Yevamot 40b — the Talmud in English

He,

the one who performed halitza,

is forbidden

by rabbinic decree to the relatives of the halutza, in all those relationships in which his wife’s relatives would be forbidden to him by Torah law, as forbidden sexual relationships:

her mother, her mother’s mother, and her father’s mother

her daughter, her daughter’s daughter, and her son’s daughter

and her sister —

when she,

the halutza herself,

is alive.

But once the halutza dies, he is permitted to her sister, just as he is permitted to his wife’s sister after his wife’s death.

And

the other

brothers —

are permitted

to all the relatives of the halutza.

And she,

the halutza,

is forbidden to his father

by Torah law, because of the forbidden relationship of “his daughter-in-law,” for she is the wife of the brother who died, and she remains forbidden to his father as his daughter-in-law even after her husband’s death.

And

she is forbidden even

to his father’s father. [

Rashi explains according to the Gemara’s initial assumption that the Mishna teaches that although, had she been the full wife of the one who performed halitza, she would not have been forbidden to his father’s father under the law of the daughter-in-law of his grandson, but only under the law of “secondary” relationships [she is a “second” to his daughter-in-law, who is forbidden by Torah law] —

nevertheless, the Sages decreed that even the halutza of his grandson should be forbidden to him.

But according to the Gemara’s conclusion, the prohibition is the prohibition of secondary relationships not because of the one who performed halitza, but because she is the wife of his deceased brother, and she is forbidden to his father’s father because she is the daughter-in-law of his grandson, who is a “second” to his daughter-in-law.]

And

she is forbidden

to his son

by rabbinic decree, because of “the father’s wife”; had she been married to the one who performed halitza, this would have been a Torah prohibition.

And

she is forbidden even

to his grandson

of the one who performed halitza, even though, had she been his wife, she would have been forbidden to him only by the words of the Scribes, since the wife of his grandfather is only a “secondary” relationship.

And the halutza is forbidden

to his brother,

because of the wife of a brother, as though she had been married to the one who performed halitza.

And to his brother’s son,

because of the wife of his father’s brother, had she been married to the one who performed halitza.

The Mishna now explains a new decree that the Sages decreed concerning the relative of his halutza, one like which we do not find in the laws of yibum:

Regarding the co-wife of his halutza, the amoraim disagreed in the first chapter [10b–11a] whether she is forbidden by karet or only by a negative commandment.

But according to everyone:

A man is permitted to the relative of the co-wife of his halutza,

because the Sages decreed the prohibition of relatives only with regard to the halutza, and not with regard to her co-wife who did not undergo halitza.

And he is forbidden to the co-wife of the relative of his halutza.

And this prohibition of the co-wife of the relative of his halutza is novel, since it is not at the place of falling for yibum!

Rather, if the relative of his halutza had been married to a stranger together with another woman, and the stranger died, the “co-wife of the relative of his halutza” is forbidden to marry the yavam, for the reason that will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

They raised a dilemma before them:

Did

the Sages decree

also with regard to

“secondary relationships” in the case of a halutza,

just as the Sages decreed secondary relationships in the case of a married woman, such as forbidding her mother’s mother [that is, the fourth generation],

or did they not

decree this in the case of a halutza?

The Gemara explains the sides of the doubt:

Perhaps only

in a Torah-level forbidden relationship,

the relatives of his wife, whose mother and mother’s mother are forbidden by Torah law,

did the Sages decree

to forbid also the

“secondary relationships,”

to forbid even the fourth generation above, his wife’s mother’s mother.

But

in the case of a halutza,

whose relatives, such as her mother and her mother’s mother, are forbidden only by rabbinic decree —

they did not decree

with regard to her

“secondary relationships,”

to forbid even the fourth generation of the mother of the mother of his halutza.

Or perhaps: there is no difference.

Come and hear

from our Mishna, in which we learned:

He,

the one who performed halitza,

is forbidden to her mother and her mother’s mother.

But “her mother’s mother’s mother” —

it does not teach

that the one who performed halitza is forbidden to her!

The Gemara rejects the proof:

In fact, they did decree secondary relationships in the case of a halutza, and they also forbade the fourth generation, the mother of the mother of the halutza.

And the reason that the tanna did not mention the fourth generation in our Mishna —

perhaps, this is the reason that he did not teach

in our Mishna the prohibition of the fourth generation in the case of a halutza —

because he needed,

the tanna wished,

to teach in the latter clause: “And the brothers”

of the one who performed halitza

are permitted [

to the relatives of his halutza].

And if he had taught

at the beginning that the one who performed halitza is forbidden to

his mother’s mother’s mother, we might have thought

that the words of the tanna in the latter clause,

“the brothers are permitted,”

refer

specifically to his mother’s mother’s mother,

who is forbidden to the one who performed halitza only by the decree concerning secondary relationships. Therefore only the one who performed halitza is forbidden to her, but not the brothers.

But with regard to his mother’s mother and his mother,

whose prohibition is not because of the decree concerning secondary relationships, but because of the decree concerning “forbidden relationships” —

not

would the other brothers be permitted to them.

And there would be room for this distinction, since the relatives who are not in the category of “secondary relationships,” such as his mother and his mother’s mother, who would be Torah-level forbidden relationships [had she been his wife], are forbidden to all the brothers [by rabbinic law!] by virtue of zika.

And we would say that the Sages decreed the prohibition of “forbidden relationships” through zika, but they did not decree the prohibition of “secondary relationships” through zika.

And even after the halitza, when the zika has already been removed, they remain forbidden to all the brothers, just as they continue to be forbidden to the brother who performed halitza, since the brother who performed halitza carried out the halitza as the agent of all the brothers. Therefore, just as with regard to him personally the Sages decreed that the decree concerning the relatives of the halutza should continue even after the zika was removed, so they decreed with regard to all the brothers.

Therefore the tanna did not write at the beginning the prohibition of his halutza’s mother’s mother’s mother, so that we should not come to this mistake in the latter clause. If so, there is no proof from here that the mother’s mother’s mother of the halutza is permitted.

But the Gemara challenges this rejection, for there is still a proof:

And let him teach

at the beginning the prohibition of

his mother’s mother’s mother

to the one who performed halitza,

and let him teach

in the latter clause:

“The brothers are permitted to all of them!”

And there would be no room for coming to a mistake.

And since the tanna did not state this prohibition at the beginning, it is proven that they did not decree secondary relationships in the case of a halutza.

The Gemara’s conclusion is: indeed,

it is difficult

for the rejection that the Gemara wished to give for the proof from the fact that the prohibition of secondary relationships in the case of a halutza was not written in the Mishna, indicating that she is permitted.

Rather, this proof is valid.

But the Gemara brings from our Mishna a proof to the contrary, that they indeed decreed secondary relationships in the case of a halutza.

Come and hear

from what is stated in the Mishna:

She,

the halutza,

is forbidden to his father and to his father’s father.

And the Gemara infers:

At any rate, it teaches: “

She is forbidden to

his father’s father.”

Is it not

that she is forbidden to him

because of the one who performed halitza, for she becomes

the halutza like

“the daughter-in-law of his son,”

which is a prohibition of secondary relationships in the case of a halutza? [

For had she been married to the one who performed halitza, she would have been forbidden to his father by Torah law as “his daughter-in-law,” and to his father’s father she would have been forbidden because she is a “second” to the forbidden relationship of “his daughter-in-law.”]

And from here it is proven that they decreed secondary relationships in the case of a halutza!

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

the halutza was not forbidden to his father’s father because of her relationship to the one who performed halitza, for in fact they did not decree secondary relationships in the case of a halutza.

Rather,

because of the deceased,

because of the dead brother, she is forbidden under the prohibition of secondary relationships.

For she becomes

the halutza [while her deceased husband was still alive] forbidden to his father’s father as a “second” to

the daughter-in-law of his son.

For just as the daughter-in-law of his son is forbidden by Torah law, so, under the law of secondary relationships, the daughter-in-law of his grandson is forbidden.

The Gemara brings another proof that they decreed secondary relationships in the case of a halutza, from our Mishna:

Come and hear: And

the halutza is forbidden

to the grandson

of the one who performed halitza.

Is it not because of the one who performed halitza

that she is forbidden, and because they decreed secondary relationships in the case of a halutza [for with regard to his son she would have been forbidden by Torah law, had she been his wife, under the law of the father’s wife; therefore, with regard to his grandson she is forbidden under the law of secondary relationships, like the wife of his grandfather]?

For she becomes

the halutza forbidden because of

the wife of his grandfather,

whose prohibition is under the law of secondary relationships [for the wife of his father is a Torah-level forbidden relationship].

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

she is forbidden not because of secondary relationships in the case of a halutza.

Rather,

because of the deceased,

the dead brother, she is forbidden, since

she becomes the wife of the brother of his grandfather,

which is forbidden to him under the law of secondary relationships.

And we challenge: How can you say that the wife of the brother of his grandfather is forbidden under the law of secondary relationships?

But Amemar permits [

above, 21b]

the wife of the brother of his grandfather!

For according to his view she is not forbidden as a secondary relationship.

Necessarily, the intention of the Mishna is to forbid her because of the grandson of the one who performed halitza, since she is the wife of his grandfather. And this prohibition is under the law of secondary relationships.

And it is proven that they decreed secondary relationships in the case of a halutza.

And we answer:

Amemar,

who permitted the wife of the brother of his grandfather,

interprets it, he will interpret our Mishna, which says “and she is forbidden to his grandson,” not as referring to the grandson of the one who performed halitza, but rather

as referring to the son of the grandfather!

to the son of the grandfather!

That is, the grandson of the “grandfather,” the father of the one who performed halitza and of the deceased brother, who is the son of the brother of the one who performed halitza.

And she is forbidden to him under the law of “his aunt,” which is a forbidden relationship for him [had the halutza been married to the one who performed halitza], and it is not a prohibition of secondary relationships.

And this is the order of the Mishna according to Amemar: she [the halutza] is forbidden to the father of the one who performed halitza [who is the grandfather], and to his father’s father.

And to the son of his father, the grandfather [and not as we had thought, his son], and to the grandson of the grandfather [and not as we had thought, the grandson of the one who performed halitza].

Accordingly, the prohibition of “his son” stated in the Mishna, who is the brother of the one who performed halitza and the brother of her deceased husband, is a Torah prohibition: the halutza is forbidden to all the brothers of the one who performed halitza by a negative commandment [“Since he did not build her, he shall not build her again,” because the one who performed halitza performed halitza as the agent of all the brothers, as Rabbi Yohanan stated above in the first chapter, 10b].

And the prohibition of “his grandson” is a forbidden-relationship prohibition, for the halutza is forbidden to him as the wife of his father’s brother.

And we wonder:

If so,

if you say this, that “his grandson” is the grandson of the grandfather and not of the one who performed halitza, you find that “his son and his grandson” stated in the Mishna

are his brother

of the one who performed halitza [who is the son of the grandfather],

and his brother’s son

of the one who performed halitza [who is the grandson of the grandfather]!

But “his brother and his brother’s son” are stated separately in the Mishna!?

And we answer: According to Amemar, the tanna taught in our Mishna two forms of “his brother and his brother’s son.”

At first

he taught “his brother”

and his brother’s son —

from the father,

for, as stated, their prohibition is by Torah law.

And

afterward

he taught “his son and his grandson” of the grandfather, who are “his brother and his brother’s son” of the one who performed halitza and of the deceased brother — when they are

and his brother’s sons

his brothers

and his brother’s son

from the mother.

For example, the deceased brother and the brother who performed halitza were brothers both from the father and from the mother, and they had another brother who was their brother from the mother but not from the father.

And the halutza is forbidden to the third brother under the law of the wife of a brother of the deceased, who was his brother from his mother and was never subject to yibum, and this is a Torah-level forbidden relationship.

Likewise, the son of the third brother is forbidden to her under the law of the wife of his father’s brother, which is a Torah-level forbidden relationship.

And the tanna was not speaking at all about the prohibition of secondary relationships.

The Gemara brings another proof:

Come and hear,

from that

which Rabbi Hiyya taught

concerning the prohibition of relationship with a halutza:

Four

forms of prohibited relationship with a halutza are forbidden

by words of Torah.

And four

are forbidden

by the words of the Scribes.

Rabbi Hiyya explains:

The four prohibitions of relationship with a halutza that are by Torah law are:

1.

The father

of the one who performed halitza is forbidden to her by Torah law, because she is the daughter-in-law of his deceased son, and the prohibition of his daughter-in-law remains forever, even after the death of his son.

2.

And his son

of the one who performed halitza is forbidden to her by Torah law, because she is the wife of his father’s brother [the brother who died].

3.

His brother

of the one who performed halitza is forbidden to her by Torah law, under the negative commandment “Since he did not build her, he shall not build her again,” and this prohibition applies to all the brothers, since the one who performed halitza performed halitza as the agent of all the brothers.

4.

And his brother’s son

of the one who performed halitza is forbidden to her by Torah law, since she is the wife of his father’s brother [who died].

These four prohibitions are

by words of Torah.

And these are the four prohibitions of relationship with a halutza by the words of the Scribes:

1.

His father’s father

of the one who performed halitza is forbidden to her under the law of secondary relationships, for she is the daughter-in-law of his grandson, and she is a “second” to his daughter-in-law, who is forbidden by Torah law.

2.

And his mother’s father

of the one who performed halitza is forbidden to her, because she is a “second” to the daughter-in-law of his daughter, who is forbidden by Torah law.

3.

His grandson.

The Gemara has now assumed that he is forbidden to her because the halutza is considered like the wife of the one who performed halitza, so as to decree the prohibition of secondary relationships with regard to her; he is forbidden to her by rabbinic law as a “second” to the wife of his grandfather, who is forbidden by Torah law.

4.

And his granddaughter.

For the halutza is forbidden to him as the wife of his maternal grandfather.

And all these are secondary relationships, forbidden only

by the words of the Scribes.

Nevertheless, the Sages decreed to forbid her.

And the Gemara infers from Rabbi Hiyya’s words:

At any rate, he teaches, “his father’s father,

by the words of the Scribes.”

Is it not

that his prohibition is

because of the one who performed halitza,

for they regarded the one who performed halitza as though he had married her,

and she becomes

as though she were

the daughter-in-law of his son,

who is forbidden under the law of secondary relationships?

And it is proven that they decreed secondary relationships in the case of a halutza! But the Gemara rejects the proof:

No,

she is forbidden not because of the one who performed halitza, but

because of the deceased,

the dead brother,

for she becomes the daughter-in-law of his son,

and is forbidden under the ordinary law of secondary relationships, and not because of the decree concerning secondary relationships in the case of a halutza.

Come and hear

from that which we learned in Rabbi Hiyya’s words:

“His mother’s father.”

Is it not because of the one who performed halitza

that she is forbidden,

for she becomes

as though she were

the daughter-in-law of his daughter,

who is a second to his daughter-in-law?

And it is proven that they decreed secondary relationships in the case of a halutza!

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

she is forbidden not because of the one who performed halitza, but

because of the deceased, for she becomes the daughter-in-law of his daughter,

of the dead brother, and is forbidden under the ordinary law of secondary relationships.

Come and hear

from that which we learned in Rabbi Hiyya’s words:

“And his grandson.”

Is it not because of the one who performed halitza, for she becomes the wife of his grandfather,

who is forbidden under the law of secondary relationships?

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

she is forbidden not because of the one who performed halitza, but

because of the deceased, for she becomes the wife of the brother of his grandfather.

And the Gemara wonders:

But Amemar permits the wife of the brother of his grandfather,

and holds that they did not decree secondary relationships with regard to her!

Necessarily, she is forbidden because of the one who performed halitza, and it is proven that they decreed secondary relationships in the case of a halutza, and therefore she is forbidden as the wife of his grandfather.

And we answer: indeed,

Amemar interprets it as being because of the one who performed halitza, and he holds

that Amemar holds that they

decreed secondary relationships in the case of a halutza,

and she is forbidden as the wife of his grandfather.

But the question remains according to the one who forbids the wife of the brother of his grandfather, who can interpret Rabbi Hiyya’s statement as referring to the deceased, with the prohibition of the wife of the brother of his grandfather; according to him, the question remains whether they decreed secondary relationships in the case of forbidden relationships or not.

Come and hear

from that which we learned in Rabbi Hiyya’s words:

“And his granddaughter.”

Is it not because of the one who performed halitza, for she becomes the wife of his maternal grandfather,

which is a secondary relationship?

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

she is forbidden not because of the one who performed halitza, but

because of the deceased, for she becomes the wife of the brother of his maternal grandfather.

And the Gemara wonders about the rejection:

But with regard to secondary relationships of a forbidden relationship, they did not decree

with regard to the wife of the brother of his maternal grandfather!

And it is impossible to forbid her because of the deceased under this prohibition.

Therefore the proof returns:

Rather, is it not,

that her entire prohibition is

because of the one who performed halitza,

for she has the prohibition of the secondary relationship of the wife of his maternal grandfather.

And learn from this: They decreed secondary relationships in the case of a halutza.

The Gemara’s conclusion is: indeed,

learn from this!

We learned in the Mishna:

A man is permitted

to the relative of the co-wife of his halutza, and he is forbidden to the co-wife of the relative of his halutza.

Rav Tovi bar Kisna said in the name of Shmuel:

One of the brothers

who has relations with the co-wife of a halutza,

that is, one yevama underwent halitza, while this one did not undergo halitza, because only one of the yevamot undergoes halitza, and the others become permitted to marry outside the levirate bond by virtue of the halitza of the one —

the child is a mamzer!

What is the reason?

Since this one did not undergo halitza —

in its

previous prohibition as the wife of a brother

it remains,

she continues to stand under the prohibition of the wife of a brother, which carries karet, for the prohibition carrying karet was permitted only for the purpose of yibum. But this woman, who does not undergo yibum, since she was released through the halitza of the other yevama, remains under the prohibition of the wife of a brother that was not permitted for yibum.

Only the halutza herself is forbidden merely by a negative commandment, since it was said concerning her, by virtue of the halitza performed with her: “Since he did not build her, he shall not build her again.”

Rav Yosef said: We too have learned

this law in our Mishna, that one who has relations with the co-wife of a halutza has a mamzer, because she remains under a prohibition carrying karet.

For we learned in it:

“A man is permitted to the relative of the co-wife of his halutza!”

Granted, if you say that the co-wife

of a halutza

stands outside,

that she is not considered a halutza at all, since the other yevama did not perform halitza as the agent of all the yevamot, but performed halitza only for herself, while the others are automatically released, and therefore they remain under their previous prohibition carrying karet as the wife of a brother —

for that reason

it is properly

permitted

for a man

to her sister,

the sister of the co-wife of his halutza.

For the Sages did not decree the decree concerning relatives with regard to the co-wife of a halutza, as they decreed with regard to the halutza herself.

But if you say that the co-wife

of a halutza

is like a halutza,

since the one yevama performed halitza as the agent of all the yevamot —

why is it permitted

for a man to the relative of the co-wife of his halutza? After all, the prohibition of relatives should be decreed with regard to her, just as it was decreed with regard to his halutza! Rather, necessarily, the one does not perform halitza as the agent of all of them; rather, they remain under the punishment of karet for the wife of a brother, and if one of the brothers has relations with them, the child will be a mamzer.

And we inquire about it:

Shall we say that this constitutes

our Mishna, from which Rav Yosef proved that one who has relations with the co-wife of a halutza has a mamzer, because she remains under the punishment of karet for the wife of a brother,

a refutation of Rabbi Yohanan,

who said

Rabbi Yohanan [above, 10b]: One who performs halitza with his yevama,

whether he or the brothers, are not liable neither for karet because of the halutza nor for karet because of her co-wife!

Since the one who performs chalitza performs it as the agent of his brother, and the woman who undergoes chalitza undergoes it as the agent of her rival wives, therefore in all of them and in all of them there is only the prohibition, “Since he did not build, he shall not again build,” and in them and in them there is no karet for a brother’s wife.

Rabbi Yohanan could say to you: And can you understand it,

that

a sister of a chalutzah

itself is a prohibition

by Torah law,

so that you can prove from our Mishna the proof of Rav Yosef, from the fact that the Mishna did not prohibit the relative of the rival wife of his chalutzah, because the rival wife of the chalutzah is not considered a “chalutzah.” For if the rival wife too were considered a “chalutzah” [since the second one underwent chalitza as her agent], necessarily the relatives of the rival wife of the chalutzah would also have to be prohibited.

But Resh Lakish said: Here,

in the Mishna below,

Rabbi taught: A sister

of a woman

divorced—

is prohibited

by Torah law. A sister of a chalutzah

is prohibited to the one who performed chalitza

by rabbinic enactment.

And since the entire prohibition of the relatives of the chalutzah herself is only rabbinic, it is possible to say that, in fact, the chalutzah undergoes chalitza as the agent of all her rival wives, and they too do not remain under the prohibition of karet for a brother’s wife, but are prohibited only by the prohibition of “he shall not build.”

Rather, the Sages distinguished between the chalutzah and her rival wives, and prohibited only the relatives of the chalutzah herself, but did not prohibit the relatives of the rival wife of the chalutzah.

And now the Gemara explains the final clause of the Mishna, which says that a man is permitted to the relative of the rival wife of his chalutzah, but is prohibited to the rival wife of the relative of his chalutzah:

What is different about this one,

that a man is permitted to the relative of the rival wife of his chalutzah?

And what is different about this one,

that a man is prohibited to the rival wife of the relative of his chalutzah, even though the relative of his chalutzah and her rival wife are married to a foreign man who is not his brother?

And how does the relative of his chalutzah prohibit her “rival wife,” who is married together with her to a foreign man?