Yevamot 41a (מא.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain: The prohibition against the co-wife of a relative of a ḥalutza who is married to an unrelated man is a special decree that the Sages enacted so that people would not come to err.

For as a matter of common practice, the relatives of women undergoing ḥalitza accompany them to the court when they perform ḥalitza. But other yevamot do not customarily accompany the yevama undergoing ḥalitza to the court to observe her ḥalitza.

And the Sages were concerned that not everyone would recognize which woman was undergoing ḥalitza. Rather, some people might mistakenly say that the relative of the woman undergoing ḥalitza, who was with her in court at the time of the ḥalitza, was the woman who underwent ḥalitza.

Therefore,

this

relative

who accompanies her—

who goes together with the woman undergoing ḥalitza—

to the court—

the Sages decreed concerning her

that her co-wife is prohibited.

For example, if a woman named Leah brings her sister Rachel to the court so that Rachel will be present with her during her ḥalitza, people might mistakenly think that Rachel is the wife of the deceased who is undergoing ḥalitza, and not Leah.

As a result of this mistake, they would think that Rachel’s co-wife is the deceased’s second wife, who is released to the marketplace through Rachel’s ḥalitza.

Therefore, if the yavam were to take Rachel’s co-wife, people would say that he took the co-wife of a woman who had undergone ḥalitza, who is prohibited to him by Torah law according to everyone.

For this reason, they prohibited taking the co-wife of a relative of a woman who had undergone ḥalitza.

But

this one,

the yevama who does not undergo ḥalitza,

who does not accompany her,

as it is not customary for a yevama who does not undergo ḥalitza to go

with her,

together with her co-wife, the yevama undergoing ḥalitza,

to the court,

and people will not come to err concerning her—

the Sages did not decree concerning them

to prohibit her sister, since people would not come to err and say that he married the sister of a woman who had undergone ḥalitza, who is prohibited to him.

Therefore, they did not prohibit the relative of the co-wife of a woman who had undergone ḥalitza.

Mishna:

1.

If one performed ḥalitza with his yevama, and his brother married her sister

—the sister of the woman who underwent ḥalitza—

and died

—the brother—

she

performs ḥalitza but may not be taken in yibbum.

By Torah law she is fit for yibbum, but she may not be taken in yibbum by rabbinic decree, because she is prohibited to him as the sister of a woman who underwent ḥalitza, a rabbinic prohibition.

2.

And likewise, if one divorced his wife, and his brother married her sister and died—

she is exempt

entirely from both yibbum and ḥalitza, because she is prohibited to him by the Torah prohibition of the nakedness of a wife’s sister. This prohibition applies even after he divorced his wife, as long as his wife remains alive.

The Gemara discusses why the tanna used the expression “and likewise,” given that in this case she is entirely exempt.

3.

A shomeret yavam,

who fell before several brothers and thereby became subject to them for yibbum,

whose brother betrothed

one of the brothers

her sister

—the sister of the yevama—and thereby rendered his yevama prohibited to him by the karet prohibition of a wife’s sister—

According to the Sages, the yevama’s bond to him ceased from the moment she became entirely forbidden to him as an incestuous relation, and her sister was no longer prohibited to him as the sister of a woman subject to the bond. For the yevama was no longer subject to him by Torah law, and he had no bond to her by which her relatives could be prohibited on account of the bond.

Nevertheless,

in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira they said: They say to him

—to that yavam who betrothed her sister:

Wait

before taking your yevama’s sister, whom you betrothed as your wife, because she is still prohibited to you as the sister of a woman subject to the bond, by rabbinic decree,

until your brother performs

one of the brothers

an act

of yibbum or ḥalitza with the yevama. Then her bond will cease, and she will no longer be prohibited to you as the sister of a woman subject to the bond.

If his brother performed ḥalitza with her, or took her in yibbum—

her bond ceased entirely, and her sister is not prohibited as the sister of a woman subject to the bond. Therefore, at that point

he may take

the yavam

his wife,

the sister of his yevama, whom he had betrothed.

And likewise, if

the yevama died—

he may take his wife,

her sister!

For even if he had taken his yevama in yibbum and she died, her sister would be permitted to him after the death of his wife.

If the yavam died,

and there was no other brother who could perform ḥalitza or yibbum, and the sister of the yevama, whom he had betrothed as his wife, was prohibited to him as the sister of a woman subject to the bond—

he must divorce

that man

his wife,

who is prohibited to him as the sister of a woman subject to the bond,

with a bill of divorce.

And

the

wife of his brother,

the yevama, the sister of the wife whom he had betrothed, he must release

through ḥalitza.

But he cannot take her in yibbum, because she is prohibited to him as the nakedness of a wife’s sister even after he divorces his wife.

By Torah law she is released without ḥalitza, since she is entirely an incestuous relation to him; but the Sages enacted that he should perform ḥalitza with her.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

If one performed ḥalitza with his yevama, and his brother married her sister and died, she performs ḥalitza but may not be taken in yibbum.

And likewise, if one divorced his wife, and his brother married her sister and died, she is exempt.

And we raised a difficulty:

What is the meaning of “and likewise”?

There is no comparison between the sister of a woman who underwent ḥalitza and the sister of a divorced woman: the former performs ḥalitza, whereas the latter is exempt from ḥalitza!

And we answer: Indeed, there is no comparison between them.

Therefore,

say

that the wording of the Mishna should be:

But if one divorced

his wife, and his brother married her sister and died, she is exempt.

Reish Lakish said: Here,

in our Mishna,

Rabbi taught

—he taught—

the following:

The sister of a divorced woman—

is prohibited

by Torah law.

Therefore, she is exempt from ḥalitza and yibbum.

The sister of a woman who underwent ḥalitza—

is prohibited

by rabbinic enactment!

Therefore, she is obligated to perform ḥalitza, but may not be taken in yibbum.

We learned in our Mishna:

A shomeret yavam whose brother betrothed

her sister,

etc.

Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira,

that the man who betrothed her must wait until his brother performs ḥalitza with the yevama or takes her in yibbum, since we say that “there is a bond,” which prohibits the yavam from marrying the relatives of his yevama.

And this bond between the yevama and the yavam has the power to prohibit the yevama’s relatives even after the yavam betrothed her sister, thereby rendering the yevama prohibited to him by a karet prohibition!

For the Sages regarded her bond to him as though it overrides the betrothal of her sister, which is recognized by Torah law; and the bond still exists by rabbinic law, despite the fact that by Torah law she is entirely an incestuous relation to him!

They raised a dilemma:

If afterward

his wife died

—the sister of his yevama, whom he had betrothed as his wife—

what is the halakha with regard to his yevama?

The basis of the question is this: Since, when she was prohibited to him for yibbum because she was the nakedness of a wife’s sister, the prohibition of a brother’s wife who has no permission for yibbum took effect upon her, defined by the designation “a brother’s wife who has children”—

Can this prohibition lapse when his wife dies, so that she returns to being permitted as a brother’s wife who has no children?

Or perhaps, since the designation of a brother’s wife who has no permission for yibbum, defined as “a brother’s wife who has children,” took effect upon her, it can no longer lapse, and she remains prohibited forever.

Rav and Rabbi Ḥanina both say: If his wife died—

the yavam again becomes

permitted to his yevama.

Shmuel and Rav Asi both say: If his wife died—

he is prohibited to his yevama.

Rava said: What is Rav’s reason

for permitting her for yibbum after his wife’s death? She had already become prohibited to him for one moment, when she was the nakedness of a wife’s sister, like a brother’s wife who has no permission for yibbum. For at that moment, when she was the nakedness of a wife’s sister, I cannot apply to her the verse, “her yevama shall come upon her”—

because she was—

for she was

a yevama who had been permitted

for yibbum at the time she fell for yibbum, when her brother-in-law died,

and became prohibited

for yibbum only after the fall, when she subsequently became the nakedness of a wife’s sister, upon his betrothal of her sister.

And

she again

became permitted

with his wife’s death, from which point she was no longer the nakedness of a wife’s sister—

And Rav holds that since she was permitted for yibbum at the time of the fall, she does not become permanently prohibited as “a brother’s wife who has children,” even when she becomes the nakedness of a wife’s sister after the time of the fall.

For the rule that she becomes permanently prohibited as “a brother’s wife who has children” was stated only with regard to a yevama who, at the time she fell for yibbum, at the time of her brother-in-law’s death, could not be described by the verse, “her yevama shall come upon her.”

Since the prohibition of a brother’s wife was not permitted then, it becomes permanent: once the prohibition takes effect, nothing can permit it afterward.

But in this case, at the time she fell for yibbum, I can apply to her the verse, “her yevama shall come upon her,” and the prohibition of a brother’s wife was permitted in her case. Only afterward did she become prohibited as the nakedness of a wife’s sister, and only from then onward can I not apply to her the verse, “her yevama shall come upon her.” She therefore does not become permanently prohibited as “a brother’s wife who has children.”

Rather, the rule is that

she returns to her original permitted status,

as a brother’s wife who has no children.

Rav Hamnuna raised an objection

to Rava from the Mishna above, which states:

Three brothers

who had

two

of them

married to two sisters, and

one brother

was unmarried,

single.

One of the married brothers died, and the unmarried brother performed maamar with her,

the betrothal that the Sages enacted for a yavam before he has intercourse with his yevama.

And afterward the second brother died,

who was married to the second sister, who was the sister of the woman with whom the maamar had been performed.

At that point, the woman with whom maamar had been performed became prohibited to the third brother because she was the sister of the woman subject to the bond, the wife of the second brother who had now fallen for yibbum. For maamar with the first sister does not make her his wife, so that the second sister would no longer be subject to him for yibbum.

And afterward his wife died,

the wife of the second brother,

after him,

leaving the woman with whom maamar had been performed. She was no longer considered the sister of a woman subject to the bond, since her sister had died—

That yevama,

the woman with whom maamar had been performed—

performs ḥalitza

and she also requires a bill of divorce for the maamar

but may not be taken in yibbum,

because she had been prohibited to him for one moment, when she was the sister of a woman subject to the bond.

And why

should the woman with whom maamar had been performed be released from him?

Let

the woman with whom maamar had been performed

be like

—like—

a yevama who was permitted, became prohibited, and again became permitted,

according to Rav—

she should return to her original permitted status!

Rava was silent

and did not answer Rav Hamnuna.

After he left,

after Rav Hamnuna had gone out,

he said

—Rava reflected on himself and asked himself:

Why did you not say to him

—to Rav Hamnuna—that the Mishna above, according to

Rabbi Elazar,

was taught in accordance with his view that “marriage causes the fall”: the marriage is what causes the woman to fall for yibbum, and from the time of the marriage the yevama is considered to have fallen for yibbum. If she becomes prohibited at the time of the marriage to her brother-in-law, she never again becomes permitted.

For

Rabbi Elazar says below, in chapter Beit Shammai: If the brother divorced his wife, then subsequently remarried her, and died, she may not be taken in yibbum. His reasoning is:

Since

when his brother divorced her,

the yevama stood

—the yevama—

before him,

before her brother-in-law,

for one moment in a prohibited state

—when his brother divorced her, she was prohibited as a brother’s wife who has no permission for yibbum—

Even though this occurred after the time of the fall [according to his view, the time of marriage]—

she became permanently prohibited to him!

But I, Rava, do not hold in accordance with Rabbi Elazar.

He then said,

Rava:

Rabbi Elazar may have said

that she becomes permanently prohibited only

where she was not fit at the time of the fall,

where she was not actually permitted for yibbum and was not fit to be taken in yibbum when her brother-in-law died. In that case we say that since she became prohibited when she was divorced, she remains prohibited forever.

But where she was fit

the yevama

at the time of the fall

for yibbum—as here, where she became the nakedness of a wife’s sister only after she had in fact been fit to be taken in yibbum—

did

Rabbi Elazar say that she becomes permanently prohibited?!

He then

subsequently returned and

said,

Rava:

Indeed!

Rabbi Elazar did say that even if she was actually permitted to be taken in yibbum and then became prohibited, she remains prohibited forever, even if the cause of her prohibition is removed.

And it was taught

in a beraita concerning our Mishna, in accordance with his statement:

As it was taught: If one betrothed the sister of his yevama after she had fallen for yibbum:

Rabbi Elazar says:

If

his yevama died—

he is permitted to his wife,

since she is no longer considered the sister of a woman subject to his bond.

But if

his wife died—

that yevama performs ḥalitza but may not be taken in yibbum, since she became prohibited to him [after the fall] for one moment, as a brother’s wife who has no permission for yibbum, because she was his wife’s sister.

The conclusion is evident: according to Rabbi Elazar, even if she was actually fit for yibbum and became prohibited only afterward, she becomes prohibited forever. But she does require ḥalitza!

And we raised a difficulty:

We inquired:

Shall we say

that

Shmuel and Rav Asi,

who disagree with Rav and hold that if his wife died he is prohibited to his yevama—

hold in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

and not in accordance with the Sages?

And we answer:

You may even say

that Shmuel and Rav Asi, even

in accordance with the Sages

hold.

For

it was only with regard to

a man who divorced a woman and remarried her that

the Sages disagreed with Rabbi Elazar,

saying that she is permitted to be taken in yibbum, and we do not say that she becomes permanently prohibited—

but only because from

the time of

the fall

—the death of the brother—

and onward, she did not become prohibited to them

the yevama by the prohibition of a brother’s wife who has no permission for yibbum.

For according to the Sages, only “death causes the fall,” and not “marriage causes the fall,” as Rabbi Elazar holds.

Therefore, the fact that she was prohibited at the time of the divorce, when she had not yet fallen for yibbum, does not render her permanently prohibited according to the Sages.

But here, where she became prohibited,

here, where the yevama became prohibited after her brother-in-law’s death, after the time of the fall—

even the Sages agree

that she becomes permanently prohibited, according to Shmuel and Rav Asi.

Mishna:

A yevama may neither perform ḥalitza nor be taken in yibbum—

until she has waited three months.

The reason will be explained in the Gemara.

And likewise, all other women may neither become betrothed nor marry

after the death of their husbands or after their divorces—

until they have waited three months,

so that the offspring of the first husband can be distinguished from that of the second husband.

For if she marries before three months have passed and gives birth seven months after the marriage, we will not know whether the child was conceived by the first husband and born after a nine-month pregnancy, or whether it was conceived by the second husband and born after a seven-month pregnancy.

Whether virgins or non-virgins, whether divorcees or widows, whether married women or betrothed women.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Married women may become betrothed

immediately, but may not marry until three months have passed.

And betrothed women,

who had not had intercourse, so there is no concern about distinguishing the offspring of the first husband from that of the second husband,

may marry

immediately.

Except for betrothed women in Judea,

where there is concern that they may have had intercourse while still betrothed,

because her fiancé’s heart

—the fiancé’s heart—

is familiar with her.

In Judea, the bride and groom were secluded together during the period after betrothal and before the time of entering the wedding canopy, so that the groom’s heart would become “familiar” with her—so that he would be accustomed to her and they would not be embarrassed before one another at the time of the mitzva intercourse. Therefore, there is concern that he may have intercourse with her when he is secluded with her.

Rabbi Yosei says:

I too hold in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, that

all women

whose husbands died while they were married to them

may become betrothed,

without needing to wait, and we do not decree that they may not become betrothed lest they marry.

And I am even more lenient than he is concerning distinguishing the offspring: in my view, women who had been betrothed are permitted even to marry, and we did not decree concerning betrothed women on account of married women.

Divorced women who had been betrothed may marry immediately, while married women may marry only after thirty days.

And I do not come to disagree with Rabbi Yehuda except in one matter.

For Rabbi Yehuda permits all of them to become betrothed, both divorcees and widows.

Whereas I hold:

except for a widow

whose husband died while she was married, with regard to whom I do not hold in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.