Yevamot 40a — the Talmud in English

At first,

before the meal-offering had been consecrated, it

was included within what was permitted.

But once the meal-offering had been consecrated, it

became forbidden

for eating until it was taken in a handful and the handful was burned.

And it became permitted again

for eating once it had been taken in a handful and its handful had been burned.

Can it return to its first permitted status,

as will be explained?

The verse states: “As unleavened loaves it shall be eaten, in a holy place” —

a mitzva!

And the Gemara infers:

Granted according to Rava, who said: “Whose is this”

— according to whose method is this beraita stated? — It is the method of

the Rabbis,

and according to his view it teaches in it “a mitzva” [which is merely an initial preference], and not “for a mitzva” [whose meaning is specifically a mitzva and not permission]; it is satisfactory.

For

here,

with regard to eating the remainder of the meal-offering,

this is what it is saying:

“As unleavened loaves it shall be eaten, in a holy place” —

a mitzva.

At first,

before the meal-offering had been consecrated, it

was included within what was permitted to him: if he wished, he ate it; if he wished, he did not eat it.

And in the middle of the words of the beraita the Gemara is astonished: How does the beraita say

“if he wished, he ate it; if he wished, he did not eat it”?

But is it possible to say the possibility that

“if he wished, he did not eat it”?

But it is written

with regard to eating consecrated things, in the portion that reaches the kohanim [Exodus 29]:

“And they shall eat them through whom atonement was made,” this teaches

the verse

that the kohanim eat

the offering,

and

the

owners

of the offering

attain atonement

through the kohanim’s eating their offering, complete atonement!

And if so, the kohanim are obligated to eat the offering and the remainder of the meal-offering, so that there will be complete atonement for the owners who bring it.

And how did you say “if he wished, he did not eat it”?

Rather,

necessarily, this is what the tanna said in the beraita:

if he wished,

the kohen who performed the procedures of the meal-offering

he

himself

eats it.

And if

he wished —

another kohen eats it!

The verse states: “As unleavened loaves it shall be eaten, in a holy place” —

a mitzva

for the kohen who performs the procedures of the meal-offering to eat it, more than another kohen.

But according to Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi, who said

that this beraita is according to the method of

Abba Shaul,

and it should be read in it “for a mitzva,” for disqualification if not done so, and not “a mitzva,” initially, it is difficult:

Here,

with regard to eating the remainder of the meal-offering —

what are the “two possibilities” here!?

What two possibilities are there here, as with a yevama [for a mitzva and not for a mitzva], such that you could say that the tanna came to exclude the second possibility from the verse?

And if you would say

that the beraita is saying two possibilities:

if he wished —

he ate it for appetite; if he wished —

he ate it with gross eating.

The verse states “as unleavened loaves it shall be eaten,” to teach that only eating with appetite is valid, and not gross eating.

It is impossible to say this.

For

gross eating —

is it

whether

called eating,

so that the verse would need to exclude it with a special exclusion?

And the very law of eating was already learned from the first verse, “And Aaron and his sons shall eat it”!

But Reish Lakish said: One who eats gross eating,

which a person’s soul recoils from,

on Yom Kippur —

is exempt from

the transgression of “every person who

shall not be afflicted.”

Since even gross eating is called affliction, because he harms himself through such eating.

And the Gemara retracts and brings two other possibilities.

Rather,

these are the two possibilities with regard to the remainder of the meal-offering:

If he wished —

he ate it as unleavened bread; if he wished —

he ate it as leavened bread.

The verse states “as unleavened loaves it shall be eaten,” and not leavened bread!

And we challenge: This law, that one eats the meal-offering only when it is baked as unleavened bread and not as leavened bread, we already knew from another verse.

But it is written:

[Leviticus 6]

“It shall not be baked leavened —

their portion

I have given it.”

And Reish Lakish said

in expounding this verse: The meal-offering itself shall not be baked leavened,

and even their portion,

the portion of the kohanim, the remainder of the meal-offering after it was taken in a handful, also

shall not be baked leavened!

And on the basis of this challenge, the Gemara brings two other possibilities:

Rather, if he wished —

when it is baked

as unleavened bread, he eats it.

If he wished —

boiled,

[the dough is scalded in boiling water first, and afterward the scalded dough is baked, as unleavened bread],

he eats it.

The verse states “as unleavened loaves it shall be eaten,” and not scalded!

And we inquire:

This “scalded” —

what are its circumstances?

How do you regard the unleavened bread baked after scalding?

If it is unleavened bread —

this is unleavened bread!

And how do you exclude scalded from “as unleavened loaves it shall be eaten”?

And if

scalded

is not unleavened bread,

there is no need for a verse to exclude it.

For “and they shall eat it

as unleavened bread” —

the Merciful One stated

in the passage of Leviticus, and there is no need for “as unleavened loaves it shall be eaten” to exclude scalded.

And we answer:

No.

I can always say to you that scalded

—

is unleavened bread.

And for this the tanna taught

an additional

verse

with regard to eating the remainder of the meal-offering: “As unleavened loaves it shall be eaten” —

to disqualify!

For although scalded that was baked is to be regarded like unleavened bread that was baked without scalding, nevertheless, with regard to the remainder of the meal-offering it must be baked without first scalding it. [Tosafot]

And the Gemara is astonished:

Rather, “scalded is unleavened bread,”

as we are saying,

that we said in the beraita that there is a need for the verse “as unleavened loaves it shall be eaten” to exclude it from eating the remainder of the meal-offering —

for what halakhic purpose!?

That is, where is scalded regarded as unleavened bread, so that the verse “as unleavened loaves it shall be eaten” is needed to exclude it, to say that with regard to the remainder of the meal-offering it is unacceptable unleavened bread!?

And we answer: What we said, that scalded is unleavened bread, means

to say that a person fulfills his obligation through it

of eating unleavened bread

on Passover, even though he scalded it

in boiling water

at the outset.

Since he then baked it again

after scalding it

in an oven —

“bread of affliction” applies to it, and a person fulfills his obligation through it on Passover.

Mishna:

a.

One who performs ḥalitza with his yevama,

thereby does not forfeit his share in the inheritance of his deceased brother; rather,

he is like one of the brothers with regard to inheritance.

b.

And if there is a father there —

the father’s property.

For he precedes the brothers in inheritance.

c.

One who takes his yevama in levirate marriage —

acquires the property of his brother,

the deceased, and it is his, even if he divorces her the following day.

Rabbi Judah says: Whether in this case or in that,

whether one of the brothers performed levirate marriage with the yevama or did not perform levirate marriage with her,

if there is a father there —

the property

that falls through inheritance from the deceased brother

belongs to the father

alone, and not to the yavam.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama is like one of the brothers with regard to inheritance.

And we inquire:

Is it obvious

that the one who performed ḥalitza did not forfeit his share!?

And we answer:

It might enter your mind to say

that

ḥalitza stands in place of levirate marriage,

and he is as though he acquired her and sent her away,

and he should take

the one who performed ḥalitza

all the property

of his deceased brother, like one who performs levirate marriage with her.

It teaches us

that he is like one of the brothers, and he does not take all of it.

And we challenge:

If so,

if the novelty of the Mishna is that the one who performed ḥalitza does not acquire all the property, why did the Mishna state

“he is like one of the brothers”?

But

“he is only like one of the brothers” would have been required of it

for the Mishna to say.

Whereas the wording of the Mishna implies that the novelty is that he has any share at all, like one of the brothers!?

And because of this difficulty the Gemara gives another explanation:

Rather, it might enter your mind to say: Since he caused her to lose

the one who performed ḥalitza

from levirate marriage, let us penalize him,

the one who performed ḥalitza, so that he will not inherit his share in the property of the deceased.

It teaches us

our Mishna that the one who performed ḥalitza does not forfeit his share.

We learned in our Mishna:

“If there is a father there” —

the father’s property.

For the Master said

[in tractate Bava Batra 115a]

a father precedes

in the inheritance of his sons

all who issue from his loins.

We learned in our Mishna:

One who takes his yevama in levirate marriage

acquires the property of his brother.

And we inquire:

What is the reason?

That is, from where do we know that the yavam immediately acquires all the property, and not the father, who is the first in inheritance to all who issue from his loins? Perhaps the father acquires all the property, as is his law, being first to all who issue from his loins, and only when the father dies will the yavam acquire all the property.

And we answer: [Deuteronomy 25]

“He shall rise in the name of his brother,” the Merciful One stated,

and from there we learned the law that the yavam acquires the property of the deceased brother.

For through the inheritance that passes to him, he establishes the name of his brother, as his inheritance is called by his name, when he performs levirate marriage with his wife.

And his name has risen

of the deceased at the time when he performs levirate marriage with his wife, and therefore at that time he also acquires his inheritance.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Judah says:

Whether in this case or in that, if there is a father there, the property belongs to the father.

Ulla said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Judah.

And similarly Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Judah.

And Ulla said, and some say Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa: What is the reason of Rabbi Judah,

who says that the father acquires the property?

But from the moment that the brother performs levirate marriage with the wife of the deceased, the name of the deceased has risen, and his inheritance should pass to the yavam, since through this there is establishment of the name of the deceased brother by the brother who performs levirate marriage with his wife?

Because

it is written,

another verse, in the passage of levirate marriage: [Deuteronomy 25]

“And it shall be that the firstborn whom she bears.”

And this verse teaches that the law of the yavam is

like that of a “firstborn”:

Just as a firstborn

of the brothers

does not have

a share in the property of the father

during the lifetime of the father, so too this one

the yavam

also does not have

a share in property that is fit to be inherited through the father [who everywhere precedes all who issue from his loins]

during the lifetime of the father.

Therefore, the yavam does not acquire the inheritance of the deceased except where there is no father.

Lest you say: Since the Torah called the yavam “firstborn”:

If, just as a firstborn takes a double portion after the death of the father, so too this one

the yavam

takes a double portion after the death of the father,

and the yavam will take his share and the share of his deceased brother in the property that the father bequeaths?

Your answer is:

Is it something

whether

“he shall rise in the name of his father” is written?

Behold,

“he shall rise in the name of his brother” is written, and not “in the name of his father”!

And once the father inherited the property of the deceased, from now on, when the father dies, he bequeaths not the property of the deceased brother but his own property, and the yavam has no share in them in order to establish the name of his brother among the dead through their inheritance.

And we inquire: According to Rabbi Judah, who holds that if the father is alive, he is the heir, and then the establishment of the name of the deceased does not take place through transferring his inheritance to the yavam,

say

that only

where there is no father, so that he may take the inheritance,

when there is no father who takes the deceased’s inheritance for himself, but it passes to the brother who performs levirate marriage, who establishes a name for his brother — only then

will the mitzva of levirate marriage be fulfilled,

since then there is establishment of a name for the deceased brother through transferring his inheritance to the brother who performs levirate marriage.

But

where there is a father,

who does not

take

the yavam

an inheritance —

will the mitzva of levirate marriage not be fulfilled!?

And we answer:

Is it something

whether

levirate marriage through inheritance

that the yavam inherits the property of the deceased

did the Merciful One make it dependent?

It is not so!

Rather,

we perform levirate marriage,

that is the mitzva.

And if there is an inheritance —

he takes it,

the yavam takes the property of the deceased.

And if not,

if the yavam does not inherit, but the father does —

he does not take

the yavam.

Rabbi Ḥanina Kara sat before Rabbi Yannai, and sat and said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Judah.

He said to him

Rabbi Yannai:

Go out,

leave,

recite your recitation outside,

and recite the statement that you said outside, and not here, because it is incorrect, since

the halakha is not according to Rabbi Judah.

A tanna taught before Rav Naḥman: The halakha is not according to Rabbi Judah.

He said to him

Rav Naḥman:

Rather, according to whom

is the halakha? — Necessarily,

according to the Rabbis!

And if so, your teaching, in which you teach that the halakha is not according to Rabbi Judah,

is obvious

— for

an individual and the many —

the halakha is according to the many!?

He said to him,

the one who taught this statement before Rav Naḥman: Should I

erase it,

remove this statement from the teaching that I teach, since it is obvious!?

He said to him: No.

Do not remove it from your teaching!

For this teaching is a “necessary teaching.” Rather, you changed its words, and because of the change it became a “non-necessary teaching.” But if you correct it and return it to the wording that they taught you, it will again become a “necessary teaching.”

For

“the

halakha

according to Rabbi Judah”

you should teach it,

that is what they taught you!

And it is found to be a statement [“teaching”] that needs to be taught, for it contains the novelty that the halakha is according to an individual.

And it is the difficulty that he raised against you,

how can it be that the halakha is according to Rabbi Judah, when the halakha is according to the many and not according to an individual!?

And you reversed it,

and taught, “the halakha is not according to Rabbi Judah.”

And as for what you reversed —

you reversed it well.

That is, you did well by reversing it, since the halakha is not according to Rabbi Judah.

But although you are correct concerning what caused you to reverse and change the version, this is not the correct version in this teaching.

Rather, you must teach it as they taught it to you: that the halakha is according to Rabbi Judah, and therefore it is a necessary teaching.

But we do not hold that the halakha is like that teaching; rather, the halakha is according to the Sages.

Mishna:

In this Mishna the enactment of the Sages is explained, to forbid upon a yavam who performed ḥalitza with his yevama the relatives of the woman who underwent ḥalitza, as though the woman who underwent ḥalitza were his wife.

And similarly they enacted concerning the yevama who underwent ḥalitza, that she should be forbidden to the relatives of the one who performed ḥalitza, as though he were her husband.

One who performs ḥalitza with his yevama —

he is forbidden to her relatives, and she is forbidden to his relatives!