Yevamot 32a (לב.) — the Talmud in English

and part of it performs halitza.

And we challenge this:

But let them say

this! What difficulty is there in the matter if, when two yevamot come from one household, one undergoes yibbum and the other undergoes an unnecessary halitza

?

If

this is what happens,

he performs yibbum

with one of them,

and then performs halitza

with the other,

so too here

there is no need to fear such a mishap.

Rather,

this

is a decree:

perhaps people will err and say that two yevamot who come from one household require both halitza and yibbum, and

perhaps he will perform halitza

with one of them

first, and then perform yibbum

with the other,

and he will thereby stand

with regard to the yibbum of the second

under the verse, “whom he did not build.”

And the Torah says: Since he did not build

his brother’s household when he performed halitza with one of them,

he shall no longer build it!

We learned in the Mishna: If the second brother performed ma’amar with the first brother’s wife, both of them—the second brother’s wife and the woman with whom he performed ma’amar—must undergo halitza and may not undergo yibbum.

Rava said:

If

the second brother, who betrothed the first brother’s wife through ma’amar, gave

her

a bill of divorce for his ma’amar

but not for her levirate bond,

her rival wife is permitted

to undergo yibbum. This is because at the time her husband died, she was no longer a rival wife of a forbidden relation through ma’amar.

Here there is no concern that people will say that, when two yevamot come from one household, one undergoes halitza and the other undergoes yibbum. For he nullifies the ma’amar he performed with her through the bill of divorce. Consequently, after the bill of divorce, everyone knows that there are two yevamot from two households.

But she,

the woman with whom he performed ma’amar herself,

is forbidden

to undergo yibbum from her falling before the first brother, since

she may be confused with “a woman who received a bill of divorce.”

That is, the Sages decreed with regard to a yevama to whom the yavam gave a bill of divorce for her levirate bond that she may not undergo yibbum with the other brothers. Since, by rabbinic law, he and all his brothers become forbidden to her as though he had performed halitza with her, because of the prohibition: “Since he did not build it, he shall no longer build it.”

And here as well, had he given her the bill of divorce both for his ma’amar and for her levirate bond, she would not have been permitted to undergo yibbum.

However, since he gave the bill of divorce only for his ma’amar, the bill of divorce nullified only his ma’amar, while the levirate bond remained as it was, and she would have been permitted to undergo yibbum. Nevertheless, the Sages decreed that she may not undergo yibbum, since she might be confused by people with a woman who received a bill of divorce for her levirate bond, who may not undergo yibbum.

Some say

that this is what

Rava said:

If he gave a bill of divorce for his ma’amar,

even she herself is permitted

to undergo yibbum with the third brother when the second brother dies.

What is the reason?

Whatever he did to her,

namely, the ma’amar he performed with her,

he removed,

as he removed it from her through the bill of divorce he gave for his ma’amar, and the levirate bond resulting from her falling before the first brother remained as it had been.

And she may undergo yibbum with the third brother by virtue of the levirate bond to him resulting from her falling before the first brother.

This is provided that he specifies that he is giving the bill of divorce only for his ma’amar and not for her levirate bond [Rashi].

Mishna:

Two brothers

who were

married to two sisters, and one of them died.

Upon her falling before the surviving brother, she is a forbidden relation to him because she is his wife’s sister, and she is exempt from both yibbum and halitza.

And afterward the wife of the second brother died,

so that the yevama was no longer forbidden to him as his wife’s sister.

She remains forbidden to him forever,

because of the prohibition against a brother’s wife,

since she was forbidden to him for one moment

as a brother’s wife who was not permitted for yibbum, like a brother’s wife whose husband has children.

Gemara:

We raise a question concerning this: What is the Mishna teaching us?

It is

obvious

that she remains forbidden forever!

For

now,

consider

the case there

in the previous Mishna [on page 30a], where there were three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, while the third was married to a stranger, and one of the husbands of the sisters died, leaving her to fall before both her sister’s husband and the husband of the stranger.

Since she is not completely cast away

at the time of her falling

from this household,

but remains bound to the brother married to the stranger for yibbum or halitza, and I apply to her at the time of her falling the verse, “the yevama shall come to him” [except with regard to the brother who is married to her sister],

and the brother married to the stranger performed yibbum with her, and afterward the sister married to the second brother died, and afterward the brother who had taken her in marriage died—

you have said

that she

may not

undergo yibbum with the brother who had been married to her sister at the time of her first falling, even though now, after her sister’s death, she is permitted to him because she is no longer his wife’s sister.

Since she is forbidden to him as a brother’s wife from the first falling, because at the time of the falling the prohibition against a brother’s wife was not permitted to him, she became forbidden to him like a brother’s wife whose husband has children. This prohibition is permanent and is not lifted by virtue of the yibbum performed by the second brother.

Here,

where there were only two brothers married to two sisters,

she is completely cast away from this household

at the time of her falling, since at that time only one brother remained, and he was married to her sister; therefore, I cannot apply to her at the time of her falling the verse “the yevama shall come to him” at all—

is it not all the more so

that the prohibition against a brother’s wife, like that involving a brother’s wife whose husband has children, takes effect upon her permanently, and if her sister subsequently dies, she does not return to be eligible for yibbum

? And since our Mishna is obvious, why did the tanna teach it

?

And we answer: The

tanna who taught our Mishna

this

Mishna

taught

it

first,

because it is the simplest case.

And

had

that

previous Mishna

appeared to permit,

as one might have thought that since, at the time of her falling from the first brother, I apply to her with regard to the third brother, who is married to a stranger, the verse “the yevama shall come to him,” she does not become forbidden even to her sister’s husband through the prohibition of a brother’s wife whose husband has children,

and he would be permitted

to perform yibbum with her after the death of his wife, her sister, when she again falls before him upon the death of the brother who had married her—

but

afterward,

subsequently,

the tanna saw

her

as forbidden,

since she was not permitted to him at the time of her first falling.

And since

the tanna

cherished

the novel prohibition taught in that Mishna,

he placed it first,

and taught it before our Mishna.

But the tanna continued to teach our Mishna as well, after it, even though now, after that Mishna had already been taught first, it is obvious and contains no novelty.

Since

a Mishna

that was already taught

does not move from its place,

the tanna continued to teach it.

The Sages taught: If his wife’s sister fell before him, and she was exempt from halitza and yibbum, and he was forbidden to her like a brother’s wife whose husband has children, and

he engaged in intercourse with her

unwittingly—

he is liable for

two sin-offerings: one

for a brother’s wife, and

one

for a wife’s sister; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable only

for one sin-offering,

for a brother’s wife alone.

And we challenge this:

But it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable only for a wife’s sister!

And we answer:

It is not difficult. Rabbi Shimon holds that one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition, and therefore:

Here,

where he is liable for a wife’s sister, the case is one in which

the living

brother

married

one of the sisters first, and the second sister became forbidden to him as a wife’s sister.

And afterward he married

his

deceased

brother’s sister, so that the prohibition of a wife’s sister preceded and took effect upon her first; therefore, the prohibition of a brother’s wife does not take effect upon the prohibition of a wife’s sister.

Here,

where he is liable for a brother’s wife, the case is one in which

the deceased

first married one of the sisters, and she became forbidden to the living brother as a brother’s wife,

and afterward

the

living

brother married her sister, so that the prohibition of a brother’s wife preceded, and the prohibition of a wife’s sister does not take effect upon it.

We raise a question concerning this:

And Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that one prohibition does not take effect upon another—

if so,

where,

in a case

the deceased married

one of the sisters first, and she became forbidden to the living brother as a brother’s wife,

and afterward the living brother married

her sister, then

since the prohibition of a wife’s sister does not take effect

upon the prohibition of a brother’s wife, and this prohibition of a brother’s wife is that of a brother’s wife whose husband has no children, which is permitted in the context of yibbum—

then here, since she is not forbidden through the prohibition of a wife’s sister, for according to Rabbi Shimon the prohibition of a wife’s sister does not take effect upon her because one prohibition does not take effect upon another—

let him perform yibbum with her!

Rav Ashi said: The prohibition of a wife’s sister

indeed did not take effect upon her in practice, but this does not mean that it does not exist at all.

Rather, it is

“suspended and standing,”

waiting and ready to take effect, for

if the prohibition of a brother’s wife is removed,

the prohibition of a wife’s sister will come and take effect

upon her.

And if we permit him to perform yibbum with her, as is the law with a brother’s wife whose husband has no children, the prohibition of a wife’s sister will take effect upon her immediately, and it will prevent the yibbum. Consequently, she has no possibility of yibbum, even though the prohibition of a wife’s sister did not take effect upon her in practice.

And therefore, the prohibition does not lapse

the prohibition of a brother’s wife that applies to her,

for the prohibition of a brother’s wife whose husband has no children is lifted only in the context of yibbum. Here, since yibbum is impossible, she is like a brother’s wife whose husband has children, with regard to whom this prohibition against a brother’s wife is not lifted; therefore, he is liable for her because of a brother’s wife.

We raise an additional question concerning Rabbi Yosei, who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon and holds that he is liable for two offerings, one for a wife’s sister and one for a brother’s wife:

And

does

Rabbi Yosei hold

that

one prohibition takes effect upon another?

But it was taught

that one who

commits a transgression carrying two possible court-imposed deaths

by the court

is judged by the

more

severe

death of the two.

For example, one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law while she is a married woman is liable for burning for his mother-in-law, which is the more severe death, and for strangulation for a married woman, which is the less severe death; therefore, he is judged by burning, which is the more severe death.

Rabbi Yosei says: He is judged according to the first connection

[the first cause of the prohibition]

that comes upon him.

And it was taught: How did Rabbi Yosei state

that he is

“judged according to the first connection that comes upon him”?

For example, initially, when he betrothed his wife, his

mother-in-law

was unmarried [a widow],

and

afterward she married

and became a married woman—

then he is

judged by

burning for the transgression involving his

mother-in-law.

But if initially she was

a married woman, and

afterward he betrothed her daughter

and she became his mother-in-law,

he is judged by

the less severe death of strangulation, for the transgression involving

a married woman.

And it is proven that Rabbi Yosei holds like Rabbi Shimon, that one prohibition does not take effect upon another, for if one prohibition did take effect upon another, he would always be judged by the more severe death.