Yevamot 32b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Abbahu said: Rabbi Yosei agrees

that a prohibition takes effect upon a prohibition

in a prohibition that adds. "

The meaning of “a prohibition that adds” is that the second prohibition adds additional people who become prohibited through it, in addition to that person who was already prohibited through the earlier prohibition; since still more people become prohibited through the additional prohibition, he too becomes prohibited through it together with them."

For example, where at first she was prohibited to him because she was his wife’s sister, which is a private prohibition applying to him, and afterward one of his brothers married her, and she then became prohibited to all the brothers through the prohibition of a brother’s wife: the prohibition of a brother’s wife adds additional people to whom she is prohibited, and therefore he too becomes prohibited through that prohibition together with them.

But, by contrast, if she was initially prohibited through the prohibition of a married woman, and afterward became his mother-in-law, no additional people were thereby added to her prohibition; therefore he is not prohibited through her being his mother-in-law, and his דין is not burning, but only strangulation.

And if at first his mother-in-law was unmarried, and she became prohibited to him because she was his mother-in-law, and afterward she married and became a married woman, which is a prohibition that adds, since now all people became prohibited through her, the prohibition of a married woman also takes effect upon her. And if he transgresses with her unwittingly, he is liable for two sin-offerings, and intentionally he is liable for the more severe death penalty.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

This works where he married

the living

brother

first married one of the sisters, and her second sister became prohibited to him by the law of a wife’s sister,

and afterward he married

the dead

brother

married her sister; Rabbi Yosei properly holds that

since there was added

to her

the prohibition

of a brother’s wife

with regard to

the remaining

brothers—

the prohibition was added

of a brother’s wife also

with regard to him,

even though she had already been prohibited to him because she was a wife’s sister.

But, where

at first

the dead one married

one of the sisters, and she then became prohibited to all the brothers because she was a brother’s wife,

and afterward the living one married

her sister, for the additional prohibition of a wife’s sister is a private prohibition—

what “prohibition that adds” is there?

And why does Rabbi Yosei make him liable for two sin-offerings?!

And if you would say

to answer that

since he became prohibited

the living brother, who married the second sister,

through all the sisters,

through all the sisters of the woman whom he married, this is considered a prohibition that adds according to Rabbi Yosei—

It is impossible to say so. For:

This—

is “a prohibition that includes,”

and not “a prohibition that adds”!

For there are no additional people here who become prohibited together with him through his wife’s sister, who has now become prohibited to him, so that it should be called “a prohibition that adds.”

Rather, it “includes,” through taking a wife’s sister, additional women who become prohibited to him!

And the distinction between a prohibition that adds and a prohibition that includes is that “adds” means additional people who become prohibited together with him through that same prohibition, whereas “includes” means additional prohibited women—with regard to him!

Rather, Rava said,

this is how Rabbi Yosei’s words are to be answered:

Rabbi Yosei actually holds that a prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition, and he is not liable for two sin-offerings unwittingly for his wife’s sister who is his brother’s wife.

Nevertheless, since she is both his brother’s wife and his wife’s sister, if he does this intentionally, he is a completely wicked person, like one who committed both transgressions, and he should be buried among the completely wicked.

And what Rabbi Yosei said—that even if the dead brother married first, and she became prohibited to the living brother through the prohibition of a brother’s wife, and afterward the living brother married her sister, for which he is liable for two—this is what he meant:

I regard him as though he had committed two, but he is not liable

to bring [if he did this unwittingly]

except

one sin-offering

.

And likewise, when Ravin came, he said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan

in explanation of Rabbi Yosei’s words:

I regard him as though he had committed two, but he is liable for only one.

And the Gemara explains:

What practical difference

is there in this, that I regard him as though he had committed two, since you exempt him from two sin-offerings?

To bury him among the completely wicked!

For there were two cemeteries for those executed by the court. One was for those sentenced to the two severe deaths, burning and stoning, and the other was for those sentenced to the lenient deaths, which are execution by the sword and strangulation.

And this one who had intercourse with a woman who is both his brother’s wife and his wife’s sister is completely wicked, and even though he is not liable to death by the court, they bury him beside those liable to the severe deaths.

And

this entire matter, the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon concerning how and where a prohibition takes effect upon a prohibition—

was stated

in the dispute of Rabbi Hiyya and Bar Kappara

:

We find that Rabbi Hiyya and Bar Kappara disagreed about three matters, whether one is liable for one or two, and afterward the Gemara will explain how these disputes correspond to the words of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon.

1.

A non-koen,

who is not a koen,

who performed

the Temple service

on Shabbat—

Rabbi Hiyya says: He is liable for two,

for profaning Shabbat and for the prohibition of being a non-koen.

Bar Kappara says: He is liable for only one,

for being a non-koen alone.

Rabbi Hiyya sprang up and swore: By the Temple service!

This is an expression of an oath, as one who swore and affirmed his words by the truth of the service in the Temple!

Thus I heard from Rabbi:

he is liable for

two.

Bar Kappara sprang up and swore: By the Temple service! Thus I heard from Rabbi:

he is liable for

one.

And below the Gemara will explain how it is possible that each one swore that Rabbi had taught him a Mishna contradicting what he had taught his fellow.

Rabbi Hiyya began to reason:

The labor of

Shabbat for everyone

of Israel

was prohibited.

When

service

in the Temple was permitted—

it was permitted for the koanim.

And only

for the koanim was it permitted, and not for non-koanim.

Therefore there are two prohibitions here:

there is here

a prohibition

because of being a non-koen, and there is here because of

the labor of

Shabbat.

Bar Kappara began to reason:

The labor of

Shabbat was prohibited to everyone.

When

the service

in the Temple

on Shabbat was permitted—without specification—

it was permitted,

and not specifically for the koanim.

Therefore

there is no

liability for Shabbat,

but

only the prohibition of a

non-koen.

And as stated, the Gemara will explain their dispute below.

2.

A blemished koen who performed service in a state of impurity

for a communal offering, for a communal offering overrides impurity—

Rabbi Hiyya says: He is liable for two,

for the service of a blemished koen and for service in a state of impurity.

Bar Kappara says: He is liable for only one.

Rabbi Hiyya sprang up and swore: By the Temple service! Thus I heard from Rabbi:

he is liable for

two.

Bar Kappara sprang up and swore: By the Temple service! Thus I heard from Rabbi:

he is liable for

one.

Rabbi Hiyya began to reason: Impurity

in the Temple service

was prohibited to everyone.

When

impurity

in the Temple

for a communal offering was permitted—

it was permitted for unblemished koanim.

And only

for unblemished koanim was it permitted, and not for blemished ones!

Therefore, when blemished ones perform service in a state of impurity,

there is here

also a prohibition

because of blemished ones, and there is here

a prohibition

because of impurity.

Bar Kappara began to reason: Impurity

in the Temple service

was prohibited to everyone.

When

the impurity

in

the service of the

Temple

for a communal offering was permitted—

it was permitted

without specification.

Therefore,

there is no

prohibition

except because of a blemished koen.

3.

A non-koen who ate

the bird of a sin-offering whose consumption was permitted through

melika

by a koen, and this bird was fit for consumption only by koanim—

Rabbi Hiyya says: He is liable for two,

for being a non-koen and for an animal carcass. For the flesh of a bird whose neck was severed by melika is considered the flesh of an animal carcass for one to whom it was not permitted.

Bar Kappara says: He is liable for only one,

for being a non-koen, but not for an animal carcass.

Rabbi Hiyya sprang up and swore: By the Temple service! Thus I heard from Rabbi:

he is liable for

two.

Bar Kappara sprang up and swore: By the Temple service! Thus I heard from Rabbi:

he is liable for

one.

Rabbi Hiyya began to reason: An animal carcass was prohibited to everyone.

When

an animal carcass was permitted for consumption

in the Temple,

through the melika of a bird of a sin-offering—

it was permitted for the koanim.

And only

for the koanim

alone

was it permitted, and not for non-koanim.

Therefore,

there is here the prohibition of being a non-koen, and there is here the prohibition of melika.

Bar Kappara began to reason: An animal carcass was prohibited to everyone.

When it was permitted in the Temple—

it was permitted

without specification.

There is here only the prohibition of being a non-koen.