Yevamot 40b (מ:) — the Talmud in English

He,

the one who performed halitza,

is prohibited

by rabbinic decree from marrying any of her relatives, specifically all those relatives who would be forbidden to him by Torah law if she were his wife, as relations forbidden by the laws of forbidden relationships:

Her mother, her maternal grandmother, and her paternal grandmother

Her daughter, her granddaughter, and her son’s daughter

And her sister—

while she is

the halutza herself

alive.

But once the halutza dies, he is permitted to marry her sister, just as he is permitted to marry his wife’s sister after his wife’s death.

And

the other

brothers—

are permitted

to marry all the relatives of the halutza.

And she,

the halutza,

is prohibited to his father

by Torah law, because of the prohibition of “his daughter-in-law,” since she was the wife of the brother who died, and she remains prohibited to his father under the prohibition of a daughter-in-law even after her husband’s death.

And

she is prohibited even

to his grandfather. [

Rashi explains this according to the Gemara’s initial assumption: The Mishna teaches that although, if she had been the complete wife of the halutz, she would not have been prohibited to his grandfather under the prohibition of a daughter-in-law of one’s grandson, but only as a “secondary” relation [she is a “secondary” relation to the daughter-in-law of his son, who is prohibited by Torah law]—

nevertheless, the Sages decreed that even the halutza of one’s grandson should be prohibited to him.

But according to the Gemara’s conclusion, the prohibition is the prohibition of secondary relations, not because of the halutz, but because she was the wife of his deceased brother. She is prohibited to his grandfather because she is the daughter-in-law of his grandson, who is a “secondary” relation to the daughter-in-law of his son. ]

And

she is prohibited

to his son

by rabbinic decree, because of the prohibition of “his father’s wife,” which would be a Torah prohibition had she been married to the halutz.

And

she is prohibited even

to his grandson

of the halutz, although, had she been the wife of the halutz, she would have been prohibited to him only by rabbinic law, since the wife of one’s grandfather is merely a “secondary” relation.

The halutza is prohibited

to his brother,

because of the prohibition against a brother’s wife, as though she had been married to the halutz.

And to his brother’s son,

because of the prohibition against the wife of one’s paternal uncle, had she been married to the halutz.

The Mishna now explains a new decree that the Sages enacted concerning the relatives of one’s halutza, a decree unlike anything else found in the laws of yibbum:

Regarding the co-wife of one’s halutza, the amoraim disputed in the first chapter [10b–11a] whether she is prohibited by karet or only by a prohibition.

But according to all opinions:

A man is permitted to marry the relative of the co-wife of his halutza,

because the Sages enacted the prohibition against relatives only with regard to the halutza, and not with regard to her co-wife, who did not undergo halitza.

But he is prohibited to the co-wife of the relative of his halutza.

This prohibition concerning the co-wife of the relative of one’s halutza is novel, since it does not involve a case in which the woman fell to yibbum!

Rather, if the relative of his halutza was married to an unrelated man together with another woman, and the unrelated man died, the “co-wife of the relative of his halutza” is prohibited from marrying the yavam, for the reason that will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

They raised a dilemma before them:

Did

the Sages decree

also with regard to

“secondary relations in the case of a halutza”,

just as the Sages decreed secondary relations with regard to a married woman, for example, prohibiting her mother’s mother [i.e., the fourth generation]—

or not

did they enact this decree in the case of a halutza?

The Gemara explains the two sides of the dilemma:

Perhaps only

with regard to a Torah-level forbidden relationship,

the relatives of his wife, whose mother and maternal grandmother are Torah-level forbidden relations,

did the Sages decree

to prohibit also the

“secondary relations”,

prohibiting even the fourth generation above her, her mother’s mother’s mother.

But

in the case of a halutza,

whose relatives, such as her mother and maternal grandmother, are prohibited only by rabbinic decree—

the Sages did not decree

with regard to her

“secondary relations”,

to prohibit even the fourth generation of the halutza’s maternal grandmother.

Or perhaps: There is no difference.

Come and hear

from our Mishna, where we learned:

He,

the halutz,

is prohibited to her mother and her maternal grandmother.

But “her mother’s maternal grandmother”—

it does not teach

that the halutz is prohibited to her!

The Gemara rejects this proof:

Actually, the Sages did decree secondary relations in the case of a halutza, and they prohibited even the fourth generation, her mother’s maternal grandmother.

And the reason that the tanna did not mention the fourth generation in our Mishna—

perhaps, this is the reason that he did not teach

the prohibition of the fourth generation in the case of a halutza—

because he wanted

the tanna

to teach in the latter clause: “And the brothers”

of the halutz

are permitted [

to marry the relatives of his halutza].

And had he taught

in the first clause that the halutz is prohibited to

his mother’s maternal grandmother, I would have assumed

that the tanna’s statement in the latter clause,

“the brothers are permitted”,

refers

specifically to his mother’s maternal grandmother,

who is prohibited to the halutz only by the decree concerning secondary relations. Therefore, only the halutz is prohibited to her, but not the brothers.

But with regard to her maternal grandmother and her mother,

whose prohibition is not due to the decree concerning “secondary relations,” but to the decree concerning “forbidden relationships”—

not

are the other brothers permitted to marry them.

There would be grounds for this distinction, since relatives who are not classified as “secondary relations,” such as her mother and maternal grandmother, who would be Torah-level forbidden relations [had she been his wife], are prohibited to all the brothers [by rabbinic law!] because of zekika.

We might say that the Sages decreed a prohibition of “forbidden relationships” through zekika, but they did not decree a prohibition of “secondary relations” through zekika.

And even after halitza, when the zekika has already been removed, these women remain prohibited to all the brothers, just as they continue to be prohibited to the brother who performed halitza, since the brother performed halitza as the agent of all the brothers. Therefore, just as the Sages themselves decreed that the prohibition against the relatives of a halutza should continue to apply to him even after the zekika was removed, so too they decreed this with regard to all the brothers.

Therefore, the tanna did not mention in the first clause the prohibition of the halutza’s mother’s maternal grandmother, so that we would not arrive at this mistaken understanding of the latter clause. If so, there is no proof from here that the halutza’s mother’s maternal grandmother is permitted.

But the Gemara challenges this rejection, because there is still a way to prove the matter:

And let him teach

in the first clause the prohibition of

the mother’s maternal grandmother

to the halutz,

and let him teach

in the latter clause:

“The brothers are permitted to marry all of them!”

Then there would be no possibility of reaching a mistaken conclusion.

And since the tanna did not mention this prohibition in the first clause, it is proven that the Sages did not decree secondary relations in the case of a halutza.

The Gemara’s conclusion is that indeed

it is difficult

for the rejection that the Gemara sought to offer for the proof from the fact that the prohibition of secondary relations in the case of a halutza was not mentioned in the Mishna, indicating that she is permitted.

Rather, this proof is valid.

But the Gemara brings a proof from our Mishna to the contrary, that indeed the Sages did decree secondary relations in the case of a halutza.

Come and hear

from that which is stated in the Mishna:

She,

the halutza,

is prohibited to his father and to his grandfather.

The Gemara infers:

In any event, it teaches: “

She is prohibited to

his grandfather.”

Is it not

that she is prohibited to him

because of the halutz, such that she has become

like

“the daughter-in-law of his son”,

which is a prohibition of secondary relations in the case of a halutza? [

For had she been married to the halutz, she would have been prohibited to his father by Torah law because of the forbidden relationship of “his daughter-in-law,” while to his grandfather she would have been prohibited because she is a “secondary” relation to the forbidden relationship of “his daughter-in-law.” ]

And from here it is proven that the Sages decreed secondary relations in the case of a halutza!

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

the halutza was not prohibited to his grandfather because of her relationship to the halutz, since in fact the Sages did not decree secondary relations in the case of a halutza.

Rather,

because of the deceased,

the deceased brother, she is prohibited under the prohibition of secondary relations.

For she has become

the halutza [during the lifetime of her deceased husband] prohibited to his grandfather as a “secondary” relation to

the daughter-in-law of his son.

Just as the forbidden relationship of a daughter-in-law is prohibited by Torah law, so too, by the laws of secondary relations, “the daughter-in-law of his son” is prohibited.

The Gemara brings another proof that the Sages decreed secondary relations in the case of a halutza, from our Mishna:

Come and hear: And

the halutza is prohibited

to his grandson

of the halutz.

Is it not because of the halutz

that she is prohibited, and because the Sages decreed secondary relations in the case of a halutza [for, had she been his wife, she would have been prohibited to his son by Torah law because of the prohibition of a father’s wife, and therefore to his grandson she is prohibited by the law of secondary relations, as the wife of his grandfather]?

For she has become

the halutza prohibited as

the wife of his grandfather,

whose prohibition is governed by the law of secondary relations [since his father’s wife is a Torah-level forbidden relationship].

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

she is not prohibited because of secondary relations in the case of a halutza.

Rather,

because of the deceased,

the deceased brother, she is prohibited, since

she has become the wife of his grandfather’s brother,

who is prohibited to him under the law of secondary relations.

And we challenge this: How can you say that the wife of his grandfather’s brother is prohibited under the law of secondary relations?

But Ameimar deems permissible [

above, 21b]

the wife of his grandfather’s brother!

According to his opinion, she is not prohibited under the law of secondary relations.

It must therefore be that the Mishna intends to prohibit her because she is the grandson of the halutz, since she is the wife of his grandfather. And this prohibition is governed by the law of secondary relations.

This proves that the Sages decreed secondary relations in the case of a halutza.

And we answer:

Ameimar,

who deemed permissible the wife of his grandfather’s brother,

interprets it—he interprets the Mishna’s statement “and she is prohibited to his grandson” not as referring to the grandson of the halutz, but

as referring to the son of the grandfather!

As the bar b’rei of the grandfather!

That is, the grandson of the “grandfather,” the father of the halutz and the deceased brother, who is the son of the halutz’s brother.

And she is prohibited to him because of the prohibition of “his aunt,” which is a Torah-level forbidden relationship for him [had the halutza been married to the halutz], and it is not a prohibition of secondary relations.

And this is the order of the Mishna according to Ameimar: She [the halutza] is prohibited to the father of the halutz [who is the grandfather], and to his grandfather.

And to the son of his father, the grandfather [and not, as we had assumed, the son of the halutz], and to the grandson of the grandfather [and not, as we had assumed, the grandson of the halutz].

Accordingly, the prohibition of “his son” mentioned in the Mishna, namely, the brother of the halutz and the brother of her deceased husband, is a Torah prohibition: The halutza is prohibited to all the brothers of the halutz by a prohibition [“Since he did not build, he shall not build again,” because the halutz performed halitza as the agent of all the brothers, as stated by Rabbi Yohanan above in the first chapter, 10b].

And the prohibition of “his grandson” is a forbidden relationship, since the halutza is prohibited to him as the wife of his father’s brother.

We wonder:

If so,

if you say this, that “his grandson” refers to the grandson of the grandfather and not to the grandson of the halutz, it follows that “his son and his grandson” mentioned in the Mishna

are his brother

of the halutz [who is the son of the grandfather],

and his brother’s son

of the halutz [who is the grandson of the grandfather]!

But “his brother and his brother’s son” are stated separately in the Mishna!?

And we answer: According to Ameimar, the tanna taught in our Mishna two forms of “his brother and his brother’s son.”

First,

he taught “his brother”

and his brother’s son—

on the father’s side,

as stated, their prohibition is by Torah law.

And

afterward,

he taught “his son and his grandson” of the grandfather, who are “his brother and his brother’s son” of the halutz and of the deceased brother—when they are

his brother

and his brother’s son

on the mother’s side.

For example, the deceased brother and the brother who performed halitza were brothers both on their father’s side and on their mother’s side, and they had an additional brother who was their maternal brother but not their paternal brother.

The halutza is prohibited to this third brother because of the prohibition of the wife of a brother who died, as he was the deceased’s maternal brother, who was never eligible for yibbum; this is a Torah-level forbidden relationship.

Similarly, the third brother’s son is prohibited to her because of the prohibition of the wife of one’s father’s brother, which is a Torah-level forbidden relationship.

And the tanna was not speaking at all about the prohibition of secondary relations.

The Gemara brings another proof:

Come and hear,

from that

which Rabbi Hiyya taught

concerning the prohibition against marrying the relatives of a halutza:

Four

forms of prohibited relationship with a halutza are prohibited

by Torah law.

And four

are prohibited

by rabbinic law.

Rabbi Hiyya explains:

The four Torah-level prohibitions involving relatives of a halutza are:

a.

The father

of the halutz is prohibited to her by Torah law, because she is the daughter-in-law of his deceased son, and the prohibition of a daughter-in-law remains forever, even after his son’s death.

b.

And his son

of the halutz is prohibited to her by Torah law, because she is the wife of his father’s brother [the brother who died].

c.

His brother

of the halutz is prohibited to her by Torah law, under the prohibition “Since he did not build, he shall not build again.” This prohibition applies to all the brothers, since the halutz performed halitza as the agent of all the brothers.

d.

And his brother’s son

of the halutz is prohibited to her by Torah law, since she is the wife of his father’s brother [who died].

These four prohibitions are

by Torah law.

And these are the four prohibitions involving relatives of a halutza that apply by rabbinic law:

a.

His grandfather

of the halutz is prohibited to her under the law of secondary relations, since she is the daughter-in-law of his grandson, a “secondary” relation to the daughter-in-law of his son, who is prohibited by Torah law.

b.

And his maternal grandfather

of the halutz is prohibited to her, because she is a “secondary” relation to the daughter-in-law of his daughter, who is prohibited by Torah law.

c.

His grandson.

For the Gemara initially assumes that he is prohibited to her because the halutza is considered the wife of the halutz, and the prohibition of secondary relations was decreed in her case. He is prohibited to her by rabbinic law as a “secondary” relation to the wife of his grandfather, who is prohibited by Torah law.

d.

And his granddaughter.

The halutza is prohibited to him as the wife of his maternal grandfather.

All these are secondary relations, prohibited only

by rabbinic law.

Nevertheless, the Sages decreed that she should be prohibited to them.

The Gemara infers from Rabbi Hiyya’s statement:

In any event, he teaches, “His grandfather,

by rabbinic law.”

Is it not

that his prohibition is

because of the halutz,

who was treated as though he had married her,

so that she has become

as though she were

the daughter-in-law of his son,

who is prohibited under the law of secondary relations?

This proves that the Sages decreed secondary relations in the case of a halutza! But the Gemara rejects the proof:

No,

she is not prohibited because of the halutz, but

because of the deceased,

the deceased brother,

for she has become the daughter-in-law of his son,

and is prohibited under the ordinary law of secondary relations, not because of the decree concerning secondary relations in the case of a halutza.

Come and hear

from that which we learned in Rabbi Hiyya’s statement:

His maternal grandfather.

Is it not because of the halutz

that she is prohibited to him,

for she has become

as though she were

the daughter-in-law of his daughter,

which is a secondary relation to his daughter-in-law?

This proves that the Sages decreed secondary relations in the case of a halutza!

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

she is not prohibited because of the halutz, but

because of the deceased, for she has become the daughter-in-law of his daughter

of the deceased brother, and she is prohibited under the ordinary law of secondary relations.

Come and hear

from that which we learned in Rabbi Hiyya’s statement:

And his grandson.

Is it not because of the halutz, for she has become the wife of his grandfather,

who is prohibited under the law of secondary relations?

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

she is not prohibited because of the halutz, but

because of the deceased, for she has become the wife of his grandfather’s brother.

The Gemara objects:

But Ameimar deems permissible the wife of his grandfather’s brother,

and maintains that the Sages did not decree that she is prohibited as a secondary relation!

It must therefore be that she is prohibited because of the halutz, proving that the Sages decreed secondary relations in the case of a halutza, and therefore she is prohibited as the wife of his grandfather.

And we answer: Indeed,

Ameimar interprets it as referring to the halutz, and he maintains

that

the Sages decreed secondary relations in the case of a halutza,

and she is prohibited as the wife of his grandfather.

But according to the one who prohibits the wife of his grandfather’s brother, he can interpret Rabbi Hiyya’s statement as referring to a prohibition because of the deceased, namely, the prohibition of the wife of his grandfather’s brother. According to him, the question remains whether the Sages decreed secondary relations in the case of forbidden relationships or not.

Come and hear

from that which we learned in Rabbi Hiyya’s statement:

And his granddaughter.

Is it not because of the halutz, for she has become the wife of his maternal grandfather,

which is a secondary relation?

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

she is not prohibited because of the halutz, but

because of the deceased, for she has become the wife of his maternal grandfather’s brother.

The Gemara objects to this rejection:

But with regard to secondary relations of a forbidden relationship, the Sages did not decree

that the wife of his maternal grandfather’s brother is prohibited!

It is impossible to prohibit her because of the deceased under this prohibition.

Therefore the proof returns:

Rather, is it not that her entire prohibition is

because of the halutz,

since she is subject to the prohibition of secondary relations as the wife of his maternal grandfather?

And conclude from this: The Sages decreed secondary relations in the case of a halutza.

The Gemara concludes: Indeed,

conclude from this!

We learned in the Mishna:

A man is permitted

to marry the relative of the co-wife of his halutza, but he is prohibited to the co-wife of the relative of his halutza.

Rav Tuvya bar Kisna said in the name of Shmuel:

One of the brothers

who engages in intercourse with the co-wife of a halutza,

that is, one yevama underwent halitza, while this one did not, since only one of the yevamot undergoes halitza, and the others become permitted to marry outsiders by virtue of the halitza performed by the first—

the child is a mamzer!

What is the reason?

Since this woman did not undergo halitza, she

remains

in her previous

prohibited status

as a brother’s wife. She continues to be subject to the prohibition of a brother’s wife, for which the penalty is karet, since the prohibition carrying karet was permitted only for the purpose of yibbum. This woman, who is not taken in yibbum because she was released through the halitza of the other yevama, remains subject to the prohibition of a brother’s wife that was not permitted for yibbum.

Only the halutza herself is prohibited merely by a prohibition, since it is stated with regard to her, by virtue of the halitza performed with her: “Since he did not build, he shall not build again.”

Rav Yosef said: We too have learned this

as a halakhic ruling in our Mishna: One who engages in intercourse with the co-wife of a halutza produces a mamzer, because she remains subject to the prohibition carrying karet.

As we learned in it:

“A man is permitted to marry the sister of the co-wife of his halutza!”

Granted, if the co-wife

of a halutza

stands outside,

since she is not considered a halutza at all, because the other yevama did not perform halitza as the agent of all the yevamot, but performed halitza only for herself, while the others are automatically released, and therefore they remain subject to their previous prohibition carrying karet as the wives of brothers—

for that reason

it is properly

permitted

for a man

to marry her sister,

the sister

of the co-wife of his halutza.

For the Sages did not enact the decree concerning relatives with regard to the co-wife of a halutza, as they enacted it with regard to the halutza herself.

But if you say that the co-wife

of a halutza

is comparable to a halutza,

since the one yevama performed halitza as the agent of all the yevamot—

why is it permitted

for a man to marry the relative of the co-wife of his halutza? The prohibition against relatives should have been enacted with regard to her, just as it was enacted with regard to his halutza! Rather, it must be that the one yevama does not perform halitza as the agent of all of them; instead, they remain subject to the penalty of karet for the prohibition of a brother’s wife, and if one of the brothers engages in intercourse with them, the child is a mamzer.

And we raise a difficulty:

Let us say that our Mishna should be

a refutation

of Rabbi Yohanan.

As he said

Rabbi Yohanan [above, 10b]: One who performs halitza with his yevama,

whether he or the brothers, are not liable for karet, neither for the halutza nor for her co-wife!

whether he or the brothers, are not liable neither for karet because of the halutza nor for karet because of her co-wife!

Since the yavam performed halitza as his brothers’ agent, and the halutza performed halitza as the agent of her co-wives, therefore, in all of them, there is only the prohibition of “since he did not build, he may no longer build,” and neither the men nor the women are subject to karet for the prohibition of a brother’s wife.

Rabbi Yohanan could say to you: But can you maintain that

is it so that

the sister of a halutza

herself is a prohibition

by Torah law,

such that you can establish Rabbi Yosef’s proof from our Mishna, based on the fact that the Mishna did not prohibit the relative of the co-wife of his halutza, because the co-wife of a halutza is not considered a “halutza”? For if the co-wife too were considered a “halutza” [since the second woman performed halitza as her agent], it would necessarily follow that the relatives of the co-wife of a halutza should also be prohibited.

But Resh Lakish said: Here,

in the Mishna below,

Rabbi taught: The sister

of a woman

who was divorced—

is prohibited

by Torah law. The sister of a halutza

is prohibited to the yavam

by rabbinic enactment.

Since the entire prohibition of the relatives of the halutza herself is only rabbinic, it is possible to say that the halutza indeed performed halitza as the agent of all her co-wives, and they too are not subject to the prohibition of a brother’s wife carrying karet, but are prohibited only by the prohibition of “he may no longer build.”

Rather, the Sages distinguished between the halutza and her co-wives: They prohibited only the relatives of the halutza herself, but did not prohibit the relatives of the co-wife of the halutza.

The Gemara now explains the latter clause of the Mishna, which states that a man is permitted to marry the relative of the co-wife of his halutza, but is prohibited from marrying the co-wife of the relative of his halutza:

What is different about this one,

so that a man is permitted to marry the relative of the co-wife of his halutza,

and what is different about this one,

so that a man is prohibited from marrying the co-wife of the relative of his halutza, although the relative of his halutza and her co-wife are married to another man, who is not his brother?

And how does the relative of his halutza prohibit her “co-wife,” who is married together with her to a non-Jewish man?