Yevamot 33a — the Talmud in English

And now the Gemara explains:

Over what do Rabbi Hiyya and Bar Kappara disagree?

Rabbi Hiyya i bar Kappara?

With regard to an inclusive prohibition —

and according to Rabbi Yosei,

who, as we find, holds with regard to an additional prohibition that a prohibition takes effect upon a prohibition, by means of migo: does he hold this way also with regard to an inclusive prohibition?

Rabbi Hiyya held: Rabbi Yosei, with regard to an inclusive prohibition, imposes two [liabilities].

Bar Kappara held: He imposes only one.

And the Gemara explains:

And what inclusive prohibition is there here

in their entire disagreement?

Granted, a non-priest

who performed service in the Temple on Shabbat —

Initially the non-priest was permitted

the non-priest

with regard to labor, and was forbidden with regard to service

in the Temple.

Shabbat comes —

since he becomes forbidden with regard to labor

on Shabbat,

he also becomes forbidden with regard to service,

for there was added on Shabbat to the prohibition of Temple service the prohibition of ordinary labor, which is an inclusive prohibition, and not an additional prohibition, since no further people became forbidden with regard to service in the Temple on Shabbat.

And if the priests too had become forbidden with regard to service in the Temple on Shabbat, then this would have been an additional prohibition.

And granted,

a blemished priest —

Initially he was permitted with regard to eating

of consecrated offerings,

and was forbidden with regard to service.

He became impure —

since he becomes forbidden with regard to eating

on account of impurity,

he also becomes forbidden with regard to service

in a state of impurity.

But with regard to pinching —

behold, it is only with two prohibitions that took effect

simultaneously that you can find it,

for at the time of pinching there take effect upon it the prohibition of a non-priest’s eating and the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass.

Before pinching, the prohibition is not on account of being a non-priest but on account of misuse, and only at the time of pinching does the prohibition of misuse cease and the prohibition of being a non-priest begin.

But

with regard to an inclusive prohibition —

you cannot find it,

for they take effect simultaneously! And on the strength of this difficulty the Gemara retracts and establishes their disagreement in a different manner:

Rather, they disagree with regard to a prohibition [taking effect] simultaneously,

in a case where the two prohibitions come at once: do both take effect, or only one,

and according to Rabbi Yosei.

Rabbi Hiyya held: Rabbi Yosei, with regard to a prohibition [taking effect] simultaneously —

imposes two [liabilities].

And

if

Bar Kappara held: [Rabbi Yosei] does not impose

Rabbi Yosei

more than one.

And the Gemara explains:

And here,

in the disagreement of Rabbi Hiyya and Bar Kappara —

what prohibition “simultaneously” is there here?

A non-priest who performed service on Shabbat —

For example, he brought forth two hairs on Shabbat,

so that he became an adult on Shabbat, at which point he becomes liable for all the mitzvot,

so being a non-priest and Shabbat were for him simultaneously.

A blemished priest as well —

For example, he brought forth two hairs, and he became impure

before bringing them forth,

so being a blemished priest and impurity were for him simultaneously,

when he became an adult.

Alternatively,

it is speaking of an adult, and for example

he cut his finger with an impure knife,

and became impure and blemished simultaneously.

And we inquire concerning this:

Granted, according to Rabbi Hiyya,

his words can properly be understood, and also the words of Bar Kappara, concerning which he swore that they were correct.

When he taught it,

when Rabbi taught his Mishna

to him,

to Rabbi Hiyya, and told him that he was liable for two — he taught it

according to Rabbi Yosei,

who holds that a prohibition takes effect upon a prohibition simultaneously.

But

when he taught it

when he taught his Mishna

to Bar Kappara,

that he was liable for one — he taught it

according to Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that a prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition simultaneously. And Bar Kappara erred and thought that Rabbi had taught it to him also according to Rabbi Yosei, and therefore he hastened and swore that Rabbi had taught him that he was liable for only one.

But according to Bar Kappara,

who held that even Rabbi Yosei is liable for only one —

And did Bar Kappara hold in his oath that

Rabbi Hiyya was lying outright

in his oath!?

And on the strength of this difficulty the Gemara establishes their disagreement in another manner:

Rather, they disagree with regard to a prohibition [taking effect] simultaneously, and according to Rabbi Shimon.

And according to Rabbi Yosei, certainly it takes effect according to everyone. Rabbi Hiyya claimed that Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yosei when the two prohibitions took effect simultaneously, and over this Bar Kappara disagreed and said that even when they take effect simultaneously Rabbi Shimon disagrees.

And Bar Kappara held that Rabbi Hiyya erred in this: Rabbi said that he was liable for two according to Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Hiyya mistakenly understood that he had told him that he was liable for two even according to Rabbi Shimon.

And we inquire concerning this:

Granted, according to Rabbi Hiyya, he swears

in order

to remove Rabbi Shimon from his established position,

from his established position that he says that a prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition, whereas here, when they took effect simultaneously, he concedes that he is liable for two.

But according to Bar Kappara,

who established Rabbi Shimon according to his established position —

why does he need to swear?

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult.

But it is still necessary now to raise the difficulty from the opposite side:

Granted, according to Bar Kappara,

he properly established his words and the words of Rabbi Hiyya, who held

when Rabbi taught it to him

that he was liable for only one —

he taught this according to Rabbi Shimon

that he taught it.

And

when he taught it to Rabbi Hiyya

that he was liable for two —

according to Rabbi Yosei

Rabbi taught it to him, who holds that a prohibition takes effect upon a prohibition.

And Rabbi Hiyya erred and thought that he had taught it to him according to Rabbi Shimon.

But according to Rabbi Hiyya,

who held that even according to the words of Rabbi Shimon he is liable for two, and all the more so according to Rabbi Yosei — did

Bar Kappara lie outright

in his oath that according to Rabbi Shimon he is liable for only one?

And we answer:

Rabbi Hiyya could say to you:

Rabbi Hiyya did not lie in his oath.

Rather, this was his error:

When Rabbi taught it to him

that he was liable for only one —

Two,

two out of the three matters over which Rabbi Hiyya and Bar Kappara disagreed,

to exempt

from two liabilities and impose one —

he taught it to him,

he taught it to him.