Yevamot 31b — the Talmud in English

, and the land:

the land upon which there is contradictory testimony whether it belongs to the seller or to the buyer —

establish it

establish

in the presumptive status of Bar Shatya,

in the presumptive status of the seller, since it was in his possession before the doubtful sale, and he remained in possession of it!

And that is to say, according to Torah law, one establishes [the matter] on the basis of the presumptive status even in a case of two [sets of witnesses] against two [sets of witnesses].

And the question returns: why, in contradictory testimony of two [sets of witnesses] against two [sets of witnesses] concerning the forbidden woman in a divorce, does her co-wife require halitza, and do we not establish her in the presumptive status of being permitted to the market!?

Rather, Abaye said:

this is how one should explain why the Mishna did not state “a doubtful divorce” in the case of doubt whether it was closer to him or doubt whether it was closer to her, as it did with a doubtful betrothal: and Rava said this in an embellished expression, [and used the wording of the verse in the Book of Job, chapter 36]

“Its companion will declare concerning it”!

It was taught with regard to betrothal

: doubt whether it was closer to him or doubt whether it was closer to her; for if the doubt was in the betrothal of a forbidden woman, her co-wife performs halitza and does not enter into yibum,

and the same law applies to divorce.

It was taught with regard to divorce:

a document written in his own handwriting, or one that has no date, or one that has only one witness, which has the status of “a doubtful divorce,” which is invalid by rabbinic law —

and the same law applies to betrothal,

for these disqualifications also apply to a betrothal document, by rabbinic law.

Rava said to him

to Abaye:

If

your explanation is

“Its companion will declare concerning it,”

that one should learn from bills of divorce to betrothal and from betrothal to bills of divorce —

what is the meaning of “this is

a doubtful divorce,”

which it teaches

at the end of our Mishna?

For the expression “this is” implies exclusion, that only the matters enumerated by the Mishna are considered “a doubtful divorce,” and one should not learn from betrothal [“its companion”] that a doubt whether it was closer to him or a doubt whether it was closer to her is also “a doubtful divorce”]!

Rather, Rava said,

this is how one should explain it:

Every

doubt

that exists in betrothal,

such as a doubt whether it was closer to him or a doubt whether it was closer to her —

exists

that same doubt also

in divorce.

And there is in divorce

a doubt

that does not exist in betrothal.

For example, a betrothal document without a date.

And

the expression

“this is” that

the tanna stated with regard to

divorce —

not specifically

it is; rather, we learn from betrothal to divorce.

Rather, because it taught “this is

a doubt”

with regard to betrothal,

which came to exclude the disqualification of the absence of a date in the betrothal document, for this is not a deficiency in betrothal —

it likewise taught “this is

a doubt”

with regard to divorce.

And the Gemara explains:

And “this is” with regard to betrothal —

to exclude what?

To exclude

the absence

of a date

in the betrothal document,

for there is no

such disqualification

in betrothal.

And we raised it:

And for what reason

indeed

did they not institute a date in

the

betrothal document?

This works according to the one who says

they instituted a date in the bill of divorce

because of produce,

for from the time the bill of divorce is written, and even before the divorce, the husband already loses his right to consume the produce of the melog property that his wife brought to him, and therefore they instituted that he write the date of the writing of the bill of divorce in the bill of divorce, so that we would know from when he has no right to consume the produce; accordingly, they did not institute writing a date in a betrothal document, because there is no practical difference in the time of writing the document, since

a betrothed woman has no produce

until she marries.

Rather, according to the one who says

they instituted a date in a bill of divorce

because of

the concern that he will shield one who is married

to his sister’s daughter,

for if she commits adultery while married to him, he will have pity on her so that they will not kill her, and he will give her a bill of divorce, and claim that she was divorced from him by this bill of divorce before she committed adultery.

And therefore the Sages instituted that they should write a date in the bill of divorce, so that he would not be able to shield her.

And if so,

let them institute a date

also in a betrothal document, so that if she commits adultery, he would not be able to claim that he betrothed her only after the adultery!?

And we answer:

because there is

one

who betroths with money,

and then there would be no enactment, because the time of the betrothal would not be known,

and there is one who betroths with a document —

the Sages did not institute a date

in the document.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Yosef, said to Rav Ashi: But a slave, for there is one who acquires [him] with money and there is one [who acquires him] with a document, and

nevertheless

the Sages instituted a date

in the document of his acquisition of a slave!?

And the practical consequence of the date concerns the slave’s property, for when a person acquires a Canaanite slave, the produce of the slave’s property belongs to the master.

And we answer:

There,

with regard to the acquisition of a slave,

the majority

of people acquire a slave

with a document,

and therefore they instituted a date in it.

But

here,

with regard to betrothal,

the majority

betroth

with money.

If you wish, say: because

writing the date in the document

is not possible

to make an enactment through it to prevent shielding from adultery!

For

what should he do,

what should be done with the document?

If

he should place it,

we place the document

with her —

for if she commits adultery,

she will erase it

the date, and claim that she became betrothed after the adultery.

If

he should place it with him,

with the husband —

sometimes she is his sister’s daughter, and he will shield her,

by erasing the date and claiming that she committed adultery before she became betrothed.

He should place it with the witnesses —

in either case there is no benefit in the matter. For:

If they remember,

the witnesses, when the time of the betrothal was, there is no need for the date written in the document; rather,

let them come and testify,

let the witnesses come and testify from their memory concerning the time of the betrothal.

And if not,

if they do not remember the date, but

sometimes they see it from the writing,

they see the time of the betrothal in the writing of the document,

and they come to testify,

and they come to testify concerning the date on the basis of their seeing it in the document — this is not testimony.

Since

the Merciful One said

that the testimony of the witnesses must be

from their mouths,

on the basis of their memory,

and not from

on the basis of

their writing.

And we refute:

if so,

that they do not write a date in the betrothal document because we have nowhere to place it,

with regard to divorce,

where the Sages instituted writing a date in the bill of divorce because perhaps he will shield his sister’s daughter,

let us say the same thing as well!

Let us say the same thing: that we have nowhere to place the bill of divorce with the date, such that the date that the Sages instituted to write in the bill of divorce would be effective, so that he would not shield his sister’s daughter.

For if they place it in the husband’s hand or in the woman’s hand, there is concern that perhaps they will erase the date in order to shield [her] from the adultery; and if [they place it] in the witnesses’ [hands], there is no need for it if they remember the date, and there is no benefit if they do not remember:

And we answer:

there,

with regard to divorce, the enactment of the date in the bill of divorce

comes for her rescue.

After the Sages instituted a date in the bill of divorce, it serves only for her “rescue,” so that if she indeed has intercourse after the divorce, she can prove this by means of the date in the bill of divorce.

For were she not to produce the bill of divorce with the date written in it, we would consider it certain that she had intercourse while she was a married woman, since the presumptive status says that she is a married woman as long as she does not produce a bill of divorce written according to its law, with the date on which she was divorced.

And therefore there is no longer concern about shielding, lest she erase the date from the bill of divorce and claim that she committed adultery after the divorce.

For if there are witnesses that she had intercourse, and she brings a bill of divorce without a date, we will establish her on the basis of her presumptive status that she was a married woman also at the time of the adultery, since she did not bring a bill of divorce in which the date was written according to its law.

But before they instituted a date in the bill of divorce, she could claim that she committed adultery after the divorce, relying on the bill of divorce in her possession, which had been written according to its law, and her claim would raise a doubt, and they would not obligate her on the basis of the presumptive status of a married woman.

But

here,

with regard to betrothal, the enactment of the date in the document

comes to her detriment!

For here, if she has intercourse and does not produce the document, we will establish her on the presumptive status of an unmarried woman, and it follows that she does not need the date in the document to protect herself; rather, it is enough for her to conceal the document.

And it follows that the entire enactment of the date in a betrothal document is only to her detriment, so that she cannot claim that she committed adultery before the betrothal, when she was unmarried, if she does not bring the document with the date written in it.

And therefore there is no reason to institute a date in the betrothal document. For if she conceals the document or erases the date written in it, we will not be able to say with certainty, against the presumptive status of an unmarried woman, that she committed adultery during the marriage, and execute her because she did not bring her betrothal document with a date, in accordance with the enactment of the Sages.

And therefore they did not institute a date in a betrothal document.

Mishna:

Three brothers married to three unrelated women, and

a brother

one of them died.

And

the brother

the second performed maamar with her, and died —

These,

the wife of the second, and the wife of the first with whom the second performed maamar, who fall before the third brother —

perform halitza

through the third brother,

but do not enter into yibum

through him.

Because the wife of the first, with whom the second performed maamar, now falls both from the marriage of the first brother and from the maamar of the second brother, and she is therefore the “wife of two dead men,” who does not enter into yibum by a teaching in the manner of an asmachta, from the verse:

As it is stated [דברים כה]

[Deuteronomy 25]:

“And one of them dies —

the yavam shall come upon her.”

Only one who

has upon her the bond to one yavam,

I apply to her [the verse] “the yavam shall come upon her.”

But not

one

who has upon her the bond to two yevamim!

And her co-wife does not enter into yibum, just as she does not enter into yibum.

Rabbi Shimon says: He enters into yibum with whichever one he wishes, and performs halitza with the second.

Because Rabbi Shimon holds that she is not considered the wife of two dead men, since if the maamar of the second effects acquisition, she is the wife of the second alone, and if maamar does not effect acquisition, she is the wife of the first alone.

And therefore he enters into yibum with whichever one he wishes. But he does not enter into yibum with both of them, because perhaps maamar effects acquisition, and they are two yevamot from one household.

But entering into yibum with one of them is not sufficient, because perhaps maamar does not effect acquisition, and they are two yevamot from two households.

And therefore he enters into yibum with one and performs halitza with the second.

Gemara:

And the Gemara raises an objection to the Rabbis, who prohibit the woman with whom maamar was performed from entering into yibum, on account of “the wife of two dead men”:

And if

the Rabbis hold that

the bond to two yevamim

through maamar is a prohibition

by Torah law,

because maamar effects acquisition of a yevama according to Torah law —

she should not require halitza either!

Rather,

necessarily, this is not a Torah law, because maamar does not effect acquisition according to Torah law, and it is impossible for there to be a yevama who is “the wife of two dead men” according to Torah law; rather, only a prohibition

by rabbinic law

is it.

And it is a decree

that because of the maamar, the two yevamot appear to people as though they come from one household, and if they enter into yibum with both of them, there is concern

lest people say

:people:

“Two yevamot who come from one household,

both

enter into yibum!

And we refute: if this is the concern, why do both of them perform halitza?

Let him enter into yibum with one and perform halitza with one!

And we answer:

A decree, lest people say

people: two yevamot who come from

one household —

part of it is built,