

wool and linen,

and not of silk or another kind!

How is this

contradiction, apparently existing between the two verses, to be resolved?

Rather, Rava said: This is how the meaning of the verse is to be expounded:

Tzitzit threads made of

wool and linen

exempt

the garment [that is, fulfill the commandment through them]

whether of their kind,

in a woolen garment and in a linen garment,

or not of their kind,

in a silk garment and the like.

Other kinds,

tzitzit threads made of silk and the like, only

in

garments that are

of their kind

exempt.

But

not of their kind,

in a woolen or linen garment,

they do not

render it

exempt.

And according to these words of Rava, we would say that wool threads must be used for a woolen garment and linen threads for a linen garment, for we would expound “the corner”—the kind of the corner! That the tzitzit thread must specifically be of the kind of the corner.

Accordingly, the Torah did not permit kilayim in tzitzit.

Therefore we need the superfluity of “wool and linen” in order to expound semukhim and permit kilayim in tzitzit.

And the Gemara objects: We based the teaching of semukhim on the teaching of the school of Rabbi Ishmael.

And

this teaching of the school of Rabbi Ishmael

does not have

the exposition

of Rava,

who expounded “the corner”—the kind of the corner! For according to Rava, every garment of every kind is obligated in tzitzit with a thread of its own kind, whereas according to the teaching of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, only a woolen or linen garment is obligated in tzitzit!

And since the school of Rabbi Ishmael does not hold like Rava, how is it possible to answer in accordance with Rava when we rely on the school of Rabbi Ishmael?! And we answer: Nevertheless,

it was necessary

to state “wool and linen,” even if one does not hold like Rava, that every garment is obligated in tzitzit.

For

it might enter your mind to say

that even according to the teaching of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, one should expound concerning a woolen or linen garment

that

as

Rava’s inference: “the corner”

means the kind of the corner.

But one should expound this only partially, in a manner compatible with the teaching of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, since the verse speaks only of woolen and linen garments, and not of garments of other kinds!

And this is what the Merciful One said:

Make for him

a tzitzit thread,

wool for a

garment

of wool, and

a tzitzit thread

of linen for a

garment

of linen.

In this way, “the corner”—the kind of the corner—is fulfilled! But this applies only to wool and linen, and not to another kind.

And when you make

a thread

of wool for a

garment

of wool—

dye it

with the color tekhelet.

But

a thread

of wool for a

garment

of linen, and

a thread

of linen for a

garment

of wool—

do not

make.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote, “wool and linen,”

as a superfluity, to expound semukhim, and to teach us:

that even

a thread

of wool for a

garment

of linen,

and

a thread

of linen for a

garment

of wool

is permitted to make.