Yevamot 33b — the Talmud in English

And

b

it was taught regarding an inclusive prohibition,

Rabbi taught him the two matters as exempt, in which one is liable only once when they took effect through an inclusive prohibition, and they are a non-koen who performed service on Shabbat, and a blemished [koen] who performed service in impurity, for they can take effect both simultaneously and one after the other through an inclusive [prohibition], as was explained above.

But if they took effect simultaneously, he taught him as liable, for even according to Rabbi Shimon he is liable for two.

And according to R

abbi

Shimon

he taught them to him.

But as for the third matter, a non-koen who ate an animal slaughtered by melika, which cannot take effect through an inclusive [prohibition], but only simultaneously, he did not teach it to him as exempt, because it applies only simultaneously, and simultaneously Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yosei that he is liable for two.

And it appeared

that

to Bar Kappara,

the other two halakhot, which likewise deal with the matter of consecrated [animals], are similar

to a non-koen who ate an animal slaughtered by melika.

And since

when

it resembled it—

he included

Bar Kappara the non-koen who ate an animal slaughtered by melika

with them,

together with the other two halakhot, for according to Rabbi Shimon, in all of them he is liable only once.

And Bar Kappara did not distinguish between the first two halakhot, in which Rabbi exempted him only through an inclusive prohibition and not through a simultaneous prohibition, and a non-koen who ate impurity, which applies only simultaneously and not through an inclusive [prohibition].

And

afterward

he examined it,

Bar Kappara,

and did not find

in the case of a non-koen who ate an animal slaughtered by melika that an inclusive prohibition could apply,

but

only a prohibition

simultaneously.

And Bar Kappara forgot that Rabbi had not taught him the case of a non-koen who ate an animal slaughtered by melika as exempt; rather, he was the one who had combined it with the other two halakhot.

And he reasoned: From this,

the case of a non-koen who ate an animal slaughtered by melika is speaking

of simultaneous [prohibitions]—

this too,

the case of a non-koen who performed service on Shabbat and a blemished [koen] who performed service in impurity, is speaking even when they took effect

simultaneously.

And since this,

the case of a non-koen who ate an animal slaughtered by melika, Rabbi taught

as exempt

according to Rabbi Shimon,

these

a non-koen who performed service in idolatrous sacrifice, and a blemished [koen] who performed service in impurity,

also as exempt

Rabbi taught them, so that according to Rabbi Shimon he is liable only once, even if they took effect simultaneously. And in this Bar Kappara erred.

Meitivi

from that which was taught in a beraita:

A non-koen who performed service on Shabbat, and a blemished [koen] who performed service in impurity—

There is here [liability] on account of being a non-koen, and on account of Shabbat, and on account of being blemished, and on account of impurity; these are the words of Rabbi Yosei.

Rabbi Shimon says: There is here only [liability] on account of being a non-koen and on account of being blemished alone!

But

the third halakha,

melika

for a non-koen—

he omitted it

the tannai from mentioning it, because it is not similar to the two of them.

And

for whom did he omit it?

If you say, for Rabbi Yosei,

who holds that in the case of a non-koen who eats an animal slaughtered by melika, Rabbi Yosei does not make him liable for two, and therefore he did not mention this together with the other two halakhot—

That is not possible.

For

now,

behold,

Rabbi Yosei,

even

through an inclusive prohibition,

where one of the prohibitions preceded the other, nevertheless

is liable for two—

through a simultaneous prohibition, is it necessary to say

that he is liable for two?!

Rather, is it not for Rabbi Shimon

who makes him liable only once, that the tannai omitted it?

Since

and

he holds that only

through an inclusive prohibition does he exempt

Rabbi Shimon from the second prohibition, for a prohibition cannot take effect upon another prohibition that preceded it.

But through a simultaneous prohibition he is liable

even Rabbi Shimon.

And

a refutation of Bar Kappara!

And we conclude: Indeed,

a refutation.

And now the Gemara explains the matter of

a non-koen who performed service on Shabbat.

In what,

in which of the Temple services did the non-koen perform service on Shabbat?

If

he performed service

in slaughtering,

behold,

slaughtering by a non-koen is valid,

and he is not liable on account of being a non-koen for it.

And if in receiving

the blood

and conveying

the blood to the altar, which are services concerning which the non-koen is warned, this is not a labor of Shabbat, because

it is mere carrying,

and one is not liable for two on its account.

If in burning,

for burning the sacrificial portions one is liable on account of being a non-koen and on account of Shabbat—

But Rabbi Yosei said:

The labor of

kindling

on Shabbat, which is stated explicitly in the Torah, “You shall not kindle fire in all your settlements on the day of Shabbat,” was singled out from the category of the labors of Shabbat to be written separately—

for a prohibition,

in order to make one liable for it for lashes, by the law of a prohibition alone, and not by the law of karet and death—

it was singled out!

And if so, according to Rabbi Yosei there is no liability here for a sin-offering on account of the labor of Shabbat.

Rav Aha bar Yaakov said:

Here it is speaking

of the slaughtering of the bull of the High Priest

on Yom Kippur.

And in accordance with the statement of the one who says: The slaughtering of the bull of the High Priest by a non-koen—

is invalid.

If so, why specifically,

why did the tannai mention specifically

a non-koen?

For behold,

even an ordinary koen as well

is liable for two for slaughtering the bull of the High Priest on Yom Kippur.

And we answer: The one

for whom it is non-koenhood, he is speaking of,

and this includes even an ordinary koen.

Rav Ashi raised an objection to it: Is it something,

two

sin-offerings that it teaches

in this beraita,

or

two

prohibitions that it teaches

in it?

Rather, it is merely counting prohibitions,

the tannai, and this does not concern the dispute whether one is liable for two when one prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition.

And

what practical difference does it make,

that the tannai mentioned the number of prohibitions—to

bury

the one who performed the two prohibitions

among the wholly wicked.

Mishna:

Two men who betrothed two women,

and at the time of their entering the wedding canopy

it happened that they

exchanged the

wife

of this one for that one, and the

wife

of that one for this one—

they are liable on account of a married woman.

And if they were brothers—

they are also liable

on account of a brother’s wife.

And if they were sisters—

also

on account of a woman with her sister.

And if they were menstruating women—

also

on account of a menstruating woman.

And

when the exchange became known,

they separate them for three months, lest they be pregnant,

and the fetuses be mamzerim, and it be necessary to distinguish between valid seed and invalid seed, so that they should not come to declare them valid, with their wives attributing their children to their true husbands, while they are mamzerim.

And if they were minors who were not fit to bear children—

they return them immediately.

And if they were daughters of kohanim—

they become disqualified from teruma.

Gemara:

And we raised it: What,

did they exchange

their wives?—

Is it something,

are we

with wicked men

who exchange their wives

dealing with?

And furthermore, that which Rabbi Hiyya taught: Here there are

in total, for the two husbands and the two women,

sixteen sin-offerings,

four sin-offerings for each man and each woman.

And

if we are dealing

with intentional action—

is there a sacrifice

for intentional action?

Rav Yehuda said, teach: They were exchanged

their wives unintentionally.

This too is logically evident,

that our Mishna is speaking of an unintentional act.

For it teaches in its latter clause: If they were minors who were not fit to bear children—

they return them immediately.

And if [they were exchanged] intentionally, is it permitted

to return them, when a woman suspected of adultery is forbidden to her husband?!

And we reject this:

This is not difficult.

For

the seduction of a minor,

even if her sexual relation was willingly,

is coercion.

And a woman subjected to coercion among Israelites [

excluding kohanim]

is permitted.

Rather,

from here it should be proved that it is speaking of an unintentional act:

From that

which it teaches: They separate them for three months, lest they be pregnant.

If they are not pregnant—

they are permitted,

behold, they are permitted to their husbands.

And if

they were exchanged

intentionally—

is it permitted?

Rather, is it not, learn from it: They were exchanged,

and not “they exchanged,” is what we learned.

And we conclude: Indeed,

learn from it.