Yevamot 26a — the Talmud in English

And Rav Ashi proves:

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on the basis of rumor,

by rumor and slander alone,

we do not remove her.

For wherever there is no proof of prohibition, but only suspicion and the rumor of people, we do not remove her from under him.

Here, too,

they prohibited the one who brings the bill of divorce, and the Sage who prohibited the vow, from marrying her only because of suspicion and rumor.

And therefore, if he married her, he should not divorce her, since

on the basis of rumor, we do not remove her!

But one about whom it was alleged that he had relations with a married woman, and her husband divorced her, and the one about whom the allegation was made married her—he must divorce her, because the matter is disgraceful!

Mishna:

And all—

the one who brings a bill of divorce from overseas, and the one who testifies concerning a woman in order to permit her to marry, and the Sage who prohibited the woman through her vow, whom the Sages prohibited from marrying the woman concerning whom they ruled—

if

they had wives

at the time of bringing the bill of divorce, or giving the testimony, or ruling concerning the vow,

and

afterward

their wives died,

their wives,

she is permitted to marry them

—the Sage, the witness, and the one who brings the bill of divorce.

For we have no reason to suspect that they intended to take this woman, since at that time they had wives.

And

so,

all of them

[all these women who were prohibited from marrying him], if

they married others

when the Sage prohibited her, or when the witness testified concerning the death of her husband,

and

again

were divorced

by them,

or were widowed

by them—

they are permitted to marry them—

the Sage, the witness, and the one who brings the bill of divorce.

Since it is evident that in their actions they did not intend to take this woman.

And all of them,

these women who are prohibited to the witness, the Sage, and the one who brings the bill of divorce, who permit them—

are permitted

in any event

to their sons or their brothers,

the sons or brothers of those who permit them; and they are prohibited only to those men themselves.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: And all of those who permit the woman, who had wives when they permitted her, and whose wives died, are permitted to marry them.

And we infer:

they died, yes,

specifically if their wives died, they are permitted to marry them.

But if

they were divorced,

the wives of those who permit them,

no!

Rather, they remain in their prohibition, because there is reason to suspect that, since he set his eyes upon this woman, he arose and divorced his wife.

Rav Hillel said to Rav Ashi: But it was taught

explicitly in a beraita:

even if they were divorced,

they are permitted to those who permit them.

If so, the words of the beraita are found to contradict our Mishna? And we answer:

it is not difficult.

The beraita does not contradict the Mishna.

This

that teaches that even if they were divorced they are permitted refers to a place

where there had been quarrel

between them and their wives previously, before they came to rule concerning this woman, even before there was room to say that he had set his eyes upon this woman. Therefore, we have no reason to suspect that he divorced his wife because of her.

This

that is inferred from the Mishna, that if they were divorced they are prohibited, refers to a place

where there had not been quarrel

between them before he permitted this woman. Therefore he is prohibited to her, because we have reason to suspect that the entire reason he divorced his wife was that he had set his eyes upon this woman.

And if you wish, say:

both this and that are cases where there had not been quarrel

This

that teaches that if they were divorced they are prohibited refers to a case

where he initiated it—

he began provoking his wife.

And this

that teaches that if they were divorced they are permitted is

where she initiated it—

she caused the quarrel. Since he is not the cause of the divorce, we have no reason to suspect that the divorce was made because he had set his eyes upon the woman whom he permitted, and therefore he is permitted to her, as in the case where their wives died.

We learned in the Mishna:

And all who married

others after they were permitted to marry,

and were divorced

or

were widowed

by the second husband, are permitted to marry those who permit them. Since she married another, there is no longer suspicion that those who permitted her permitted her in order to marry her.

And we say:

it might enter your mind,

at first the Gemara thought that what the Mishna stated the case of death, namely, “they were widowed” by the second husband, and the case of divorce, namely, that they were divorced by the second husband, was because the case of death refers to the preceding Mishna, which states that until the witness testified that he had died, or that he had killed him, he may not marry his wife.

And concerning this, the Mishna here added that if she married another on his testimony, and the second husband also died, she is then permitted to marry this witness.

Whereas the case in which the woman married others and “was divorced” refers to the preceding Mishna, concerning one who brings a bill of divorce from overseas, to whom she is prohibited from marrying with this bill of divorce. And our Mishna teaches anew that if she married another with that bill of divorce, and the second husband also divorced her, she is permitted to marry a third time the one who first brought her bill of divorce.

And it follows that what the Mishna stated, “And all who married others and were divorced or widowed,” are permitted to marry them—

the case of

death,

which it teaches, “were widowed,” refers

to death,

to the witness who testifies that her husband died, and she went and married another, and the second husband died.

And

the case of

divorce,

which it teaches, “were divorced,” refers

to divorce,

to the witness who brings a bill of divorce, and the woman married another, and was divorced by him.

And although in both cases her two husbands died, or she was divorced by two husbands, it is explained in the Mishna that she is permitted to marry a third time the witness of her first husband’s death, or the one who brought the bill of divorce from her first husband. And we do not say that she is now prohibited from marrying anyone, because she has acquired the status of a woman whose husbands die, or of a woman who is repeatedly divorced.

Shall we say,

shall we say that

our Mishna

our Mishna is

not in accordance with Rabbi!

For if it were in accordance with Rabbi, he said: after two occurrences

[two times]

it establishes a presumption.

And according to Rabbi’s words, a woman who married her first husband and he died, and then married a second husband and he died, may never again marry, because she has acquired the status of a woman whose husbands die through her marriages.

But our Mishna, which permits her to marry [in a case where there is no suspicion] even a third time, must be in accordance with the Rabbis, who hold that only after three occurrences does she acquire the status that her husband will die, or that she will be divorced.

For according to Rabbi, when two husbands have died while married to her, she is again prohibited from marrying.

And we answer:

no.

Our Mishna is even in accordance with the Rabbis.

And do not interpret our Mishna as meaning that the case of death refers to the witness concerning death, and the case of divorce refers to the one who brings the bill of divorce.

Rather,

death

mentioned in our Mishna, for example, when they married others and died, and they are permitted to marry, refers only

to divorce.

That is, either to the one who brings a bill of divorce, or to the Sage who prohibited the woman through a vow.

And divorce

mentioned in our Mishna refers

to death.

That is, to the witness who testifies, “He died; I killed him,” and she married another husband and was divorced by him, in which case the witness is now permitted to marry her.

Therefore, in both cases she is permitted to marry even a third time, even according to Rabbi. Since she has not acquired a presumption twice, neither with regard to divorce nor with regard to death, for she left her husbands once through death and once through divorce.

We learned in the Mishna:

And all of them are permitted to their sons or their brothers,

the sons or brothers of those who permit them. And they are prohibited only to those men themselves.

And we challenge this:

What is different from that which we learned: One about whom it was alleged concerning a woman

[one suspected of having relations with a woman], besides the fact that they prohibited him from marrying her,

he is prohibited

also

to her mother, her daughter, and her sister.

For perhaps, after he marries her mother or her daughter, this woman will have relations with him, since she is already accustomed to him. And it will be found that he transgresses the prohibition punishable by karet. For from the moment that he married her mother or her daughter, this woman becomes prohibited to him by a complete prohibition of forbidden relations. Therefore, they also prohibited him from marrying her relatives, since we have reason to fear that he will go and have relations with her, and transgress a prohibition punishable by karet.

And since we find that the Sages were concerned that he might marry her daughter or mother, so that through this he would become accustomed to her, the same should apply in our Mishna: she should be prohibited from marrying those who permit her [such as the one who brings a bill of divorce, the witness concerning a woman, and the Sage who prohibited her vow]. Why should we not also prohibit her from marrying their relatives, because we should fear that there was a licentious plan between them, to marry this man’s son, and that this man would thereby become accustomed to her?

And we answer: You have reason to fear relations through the marriage of relatives only in the case of a man who is prohibited with regard to a particular woman; in such a case we prohibit him also with regard to her relatives.

For

with regard to women toward women, it is common that they go.

It is common for women to go to other women; therefore, there is reason to fear that if he marries her mother or daughter, she will come to her mother, and he will come to relations with her.

But she is permitted with regard to his relatives, because there is no reason to fear that the man will come to visit his relative and have relations with the woman. Since

with regard to men toward men, it is not common.

It is not common for men to visit one another for an extended period during which there would be reason to fear relations between the woman and the one who permitted her to marry.

Alternatively: with regard to women, since their intercourse does not prohibit them to one another,

for a woman never becomes prohibited to her husband because he has relations with one of her relatives, therefore

they are not particular

the relatives

to one another

[one concerning the other] to guard her so that she will not have relations.

Therefore, we have reason to fear that one will come to the other and have relations with the man with whom she had relations previously. For she is not concerned that her relative will report this.

But

with regard to men, since their intercourse prohibits them to one another, they are particular toward one another—

for men are particular that a man should not be secluded with their wives, since one who has relations with a married woman renders her permanently prohibited to her husband. And since this is so, seclusion is not common, and his relative is apprehensive about coming to him and having relations with his wife,

since he knows that the husband is particular about this.

Therefore, although he is prohibited with regard to her relatives, she is permitted with regard to his relatives.

And we challenge this:

If so,

that a woman is permitted with regard to his relatives, and there is no reason to fear that his relative will have relations with his wife, this woman should also be permitted with regard to

his father as well.

And why did the Mishna mention only that she is permitted with regard to their sons or their brothers?

And we answer: Indeed, she is also permitted with regard to his father. And our Mishna stated it in the language of

“it is not necessary”

[it was written by way of an inference from the lesser to the greater].

It is not necessary to say that his father,

to whom they are permitted to marry, and we do not fear that this one who permits her will have relations with her, since

his son is in awe of him

[he is ashamed before his father], and he stands in fear of him, and surely the son will be careful not to be secluded with her.

But

if she married

his son,

the son of the one who permitted her,

since his father is not in awe of him,

for the father is not so ashamed before his son,

perhaps not

the Sages permitted her to marry his son.

It teaches us

our Mishna that she is permitted with regard to all his relatives, for the reasons stated.

We will return to you, chapter: How Is His Brother’s Wife

The first Mishna in this chapter discusses a case in which two sister yevamot, from two brothers, fell for yibbum before two brothers.

By Torah law, both of them are permitted for yibbum, but the Sages decreed that they should be forbidden.

And two reasons for this law were stated in the Gemara:

The first, because they resemble his wife’s sister. And this prohibition is called “the sister of his zekuka,” and because of it he cannot perform yibbum with them; rather, they perform chalitza.

And the second, because of the prohibition against nullifying the mitzva of the brothers, for if one of the brothers performs yibbum with one of the sisters and the other brother dies, the second sister will leave without chalitza, because she is forbidden to him on account of the nakedness of a wife’s sister.

But if he performs chalitza with the first sister, he can return and perform chalitza with the second one as well.

Mishna:

a.

Four brothers, two of them married to two sisters, and those married to the sisters died.

And each of the sisters is forbidden to the brothers liable for yibbum, because she is “the sister of his zekuka.”

These perform chalitza,

because their entire prohibition is only by rabbinic words,

and they do not perform yibbum

as was explained.

And if they preceded

the brothers

and took them in marriage—

they must send them out.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The House of Shammai says: They may remain. And the House of Hillel says: They must send them out.

b.

If one of them was forbidden to one [brother] by a prohibition of forbidden relations—

her sister is not considered the sister of one who is subject to zika, for he has no zika with a forbidden relation; therefore, he is

forbidden to her,

because of the forbidden relation,

and permitted to her sister.

And

if

the second brother—

is forbidden to both of them.

c.

If one of them was forbidden to the brother liable for yibbum by a prohibition that is not a prohibition punishable by karet, so that despite the prohibition she falls before him by Torah law, for example:

a prohibition of a mitzva,

which is the prohibition of “secondary relations to forbidden relations,” which the Sages prohibited.

And a prohibition of sanctity,

which is the prohibition of those liable for negative commandments with respect to the priesthood, such as a divorcee.

She performs chalitza and does not perform yibbum.

d.

If one of them was forbidden to this one by a prohibition of forbidden relations, and the second was forbidden to this one by a prohibition of forbidden relations—

the one forbidden to this one—

is permitted to that one, and the one forbidden to that one—

is permitted to this one.

And this is what they said: Her sister

of the forbidden relation,

when she is his yevama,

who falls together with her for yibbum—

either performs chalitza or performs yibbum!

Because she is not considered the sister of one who is subject to zika, since the forbidden relation is not “subject to zika” with the brother liable for yibbum.

Gemara:

The Gemara proves:

Infer from this

from the words of the Mishna that

there is zika.

That is, the zika between the brother liable for yibbum and his yevama is a status [or acquisition] of marriage. And by virtue of the marital status between them, the Sages decreed prohibitions of intimacy upon the relatives of the yevama. And among the forbidden relatives is included “the sister of one subject to zika.”

And earlier [17b], Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda disagreed about this: whether they regarded the zika between the yevama and her brother liable for yibbum, such that she is the sister of one subject to zika, as the sister of his wife, by rabbinic enactment.

For if there is no zika,

if you say that there is no marital status between the brother liable for yibbum and his yevama, and there was no basis for the Sages to forbid the yevama’s relatives to the brother liable for yibbum, the difficulty is:

After all,

these are

these

two sisters,

coming from two households,

and upon each one there is a separate mitzva of the brothers, and if there is no prohibition regarding the sister of one subject to zika—

this

one brother

should perform yibbum with one

of the yevamot,

and this

second brother

should perform yibbum with one

the second one. [

But one brother cannot perform yibbum with both of them, because they are two sisters.]

The Gemara rejects:

I can always say to you: There is no zika,

there is no marital status between the brother liable for yibbum and his yevama, and there is no prohibition of the relatives of the sister subject to zika.

And

what the tanna said—that it is forbidden to perform yibbum with both of them—is

because he holds: It is forbidden to nullify the mitzva of the brothers.

It is forbidden to cause the law of yibbum and chalitza to lapse entirely with regard to one of the yevamot.

And therefore there is concern here,

perhaps while one performs yibbum

one

one

of the brothers,

the other will die, and he will nullify the mitzva of the brothers.

For if one brother performs yibbum with one of the sisters, he can no longer perform yibbum with the second sister, since she is his wife’s sister. And he does not need [and cannot] perform chalitza with her either, because when he performs yibbum with her sister, she becomes forbidden to him by the prohibition of a wife’s sister. Only his brother can perform yibbum or chalitza with the second one.

Perhaps his brother will die, and it will emerge that the second sister leaves without yibbum and without chalitza, and the mitzva of the brothers will be nullified. Therefore the Sages instituted that both of them should leave through chalitza, so that even if one of the brothers dies, the brother who performed chalitza can return and perform chalitza with the second one.

And we raise an objection:

If so, if the reason that they perform chalitza with both of them is because of the prohibition against nullifying the mitzva of the brothers—

—

three also!

Why did the Mishna establish the law with four brothers? After all, with three brothers as well the law would be so: if two died and left two sister yevamot, it could teach the innovation that it is forbidden for the third brother, who remains alone, to perform yibbum with either of the sisters, so as not to forbid her sister to himself through yibbum, so that the mitzva of the brothers should not be nullified.

But if it is said that the reason for the Mishna is because there is zika, the Mishna properly chose four brothers.

For had the Mishna established the case with three brothers, we would say that only when the two sisters fall before one brother and both are subject to zika with him, each of the two becomes forbidden because she is the sister of one subject to zika. But not when two sisters fall before two brothers, for then it could be said that one of them falls before this brother and the second before another brother, and the sister whom he takes for himself does not become forbidden by the law of “the sister of one subject to zika,” because her sister is subject to zika only with his brother, and not with him.

And we answer:

We are stating, “It is not necessary”!

We chose the more innovative law, and consequently the simpler law will be understood.

It is not necessary

for the tanna to say

three,

for then certainly the mitzva of the brothers is nullified, since when he performs yibbum with one, he makes her co-wife the sister of his wife.

But four,

where the two sisters fell before two brothers, and there is another brother besides him who can perform yibbum, here there is no nullification of the mitzva of the brothers.

And

with regard to death,

that perhaps the other brother will die, and then the co-wife will fall before the one who performed yibbum with her sister, and will be released without chalitza—

we are not concerned.

It teaches us

that we are indeed concerned about the death of the other brother.