Yevamot 26a (כו.) — the Talmud in English

And Rav Ashi proves:

apparently,

based on rumor,

based only on rumor and slander,

we do not remove her.

For wherever there is no proof of a prohibition, but only suspicion and the people's rumor, we do not remove her from under his authority.

Here too,

they prohibited the one who brought the bill of divorce, and the Sage who prohibited the woman through her vow, from marrying her only because of the suspicion generated by the rumor.

Therefore, if he married her, he need not divorce her, since

in a case of rumor, we do not remove her.

But in the case of a man about whom there were allegations concerning a married woman, whose husband divorced her, and the man about whom the allegations had been made married her, he must divorce her, because the matter is improper!

Mishna:

And all of them—

the one who brings a bill of divorce from overseas, the one who testifies concerning a woman in order to permit her to marry, and the Sage who prohibited a woman through her vow, whom the Sages prohibited from marrying the woman concerning whom they had ruled—

if

they had wives

at the time of bringing the bill of divorce, giving the testimony, or ruling concerning the vow,

and

afterward

their wives died,

they are permitted to marry them

[the Sage, the witness, and the one who brought the bill of divorce].

For we need not be concerned that they intended to take this woman as a wife, since at that time they had wives.

And

likewise,

all of them

[all these women who were prohibited from marrying him], if

they married others

when the Sage prohibited her or when a witness testified that her husband had died,

and

again

they were divorced

by them,

or they were widowed

by them—

they are permitted to marry them—

the Sage, the witness, and the one who brought the bill of divorce.

Since it is evident that their actions were not intended for the purpose of taking this woman as a wife.

And all of them,

these women who are prohibited to the witness, the Sage, and the one who brought the bill of divorce who permitted them,

are permitted

in any event

to their sons or their brothers

of those who permitted them; and they are prohibited only to those men themselves.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: And all of them—the ones who permit the woman, who had wives when they permitted her, and whose wives died—are permitted to marry them.

And we infer:

If they died, yes;

that is, they are permitted to marry them specifically if their wives died.

But if

their wives were divorced,

the wives of those who permitted them,

no!

Rather, the women remain prohibited to them, because there is concern that, having set his sights on this woman, he arose and divorced his wife.

Rav Hillel said to Rav Ashi: But it was taught

explicitly in a beraita:

Even if they were divorced,

they are permitted to those who permitted them.

If so, the words of the beraita contradict our Mishna. And we answer:

It is not difficult.

The beraita does not contradict the Mishna.

This

statement in which it is taught that even if they were divorced they are permitted refers to a situation

where there had already been strife

between them and their wives, before they came to rule concerning this woman, even before there was any basis for saying that he had set his sights on this woman. Therefore, we need not be concerned that he divorced his wife because of her.

That

which is inferred from the Mishna, that if they were divorced the women are prohibited, refers to a situation

where there had not been strife

between them before they permitted this woman. Therefore, he is prohibited from marrying her, because we must be concerned that he divorced his wife only because he had set his sights on this woman.

And if you wish, say: Both cases involve a situation where there had not been strife between them and their wives before they permitted this woman. Nevertheless, the contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita can be resolved.

This

statement that if they were divorced the women are prohibited refers to a case in which

he initiated it—

he began provoking his wife.

And this

statement that if they were divorced the women are permitted refers to a case

where she initiated it—

she caused the strife. Since he was not the cause of the divorce, we need not be concerned that the divorce occurred because he had set his sights on the woman whom he had permitted; therefore, he is permitted to marry her, just as when his wife died.

We learned in the Mishna:

And all of them who married

others after they had been permitted to marry,

and were divorced

or

widowed

by the second husband, are permitted to marry those who permitted them. Since they married another man, there is no longer any suspicion that those who permitted them did so in order to marry them.

And we say:

It might have entered your mind—the Gemara initially understood that the Mishna mentioned the case of death, namely, that they “were widowed” by the second husband, and the case of divorce, namely, that they were divorced by the second husband, because the case of death refers to the preceding Mishna, which states that until the witness testified that the husband had died, or that he had killed him, he may not marry his wife.

The Mishna here then added that if she married another man on the basis of his testimony and the second husband also died, she is now permitted to marry this witness.

Whereas the case in which the woman married another man and “was divorced” refers to the preceding Mishna concerning the one who brings a bill of divorce from overseas, to whom she is prohibited from marrying on the basis of this bill of divorce. Our Mishna teaches that if she married another man on the basis of that same bill of divorce and the second man also divorced her, she is permitted to marry a third time the one who originally brought her bill of divorce.

It follows that when the Mishna says, “And all of them who married others and were divorced or widowed are permitted to marry them”—

the case of

death, in which it says “were widowed,”

refers

to death,

to the witness who testified that her husband had died, after which she went and married another man and the second husband died.

And

the case of

divorce,

in which it says “were divorced,” refers

to divorce,

to the one who brought a bill of divorce, after which the woman married another man and was divorced by him.

And although in both cases both of her husbands died, or she was divorced by both of them, it is clear from the Mishna that she is permitted to marry a third time the witness who testified concerning the death of her first husband, or the one who brought the bill of divorce from her first husband. We do not say that she is now prohibited from marrying anyone, because she has acquired the status of a ketalanit, a woman whose husbands die, or because she has acquired the status of one who is destined to be divorced.

Shall we say,

that

our Mishna

is

not in accordance with Rabbi!

For if it were in accordance with Rabbi, he said that after two occurrences

[two times]

a presumption is established.

According to Rabbi, a woman who married her first husband and he died, and then married a second husband and he died, may never marry again, because she has acquired the status of a ketalanit, a woman whose husbands die through her marriages.

But our Mishna, which permits her to marry even a third time [in a case where there is no suspicion], must be in accordance with the Rabbis, who maintain that only after three occurrences does she acquire a presumption that her husband will die or that she will be divorced.

For according to Rabbi, when two husbands have died while married to her, she is prohibited from marrying again.

And we answer:

No.

Our Mishna can also be in accordance with the Rabbis.

And do not interpret our Mishna as meaning that the case of death refers to the witness concerning death, while the case of divorce refers to the one who brings the bill of divorce.

Rather,

death,

the case mentioned in our Mishna, in which she married others and they died and she is permitted to marry again, refers only

to divorce.

That is, it concerns either the one who brings a bill of divorce or the Sage who prohibited the woman through a vow.

And divorce,

the case mentioned in our Mishna, refers

to death.

That is, it concerns the witness who testified that her husband had died, after which she married another husband and was divorced by him; the witness is now permitted to marry her.

Therefore, in both cases she is permitted to marry even a third time, even according to Rabbi. Since she has not acquired a presumption twice regarding either divorce or death, as she left one husband through death and one through divorce.

We learned in the Mishna:

And all of them are permitted to their sons or their brothers

of those who permitted them; and they are prohibited only to those men themselves.

And we ask:

How is this different from that which we learned: One about whom there were allegations concerning a woman

[one suspected of having intercourse with a woman], besides the fact that he was prohibited from marrying her,

is prohibited

also

to her mother, her daughter, and her sister.

For perhaps, after he marries her mother or her daughter, this woman will engage in intercourse with him, since she is already accustomed to being with him. He would then transgress a prohibition punishable by karet. From the moment he married her mother or her daughter, this woman becomes completely forbidden to him as an erva. Therefore, they also prohibited him from marrying her relatives, since we must be concerned that he may go and engage in intercourse with her and transgress a prohibition punishable by karet.

And since we find that the Sages were concerned that he might marry her daughter or mother, so that through this he would become accustomed to being in her presence, the same should apply in our Mishna: She should be prohibited from marrying those who permitted her [such as the one who brought a bill of divorce, a witness concerning the woman, or a Sage who prohibited her vow]. Why did they not also prohibit her from marrying their relatives, out of concern that perhaps there had been a licentious scheme between them, that she would marry this man's son and thereby become accustomed to being in his presence?

And we answer: There is concern that intercourse may result through marrying relatives only in the case of a man who is prohibited with regard to a particular woman; in that case, we prohibit him from marrying her relatives as well.

For

women commonly go to women.

It is common for women to visit other women. Therefore, there is concern that if he marries her mother or daughter, she will come to her mother and engage in intercourse with him.

But she is permitted to marry his relatives, because there is no concern that the man will come to visit his relative and engage in intercourse with the woman, since

men do not commonly visit men.

It is not common for men to visit one another for an extended period in which there would be concern that intercourse might occur between the woman and the man who permitted her to marry.

Alternatively: As for women, since their intercourse does not prohibit them to one another,

since a woman never becomes prohibited to her husband because he engages in intercourse with one of her relatives, therefore

they are not particular

the relatives

with regard to one another

[one with regard to the other] to guard her so that she will not engage in intercourse.

Therefore, we must be concerned that one woman may come to the other and engage in intercourse with the man with whom she had previously engaged in intercourse. She is not concerned that her relative will report this.

But

men, whose intercourse prohibits their wives to one another, are particular with regard to one another—

for men are careful that no man be secluded with their wives, since one who engages in intercourse with a married woman renders her permanently prohibited to her husband. Consequently, such seclusion is uncommon, and a relative is concerned about coming to his house and engaging in intercourse with his wife,

because he knows that the husband is particular about this.

Therefore, although he is prohibited from marrying her relatives, she is permitted to marry his relatives.

And we ask:

If so,

since a woman is permitted to marry his relatives and there is no concern that his relative will engage in intercourse with his wife, this woman should

also be permitted to marry his father.

Why, then, does the Mishna mention only that she is permitted to marry their sons or their brothers?

And we answer: Indeed, she is also permitted to marry his father. And our Mishna uses the formulation

“it is not necessary to state”

[it was written by way of kal va-chomer].

It is not necessary to state his father,

to whom she is permitted to marry, and we do not fear that the one who permitted her will engage in intercourse with her, since

his son is embarrassed before him

[he is embarrassed before his father], and stands in awe of him; certainly, the son will take care not to be secluded with her.

But

if she marries

his son,

of the one who permitted her,

whose father is not embarrassed before him,

as a father is not so embarrassed before his son,

perhaps not

did the Sages permit her to marry his son.

It teaches us

our Mishna that she is permitted to marry all of his relatives, for the reasons stated.

We return to you, chapter “How did his brother’s wife”

The first Mishna of this chapter discusses a case in which two sisters who are yevamot, the wives of two brothers who died, fell before two brothers for yibbum.

By Torah law, both of them are permitted for yibbum; however, the Sages decreed that they are forbidden.

The Gemara gives two reasons for this law:

The first is that they resemble one's wife's sister. This prohibition is called “the sister of one's zekuka,” and because of it they cannot undergo yibbum; rather, they must undergo halitza.

The second is the prohibition against nullifying the mitzva of the yevamim: if one of the brothers performs yibbum with one of the sisters and the other brother dies, the second sister will leave without halitza, because she is forbidden to him as the wife’s sister.

But if he performs halitza with the first sister, he can then return and perform halitza with the second one as well.

Mishna:

1.

Four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and those who were married to the sisters died.

Each of the sisters is forbidden to the yevamim, since she is “the sister of one's zekuka”.

These women must undergo halitza,

since their prohibition is only rabbinic,

but they may not undergo yibbum,

as explained.

And if they preceded

the brothers

and married them—

they must divorce them.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Beit Shammai say: They may remain married. And Beit Hillel say: They must divorce them.

2.

If one of them was forbidden to one of the brothers by a prohibition of forbidden relations—

her sister is not considered the sister of a zekuka, since he has no bond with a woman forbidden to him by a prohibition of forbidden relations; therefore, he is

forbidden to her,

because of the forbidden relationship,

but permitted to her sister.

And

if the

second brother—

he is forbidden to both of them.

3.

If one of them was forbidden to the yavam by a prohibition that is not a prohibition punishable by karet, so that despite the prohibition she falls before him by Torah law, for example:

a prohibition of a mitzva,

which is the prohibition of “secondary relatives to forbidden relations” prohibited by the Sages.

And a prohibition of sanctity,

which is a prohibition of those liable for violating a negative commandment with regard to the priesthood, such as a divorcee.

She must undergo halitza but may not undergo yibbum.

4.

If one of them was forbidden to one of the brothers by a prohibition of forbidden relations, and the other was forbidden to the other brother by a prohibition of forbidden relations—

The one forbidden to this brother—

is permitted to the other; and the one forbidden to that brother—

is permitted to the other.

And this is what they said: “Her sister,

the sister of a woman forbidden by a prohibition of forbidden relations,

when she is his yevama,

who falls together with her for yibbum—

may either undergo halitza or undergo yibbum!”

Since she is not considered the sister of a zekuka, as the woman forbidden by a prohibition of forbidden relations is not “bound” to the yavam.

Gemara:

The Gemara proves:

Infer from here

from the words of the Mishna that

there is a bond.

That is, the bond between the yavam and his yevama constitutes a state [or acquisition] of marriage. By virtue of the marital status between them, the Sages decreed prohibitions of intimacy with the relatives of the yevama. Among the forbidden relatives is “the sister of one's zekuka”.

Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda previously [17b] disagreed on this matter, whether they considered the bond between the yavam and his yevama sufficient to make her the sister of his zekuka, like the sister of his wife, by rabbinic enactment.

For if there is no bond,

if you say that there is no state of marriage between the yavam and his yevama, and that there was no basis for the Sages to prohibit the yevama’s relatives to the yavam, this is difficult:

After all,

these

two

sisters

come from two separate households,

and each one has a mitzva of yibbum in her own right; and if there is no prohibition against the sister of a zekuka—

this

one brother

should perform yibbum with one

of the yevamot,

and this

second brother

should perform yibbum with one

of the other sisters.

But one brother cannot perform yibbum with both of them, because they are sisters.

The Gemara rejects this:

I will always say to you that there is no bond;

there is no state of marriage between the yavam and his yevama, and there is no prohibition involving the relatives of the sister of a zekuka.

And

the reason the tanna said that one may not perform yibbum with both of them is

because he holds: It is prohibited to nullify the mitzva of the yevamim.

It is prohibited to cause the law of yibbum and halitza to lapse entirely with regard to one of the yevamot.

Therefore, there is concern here

that perhaps, while one

of

one

of the brothers is performing yibbum,

the other will die, and he will thereby nullify the mitzva of the yevamim.

If one brother performs yibbum with one of the sisters, he can no longer perform yibbum with the second sister, since she is his wife’s sister. He does not need—and cannot—perform halitza with her either, because when he performs yibbum with her sister, she becomes forbidden to him by the prohibition of a wife’s sister. Only his brother can perform yibbum or halitza with the second sister.

Perhaps his brother will die, and it will emerge that the second sister leaves without yibbum and without halitza, thereby nullifying the mitzva of the yevamim. Therefore, the Sages enacted that both women should leave through halitza, so that even if one of the brothers dies, the brother who performed halitza can return and perform halitza with the second one.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if the reason they perform halitza with both of them is the prohibition against nullifying the mitzva of the yevamim—

three brothers as well!

Why did the Mishna formulate the law with four brothers? The same law applies with three brothers: if two of them died, leaving two sister-yevamot, one could teach the novel point that the third brother, who remains alone, may not perform yibbum with either of the sisters, so that he will not render her sister forbidden to himself through yibbum, thereby preventing the mitzva of the yevamim from being fulfilled.

But if we say that the reason for the Mishna is that there is a bond, it is well that the Mishna chose the case of four brothers.

For had the Mishna formulated the case with three brothers, we would have said that only when the two sisters fall before one brother, and both are bound to him, is each of the two forbidden as the sister of his zekuka. But not when two sisters fall before two brothers, in which case one might say that one of them falls before this brother and the other before the other brother, and the sister whom he takes for himself is not forbidden by the law of “the sister of one's zekuka,” since her sister is bound only to his brother, and not to him.

And we answer:

We are stating the case that need not be stated!

We chose the more novel law, and the simpler law follows from it.

It need not be stated

for the tanna to say

three,

since in that case the mitzva of the yevamim is certainly nullified, because when he performs yibbum with one of them, he makes her rival the sister of his wife.

But four,

where the two sisters fell before two brothers, and there is another brother besides him who can perform yibbum, there is no nullification of the mitzva of the yevamim here.

And

with regard to death,

that perhaps the other brother will die, and then the rival will fall before the one who performed yibbum with her sister, and she will be exempt without halitza—

we are not concerned.

It teaches us

that we are in fact concerned about the death of the other brother.