Yevamot 40a (מ.) — the Talmud in English

At first,

before the meal-offering had been consecrated, it

was included within what was permitted.

But once the meal-offering had been consecrated, it

became prohibited

for consumption until it was kemitzah was performed and the kometz was burned on the altar.

And it again became permitted

for consumption once kemitzah had been performed and its kometz had been burned.

Could it return to its original permitted status,

as will be explained?

The verse states: “It shall be eaten as matza, in a sacred place” —

a mitzva!

And the Gemara analyzes this:

Granted, according to Rava, who says: This is according to whom

is this beraita stated according to? According to the view of

the Rabbis,

and according to his explanation, the beraita teaches “a mitzva” [which indicates merely the preferred manner from the outset], and not “for a mitzva” [which would mean that it is specifically a mitzva and not merely permitted], this is understandable.

For

here,

with regard to eating the remainder of the meal-offering,

this is what it is saying:

“It shall be eaten as matza, in a sacred place” —

a mitzva.

At first,

before the meal-offering had been consecrated, it

was included within what was permitted: If he wished, he could eat it; if he wished, he need not eat it.

In the middle of the beraita’s statement, the Gemara raises a difficulty: How can the beraita say

“If he wished, he could eat it; if he wished, he need not eat it”?

Can one really suggest the possibility that

“if he wished, he need not eat it”?

But it is written

with regard to eating consecrated food, referring to the portion given to the priests [Exodus 29]:

“And they shall eat those things through which atonement was effected for them,” teaches

the verse

that the priests eat

the offering,

and

the

owners

of the offering

attain atonement

through the priests’ eating their offering, thereby attaining complete atonement!

If so, the priests are obligated to eat the offering and the remainder of the meal-offering, so that the owners who brought it will attain complete atonement.

And how could you say, “If he wished, he need not eat it”?

Rather,

the tanna of the beraita must have said as follows:

If he wished,

the priest who performed the procedures of the meal-offering could eat it —

he

himself

eats it.

And if

he wished —

another priest eats it!

The verse states: “It shall be eaten as matza, in a sacred place” —

a mitzva

for the priest who performs the procedures of the meal-offering to eat it, rather than another priest.

But according to Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi, who says

that this beraita is according to the view of

Abba Shaul,

and that it reads “for a mitzva,” indicating that the requirement is indispensable, and not “a mitzva,” which indicates a preferred manner from the outset, this is difficult:

Here,

with regard to eating the remainder of the meal-offering —

what “two possibilities” are there!?

What two possibilities are there here, as there are in the case of a yevama [for a mitzva and not for a mitzva], such that one could say that the tanna came to exclude the second possibility based on the verse?

And if you would say

that the beraita is stating two possibilities:

If he wished —

he eats it for appetite; if he wished —

he eats it after overeating.

The verse states, “It shall be eaten as matza,” teaching that only eating with appetite is valid, but eating after overeating is not.

This cannot be said.

For

eating after overeating —

does it

indeed

have the status of eating,

so that a special exclusion is required to disqualify it?

And the basic law of eating has already been derived from the first verse, “And Aaron and his sons shall eat it”!

But didn’t Reish Lakish say: One who eats after overeating

in a manner that causes a person’s soul to recoil,

on Yom Kippur —

is exempt from

the transgression of “every soul that

shall not be afflicted.”

Since even eating after overeating is called affliction, as such eating harms him.

The Gemara retracts this explanation and presents two other possibilities.

Rather,

these are the two possibilities with regard to the remainder of the meal-offering:

If he wished —

he eats it as matza; if he wished —

he eats it as leavened bread.

The verse states, “It shall be eaten as matza,” and not as leavened bread!

And we refute this: This law, that the meal-offering may be eaten only when it is baked as matza and not as leavened bread, was already known from another verse.

But it is written:

[Leviticus 6]

“It shall not be baked as leavened bread —

I have given it as their portion

for them.”

And Reish Lakish said

in his exposition of this verse: The meal-offering itself may not be baked as leavened bread,

and even their portion

of the priests—the remainder of the meal-offering after kemitzah—also

may not be baked as leavened bread!

By virtue of this refutation, the Gemara presents two other possibilities:

Rather, if he wished —

when it is baked

as matza, he eats it.

If he wished —

he eats it as ḥalut [

the dough is first scalded in boiling water, and afterward the scalded dough is baked as matza],

he eats it.

The verse states, “It shall be eaten as matza,” and not as ḥalut!

We inquire into this:

This “ḥalut” —

what are its circumstances?

How do you regard matza that was baked after being scalded?

If it is matza —

it is matza!

And how can you exclude ḥalut from “It shall be eaten as matza”?

And if

it is ḥalut and

is not matza,

there is no need for a verse to exclude it.

For “And they shall eat it

as matza” —

the Merciful One stated

in the passage of the eighth chapter, and there is no need for “It shall be eaten as matza” to exclude ḥalut.

And we resolve this:

No.

I will always say to you that

ḥalut

is matza.

And for this reason the tanna taught

a

verse

additional to the eating of the remainder of the meal-offering: “It shall be eaten as matza” —

indispensably!

For although ḥalut that was subsequently baked is to be regarded as matza baked without prior scalding, nevertheless, in the case of the remainder of the meal-offering, it must be baked without first scalding it. [Tosafot]

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Rather, “ḥalut is matza,”

as we are saying,

that the beraita says that the verse “It shall be eaten as matza” is needed to exclude it from the eating of the remainder of the meal-offering —

for what halakhic purpose!?

That is, in what respect is ḥalut considered matza, such that the verse “It shall be eaten as matza” is needed to teach that, with regard to the remainder of the meal-offering, it is unsuitable matza!?

And we resolve this: When we said that ḥalut is matza, the intention is

to say that a person fulfills his obligation through it

when eating matza

on Pesaḥ, even though he scalded it

in boiling water

at the outset.

Since he subsequently baked it

after scalding it

in an oven —

“we call it ‘the bread of affliction,’ and a person fulfills his obligation through it on Pesaḥ.

Mishna:

a.

One who performs ḥalitza with his yevama,

does not thereby forfeit his share in the inheritance of his deceased brother; rather,

he is like one of the brothers with regard to inheritance.

b.

And if there is a father —

the property belongs to the father,

as he precedes the brothers in inheritance.

c.

One who takes his yevama in levirate marriage —

acquires the property of his brother

who died, and it belongs to him, even if he divorces her the following day.

Rabbi Yehuda says: In either case,

whether one of the brothers performed levirate marriage with the yevama or none of them did,

if there is a father —

the property

that would otherwise be inherited from the deceased brother

belongs to the father

alone, and not to the yavam.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama is like one of the brothers with regard to inheritance.

We inquire into this:

Is this not obvious

that the one who performed ḥalitza does not forfeit his share!?

And we resolve this:

It might enter your mind to say

that

ḥalitza stands in place of levirate marriage,

and he is considered as though he acquired her and then sent her away,

and the one who performed ḥalitza should take

the

entire property

of his deceased brother, like one who performs levirate marriage with her.

It teaches us

that he is like one of the brothers and does not take everything.

And we raise a difficulty:

If so,

if the novelty of the Mishna is that the one who performed ḥalitza does not acquire all the property, why did the Mishna state

“he is like one of the brothers”?

It should have said

“he is only like one of the brothers”,

the Mishna should have stated.

Yet the wording of the Mishna indicates that its novelty is that he has any share at all, like one of the brothers!?

Because of this difficulty, the Gemara offers another explanation:

Rather, it might enter your mind to say: Since he caused her to lose

the possibility of

levirate marriage, let us penalize him

by denying him his share in the property of the deceased.

It teaches us

our Mishna that the one who performed ḥalitza does not forfeit his share.

We learned in our Mishna:

“If there is a father” —

the property belongs to the father.

For the Master said [

Bava Batra 115a] that

a father precedes

his sons

and all his descendants in inheritance.

We learned in our Mishna:

“One who takes his yevama in levirate marriage”

acquires the property of his brother.

We inquire into this:

What is the reason?

That is, from where do we know that the yavam immediately acquires all the property, and not the father, who precedes all his descendants in inheritance? Perhaps the father acquires all the property, as is his legal status, since he precedes all his descendants, and only after the father dies will the yavam acquire all the property.

And we resolve this: [Deuteronomy 25]

“He shall establish the name of his brother,” the Merciful One said,

and from this we learn the law that the yavam acquires the property of his deceased brother.

For through the inheritance that passes to him, he establishes the name of his brother: the inheritance is called by the deceased brother’s name when he performs levirate marriage with his wife.

And his name is thereby established

at the moment that he performs levirate marriage with his wife; therefore, at that moment he also acquires his inheritance.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says:

In either case, if there is a father, the property belongs to the father.

Ulla said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

And Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa likewise said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

And Ulla said, and some say Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda,

who says that the father acquires the property?

But from the moment that the brother performs levirate marriage with the deceased man’s wife, the name of the deceased is established, and his inheritance ought to pass to the yavam, since through this the deceased’s name is established with the brother who performed levirate marriage with his wife.

It is because

it is written,

in another passage concerning levirate marriage: [Deuteronomy 25]

“And it shall be that the firstborn whom she bears.”

And this verse teaches that the yavam’s legal status is

like that of a “firstborn”:

Just as a firstborn

among the brothers

has no

share in the father’s property

during the father’s lifetime, so too this

yavam

has no

share in property that would be inherited through the father [since, in every case, he precedes all his descendants]

during the father’s lifetime.

Therefore, the yavam acquires the deceased’s inheritance only where there is no father.

Lest you say: Since the Torah called the yavam a “firstborn”:

Just as a firstborn takes a double portion after the father’s death, so too this

yavam

takes a double portion after the father’s death,

and the yavam should take both his own share and the share of his deceased brother in the property inherited from the father?

The answer is:

Is it written

that

“he shall establish the name of his father”?

It is

“he shall establish the name of his brother,” and not “the name of his father”!

And once the father inherited the deceased’s property, from that point onward, when the father dies, he bequeaths not the deceased brother’s property but his own property; the yavam has no share in it through which to establish the name of his brother among the dead through their inheritance.

We inquire into this: According to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if the father is alive, he is the heir, and therefore the establishment of the deceased’s name through transferring his inheritance to the yavam does not occur,

let us say

that only

where there is no father who would take the inheritance

—when there is no father to take the deceased’s inheritance for himself, and it passes instead to the brother who performs levirate marriage and establishes his brother’s name—only then

is the mitzva of levirate marriage fulfilled,

since the deceased brother’s name is then established through the transfer of his inheritance to the brother who performs levirate marriage.

But

where there is a father, [

who does not

take

the yavam

an inheritance —

is the mitzva of levirate marriage not fulfilled!?

And we resolve this:

Is it

the case that

the Merciful One made levirate marriage dependent on inheritance,

on the yavam inheriting the deceased’s property?

Did the Merciful One make it dependent on that?

That is not so!

Rather,

the levirate marriage itself is performed,

that is the mitzva.

And if there is an inheritance —

he takes it,

the yavam takes the deceased’s property.

And if there is not,

if the yavam does not inherit it, but the father does —

he does not take it,

the yavam does not.

Rabbi Ḥanina Kara was sitting before Rabbi Yannai, and he sat and said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yannai said to him:

Go,

leave,

recite your recitation outside,

and recite the statement you made outside, rather than here, for it is incorrect, since

the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

A tanna taught before Rav Naḥman: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said to him:

Rather, according to whom

is the halakha? Necessarily,

according to the Rabbis!

If so, your teaching that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda is

obvious,

for

when there is one sage and the majority,

the halakha follows the majority!?

He said to him,

the one who had taught this statement before Rav Naḥman said: Should I

remove it,

remove this statement from my teaching, since it is obvious!?

He said to him: No.

Do not remove it from your teaching!

For this is a “necessary Mishna.” Rather, you altered its wording, and because of that alteration it became an “unnecessary Mishna.” But if you correct it and restore it to the wording that was taught to you, it will once again be a “necessary Mishna.”

For

you

were taught: “The halakha

is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,”

you were taught it,

that is, this is what was taught to you!

It follows that this is a statement [a “Mishna”] that requires being taught, since it contains the novel point that the halakha follows an individual sage.

And he raised this difficulty against you: How can the halakha be in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, when the halakha follows the majority and not an individual sage!?

And you reversed it,

and changed it to read, “The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.”

And with regard to what you reversed —

you reversed it properly.

That is, you acted properly in reversing it, since the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

However, despite the fact that you were correct in what caused you to reverse and alter the version, that is not the correct version of this Mishna.

Rather, you must teach it as it was taught to you: that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda; therefore, it is a necessary Mishna.

But we do not hold that the halakha follows that Mishna; rather, the halakha follows the Rabbis.

Mishna:

This Mishna explains the ordinance of the Sages prohibiting a yavam who performed ḥalitza with his yevama from marrying her close relatives, as though the woman who underwent ḥalitza had been his wife.

Similarly, they instituted that the yevama who underwent ḥalitza is prohibited from marrying the close relatives of the man who performed ḥalitza, as though he had been her husband.

One who performs ḥalitza with his yevama —

He is prohibited from marrying her close relatives, and she is prohibited from marrying his close relatives!

He is forbidden to marry her relatives, and she is forbidden to marry his relatives!