Yevamot 33b (לג:) — the Talmud in English

And

in the case of

an inclusive prohibition, Rabbi taught him the two cases in which one is liable for only one offering when the prohibitions took effect as an inclusive prohibition. They are a non-priest who performed the Temple service on Shabbat, and one with a physical defect who performed the service in a state of ritual impurity. These prohibitions can take effect both simultaneously and successively as an inclusive prohibition, as explained above.

But if they took effect simultaneously, he taught him the ruling of liability: even according to Rabbi Shimon, he is liable for two.

And according to

Rabbi

Shimon,

he taught him those cases.

But concerning the third case, a non-priest who ate a bird killed by melika, which can take effect as an inclusive prohibition only simultaneously and not successively, he did not teach him that one is exempt, because it applies only when the prohibitions take effect simultaneously; and when they take effect simultaneously, Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yosei that he is liable for two.

And it appeared

that

Bar Kappara

the other two teachings, which likewise deal with sacrificial matters, were similar

to the non-priest who ate a bird killed by melika.

And since

they

were similar to it—

he associated

the non-priest who ate a bird killed by melika

with them,

together with the other two teachings, since according to Rabbi Shimon, in all three of these cases he is liable for only one.

Bar Kappara did not distinguish between the first two teachings, in which Rabbi exempted him only when the prohibition was inclusive, but not when the prohibitions took effect simultaneously, and the non-priest who ate [unclear: the source reads “ate impurity”], which applies only when the prohibitions took effect simultaneously and not as an inclusive prohibition.

And

afterward

Bar Kappara examined it

and

did not find

a possibility of an inclusive prohibition in the case of the non-priest who ate a bird killed by melika,

but

only a prohibition

taking effect simultaneously.

And Bar Kappara forgot that Rabbi had not taught him the case of the non-priest who ate a bird killed by melika as a case of exemption; rather, he himself had combined it with the other two teachings.

And he reasoned: Since from this case,

the non-priest who ate a bird killed by melika,

is referring to simultaneous prohibitions—

this too,

the non-priest who performed the service on Shabbat and the one with a physical defect who performed the service in a state of ritual impurity, also refers to cases in which the prohibitions took effect

simultaneously.

And since

Rabbi taught the case of the non-priest who ate a bird killed by melika

as a case of exemption

according to Rabbi Shimon,

these

the non-priest who performed the service on Shabbat and the one with a physical defect who performed the service in a state of ritual impurity,

also as cases of exemption

were taught by Rabbi, meaning that according to Rabbi Shimon he is liable for only one, even if the prohibitions took effect simultaneously. And in this Bar Kappara erred.

Meytivi

from that which was taught in a beraita:

A non-priest who performed the service on Shabbat, and one with a physical defect who performed the service in a state of ritual impurity—

There is here liability on account of being a non-priest, on account of Shabbat, on account of a physical defect, and on account of ritual impurity; these are the words of Rabbi Yosei.

Rabbi Shimon says: There is here liability only on account of being a non-priest and on account of a physical defect!

But

the third teaching,

melika

for a non-priest—

he omitted it

the tanna omitted mention of it because it is not similar to the other two.

And

for whom did he omit it?

If you say: For Rabbi Yosei,

who holds that Rabbi Yosei would not make the non-priest who ate a bird killed by melika liable for two, and therefore the tanna did not mention it together with the other two teachings—

that cannot be so.

Because

now

even

Rabbi Yosei,

even

with regard to an inclusive prohibition,

when one of the prohibitions preceded the other, nevertheless

makes him liable for two—

with regard to prohibitions taking effect simultaneously, is it necessary to say

that he is liable for two?!

Rather, it must be for Rabbi Shimon,

who makes him liable for only one, that the tanna omitted this case.

Since

and

he holds that only

with regard to an inclusive prohibition does Rabbi Shimon exempt him

from the second prohibition, because a prohibition cannot take effect upon another prohibition that preceded it,

but when the prohibitions take effect simultaneously, Rabbi Shimon too makes him liable

for two.

And

this is a refutation of Bar Kappara!

And we conclude: Indeed,

this is a refutation.

The Gemara now explains the matter of

the non-priest who performed the service on Shabbat.

With regard to what,

which of the Temple services did the non-priest perform on Shabbat?

If

he performed

the slaughter,

behold,

slaughtering by a non-priest is valid,

and he is not liable for being a non-priest on its account.

And if it was receiving

the blood

and conveying

the blood to the altar, which are services concerning which a non-priest is warned, this is not a labor of Shabbat, because

it is merely carrying,

and one is not liable for two offerings on its account.

If it was the burning of the offerings,

for burning the sacrificial portions one is liable on account of being a non-priest and on account of Shabbat—

but Rabbi Yosei said:

The labor of

kindling

on Shabbat, which the Torah explicitly states—“You shall not kindle fire in any of your dwelling places on the day of Shabbat”—was singled out from the other labors of Shabbat and written separately

as a prohibition,

in order to make one liable for lashes for it as a prohibition alone, and not as a transgression punishable by karet or death;

it was singled out!

And if so, according to Rabbi Yosei there is no liability for a sin-offering here on account of the labor of Shabbat.

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said:

Here we are dealing

with the slaughter of the bull of the High Priest

on Yom Kippur.

And this is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says: The slaughter of the bull of the High Priest by a non-priest

renders it invalid.

If so, why specifically

did the tanna mention specifically

a non-priest?

For

even an ordinary priest as well

would be liable for two offerings for slaughtering the bull of the High Priest on Yom Kippur.

And we answer: He said

“one for whom it is non-priesthood in his case,”

meaning even an ordinary priest.

Rav Ashi raises an objection: Is it that

two

sin-offerings does it teach

in this beraita,

or

two

prohibitions does it teach

in it?

Rather, it is merely counting prohibitions

the tanna is counting, and this has no bearing on the dispute over whether one is liable for two when one prohibition takes effect upon another.

And

what practical difference does it make

that the tanna stated the number of prohibitions? It is in order

to bury

the one who transgressed the two prohibitions

among the wholly wicked.

Mishna:

Two men who betrothed two women,

and at the time they entered the wedding canopy,

it happened that they

exchanged

the wife

of this one with that one, and

the wife

of that one with this one—

they are liable on account of a married woman.

And if they were brothers—

they are also liable

on account of a brother’s wife.

And if they were sisters—

also

on account of a woman with regard to her sister.

And if they were menstruating women—

also

on account of a menstruating woman.

And

once the exchange became known,

they separate them for three months, lest they be pregnant,

and the offspring be mamzerim. It is necessary to distinguish between legitimate seed and illegitimate seed, so that they will not come to validate them, with the women attributing their children to their true husbands, when in fact they are mamzerim.

And if they were minors who were not capable of bearing children—

they return them immediately.

And if they were daughters of priests—

they are disqualified from partaking of teruma.

Gemara:

And we raise the following difficulty: Did they really

exchange

their wives?

Is it

the case that

wicked people

who exchange their wives

are we dealing with?

And furthermore, concerning that which Rabbi Hiyya taught: Here there are

in total, for the two husbands and the two women,

sixteen sin-offerings,

four sin-offerings for each man and woman.

And

if we are dealing with an intentional transgression,

then

is there a sin-offering

for an intentional transgression?

Rav Yehuda said: Read instead: They were exchanged,

meaning that their wives were exchanged inadvertently.

This too is reasonably inferred,

that our Mishna is speaking of an inadvertent act.

As it teaches in the latter clause: If they were minors who were not capable of bearing children—

they return them immediately.

And if it were intentional, would it be permitted to return them,

when a woman suspected of adultery is forbidden to her husband?!

And we reject this:

This is not difficult.

For

the seduction of a minor,

even if her sexual relations were consensual,

are considered coerced relations.

And coerced relations involving an Israelite woman [

excluding daughters of priests]

are permitted.

Rather, from here it can be proved that the case concerns an inadvertent act:

From that

which it teaches: They separate them for three months, lest they be pregnant.

If they are not pregnant—

they are permitted,

meaning they are permitted to their husbands.

And if

their wives were exchanged

intentionally—

would it be permitted?

Rather, must we not conclude from this that it teaches: They were exchanged,

and not that they exchanged them.

And we conclude: Indeed,

learn from this.