Yevamot 30b (ל:) — the Talmud in English

As they say:

Beit Shammai:

the ma’amar effects acquisition

a complete acquisition,

and according to them, the ma’amar alone is sufficient to make the non-Jewish woman a complete tzarat erva, who does not even require halitza.

Therefore,

the Mishna teaches us

that she performs halitza, since the ma’amar does not effect a complete acquisition, and

not in accordance with Beit Shammai.

The Gemara now asks in the opposite direction:

And according to Rav Naḥman,

who inferred from the Mishna at the beginning of the previous amud that there is no zika even when there is only one brother, and therefore a tzarat erva cannot be prohibited through zika—

the proof

of

Rav Ashi

from our Mishna, that there is zika that prohibits a tzarat erva through zika, even when there are two brothers, is difficult!

And if you would say

that one should explain that Rav Ashi’s inference cannot be made from our Mishna, because

the same law applies even if: he died

first—the brother who was married to the non-Jewish woman died, and the non-Jewish woman fell before the two brothers who were married to the sisters.

And afterward one of them divorced

his wife, one of the sisters.

And he married the non-Jewish woman, and then died—

his co-wife is permitted,

and she is not prohibited because she had been a tzarat erva through zika before her marriage to the second brother, since zika does not prohibit a tzarat erva through zika.

There is still a difficulty:

Rather,

according to this, the conclusion of the Mishna’s statement,

“This is

what they said: All of them [the forbidden relatives] whose co-wives died or were divorced—their co-wives are permitted”

—to exclude what

does it come?

For the expression “This is what they said” means that it comes to exclude another case. This exclusion is the novel teaching of the Mishna.

Necessarily, the Mishna’s novel teaching must be as follows: Only when the non-Jewish woman was a tzarat erva through zika alone is she not prohibited, because zika does not prohibit a tzarat erva through zika.

And

to exclude

the case where

he married

the non-Jewish woman—the brother married to the sister of his wife married the non-Jewish woman, and the non-Jewish woman thereby became a tzarat erva, as she was married together with the sister of his wife to the same brother—

and

only

afterward,

after the non-Jewish woman had already become a tzarat erva,

he divorced

the sister, and then died, so that the non-Jewish woman fell before the third brother. This woman is indeed considered a tzarat erva, and she goes out into the marketplace without halitza.

This is what the Mishna said: The case in which the forbidden relative died or was divorced before he married her co-wife is the one about which they said, “All of them whose co-wives died or were divorced—their co-wives are permitted.”

But if he married the co-wife while the forbidden relative was still married to him, and only afterward divorced the forbidden relative, the co-wife is prohibited as a “tzarat erva.” And if he dies, the co-wife is exempt from yibbum, even though at the time of his death she is not actually a tzarat erva, since he had divorced the forbidden relative before his death.

However, this explanation depends on a dispute among the amoraim concerning the explanation of the Mishna:

For earlier, on folio 13a, the Gemara raises a contradiction between the first Mishna in tractate Yevamot and our Mishna.

The first Mishna implies that if, at the time of his death, the non-Jewish woman does not fall together with the forbidden relative, she does not have the exemption of a tzarat erva. This is so whether he divorced the forbidden relative and afterward married the non-Jewish woman, or married the non-Jewish woman and afterward divorced the forbidden relative.

Whereas our Mishna implies that only when he divorced the forbidden relative and afterward married the non-Jewish woman is she not called a tzarat erva. But if he married the non-Jewish woman and afterward divorced the forbidden relative, she has the exemption of a tzarat erva, despite the fact that at the time of his death only she falls, and not the forbidden relative, since he had already divorced the forbidden relative.

The amoraim disagree concerning the resolution of this contradiction:

According to Rabbi Yirmeya, the two Mishnayot were taught in accordance with a dispute among tannaim:

The dispute is whether death causes the woman to fall for yibbum, in which case the non-Jewish woman must fall at the time of death together with the forbidden relative in order to have the status of a tzarat erva. This is the view of the first Mishna.

Or whether marriage causes the woman to fall for yibbum, meaning that from the time of the deceased brother’s marriage, the woman is considered one who is destined to fall before the yavam when her husband dies childless.

And in order to acquire the status of a tzarat erva, it is sufficient that the non-Jewish woman be married together with the forbidden relative, even if at the time of the brother’s death only the co-wife, and not the forbidden relative, falls for yibbum.

Thus, even if he divorced the forbidden relative before his death, and at the time of his death only the non-Jewish woman falls, she is exempt—exempt—from halitza, by the law of a tzarat erva.

According to Rava, however, both Mishnayot hold that death causes the woman to fall, and the tanna formulated them according to the principle of “this, and it is unnecessary to state that.”

That is, the Mishna at the beginning of the tractate says that any woman who does not fall at the time of death together with the forbidden relative is not called a tzarat erva, even though during her marriage there was a period when she was a co-wife of the forbidden relative.

And our Mishna adds that it is unnecessary to state that if he divorced the forbidden relative and ultimately married the non-Jewish woman, she is not a tzarat erva and is permitted to undergo yibbum.

This works well if Rav Naḥman holds

like

Rabbi Yirmeya, who said [13b above]:

It is divided:

the one who taught

one Mishna—

did not teach this

Mishna,

and the one who taught

this Mishna

did not teach that one!

And this tanna,

who taught the first Mishna,

holds that death causes the woman to fall,

and a tzarat erva is one who falls together with the forbidden relative at the time of death.

And this tanna,

who taught our Mishna,

holds that the initial marriage causes the woman to fall,

and a tzarat erva is one who was married together with the forbidden relative to one man, even if the forbidden relative was divorced before the death and only the co-wife fell—

This is satisfactory.

Since the intent of our Mishna is to say:

“This is

the case [where he first divorced the sister and ultimately married the non-Jewish woman] about which they said: All of them [the forbidden relatives] who died or were divorced—their co-wives are permitted”

—to exclude the case where he married

the non-Jewish woman

and ultimately divorced

the sister, in which case she is prohibited as a tzarat erva, since the tanna of our Mishna holds that marriage causes the woman to fall for yibbum.

Rather, if he holds

Rav Naḥman

like Rava, who said that, in fact,

our Mishna and the Mishna at the beginning of the tractate

are the view of one tanna,

who holds that death causes the woman to fall for yibbum—

and

the tanna formulated both Mishnayot according to the principle

“this, and it is unnecessary to state that”—

If so,

“This is”

which the tanna said in our Mishna—

to exclude what?

What does our Mishna come to exclude when it says, regarding the case in which he divorced the sister and ultimately married the non-Jewish woman: “This is the case about which they said: All of them who died or were divorced—their co-wives are permitted”?

For according to him, it is impossible to say, as Rav Ashi excludes, that if the first brother died, and afterward the second brother divorced, and afterward married the non-Jewish woman, she is nevertheless prohibited as the tzarat erva of the sister of his wife through zika.

For according to Rav Naḥman, even if he married the non-Jewish woman and ultimately divorced the sister, she is not a tzarat erva and is permitted; all the more so she is permitted when he divorced first and married afterward!

The Gemara’s conclusion is:

Inevitably,

Rav Naḥman

holds like Rabbi Yirmeya.

Our Mishna follows the tanna who says that marriage causes the woman to fall for yibbum.

Our Mishna teaches that only if he married the non-Jewish woman and ultimately divorced the sister does the non-Jewish woman become a tzarat erva, but not when he divorced first and afterward married the non-Jewish woman, because the zika that existed before he married her does not make her a tzarat erva through zika.

The Gemara now discusses the matter according to Rava, who says that both Mishnayot follow one tanna, who holds that death causes the woman to fall, and that the tanna stated “this, and it is unnecessary to state that.”

According to him, even if he married the non-Jewish woman and afterward divorced the sister, she is permitted:

And according to Rava, this works well if he holds like Rav Ashi,

with regard to the existence of zika—

For we can say that the Mishna’s exclusion,

“This is,”

comes—

to exclude the case where one of the husbands of the sisters died

without

divorcing

his wife,

for even so, the non-Jewish woman is prohibited as a tzarat erva!

And according to Rava, an additional law is being taught here, one that Rav Ashi does not need to teach, as will be explained.

That is, Rava agrees with Rav Ashi in only one detail: that there is zika, creating a state of marital bond between the yevama and the yavam, and therefore there is a prohibition of a “tzarat erva through zika,” as Rav Ashi said.

However, Rav Ashi holds that marriage causes the woman to fall, and this is how he explained and inferred the Mishna [on the previous amud].

On this point Rava disagrees with him, holding that that Mishna, too, follows the one who says that death causes the woman to fall.

Accordingly, Rava must state a novel teaching: that there is a fall for yibbum resulting from the zika of a brother who did not perform yibbum.

For otherwise, how would the non-Jewish woman become prohibited under the law of a tzarat erva? A tzarat erva is prohibited only at the time of the fall, and according to Rava only death causes the woman to fall, not marriage, as Rav Ashi holds.

Therefore, Rava holds that if one of the husbands of the sisters dies without performing yibbum or halitza with the non-Jewish woman, then at the time of his death she falls from him, by virtue of his zika, before the remaining brother.

For the marital bond that he has with her has the power to cause her to fall for yibbum before his brother. It follows that she now falls by virtue of the second brother’s zika before the third brother, who remains of the three brothers, together with the forbidden relative—the sister of his wife who was married to the second brother—and she is therefore a tzarat erva at the time of death.

As stated, Rava agrees with Rav Ashi only with regard to the existence of zika.

But he does not agree with him in placing our Mishna according to the view of the tanna who says that marriage causes the woman to fall. Rather, he follows the view of the tanna who says that death causes the woman to fall.

Therefore, Rava does not infer from the fact that the Mishna presents the case in which he divorced the sister and ultimately married the non-Jewish woman that if he married her first and ultimately divorced the sister, she becomes a tzarat erva.

For according to him, in such a case she does not become a tzarat erva, because he holds that death causes the woman to fall, and at the time of death she must be a tzarat erva. Here, however, the forbidden relative was divorced before the death.

Therefore, Rava infers the Mishna’s statement “This is” as follows: “

This is”—the reason is that the brother divorced his wife; therefore, at the time of his death, the non-Jewish woman does not fall from him, by virtue of her zika to him, as a tzarat erva through zika.

But if the second brother did not divorce her, then even if he never married the non-Jewish woman at all, if he dies, she is prohibited because she is a tzarat erva, as she falls by virtue of the second brother’s zika. [

The reason why, according to Rava, this does not involve the prohibition of the wife of two deceased men is explained by Rashi.]

Rather,

but

if Rava holds

like

Rav Naḥman,

it is difficult: There is no zika, there is no fall by virtue of zika, and there is no tzarat erva through zika.

“This is”

which our Mishna states—

to exclude what!?

The Gemara’s conclusion:

Inevitably,

Rava

holds like Rav Ashi

in that there is zika.

Mishna:

And all of them,

all fifteen forbidden relatives whom we learned in the first Mishna, at the beginning of the tractate, who exempt their co-wives,

with regard to whom there were

for the deceased brother

doubtful betrothals or doubtful divorces, these are their co-wives

who are “co-wives of a forbidden relative in a case of uncertainty”—

they perform halitza,

since perhaps they are not co-wives of a forbidden relative.

But they do not undergo yibbum,

since perhaps they are co-wives of a forbidden relative.

The Mishna explains:

How

did he have with regard to them

“doubtful betrothals”?

For example, he

threw her

money of

betrothal

in the public domain, within a precisely measured distance of eight cubits.

Since a person’s four cubits acquire an object for him, if the money reached within her four cubits, she acquired the betrothal money and was betrothed to him.

However, since the money was lying in a place that was

possibly closer to him,

within the four cubits of the brother who threw the money, and the woman did not acquire it and was not betrothed—

possibly closer to her,

meaning that the money entered within her four cubits, so that she acquired it and was betrothed to him—

this is “doubtful betrothals.”

And what is

“doubtful divorces”?

For example, he

wrote

her a bill of divorce

in his own handwriting, but there were no witnesses on it.

Or he gave her a bill of divorce that was not in his own handwriting, and

there were witnesses on it, but it contained no date.

Or he gave her a bill of divorce that was not in his own handwriting, and

it contained a date but only one witness—

this is “doubtful divorces.”

For all these bills of divorce are valid, and if she married another man after receiving them, the child is fit.

Nevertheless, the Sages instituted that one should not divorce with such documents ab initio, as is explained in tractate Gittin [86a]. Therefore, her divorce with them is called “doubtful divorce,” since one may not rely on them ab initio.

Therefore, if a forbidden relative was divorced with such a bill of divorce and her husband then died, her co-wife must be treated as though the forbidden relative had been divorced in a case of uncertainty: she may not undergo yibbum, but she requires halitza.

And although this case is one of bediavad, after the forbidden relative has already been divorced with this bill of divorce, it is nevertheless necessary to prohibit the co-wife from undergoing yibbum, since the bill of divorce with which the forbidden relative was divorced is called a bill of divorce that is invalid ab initio. If she were to undergo yibbum, people might say that a tzarat erva may undergo yibbum.

The Gemara will explain why the Mishna did not cite, with regard to divorce, the parallel example of betrothal: that he threw her a bill of divorce, and it was uncertain whether it was closer to him or closer to her.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: What are “doubtful betrothals”? He threw her betrothal money, and it was uncertain whether it was closer to him or closer to her.

The Gemara infers:

But with regard to divorce, “possibly closer to him or possibly closer to her”

it did not teach

in the Mishna, because in such a case the co-wife of the forbidden relative does not even require halitza; rather, she is certainly a tzarat erva and goes out without halitza.

The Gemara asks:

What is the reason

that the Mishna distinguishes between doubtful betrothals and doubtful divorces?

Rabba said: This woman,

who was the co-wife of a forbidden relative before the forbidden relative was divorced,

stands with the presumption that she is permitted to the marketplace,

if her husband dies.

And because of the uncertainty

concerning the forbidden relative’s divorce,

you come to prohibit her

from marrying into the marketplace until she performs halitza.

And based on the laws of presumptive status, we determine with certainty that

you should not prohibit her because of the uncertainty;

rather, leave her in her presumptive status, that she is permitted to marry into the marketplace!

But in the three cases in the Mishna that are called “doubtful divorces,” she is not a woman whose divorce is uncertain. Rather, the bill of divorce is not of the preferred kind, and the Sages were concerned that people might think that it is not a bill of divorce and might consequently say that a tzarat erva may undergo yibbum. Therefore, they decreed that she must perform halitza and may not undergo yibbum.

Abaye said

to Rabba:

If so,

that you place her under the presumption that she is permitted to marry into the marketplace—

with regard to

doubtful

betrothals, too, let us say: This woman,

until the forbidden relative was betrothed with doubtful betrothal,

stood with the presumption that she was permitted to the yavam,

she

stood,

in the event that her husband died.

And because of the uncertainty

concerning the forbidden relative’s betrothal,

you come to prohibit her

from undergoing yibbum as a tzarat erva.

Do not prohibit her because of the uncertainty,

but leave her with her presumptive status, that she is permitted to the yavam!?

Rabba said to him:

There,

with regard to doubtful betrothals, we follow the rule of

stringency,

and prohibit her from undergoing yibbum.

Later, the Gemara will explain why, in the case of the forbidden relative’s doubtful divorce, we do not apply stringency because of the uncertainty and prohibit her from marrying into the marketplace without halitza.

Abaye expressed his astonishment to him: But

this stringency—

a stringency

that leads to leniency!

For there is concern that, as a result of your being stringent with regard to the forbidden relative’s doubtful betrothal and prohibiting her co-wife from undergoing yibbum as a tzarat erva, this will lead to lenient conduct, and people will err and permit a married woman. For—

sometimes he goes,

the man who betrothed the forbidden relative with doubtful betrothal,

and betroths her sister

the other one [the sister of the forbidden relative whom he betrothed with doubtful betrothal], with

definite betrothal.

According to the law, the second sister is betrothed to him, because the doubtful betrothal of the first sister did not take effect, since we must leave her with the presumption that she is not betrothed to him.

Alternatively, sometimes another man comes

and

betroths her herself,

the forbidden relative who had been betrothed with doubtful betrothal, during the lifetime of her husband, with

definite betrothal.

According to the law, she is betrothed to the second man, since the first man’s betrothal did not take effect because of the uncertainty; she has the presumption that she was not betrothed to him.

And since you prohibited her,

Rabba,

co-wife from undergoing yibbum [

that is, according to Rabba’s explanation of the reason for the Mishna, we apply stringency with regard to the co-wife and prohibit her from undergoing yibbum as a tzarat erva]—

people will say,

people will come to err and say, because her co-wife is prohibited from undergoing yibbum,

that

the betrothals of

the first are betrothals,

which is why her co-wife is a tzarat erva,

whereas

his betrothals

of the latter—

are not betrothals!

They may mistakenly think that she does not require a bill of divorce from the second man, because they will regard the second man as one who betrothed a married woman, whose betrothal does not take effect. In truth, however, the second man’s betrothal is a betrothal according to Torah law, while the concern regarding the first man’s betrothal is only a rabbinic stringency.

Similarly, if the first man were to return and betroth the sister of the forbidden relative, and then die, and we prohibited the forbidden relative’s co-wife from undergoing yibbum, people might err and think that his betrothal of the forbidden relative had taken effect, which is why her co-wife is a tzarat erva, whereas his betrothal of her sister had not taken effect [because betrothal does not take effect with the sister of a wife].

He might then come to marry his maternal brother’s wife, since he would think that she had not been married to his brother.

Whereas in truth, his brother’s betrothal of her had taken effect, and she is prohibited to him as his maternal brother’s wife, for whom there is no possibility of yibbum, and she remains prohibited even after her brother’s death.

And if so, the question arises: How can we be stringent in a case where the stringency could lead to the inadvertent permitting of a married woman, or the wife of his maternal brother!?