Yevamot 25b — the Talmud in English

But did Rav Menashe not say: ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

a robber by rabbinic enactment

—who is considered a robber only by rabbinic enactment—and for example, one who plays games of chance, releases pigeons, or plays dice, whom the Sages considered a robber and disqualified from testimony [as explained in tractate Rosh Hashana 22a]—

is fit for the testimony concerning a woman,

to say that her husband died.

However,

a robber according to words of Torah,

who is considered a robber according to Torah law—

is disqualified

even

for testimony concerning a woman.

And if so, it is again difficult: Why, when one says, “I killed him,” concerning the husband of a certain woman, do they permit her to marry on the basis of his testimony? After all, he is considered wicked according to Torah law, for he is a murderer, and his testimony is not testimony even for testimony concerning a woman.

Let us say,

shall we say that

Rav Menashe said

his statement—that one who is wicked according to Torah law is disqualified from testimony concerning a woman—because he holds

like Rabbi Yehuda,

who says in our Mishna that one who testifies, “I killed so-and-so” \-

the woman is not permitted to marry on the basis of his testimony, even to another man!?

But the Rabbis, who hold that she is permitted to marry on the basis of this testimony, hold that even one who is wicked according to Torah law is fit for testimony concerning a woman, because the Sages were lenient in testimony concerning a woman, in order to permit the woman so that she would not remain agunah.

And we answer:

Rav Menashe can say to you: As for me, who say

that a robber according to Torah law is disqualified even from testimony concerning a woman, I hold

even according to the Rabbis.

And the reason of the Rabbis here,

that one who testifies, “I killed so-and-so,” is trusted to permit his wife to marry, despite the fact that he is wicked according to Torah law, is

as

he

Rava said.

For Rava said: A person is close to himself, and a person does not render himself wicked!

Therefore, although the witness admits that he committed a wicked act, he is not trusted concerning this.

For only concerning money does a person’s admission help to obligate himself monetarily on the basis of his own statement. But concerning prohibitions, he is not trusted to say that he himself acted wickedly.

And therefore the Rabbis hold that although the witness said that he was the one who killed so-and-so, he is not considered wicked.

And although he is not trusted with regard to himself concerning what he said, “I killed him,” nevertheless, with regard to the woman, he is trusted in his testimony to say that her husband was killed, and she is permitted to marry.

And according to this answer, one who says, “So-and-so sodomized me willingly,” is also trusted together with another witness to have the one who sodomized him killed.

For although, according to his words, he is wicked, and he is therefore disqualified from testimony, his admission is not accepted.

Since only with regard to himself is he not trusted to testify that he was sodomized willingly, but with regard to his fellow he is trusted to testify that the fellow sodomized him, since palginan dibura, and we divide his statement: we trust him concerning what he said, “So-and-so sodomized me,” but we do not trust him concerning what he said, that he sodomized him willingly.

And Rav Yosef, who said above that one who says, “So-and-so sodomized me willingly,” does not join in his testimony with another witness in order to have the one who sodomized him killed, apparently disagrees with Rava, and holds that a person does render himself wicked, and he is therefore again disqualified from testimony as a wicked person.

And from now it is difficult:

Let us say that Rav Yosef—

who said, holds like Rabbi Yehuda!?

For according to Rav Yosef, even one who says, “I killed him,” is not trusted to permit the woman to marry on the basis of his statement, just as he is not trusted to say, “So-and-so sodomized me willingly,” with regard to the one who sodomized him.

And this is the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the witness is not trusted at all.

And not like the Rabbis, who say in our Mishna that one who says, “I killed him,” is trusted to permit the woman to marry on the basis of his statement.

And we answer:

Rav Yosef can say to you: As for me, I say even according to the Rabbis.

For they too agree concerning “So-and-so sodomized me willingly” that he is not trusted at all, since according to his testimony he is wicked, and a wicked person is disqualified from testimony.

And that the Sages trusted him in testimony concerning a woman to say, “I killed him”—

testimony concerning a woman is different, for the Rabbis were lenient in it

to accept even the testimony of a wicked person.

And Rav Yosef holds that

Rav Menashe, who said

that one who is wicked according to Torah law is disqualified even from testimony concerning a woman—

is like Rabbi Yehuda,

who says that the witness is not trusted in testimony, “I killed him,” to permit her to marry.

But according to the Rabbis, Rav Menashe agrees that one who is wicked according to Torah law is fit for testimony concerning a woman.

We learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: If the witness said

“I killed him”

concerning so-and-so, and his wife is permitted to marry, his wife may not marry. But if he said

“I killed him, she may marry,”

his wife.

And we object:

What is different when he

said

“I killed him,”

that his wife may not marry on the basis of his statement, as was explained—that Rabbi Yehuda holds that a person renders himself wicked, and a wicked person is disqualified from testimony?

And what is different when he

said

“We killed him,”

that Rabbi Yehuda concedes in this case that she may marry on the basis of his statement?

After all, in this case too he testifies concerning himself that he is wicked!? And we answer:

Rabbi Yehuda said:

The wording “We killed him” that is taught does not mean that he assisted in killing him. Rather,

it is speaking of one who says, “I was with those who killed him,”

but I did not kill him myself.

And he is not wicked, and he is trusted in his testimony.

And was it not taught

in a beraita, support for our words?

For it was taught:

They said to him

the Sages

to Rabbi Yehuda,

to prove according to their words that one who says, “I killed him,” is trusted to permit the woman to marry on the basis of his statement:

There was an incident

that occurred

with one bandit who went out to be executed in the district of Cappadocia

[a place-name].

And he said to them,

the bandit:

“Go, tell the wife of Shimon ben Kohen: I killed her husband, upon my entering Lod!”

And some say [and there are those who say] that he said as follows: I killed her husband

[and there are those who say] that he said this: I killed her husband

upon the entry

of her husband

into Lod.

And the court permitted

the court

his wife,

the wife of Shimon ben Kohen, to marry on the basis of the testimony of this bandit.

And it is proved that although he incriminated himself in his testimony, he is trusted to permit the woman to marry on the basis of his statement.

Rabbi Yehuda said to them,

the Sages:

“And is it from there

that you bring

proof

for your words?

This bandit did not say, “I killed him.” Rather, it is speaking

of one who says, “I was with those who killed him,”

but I myself did not harm him.”

And we challenge this:

But

in the beraita

it teaches, “bandit”!

And it implies that he himself was a murderer. How can we rely on his testimony?

And we answer: This person was not a bandit. Rather,

he was apprehended on account of banditry.

He was apprehended on the charge of banditry, because they suspected that he himself was a bandit, since he had been with the bandits.

And we challenge this:

But it teaches, “went out to be executed”!

It follows that the court judged him as a murderer and sentenced him to death!

And we answer: His going out to be executed was not by an Israelite court, but by

a court

[a court]

of gentiles, who are not precise

[who do not investigate carefully] to clarify the truth of the matter,

and they kill

[and kill] on the basis of their assessment and flimsy proofs.

And therefore they executed this person, because they saw him in the company of the bandits.

But in truth, his hands did not shed blood, and he is not included among the wicked, and his testimony is valid.

And therefore, they permitted a woman to marry on the basis of his statement.

And likewise our Mishna, in which Rabbi Yehuda validated one who says, “We killed him,” also refers to a case in which he said, “I was with those who killed him.”

Mishna:

1.

The sage who prohibited the woman by a vow from her husband,

where the woman vowed not to derive benefit from her husband, and her husband did not annul the vow for her, and she went to a sage to have her vow permitted, and he did not find for her an opening for regret that would allow him to permit her vow, and he prohibited her to her husband because of her vow, so that she should not derive benefit from him, and her husband then divorced her, or the husband died—

behold, this

the sage

may not marry her,

because of suspicion, for they will suspect him that it was possible for him to find an opening to permit her vow, and he refrained from doing so because he had set his eyes upon her.

2. A minor whom her brothers or her mother married: the betrothal takes effect by rabbinic enactment. And if she wishes to leave her husband, she does not require a bill of divorce; rather, she may say that she does not desire him, and through this she is permitted to everyone. And this matter is called “mi'un.”

A minor who

performed mi'un

with her husband before the sage sitting on the court,

or who performed halitza

with her levir

before him,

the sage sitting on the court of halitza—

if the sage wishes—

he may marry her,

and there is no suspicion here that he permitted her for his sake.

Because he

is not found alone at the mi'un or at the halitza, but sits on a court of three. For this is the law: mi'un and halitza must be performed before

a court.

And since there are two other judges with him, there is no trace of suspicion, since three are certainly not suspected.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: The sage who prohibited the woman by a vow from her husband—behold, he may not marry her.

And the Gemara infers:

This

is so; if

he permitted

the sage released her from the obligation of her vow, and afterward her husband died or divorced her—

he may marry her

the sage, if he wishes, since there is no suspicion here.

And we object:

In what case are we dealing

in our Mishna, such that if the sage permitted her vow she is permitted to him, and if he prohibited it she is prohibited to him?

If you say, with one

[one sage]?

One—

can he permit

[can only one sage permit vows]!?

But did Rav Hiyya bar Avin say in the name of Rav Amram: A tanna

in a beraita:

The permitting of vows

must be performed

by three

judges!

Rather,

necessarily, our Mishna is dealing

with three,

that this woman came before three sages to have her vow permitted.

But now it is difficult: Three—

are they suspected!?

But did we not learn

in our Mishna: A woman who

performed mi'un or halitza before him

the sage—

he may marry her, because

he is included in

a court

of three. And with three there is no suspicion.

And why, then, concerning vows, if the sages prohibited her, is it forbidden for one of them to marry her? And we answer:

Always,

the Mishna should be established

with one

sage.

And nevertheless he can permit the vow alone, because he is an expert individual in the laws of vows,

as Rav Hisda said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan,

that the permitting of vows is either by three ordinary people or

by an expert individual.

And

here too,

in our Mishna, it is speaking

of an expert individual,

and therefore he can permit the vow alone. And in this regard our Mishna said that if he prohibited her and did not permit her, it is forbidden for the sage to marry her because of suspicion.

We learned in the Mishna:

She performed mi'un or halitza

before a sage, he may marry her, because

he

is included in

a court.

And we infer:

The reason is that there is

a

court,

which is three, and therefore we need not be concerned about suspicion.

But with two

[with two],

not

may he marry her! For one does not suspect three, but one suspects two.

And we object:

What is different from that which we learned:

Two

witnesses who signed on a deed of sale,

where Reuven sold land to Shimon and gave him a deed of sale concerning it, may the witnesses who signed the deed later return and purchase this land from Shimon.

And

likewise witnesses who signed

on a bill of divorce,

they may marry her.

And why

did the Sages not suspect this matter,

to say that the witnesses to the sale should be prohibited from purchasing the land, or that the witnesses to the bill of divorce should be prohibited from marrying the woman, and we do not suspect that their signatures were false, and that they signed only because they had set their eyes on the land or on the woman!? Rather, the reason is that there is suspicion only with one and not with two.

And if so, why does our Mishna imply that only because they are a court—that is, three—is there no suspicion?

And we answer: Indeed, even with two there is no suspicion. And what the Mishna gave as the reason, “because he is a court,” is not intended to teach us that only with three is there no suspicion and with two there is suspicion. Rather, the tanna came to teach us the law of mi'un, that it must be performed before three.

And

this itself it teaches us: to exclude the one who says

who holds that it is possible to perform

mi'un before two, it teaches us

that there is no

mi'un

except

before

presence of

three.

They raised a dilemma: All those concerning whom the Sages said that he should not marry [namely, one who brings a bill of divorce from overseas, the witness who testified concerning the husband’s death [who were mentioned in the preceding Mishna], and the sage who prohibited the woman], if he transgressed and

married

the woman—

what is the law: must he divorce her?

Rav Kahana said: If he transgressed and

married—

he divorces,

for even after the fact the Sages prohibited him.

Rav Ashi said: If he married—

he does not divorce.

Rav Zuti of the house of Rav Pappi taught them

[he taught the Sages]

according to the view of the one who says: If he married, he does not divorce.

The Rabbis said to Rav Ashi: This law that you say, that if he married he does not divorce—is it

This law that you state, that if he married her he need not divorce her, is it

a received teaching

that you received thus from your teachers,

or

do you say it as a

an inference

that you say so?

Rav Ashi said to them:

It is a Mishna!

For we learned above:

One concerning whom there was a report about a maidservant,

who was suspected of having intercourse with the maidservant, and afterward she

was emancipated.

Or one who was suspected of having intercourse with

a gentile woman, and

afterward she

converted—

behold, he may not marry her,

because of the disrepute, lest they say that this provides proof that the report of the suspicion was true.

And if

he transgressed and

married—

he does not divorce.