Yevamot 34a (לד.) — the Talmud in English

And we raised the issue:

who

is

this tanna

who taught our Mishna, which prohibits each of them under all four prohibitions and obligates him to bring four sin-offerings,

who holds

also

the principle of a comprehensive prohibition and

also

the principle of an additive prohibition and

also

the principle that prohibitions take effect simultaneously?

For when Reuven, the first brother, betrothed one of the women, Rachel, she became prohibited to his brother Shimon simultaneously under two prohibitions: as a married woman and as the wife of his brother.

And when Shimon betrothed her sister, Leah, Rachel, the wife of Shimon’s brother Reuven, became prohibited to him also as his wife’s sister. This prohibition took effect by virtue of its being a comprehensive prohibition, since Shimon was now prohibited also from the other sisters of his wife.

And from the moment that Rachel, Reuven’s wife, began to menstruate and thereby became prohibited to her husband Reuven, she also became prohibited to Shimon under the prohibition of a menstruating woman, as the prohibition of a menstruating woman is an additive prohibition, since additional people were now included among those prohibited by this prohibition.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

Our Mishna is

the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

As it was taught in a beraita: There is one who eats one act of eating and is liable to bring four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering:

A

ritually impure person who ate forbidden fat, which was left over from

consecrated offerings,

and this took place

on Yom Kippur.

Rabbi Meir says: If it was Shabbat and he carried it out in his mouth—

he is liable [

but on Yom Kippur he is not liable for the labor of carrying out].

They said to him:

The offering for carrying out on Shabbat

is not of the same category.

For we are discussing liability only for eating, and not for carrying out.

And here all the elements are present:

For when the animal was formed, the prohibition against eating forbidden fat took effect upon it, but it was not yet prohibited for benefit.

Once the animal was consecrated, a prohibition against deriving benefit from the fat took effect by virtue of its being consecrated, which had not applied previously.

And since the fat became prohibited for benefit, it also became prohibited to a non-priest for eating, and this too is an additive prohibition.

And once the offering became leftover, its fat became prohibited for “the eating of the altar,” and by virtue of this it also became prohibited for human consumption; this too is an additive prohibition.

And once the person became ritually impure, the prohibition against eating consecrated food in a state of ritual impurity took effect upon the fat as a comprehensive prohibition, since from the moment he became impure he was prohibited from eating all consecrated food.

And when Yom Kippur arrived, its prohibition took effect as a comprehensive prohibition, since from then on he was prohibited from eating all food.

And if this occurred on Shabbat, Shabbat and Yom Kippur took effect simultaneously.

Therefore Rabbi Meir holds him liable also for carrying out on Shabbat.

And it emerges that Rabbi Meir holds him liable in all three forms in which one prohibition takes effect upon another.

And we raised the issue: Now that we have established that our Mishna follows the approach of Rabbi Meir,

and Rabbi Meir—

in accordance with whose opinion

among his teachers does he hold him liable here, in the case of one who married a woman and erred in a matter of mitzva? For we find that Rabbi Meir’s teachers disagreed about this matter.

If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, didn’t he say: One who erred in a matter of mitzva—

is exempt!

Rather,

necessarily,

it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer,

who holds one who errs in a matter of mitzva liable to bring a sin-offering; Rabbi Meir said this in accordance with his view.

And

if you wish, say: Actually,

Rabbi Meir said his ruling also

in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.

in this matter.

When Rabbi Yehoshua said that one who erred in a matter of mitzva is exempt—

that statement applies only with regard to

one who had two

infants

to circumcise, one whose time for circumcision was on Shabbat and one whose time was after Shabbat,

whose time was pressing,

as he had to circumcise the infant whose time was on Shabbat; and because he was pressed by the mitzva, he erred and circumcised on Shabbat the infant whose time was after Shabbat. Rabbi Yehoshua exempted him because he was pressed to perform the mitzva.

But this case,

the case of one who married a woman,

since its time is not pressing—

he did not

Rabbi Yehoshua exempt him.

And we challenge this:

But with regard to teruma, whose time is not pressing

to eat it,

he exempts him

Rabbi Yehoshua because he erred in a matter of mitzva.

As we learned in a Mishna: If one was eating teruma and it became known

to him

that he was the son of a divorced woman or the son of a halutza—

Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable

to pay

the principal and an additional fifth.

And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him,

because he erred in a matter of mitzva. And the same law should apply that he should be exempt from bringing an offering, in a case where an offering is otherwise required, even though its time is not pressing.

And we answer:

This matter was stated concerning it. Rav Bibi bar Abaye said: Here we are dealing with one who was

eating

teruma on Passover eve, when its time is pressing.

And if you wish, say:

Indeed, it was not Rabbi Meir who taught our Mishna, since he would in fact exempt one who erred in a matter of mitzva.

Rather, our Mishna holds him liable

for prohibitions that take effect simultaneously, and

even

in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon,

who is lenient concerning a prohibition taking effect upon another prohibition. And as the Gemara will explain:

Granted, all of them—

the prohibitions concerning familial relationships—

can be found,

for example,

where

the two brothers

appoint an agent

to betroth the two sisters on their behalf,

and they themselves appoint

the two sisters

agents

to become betrothed to the two brothers,

and one agent encounters the other agent,

so that all three prohibitions—as a married woman, the wife of one’s brother, and one’s wife’s sister—take effect simultaneously.

But

the prohibition of

menstruation—how can you find it taking effect simultaneously with these three prohibitions, so that both the men and the women would each be liable to bring four sin-offerings, and, as we learned, there would be sixteen sin-offerings here?

taking effect simultaneously with these three prohibitions, so that both the men and the women should each be liable for four sin-offerings, and as we learned, that there are here sixteen sin-offerings?

Rav Amram said that Rav said: We are dealing with

a case where they were all minors: the two brothers had not yet reached the age of thirteen, and the two sisters had not yet reached the age of twelve.

And the date on which all of them would reach majority was the same day.

And they delivered their betrothals to an agent, instructing him to betroth them on the condition that their betrothals would take effect on the day they reached majority.

And when the day on which all of them reached majority arrived, the two sisters were

flowing

with menstrual blood that had begun before that day and continued into it without interruption.

It follows that at the beginning of the day on which all of them became adults, they became prohibited under all four prohibitions simultaneously.

And the Gemara explains that this must be established as a case in which they were flowing with blood without interruption, both in order to hold the brothers liable and in order to hold the sisters liable.

That is, the flow of blood continued

from

before the year of

thirteen

of the two brothers had been completed until

after

they had completed

thirteen

years.

This was in order

to render them liable,

the brothers, for all four liabilities precisely at the moment they reached the age of thirteen.

And this flow of blood also continued

from

the year of

twelve

of the sisters until

after

they had completed

twelve

years, in order

to render them liable,

the sisters, simultaneously for all four prohibitions.

We learned in the Mishna that when the error became known,

they separate them

from their husbands.

And the Gemara assumed that the error became known immediately after intercourse took place.

And we raised the issue:

But a woman does not become pregnant from her first act of intercourse,

so why do we need to separate them in order to determine whose offspring they are and what their lineage is?

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said:

This is referring to a case

where they had intercourse and repeated

the intercourse a second time.

And we refute this: Since we established that our Mishna follows Rabbi Eliezer, who holds liable one who errs in a matter of mitzva, and he holds one liable for two acts of intercourse performed even in a single lapse of awareness, when he did not learn between one act of intercourse and the next that the act was prohibited—

then if they returned and had intercourse, they should be liable to bring a sin-offering also for the second act of intercourse.

But then, with regard to that which Rabbi Hiyya taught: There are sixteen sin-offerings here—

there would be

thirty-two

sin-offerings

indeed!

And we answer:

But according to your reasoning, with regard to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds one liable

for a separate sin-offering

for each act of sexual release,

even during a single act of intercourse, if so, there would be

many

sin-offerings

indeed, and not sixteen.

and not sixteen.

Rather,

you must necessarily answer

that

the sin-offerings for their acts

at the first act of sexual release

alone

are counted

by the tanna.

Here too,

answer your question that the sin-offerings for

the first act of intercourse

alone

are counted.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: