Yevamot 32b (לב:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Abbahu said: Rabbi Yosei concedes

that one prohibition can take effect upon another prohibition

in the case of an additional prohibition. "

The meaning of an additional prohibition is that the second prohibition adds other people who become prohibited through it, in addition to the person who was already prohibited through the earlier prohibition; since additional people become prohibited through the additional prohibition, he too becomes prohibited through it together with them.

For example, initially she was prohibited to him as his wife's sister, which is a personal prohibition applying to him alone. Then one of his brothers married her, and she thereby became prohibited to all the brothers as a brother's wife. The prohibition of a brother's wife thus adds other people to whom she is prohibited, and therefore he too becomes prohibited to her through that same prohibition together with them.

By contrast, if she was initially prohibited as a married woman, and afterward became his mother-in-law, no additional people were added to her prohibition. Therefore he does not become prohibited to her as his mother-in-law, and his punishment is not burning but only strangulation.

And if initially his mother-in-law was unmarried, and she became prohibited to him as his mother-in-law, and afterward she married and became a married woman—which is an additional prohibition—since now she became prohibited to all men, the prohibition of a married woman also takes effect upon her. If he has relations with her unintentionally, he is liable to bring two sin offerings, and if intentionally, he is liable to the more severe death penalty."

The Gemara raises an objection:

This works well when the living brother married

the

living

sister first, so that her second sister became prohibited to him as his wife's sister,

and afterward the deceased brother married

the

deceased

sister, in which case Rabbi Yosei can properly maintain that

since there was added

to her

the prohibition

of a brother's wife

with regard to

the other

brothers,

the prohibition

of a brother's wife was also added

with regard to him, despite the fact that she had already been prohibited to him as his wife's sister.

But

when

initially the

deceased brother married

one of the sisters, and she then became prohibited to all the brothers as a brother's wife,

and afterward the living brother married

her sister, for whom the additional prohibition of a wife's sister is a personal prohibition—

what additional prohibition is there?

And why does Rabbi Yosei hold him liable to bring two sin offerings!?

And if you would say

that one can answer that

since he became prohibited

the living brother who married the second sister

to all the sisters,

to all of the wife's sisters, this is considered an additional prohibition according to Rabbi Yosei—

This cannot be said. For:

This—

is an inclusive prohibition,

and not an "additional prohibition"!

For there are no additional people who become prohibited together with him through his wife's sister, who has now become prohibited to him, such that it should be called an "additional prohibition."

Rather, by marrying his wife's sister, it includes additional women who become prohibited to him!

And the distinction between an additional prohibition and an inclusive prohibition is that an "additional" prohibition adds additional people who become prohibited together with him through that same prohibition, whereas an inclusive prohibition includes additional persons who become prohibited with regard to him!

Rather, Rava said,

this is how Rabbi Yosei's statement should be explained:

Rabbi Yosei actually maintains that one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition, and that one who has relations unintentionally with his wife's sister, who is also his brother's wife, is not liable to bring two sin offerings.

Nevertheless, since she is both his brother's wife and his wife's sister, if he does so intentionally, he is a complete wicked person, as one who committed both transgressions, and he should be buried among the completely wicked.

And when Rabbi Yosei said that even if the deceased brother married first, causing her to become prohibited to the living brother as a brother's wife, and afterward the living brother married her sister, for which he is liable to bring two, this is what he meant:

I regard him as though he had committed two transgressions, but he is not liable

to bring [if he did so unintentionally]

anything but

a sin offering

one.

And similarly, when Ravin came, he said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan

in explaining Rabbi Yosei's statement:

I regard him as though he had committed two transgressions, but he is liable to bring only one.

And the Gemara explains:

What practical difference

is there in regarding him as though he had committed two transgressions, once you exempt him from bringing two sin offerings?

To bury him among the completely wicked!

For there were two burial grounds for those executed by the court. One was for those sentenced to the two more severe forms of death, burning and stoning, and the other was for those sentenced to the less severe forms of death, decapitation and strangulation.

And this person, who had relations with a woman who was both his brother's wife and his wife's sister, is a completely wicked person. Even though he is not liable to receive execution by the court, they bury him with those liable to the more severe forms of death.

And

this entire matter, concerning the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon as to how and where one prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition,

was stated in connection with the dispute

between Rabbi Hiyya and bar Kappara;

it was stated:

We find that Rabbi Hiyya and bar Kappara disagreed concerning three matters, whether one is liable to bring one offering or two for them. The Gemara will subsequently explain how these disputes correspond to the opinions of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon.

1.

A non-kohein,

who is not a kohein,

who served

in the Temple service

on Shabbat—

Rabbi Hiyya says: He is liable to bring two,

for desecrating Shabbat and for the prohibition applying to a non-kohein.

Bar Kappara says: He is liable to bring only one,

for the status of a non-kohein alone.

Rabbi Hiyya immediately sprang up and swore: By the Temple service!

[This is an expression of an oath, as one who swears and affirms the truth of his words by invoking the Temple service!]

This is what I heard from Rabbi:

He is liable to bring

two.

Bar Kappara immediately sprang up and swore: By the Temple service! This is what I heard from Rabbi:

He is liable to bring

one.

The Gemara will explain below how it is possible that each one swore that Rabbi had taught him a Mishna contradicting what he had taught the other.

Rabbi Hiyya began his argument:

The labor of

Shabbat was prohibited to everyone,

to every Israelite,

was prohibited.

When

the Temple service

in the Temple was permitted—

it was permitted for the kohanim.

And it was permitted

only for kohanim, and not for non-kohanim.

Therefore, there are two prohibitions here:

there is here

a prohibition

on account of the status of a non-kohein, and there is here the prohibition of

the labor of

Shabbat.

Bar Kappara began his argument:

The labor of

Shabbat was prohibited to everyone.

When

the service

in the Temple

on Shabbat was permitted—in general,

it was permitted,

and not specifically for kohanim.

Therefore,

there is no

liability for Shabbat here,

but

only the prohibition of a

non-kohein.

As stated, the Gemara will explain their dispute below.

2.

A blemished kohein who served while impure

in a communal offering, for a communal offering overrides impurity—

Rabbi Hiyya says: He is liable to bring two,

for the service of a blemished kohein and for service while impure.

Bar Kappara says: He is liable to bring only one.

Rabbi Hiyya immediately sprang up and swore: By the Temple service! This is what I heard from Rabbi:

He is liable to bring

two.

Bar Kappara immediately sprang up and swore: By the Temple service! This is what I heard from Rabbi:

He is liable to bring

one.

Rabbi Hiyya began his argument: Impurity

in the Temple service

was prohibited to everyone.

When

impurity

in the Temple

was permitted for a communal offering,

it was permitted for unblemished kohanim.

And it was permitted

only for unblemished kohanim, and not for those with blemishes!

Therefore, when those with blemishes serve while impure,

there is here

also a prohibition

on account of those with blemishes, and there is here

a prohibition

on account of impurity.

Bar Kappara began his argument: Impurity

in the Temple service

was prohibited to everyone.

When

the impurity

in

the service of the

Temple

for a communal offering was permitted,

it was permitted

in general.

Therefore,

there is no

prohibition

except that of a blemished kohein.

3.

A non-kohein who ate

a bird sin offering whose consumption was permitted through

melika

by a kohein, and this bird is fit for consumption only by kohanim—

Rabbi Hiyya says: He is liable to bring two,

for the status of a non-kohein and for a carcass (nevela), since the flesh of a bird whose neck was severed by melika is considered the flesh of a carcass for one to whom it was not permitted.

Bar Kappara says: He is liable to bring only one,

for the status of a non-kohein, but not for a carcass.

Rabbi Hiyya immediately sprang up and swore: By the Temple service! This is what I heard from Rabbi:

He is liable to bring

two.

Bar Kappara immediately sprang up and swore: By the Temple service! This is what I heard from Rabbi:

He is liable to bring

one.

Rabbi Hiyya began his argument: A carcass was prohibited to everyone.

When

a carcass was permitted for consumption

in the Temple,

through the melika of a bird sin offering,

it was permitted for kohanim.

And it was permitted

for kohanim

alone

and not for non-kohanim.

Therefore,

there is here the prohibition of the status of a non-kohein, and there is here the prohibition of melika.

Bar Kappara began his argument: A carcass was prohibited to everyone.

When it was permitted in the Temple—

it was permitted

in general.

There is here only the prohibition of the status of a non-kohein.