Yevamot 32a — the Talmud in English

And part of it is released.

And we challenge this:

“And they will say”:

Will people say this? And what mishap is there in the matter, if, when two yevamot come from one household, one undergoes yibbum and the other undergoes an unnecessary halitza?

And we answer:

If,

if this should happen,

the one who performs yibbum

with one of them,

and afterward performs halitza

with the other,

so too

we have no reason to fear such a mishap.

Rather,

it is a

decree,

lest they come to err and say that two yevamot who come from one household require both halitza and yibbum, and

perhaps he performs halitza

with one of them

first, and afterward performs yibbum

with the other,

and he thereby stands

with regard to the yibbum of the second

under “that he shall not build.”

And the Torah said: Once he has not built

the house of his brother, when he performed halitza with one—

he shall not build again!

We learned in the Mishna: If the second brother performed maamar with the wife of the first, both of them—the wife of the second and the woman with whom he performed maamar—must undergo halitza and may not undergo yibbum.

Rava said:

If

the second brother, who betrothed the wife of the first through the betrothal of maamar, gave

her

a bill of divorce for his maamar

but not for her bond of levirate obligation—

her co-wife is permitted

to undergo yibbum, namely, the wife of the second. Since, at the time her husband died, she was no longer the co-wife of a forbidden relative through maamar.

And here there is no concern to decree lest people say that, when two yevamot come from one household, one undergoes halitza and one undergoes yibbum. For he nullifies through the bill of divorce the maamar that he performed with her. It follows that after the bill of divorce, everyone knows that there are here two yevamot from two households.

But she,

the woman with whom he performed maamar herself,

is forbidden

to undergo yibbum through her falling before the first brother, since

she is confused with “the recipient of a bill of divorce.”

That is, the Sages decreed concerning a yevama to whom the levir gave a bill of divorce for her bond of levirate obligation that she may not undergo yibbum with the remaining brothers. For, by rabbinic law, he and all his brothers become forbidden to her as though he had performed halitza with her, through the prohibition: “Once he has not built, he shall not build again.”

And here too, had he given her the bill of divorce both for his maamar and for her bond of levirate obligation, she would not have undergone yibbum.

However, since he gave the bill of divorce only for his maamar, the bill of divorce nullified only his maamar, while the bond of levirate obligation remained as it was, and she could have undergone yibbum. Rather, the Sages decreed concerning her that she may not undergo yibbum, since people confuse her with one who received a bill of divorce for her bond of levirate obligation, who may not undergo yibbum.

There are those who say:

Thus

Rava said:

If he gave a bill of divorce for his maamar—

even she herself is permitted

to undergo yibbum with the third brother, when the second brother dies.

What is the reason?—

Whatever he did to her,

the maamar that he performed with her, he has

taken it away,

removing it from her through the bill of divorce that he gave for his maamar, and the bond of levirate obligation resulting from the fall before the first brother remained with her as it had been.

And she may undergo yibbum with the third brother by virtue of the bond of levirate obligation to him resulting from the fall before the first brother.

And this is on condition that he explicitly states that he is giving the bill of divorce only for his maamar, and not for her bond of levirate obligation [Rashi].

Mishna:

Two brothers

who were

married to two sisters, and one of them died.

And through her falling before him she is a forbidden relative to the second brother, because she is his wife’s sister, and therefore she is exempt from both yibbum and halitza.

And afterward the wife of the second died,

and the yevama was no longer forbidden to him as his wife’s sister.

She remains forbidden to him forever,

through the prohibition of a brother’s wife,

since she was forbidden to him for one moment,

through the prohibition of a brother’s wife who was not permitted for yibbum, like a brother’s wife who has children,

Gemara:

And we consider concerning it: What does the Mishna inform us?

It is

obvious

that she remains forbidden forever!

For

now,

indeed,

and what of there,

in the previous Mishna [on page 30a], where there were three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and the third was married to a stranger, and one of the husbands of the sisters died, so that she fell before her sister’s husband and before the husband of the stranger?

That she is not entirely cast off

at the time of her fall

from this household,

but she is bound to the brother married to the stranger for yibbum or halitza, and at the time of the fall I can apply to her: “The yevama shall come to him” [except with regard to the brother who is married to her sister].

And the brother married to the stranger performed yibbum with her, and afterward her sister, who was married to the second brother, died, and afterward the brother who had taken her in marriage died—

you said

that she

does not

undergo yibbum with the brother who had been married to her sister at the time of her first fall, even though now, after her sister died, she is permitted to him because she is no longer his wife’s sister.

Since she is forbidden to him through the prohibition of a brother’s wife from the first fall, because at the time of the fall the prohibition of a brother’s wife was not permitted to him, and she became forbidden to him like a brother’s wife who has children. And this prohibition is forever and is not removed by virtue of the yibbum of a second brother.

Here,

where there were only two brothers married to two sisters,

who is entirely cast off from this household

at the time of the fall, for at that time only one brother who is married to her sister remains, and at the time of the fall I cannot apply to her at all: “The yevama shall come to him”—

all the more so

does the prohibition of a brother’s wife, like that of a brother’s wife who has children, take effect upon her forever, and if her sister subsequently dies, she does not return to undergo yibbum!?

And since our Mishna is obvious, why did the tannai teach it!?

And we answer: The

tannai

who taught our Mishna,

this

Mishna of ours,

taught

it

first,

because it is the simplest.

And

if

that

previous Mishna

appeared to be permitted,

for one might have thought: Since at the time of the fall from the first brother I can apply to her, with regard to the third brother married to the stranger, “The yevama shall come to him,” she does not become forbidden even to her sister’s husband through the prohibition of a brother’s wife who has children,

and she is permitted

to him for yibbum, after the death of his wife, her sister, when she again falls before him through the death of the brother married to the stranger.

But

afterward,

subsequently,

the tannai

saw her

as forbidden,

since she was not permitted to him at the time of her first fall.

And since,

because

the novelty was dear to him

to the tannai—the novelty of prohibition in that Mishna—he

placed it first,

and taught it before our Mishna.

But the tannai continued to teach our Mishna as well, afterward, even though now, after that Mishna had already been taught first, it is obvious and contains no novelty.

Since

a Mishna

that has been taught

does not move from its place,

from continuing to be taught.

The Sages taught:

If his wife’s sister fell before him, and she is exempt from halitza and yibbum, and he is forbidden to her like a brother’s wife who has children, and

he came upon her

unintentionally—

he is liable for her

two sin-offerings. One

for a brother’s wife, and

one

for a wife’s sister; these are the words of Rabbi Yose.

Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable only

for one sin-offering,

for a brother’s wife alone.

And we challenge this:

But it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable only for a wife’s sister alone!

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

Rabbi Shimon holds that one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition, and therefore:

Here,

where he is liable for a wife’s sister, this refers to a case in which

the living

brother

married

one of the sisters first, and the second sister became forbidden to him through the prohibition of a wife’s sister.

And afterward he married

his

dead

brother’s sister, whose prohibition as a wife’s sister preceded and took effect upon her first; therefore the prohibition of a brother’s wife does not take effect upon the prohibition of a wife’s sister.

Here,

where he is liable for a brother’s wife, this refers to a case in which

the dead brother married

one of the sisters first, and she became forbidden to the living brother through the prohibition of a brother’s wife,

and afterward

the

living brother

married her sister, for the prohibition of a brother’s wife preceded, and the prohibition of a wife’s sister does not take effect upon it.

And we consider concerning it:

And Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that one prohibition does not take effect upon another—

if so,

where,

in a case in which

the dead brother married

one of the sisters first, and she became forbidden to the living brother through the prohibition of a brother’s wife,

and afterward the living brother married

her sister, then

since the prohibition of a wife’s sister did not take effect

upon the prohibition of a brother’s wife—and this prohibition of a brother’s wife is the prohibition of a brother’s wife who has no children, which is permitted in the place of yibbum—

here, since she is not forbidden through the forbidden-relative status of a wife’s sister, for according to Rabbi Shimon the prohibition of the forbidden relative of a wife’s sister did not take effect upon her, since one prohibition does not take effect upon another—

let him perform yibbum with her!

Rav Ashi said: The prohibition of a wife’s sister

did not in fact take effect upon her, but this does not mean that it does not exist at all.

Rather, it is

“suspended and standing,”

suspended and standing, ready to take effect upon her, for

if the prohibition of a brother’s wife is removed—

the prohibition of a wife’s sister comes and takes effect

upon her.

And if we permit him to perform yibbum with her, according to the law of a brother’s wife who has no children, the prohibition of a wife’s sister will take effect upon her immediately, and he will refrain from performing yibbum. It follows that she has no possibility of yibbum, even though the prohibition of a wife’s sister did not in fact take effect upon her.

And therefore, it was not removed

the prohibition of a brother’s wife that applies to her,

for the prohibition of a brother’s wife who has no children was permitted only in the place of yibbum. But here, where there is no possibility of yibbum, she is like a brother’s wife who has children, for this prohibition of a brother’s wife was not permitted, and therefore he is liable for her because of a brother’s wife.

And we further consider concerning Rabbi Yose, who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon and holds that he is liable for two, because of a wife’s sister and because of a brother’s wife:

And

does

Rabbi Yose hold

that

one prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition?

But it was taught:

One who

committed a transgression for which there are two forms of judicial death

by the court

is judged by the

form of death that is

more severe

of the two.

For example, one who comes upon his mother-in-law when she is a married woman: he is liable for burning because of his mother-in-law, which is the more severe form of death, and for strangulation because of a married woman, which is the less severe form of death; he is judged by burning, which is the more severe form of death.

Rabbi Yose says: He is judged according to the first relationship

[the cause of the prohibition]

that came upon him.

And it was taught: How did Rabbi Yose say

that he is

“judged according to the first relationship that came upon him”?

For example, at first, when he betrothed his wife, his

mother-in-law

was unmarried [a widow],

and

afterward she married and

became a married woman—

he is

judged by

burning for the transgression involving his

mother-in-law.

But if at first she was

a married woman, and

afterward he betrothed her daughter and

she became his mother-in-law—

he is judged by

the less severe form of death, strangulation, for the transgression involving a

married woman.

And it is proven that Rabbi Yose holds like Rabbi Shimon, that one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition, for if one prohibition did take effect upon another prohibition, he would always be judged by the more severe form of death.