Yevamot 31a — the Talmud in English

Rabba said to him:

since you require

for the “co-wife of a forbidden relative”

chalitza—

they know that

the betrothal of the forbidden relative is not a betrothal, and the reason that her co-wife does not undergo levirate marriage

is merely a stringency,

and she is not the co-wife of a forbidden relative.

And therefore they will not come to error, whether he himself betroths her sister, or whether another comes and betroths her.

Abaye said to him:

If so,

since it is possible to institute a stringency and not be concerned about a mishap, because people see the distinction between chalitza and levirate marriage,

divorce also—let him teach

in our Mishna “uncertain divorce,” in the Mishna, in a form similar to “uncertain betrothal,” in a case where he threw the bill of divorce and it is uncertain whether it was nearer to him or nearer to her,

and let him require her chalitza

as a stringency.

And there is no concern that the stringency will lead to leniency, that people will err and think from this that since she performs chalitza, the divorce of the forbidden relative is a complete divorce, for if it were not a complete divorce, she would be the co-wife of a forbidden relative, who does not require chalitza.

And because of this error, that they will think that her divorce is a complete divorce, they will come to a mishap: if, after these divorces, one man betroths her, and afterward that same man returns and betroths her sister, people will think that the betrothal of her sister is not a betrothal, since the betrothal had taken effect for him with her first sister.

But in truth, this woman is not divorced, and his betrothal of her is not a betrothal, while the betrothal of her sister is a betrothal. It follows that because of this error we will permit a married woman to the outside world.

There is no concern for this, since

they know

from the fact that her co-wife does not undergo levirate marriage

that

her chalitza is only

a mere stringency,

and the divorce of the forbidden relative is not a divorce!

And why did the tanna not teach in the Mishna “uncertain divorce,” similarly to “uncertain betrothal”? Rabba said to him: The Sages were concerned that

if you say

to be stringent, so that the co-wife of a forbidden relative in a case of uncertain divorce

performs chalitza,

they will come to say that she also

undergoes levirate marriage.

And they will come to perform levirate marriage with the co-wife of a forbidden relative, and you will thereby cause them to stumble in a prohibition punishable by karet.

For in truth, when the forbidden relative, who was divorced with an uncertain divorce, is maintained in her previous status that she is not divorced but is a married woman, the co-wife is the co-wife of a forbidden relative, and she is forbidden to the yavam by the karet prohibition of a brother’s wife.

Abaye said to him:

Here too,

in the case of uncertain betrothal of the forbidden relative, you should be concerned that

if you say she performs chalitza,

they will come to say that she also

undergoes levirate marriage!

But it is possible that her betrothal is a betrothal, and she is the co-wife of a forbidden relative!

Rabba said to him:

Let her undergo levirate marriage, and there is nothing wrong with that,

since

she is maintained

as one who is not the co-wife of a forbidden relative

she stands.

Abaye raised an objection

to Rabba, another difficulty:

We learned below: If one was married to two women, a foreign woman and his brother’s daughter, and

the house fell upon him and upon

his wife who was

his brother’s daughter.

And both of them died.

And the foreign woman remained, who had been the co-wife of his brother’s daughter, and she now falls for levirate marriage,

and it is not known which of them died first:

Was the husband the first to die, and afterward his brother’s daughter, with the result that his brother’s daughter fell together with the foreign woman for levirate marriage? And since his brother’s daughter is the daughter of the yavam, and she is a forbidden relative to him, the foreign woman, her co-wife, is exempt from chalitza and from levirate marriage.

Or perhaps his brother’s daughter died first, and her husband afterward, with the result that at the time of the brother’s death the foreign woman was not the co-wife of the yavam’s daughter, since his daughter died before the death of his brother; and a co-wife of a forbidden relative exists only at the time of death, and she is therefore fit for levirate marriage.

Since the matter is uncertain,

the co-wife performs chalitza and does not undergo levirate marriage.

And

why

does she perform chalitza and not undergo levirate marriage?

According to your method,

here too let us say: This woman,

the foreign woman, before the house fell upon her husband and upon her co-wife,

stands with a presumption of being permitted to the outside world,

as the co-wife of a forbidden relative.

And because of the uncertainty,

perhaps her co-wife died before her husband,

you come to forbid her.

Maintain her in her presumptive status, that she is permitted to marry into the outside world, and

do not forbid her because of uncertainty!?

And if you would say, here too,

they decreed upon her

as a stringency

that she should perform chalitza and not undergo levirate marriage—

It is impossible to explain this in that way, because

it is a stringency that leads to leniency.

For if you say she performs chalitza—

she will undergo levirate marriage!

And if she undergoes levirate marriage, you have harmed the co-wife of a forbidden relative, who is forbidden by karet!

Rabba said to him:

Divorce, which is common,

which is an ordinary matter,

the Sages decreed concerning it

not to be stringent and require chalitza of the co-wife of a forbidden relative when the forbidden relative was divorced by an uncertain divorce, because of the concern that if you say she performs chalitza, they will come to err and say that she also undergoes levirate marriage.

But

a collapse, which is uncommon,

for it is not usual that people should die in a collapse—

the Sages did not decree concerning it

not to be stringent upon her and require chalitza because of uncertainty, because of the concern that if you say she performs chalitza, they will say that she also undergoes levirate marriage; rather, they required her to perform chalitza, as a stringency.

Alternatively,

there is another distinction:

Divorce, where the forbidden relative remains,

where the forbidden relative is present before us,

so that it is evident,

everyone sees that a forbidden relative is here,

and

nevertheless

her co-wife—

you require her to perform chalitza.

People say:

People:

the Sages established it with regard to the bill of divorce,

it became clear to the Sages

that

this bill of divorce of the forbidden relative

is a proper bill of divorce,

and her co-wife is not the co-wife of a forbidden relative; therefore she does not leave without chalitza.

And

because of this error

they come

to come

to perform levirate marriage with the co-wife,

while in truth she is the co-wife of a forbidden relative.

But

a collapse—

did the Sages establish anything concerning it in a collapse?

Can the Sages know who died first in a collapse?

And therefore, if the Sages require her to perform chalitza, they will not come to say that she is not the co-wife of a forbidden relative and perform levirate marriage with her; rather, everyone will know that only as a stringency, because of the lack of knowledge of who died first, they required her to perform chalitza.

And the Gemara still asks:

And

for

with regard to divorce, did we not teach

that they were stringent with her and required chalitza, and they were not concerned to say, “If you say she performs chalitza, [she will also] undergo levirate marriage”!?

And we learned

in tractate Gittin [78b]:

She was standing

his wife

in the public domain, and he threw it to her

the bill of divorce in the public domain—

If the bill of divorce was

nearer to her—

she is divorced.

And if the bill of divorce was

nearer to him—

she is not divorced.

And if the bill of divorce was

halfway between—

she is divorced and is not divorced.

And we say: For what halakhic purpose,

what is the practical expression of the law that when it is halfway between she is “divorced and is not divorced”?

On the one hand, we say that she is divorced—

For if he is a priest,

her husband,

she is forbidden to him,

to retain her as his wife, because of uncertainty, perhaps she is divorced.

And on the other hand, we say that she is not divorced—

And if she is a forbidden relative

to the yavam,

she,

and the husband died after the doubtful divorce—

her co-wife requires chalitza,

perhaps the forbidden relative is not divorced.

And we do not say,

Maintain the forbidden relative in her presumptive status that she is not divorced, and her co-wife is certainly the co-wife of a forbidden relative, and do not be stringent and require her to perform chalitza, because

“if you say she performs chalitza, [A0160]]she will also

she also]

undergo levirate marriage”!

And if so, the difficulty is: Since we find that even with regard to uncertain divorce they were stringent with her and required chalitza, and they were not concerned that “if you say she performs chalitza, she will also undergo levirate marriage,” why did we not teach in our Mishna, with regard to uncertain divorce, something analogous to uncertain betrothal: that he threw the bill of divorce and it is uncertain whether it was nearer to him or nearer to her, and if the divorced woman was a forbidden relative to the yavam, her co-wife performs chalitza and does not undergo levirate marriage, and there is no concern that “if you say she performs chalitza, [she will also] undergo levirate marriage”?

And we answer:

It was stated concerning it,

concerning this Mishna:

Rabba and Rav Yosef, both of them say: Here,

the Mishna in tractate Gittin—

we are dealing with two groups of witnesses.

When

one group says it was nearer to her

the bill of divorce,

and

one

group says it was nearer to him

the bill of divorce.

And since we have two contradictory testimonies, one of which says that there was a divorce here and the other says that there was no divorce here, it is impossible to maintain her in her presumptive status that she is not divorced, because a presumption clarifies the uncertainty where there are no witnesses, but it cannot clarify the uncertainty where there are witnesses saying that a change occurred in the presumption.

And even though there is a group of witnesses contradicting it, the matter nevertheless remains uncertain.

For it is

the divorce of the forbidden relative

a biblical uncertainty,

and therefore the co-wife of the forbidden relative is obligated to perform chalitza because of uncertainty, by Torah law.

And this is not merely a stringency, such that we could say that she should not be required to perform chalitza because of the reasoning that “if you say she performs chalitza, [she will also] undergo levirate marriage.”

And

if

the Mishna here,

if we wish to establish it with regard to uncertain divorce, as with betrothal, we would have to establish it

with one group

of witnesses, where one witness says that the bill of divorce was nearer to him, and a second witness contradicts him and says that the bill of divorce was nearer to her. And one witness who is contradicted by a second witness does not prevent us from maintaining a matter in its presumptive status; therefore, we must maintain the co-wife of the forbidden relative in her presumptive status, that she has a presumption of being permitted to the outside world.

And since

it is

such an uncertain divorce only within the category of

“a rabbinic uncertainty,”

since by Torah law we maintain her in her presumptive status of being permitted to the outside world, we should not be stringent and require her co-wife to perform chalitza, for the reason that “if you say she performs chalitza, [she will also] undergo levirate marriage.”

And

therefore, we did not teach such uncertain divorce in our Mishna.

And in this, betrothal differs from divorce.

For when there is uncertainty concerning the betrothal of the forbidden relative because one witness contradicts another witness, we must maintain the co-wife of the forbidden relative in her presumptive status of being permitted to the yavam, and say that she is not the co-wife of a forbidden relative. Rather, we are stringent with her, so that she performs chalitza and does not undergo levirate marriage. And there is no concern that the matter may lead to a mishap, that “if you say she performs chalitza, [she will also] undergo levirate marriage,” because in fact, according to the fundamental law, she undergoes levirate marriage.

But with regard to uncertain divorce of the forbidden relative, we must maintain her co-wife in her presumptive status of being permitted to the outside world, and we should not be stringent with her and require her to perform chalitza, because this can lead to a mishap concerning her, that “if you say she performs chalitza, [she will also] undergo levirate marriage”; and here levirate marriage is a mishap involving a prohibition punishable by karet, since the presumption says that she is the co-wife of a forbidden relative! And the Gemara proves:

And from where is it that the Mishna here

must be established

with one group,

of one witness contradicting another witness?

Analogous to betrothal—

just as betrothal

is discussed

with one group, so too divorce is with one group.

Rather, it is possible to object:

And betrothal itself—

from where is it that it is with one group,

that of one witness against one witness, that it is being discussed?

Perhaps it is with two groups of witnesses

who contradict one another that we are dealing!?

And the Gemara answers:

If it is with two groups of witnesses

who contradict one another that we are dealing, why should the co-wife perform chalitza and not undergo levirate marriage?

Let us maintain her in her presumptive status that she is permitted to the yavam, and if so,

let her undergo levirate marriage, and there is nothing wrong with that!

Rather, it is necessarily speaking of one group of two witnesses, in a manner that one witness contradicts one witness; therefore, there is concern that perhaps the forbidden relative was betrothed, and her co-wife should perform chalitza and not undergo levirate marriage.

And the Gemara wonders: How is it possible to say that when two groups of witnesses contradict one another she should undergo levirate marriage, and there is nothing wrong with that!?

And the Gemara’s question is in the style of “either way”: What is the law in every uncertainty involving the contradiction of two groups of witnesses [briefly called “two against two”] where there is a presumption?

Is “two against two” in a place where there is a presumption a biblical uncertainty, so that the uncertainty remains by Torah law and the presumption does not decide it, because where witnesses contradict one another the presumption is not determinative?

As the Gemara said above, that Rabba and Rav Yosef established the Mishna in Gittin as referring to two groups of witnesses who contradict one another: “for it is a biblical uncertainty.”

Or, “two against two” in a place where there is a presumption is a rabbinic uncertainty, so that by Torah law the matter is maintained according to its presumption, but the Sages were stringent to forbid it because of uncertainty:

A. If we say that “two against two” is a biblical uncertainty, as Rabba and Rav Yosef hold, the difficulty is:

Behold,

there stand

two

witnesses, and they say

that the betrothal money was

nearer to her,

and the forbidden relative was betrothed, and her co-wife is the co-wife of a forbidden relative, forbidden to the yavam by a prohibition punishable by karet,

and

if

you say, “Let her undergo levirate marriage, and there is nothing wrong with that”!?

But when we have a contradiction between two groups of witnesses, the uncertainty remains by Torah law, and there is no place for a presumption to decide when the uncertainty before us results from a contradiction in the words of the witnesses!

B. It should be proved that “two against two” is only a rabbinic uncertainty, and by Torah law we rely upon a presumption even in a place of “two against two”; therefore, the difficulty is:

And furthermore, with two groups of witnesses

in the case of divorce,

also

there is a difficulty: Why do you require chalitza

for

the co-wife of the forbidden relative because of the concern that perhaps the forbidden relative was divorced?

But in every case of “two against two” where there is a presumption, it is only

a rabbinic uncertainty,

since by Torah law we maintain the matter according to the presumption where two groups of witnesses contradict one another!

For

by Torah law

we say: Set the two

witnesses who say that she was divorced

against

opposite

the two,

witnesses who say that she was not divorced,

and the woman

the co-wife of the forbidden relative

maintain her according to her presumption

of being permitted to the outside world!

And why do you forbid her because of the “rabbinic uncertainty” of the divorce of the forbidden relative herself?

And the proof that “two against two” is a rabbinic uncertainty, and by Torah law we maintain the matter according to a presumption, is

as it is with

as we find

the property of Bar Shatya,

the property of a man called “Bar Shatya,” who was at times mentally incompetent and at times mentally competent.

Bar Shatya sold property,

he sold his property, real estate.

Two witnesses came

and said:

When he was sound,

mentally healthy,

he sold,

he sold his property, and the purchaser acquired it.

And two witnesses came

other

and said: “When he was insane he sold,”

and the sale of an insane person is not a sale, and the purchaser did not acquire the land!

And Rav Ashi said: Set the two witnesses against the two witnesses,

set the testimony of the two against the testimony of the two who oppose them.