Yevamot 31b (לא:) — the Talmud in English

And the land,

the land concerning which there is contradictory testimony as to whether it belongs to the seller or the buyer—

establish it

establish it

as being in the possession of bar Shatya,

in the seller’s possession, since it had been in his possession before the disputed sale, and it remains in his possession!

And this means that by Torah law, one relies on the presumption of possession even in a case of two contradictory pairs of witnesses.

The question therefore returns: Why, when two contradictory pairs of witnesses testify concerning the divorce of the forbidden woman, must her rival wife perform ḥalitza, rather than relying on the presumption that she is permitted to marry someone outside the levirate bond?

Rather, Abaye said:

This is how one should explain why the Mishna did not state “doubtful divorce” in a case where it is uncertain whether the bill of divorce was closer to him or closer to her, as it did with regard to doubtful betrothal; and Rava stated this in an aphoristic expression,

“Let its counterpart explain it”!

The tanna taught with regard to betrothal:

If it is uncertain whether the bill of betrothal was closer to him or closer to her, then, if the uncertainty concerned the betrothal of a forbidden woman, her rival wife performs ḥalitza and does not undergo levirate marriage,

and the same applies to divorce.

The tanna taught with regard to divorce:

If the bill of divorce was written in his own handwriting, or if it contains no date, or if it contains only one witness, it has the status of a “doubtful divorce,” which is invalid by rabbinic decree—

and the same applies to betrothal,

since these disqualifications also apply by rabbinic decree to a bill of betrothal.

Rava said

to Abaye:

If

your explanation is

“Let its counterpart explain it,”

meaning that one should derive the law of betrothal from divorce and the law of divorce from betrothal—

what is the meaning of “This is

a doubtful divorce”

that it teaches

at the end of our Mishna?

But the expression “this is” implies exclusion: Only the cases listed by the Mishna are considered “doubtful divorce,” and one should not derive from betrothal [“its counterpart”] that a case where it is uncertain whether the bill was closer to him or closer to her is also “doubtful divorce”!

Rather, Rava said,

this is how one should explain it:

Every

doubt

that exists with regard to betrothal,

such as the doubt whether the bill was closer to him or closer to her—

exists

also for that same doubt

with regard to divorce.

And there is a doubt with regard to divorce

that

does not exist with regard to betrothal,

such as a bill of betrothal without a date.

And

the expression

“This is” that

the tanna stated with regard to

divorce—

is not literal;

rather, the law is derived from betrothal to divorce.

Rather, because it taught “This is

a doubt”

with regard to betrothal,

which was intended to exclude the disqualification resulting from the absence of a date in a bill of betrothal, since the absence of a date is not a deficiency with regard to betrothal—

it also taught “This is

a doubt”

with regard to divorce.

And the Gemara explains:

And “This is” with regard to betrothal—

what does it exclude?

It excludes

the absence of a

date

in a bill of betrothal,

as there is no

such disqualification

with regard to betrothal.

We raised a difficulty:

And for what reason

indeed

did they not institute a date in

a bill of

betrothal?

This works well according to the one who says

that they instituted a date in a bill of divorce

because of produce:

From the time the bill of divorce is written, even before the divorce, the husband already loses his right to consume the produce of the usufruct property that his wife brought to him. Therefore, they instituted that the date of writing the bill be recorded in the bill of divorce, so that we would know from what time he no longer has the right to consume the produce. According to this explanation, it is reasonable that they did not institute recording a date in a bill of betrothal, because the date on which the bill was written has no practical consequence, since

a betrothed woman has no produce

until she marries.

But according to the one who says

that they instituted a date in a bill of divorce

because of

the concern that he might provide a cover for

his niece,

so that if she commits adultery while married to him, he will take pity on her lest she be executed, give her a bill of divorce, and claim that she was divorced from him by this bill before she committed adultery—

Therefore, the Sages instituted that a date be written in the bill of divorce, so that he would be unable to provide her with such a cover.

And if so,

let them institute a date

also in a bill of betrothal, so that if she commits adultery, he could not claim that he betrothed her only after the adultery!?

And we answer:

Because there is

one

who betroths with money,

and then there would be no effective enactment, because the date of the betrothal would not be known,

and there is one who betroths with a bill—

the Sages did not institute a date

in the bill.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Yosef, said to Rav Ashi: But what of a slave, where some acquire him with money and others with a bill, and

nevertheless

the Sages instituted a date

in the bill documenting his acquisition!?

The practical consequence of the date concerns the slave’s property: Once a person acquires a Canaanite slave, the produce of the slave’s property belongs to the master.

And we answer:

There,

with regard to the acquisition of a slave,

most

people acquire a slave

with a bill,

and therefore they instituted a date in it.

But

here,

with regard to betrothal,

most

people betroth

with money.

Alternatively, if you wish, say: Because

recording a date in the bill

is not possible

as an enactment to prevent providing a cover for adultery!

For

how should we act,

what should we do with the bill?

If

we place it

in her possession,

with her—

then, if she commits adultery,

she can erase it,

the date, and claim that she was betrothed after the adultery.

If

we place it with him,

in the husband’s possession—

sometimes she is his niece, and he provides her with a cover

by erasing the date and claiming that she committed adultery before she was betrothed.

Let us place it with the witnesses—

in either case, this is of no benefit. For:

If they remember

when the betrothal took place, there is no need for the date written in the bill; rather,

let them come and testify,

let the witnesses come and testify from their memory concerning the date of the betrothal.

And if they do not,

if they do not remember the date, but

sometimes they see it from the document,

they see the date of the betrothal in the writing of the bill,

and come to testify,

coming to testify concerning the date on the basis of having seen it in the bill—this is not testimony,

since

the Torah said

that the testimony of the witnesses must be

from their mouths,

on the basis of their memory,

and not from

the basis of

their writing.

And we refute this:

If so,

if a date is not written in a bill of betrothal because there is nowhere to place it,

with regard to divorce

where the Sages instituted that a date be written in a bill of divorce because of the concern that he might provide a cover for his niece,

let us say the same!

Let us say that there is nowhere to place the bill of divorce with its date, so that the date that the Sages instituted to be written in the bill of divorce would be effective in preventing him from providing a cover for his niece.

For if it is placed in the husband’s or the wife’s possession, there is concern that one of them might erase the date in order to provide a cover for the adultery; and if it is placed with the witnesses, this is unnecessary if they remember the date, and of no benefit if they do not remember it:

And we answer:

There,

with regard to divorce, the enactment of recording a date in the bill of divorce—

comes to provide her with a means of exoneration.

After the Sages instituted a date in the bill of divorce, it serves only for her “exoneration”: If she indeed had intercourse after the divorce, she can prove this by means of the date in the bill of divorce.

For had she not produced the bill of divorce with the date written in it, we would regard her as certainly having had intercourse while she was a married woman, since the presumption is that she is a married woman as long as she does not produce a properly written bill of divorce bearing the date on which she was divorced.

Therefore, there is no longer concern that someone might provide her with a cover, lest she erase the date from the bill of divorce and claim that she committed adultery after the divorce.

For if there are witnesses that she had intercourse, and she produces a bill of divorce without a date, we will establish her status according to the presumption that she was a married woman even at the time of the adultery, since she did not produce a bill of divorce in which the date was properly written.

But before they instituted a date in the bill of divorce, she could claim that she committed adultery after the divorce, relying on the bill in her possession, which had been properly written; her claim would have raised a doubt, and they would not have imposed liability on her solely on the basis of the presumption that she was a married woman.

But

here,

with regard to betrothal, the enactment of recording a date in the bill—

comes to her detriment!

For here, if she has intercourse and does not produce the bill, we will establish her status according to the presumption that she is unmarried. Consequently, she does not need the date in the bill to protect herself; it is sufficient for her to conceal the bill.

It follows that the entire purpose of instituting a date in a bill of betrothal would be to her detriment: She would be unable to claim that she committed adultery before the betrothal, when she was unmarried, if she did not produce the bill with the date written in it.

Therefore, there is no point in instituting a date in a bill of betrothal. For if she conceals the bill or erases the date written in it, we cannot state with certainty, contrary to the presumption that she was unmarried, that she committed adultery during the marriage, and execute her merely because she did not produce her bill of betrothal with a date, as the Sages had instituted.

Therefore, they did not institute a date in a bill of betrothal.

Mishna:

Three brothers were married to three unrelated women, and one

brother

of them died.

And the second brother performed ma’amar with her and died

the brother

as well—

These,

the wife of the second brother and the wife of the first brother with whom the second brother performed ma’amar, who now fall before the third brother—

perform ḥalitza

through the third brother,

but do not undergo levirate marriage

through him.

This is because the wife of the first brother with whom the second brother performed ma’amar now falls before the third brother both by virtue of her marriage to the first brother and by virtue of the ma’amar of the second brother. She is therefore the “wife of two deceased men,” and she may not undergo levirate marriage, based on an interpretive derivation from the verse:

As it is stated

[Deuteronomy 25]:

“And one of them dies—

the yevama shall come to him.”

Only one

upon whom there rests the levirate bond of one yavam

can I apply the phrase, “the yevama shall come to him.”

But not

one

upon whom there rests the levirate bond of two yevamim!

And her rival wife likewise may not undergo levirate marriage, just as she may not.

Rabbi Shimon says: He performs levirate marriage with whichever one he wishes, and performs ḥalitza with the second.

This is because Rabbi Shimon maintains that she is not considered the wife of two deceased men: If the ma’amar of the second brother acquires her, she is the wife only of the second brother; and if ma’amar does not acquire her, she is the wife only of the first brother.

Therefore, he may perform levirate marriage with whichever one he wishes. However, he may not perform levirate marriage with both of them, because perhaps ma’amar acquires her, in which case they are two yevamot from one household.

But it is not sufficient to perform levirate marriage with only one of them, because perhaps ma’amar does not acquire her, in which case they are two yevamot from two households.

Therefore, he performs levirate marriage with one and ḥalitza with the other.

Gemara:

The Gemara raises an objection to the Rabbis, who prohibit the woman subject to ma’amar from undergoing levirate marriage because she is “the wife of two deceased men”:

And if

the Rabbis maintain that

the levirate bond of two yevamim,

created through ma’amar, is a prohibition

by Torah law,

because ma’amar acquires the yevama by Torah law—

then ḥalitza should not be required either!

Rather,

it must be that this is not a Torah law, because ma’amar does not acquire her by Torah law, and it is impossible for a yevama to be the “wife of two deceased men” by Torah law; rather, it is only a prohibition

by rabbinic decree

that applies.

And it is a decree

that, because of the ma’amar, the two yevamot appear to people as though they come from one household; and if they were to perform levirate marriage with both of them, there would be concern

that people might say:

Two yevamot who come from one household,

the two

of them

undergo levirate marriage!

And we refute this: If this is the concern, why do both of them perform ḥalitza?

Let him perform levirate marriage with one and perform ḥalitza with the other!

And we answer:

A decree, lest people might say

that two yevamot who come from

one household—

part of it is built,