Yevamot 25b (כה:) — the Talmud in English

But did Rav Menashe not say:

a robber by rabbinic law

considered a robber only by rabbinic law], such as one who engages in games of chance, releases pigeons, or plays dice, whom the Sages deemed a robber and disqualified from bearing witness [as explained in tractate Rosh HaShana 22a]—

is fit to testify concerning a woman,

to state that her husband has died.

However,

a robber by Torah law,

who is considered a robber by Torah law—

is disqualified

even

from testifying concerning a woman.

If so, the difficulty arises again: Why, when one says, “I killed him,” referring to so-and-so’s husband, do they permit her to marry on the basis of his testimony? Is he not considered wicked by Torah law, since he is a murderer, and is his testimony not invalid even for testimony concerning a woman?

Shall we say,

that

Rav Menashe said

that one who is wicked by Torah law is disqualified from testifying concerning a woman because he holds

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who says in our Mishna that one who testifies, “I killed so-and-so” \-

may not permit the woman to marry on the basis of his testimony, even to another man!?

But the Rabbis, who hold that she may marry on the basis of this testimony, hold that even one who is wicked by Torah law is fit to testify concerning a woman, because the Sages were lenient with regard to testimony concerning a woman, in order to permit the woman to marry and prevent her from remaining indefinitely unable to remarry.

And we answer:

Rav Menashe can say to you: As for me, who say

that one who is a robber by Torah law is disqualified even from testifying concerning a woman, I hold this

even according to the Rabbis.

And the reason of the Rabbis here,

that one who testifies, “I killed so-and-so,” is trusted to permit his wife to marry despite being wicked by Torah law, is

as

said by

Rava.

For Rava said: A person is related to himself, and a person cannot render himself wicked!

Therefore, although the witness admits that he committed a wicked act, he is not believed with regard to that fact.

For only with regard to monetary matters does a person’s admission serve to obligate him monetarily on the basis of his own statement. But with regard to prohibitions, he is not believed to say that he himself rendered himself wicked.

Therefore, the Rabbis hold that although the witness said that he was the one who killed so-and-so, he is not considered wicked.

And although he is not believed with regard to himself concerning his statement, “I killed him,” nevertheless, with regard to the woman, he is believed in his testimony to say that her husband was killed, and she is permitted to marry.

According to this answer, one who says, “So-and-so sodomized me willingly,” is likewise believed together with another witness to have the perpetrator executed.

For although, according to his statement, he is wicked and therefore disqualified from bearing witness, his admission is not accepted.

Since he is believed only with regard to his fellow, but not with regard to himself, to testify that he was sodomized willingly, he is nevertheless believed concerning his fellow to testify that the latter sodomized him, because palginan dibura, “we divide the statement”: We accept what he said, “So-and-so sodomized me,” but do not accept what he said that the act was performed willingly.

And Rav Yosef, who said above that one who says, “So-and-so sodomized me willingly,” does not join with another witness through his testimony in order to have the perpetrator executed, apparently disagrees with Rava. He holds that a person does render himself wicked, and he is therefore disqualified from bearing witness as one who is wicked.

The difficulty now arises:

Shall we say that Rav Yosef

speaks in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda!?

For according to Rav Yosef, even one who says, “I killed him,” is not believed to permit the woman to marry on the basis of his statement, just as he is not believed concerning the perpetrator when he says, “So-and-so sodomized me willingly.”

And this is the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the witness is not believed at all.

And not that of the Rabbis, who say in our Mishna that one who says, “I killed him,” is believed to permit the woman to marry on the basis of his statement.

And we answer:

Rav Yosef can say to you: As for me, I speak even according to the Rabbis.

For they too agree, with regard to one who says, “So-and-so sodomized me willingly,” that he is not believed at all, since according to his testimony he is wicked, and one who is wicked is disqualified from bearing witness.

And as for the fact that the Sages believed him with regard to testimony concerning a woman when he says, “I killed him”—

testimony concerning a woman is different, as the Rabbis were lenient concerning it

to accept even the testimony of one who is wicked.

And Rav Yosef holds that

Rav Menashe, who said

that one who is wicked by Torah law is disqualified even from testifying concerning a woman—

speaks in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who says that the witness is not believed, with regard to the testimony “I killed him,” to permit her to marry.

But with regard to the opinion of the Rabbis, Rav Menashe concedes that one who is wicked by Torah law is fit to testify concerning a woman.

We learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: If the witness said

“I killed him”

concerning so-and-so, and his wife is permitted to marry, his wife may not marry. But if he said

“We killed him, she may marry”

his wife.

And we challenge this:

What is different when he

said

“I killed him”,

so that his wife may not marry on the basis of his statement, as explained: Rabbi Yehuda holds that a person renders himself wicked, and one who is wicked is disqualified from bearing witness?

And what is different when he

said

“We killed him”,

such that Rabbi Yehuda concedes that she may marry on the basis of his statement?

But in this case too, he testifies concerning himself that he is wicked! And we answer:

Rabbi Yehuda said:

The wording “we killed him” taught in the Mishna does not mean that he assisted in killing him. Rather, it means

that he said, “I was with those who killed him,

but I did not kill him myself.”

He is therefore not wicked, and he is believed in his testimony.

But it was taught

in a beraita in support of our explanation.

As it was taught:

The Sages said

to

Rabbi Yehuda,

to prove their position that one who says, “I killed him,” is believed to permit the woman to marry on the basis of his statement:

There was

an incident

involving a bandit who was taken out to be executed in the district of Cappadocia

[a place-name].

And he said to them,

the bandit:

“Go and tell the wife of Shimon ben Kohen: I killed her husband when I entered Lod!”

And some say

[and there are those who say] that he said as follows: I killed her husband

when he entered

Lod,

when her husband entered Lod.

And they permitted

the court

his wife

the wife of Shimon ben Kohen, to marry on the basis of this bandit’s testimony.

It is evident that although he rendered himself wicked through his testimony, he is believed to permit the woman to marry on the basis of his statement.

Rabbi Yehuda said

to the Sages:

And is it from there

that you bring

proof

for your position?

This bandit did not say, “I killed him.” Rather, it means

that he said, “I was with those who killed him,”

but I myself did not harm him.

And we challenge this:

But

in the beraita

it teaches: “A bandit”!

This implies that he himself was a murderer. How, then, can we rely on his testimony?

And we answer: This man was not a bandit. Rather, he was

apprehended on account of banditry.

He was apprehended on suspicion of banditry, as they suspected that he himself was a bandit because he had been with the bandits.

And we challenge this:

But it teaches: “He was taken out to be executed”!

This indicates that a court judged him to be a murderer and sentenced him to death!

And we answer: He was not taken out to be executed by an Israelite court, but by

a court

[a court]

of gentiles, who are not exacting

[who do not carefully ascertain] the truth of the matter,

and kill

[and execute] on the basis of their assessment and tenuous evidence.

Therefore, they took this man out to be executed because they had seen him in the company of the bandits.

But in truth, his hands had not shed blood, and he was not included among the wicked; his testimony was valid.

And therefore, they permitted a woman to marry on the basis of his statement.

And likewise, in our Mishna, where Rabbi Yehuda deemed valid the testimony of one who says, “We killed him,” this too refers to a case in which he said, “I was with those who killed him.”

Mishna:

a.

A Sage who prohibited a woman by vow from her husband,

where the woman vowed not to derive benefit from her husband, and her husband did not annul the vow; she then went to a Sage to have her vow dissolved, but he could not find an opening for regret that would enable him to dissolve it, and he prohibited her from her husband because of her vow, so that she may not derive benefit from him, and her husband subsequently divorced her, or the husband died—

that

Sage

may not marry her,

because of suspicion: They may suspect that he could have found an opening to dissolve her vow but refrained from doing so because he had set his eyes on her.

b. A minor girl whom her brothers or mother married off has rabbinic kiddushin. If she wishes to leave her husband, she does not require a bill of divorce; rather, she can say that she does not desire him, and she is thereby permitted to everyone. This procedure is called mi'un.

A minor girl who

performed mi'un

before her husband in the presence of the Sage sitting as part of a court,

or who performed halitza

with her yavam

in his presence,

in the presence of the Sage sitting as part of a court for halitza—

if the Sage wishes, he

may marry her,

and there is no suspicion that he permitted her for his own sake.

Because he

is not present alone for the mi'un or halitza, but sits as part of a court of three. For the law is that mi'un and halitza must be performed in the presence of

a court.

And since two other judges are with him, there is no concern of suspicion, as three people are certainly not suspected.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A Sage who prohibited a woman by vow from her husband may not marry her.

The Gemara infers:

This implies that

if

the Sage permitted

her from the obligation of her vow, and afterward her husband died or divorced her—

he may marry her,

if he wishes, as there is no suspicion here.

And we challenge this:

With what are we dealing

in our Mishna, such that if the Sage dissolved her vow she is permitted to him, but if he prohibited her she is forbidden to him?

If you say it concerns one

[one Sage]?

One—

is he able to dissolve

[can one Sage alone dissolve vows]!?

But did Rav Hiyya bar Avin say that Rav Amram said, and a tanna taught

in a beraita:

The dissolution of vows

must be performed

by three

judges!

Rather,

necessarily, our Mishna is dealing

with three,

as this woman came before three Sages to have her vow dissolved.

But now the difficulty arises: Three—

are they suspected!?

But didn’t we learn

in our Mishna: A woman who

performed mi'un or halitza in his presence

of a Sage

may marry him, because

he is included in

a court

of three, and there is no suspicion with three?

Why, then, with regard to vows, if the Sages prohibited her, is one of them forbidden to marry her? And we answer:

Actually,

the Mishna should be understood as dealing

with one

Sage.

Nevertheless, he can dissolve the vow alone, because he is an expert individual in the laws of vows,

as Rav Hisda said that Rabbi Yohanan said,

that the dissolution of vows is performed either by three ordinary judges or

by one expert.

And

here too,

our Mishna is dealing

with one expert,

and therefore he can dissolve the vow alone. It is in this context that our Mishna says that if he prohibited her and did not dissolve her vow, the Sage may not marry her because of suspicion.

We learned in the Mishna: A woman who

performed mi'un or halitza

in the presence of a Sage may marry him, because

he

is included in

a court.

And we infer:

The reason is that there is

a

court,

which consists of three, and therefore there is no concern of suspicion.

This implies that with two,

[with two],

she may not

marry him, because three are not suspected, whereas two are suspected.

And we challenge this:

What is different from that which we learned:

Two

witnesses who signed a deed of sale,

where Reuven sold land to Shimon and gave him a deed of sale for it, may later purchase this land from Shimon.

And

likewise, witnesses who signed

a bill of divorce,

may marry her.

And why

did the Sages not concern themselves with this matter,

saying that the witnesses to the sale should be prohibited from purchasing the land, or that the witnesses to the divorce should be prohibited from marrying the woman, out of concern that their signatures were false and that they signed only because they had set their eyes on the land or the woman? Rather, the reason is that suspicion applies only to one person, not to two.

If so, why does our Mishna imply that there is no suspicion only because they are a court, meaning three people?

And we answer: Indeed, there is no suspicion even with two. And when the Mishna gives the reason “because he is a court,” it is not teaching us that there is no suspicion only with three, whereas there is suspicion with two. Rather, the tanna is teaching the law of mi'un: It must be performed in the presence of three.

And

this itself teaches us: It is to exclude the opinion of one who says

that it is possible to perform

mi'un in the presence of two; this teaches us

that

mi'un

is performed only

in the

presence of

three.

They raised a dilemma: All those concerning whom the Sages said that he may not marry her [namely, one who brings a bill of divorce from overseas, the witness who testified to the husband’s death [mentioned in the preceding Mishna], and the Sage who prohibited the woman]—if he transgressed and

married

the woman,

what is the law: must he divorce her?

Rav Kahana said: If he transgressed and

married—he

must divorce her,

as the Sages prohibited him from her even after the fact.

Rav Ashi said: If he married—he

need not divorce her.

Rav Zuti of the school of Rav Pappi taught them

[he taught the Sages]

in accordance with the opinion that if he married he need not divorce her.

The Rabbis said to Rav Ashi:

This law that you state, that if he married he need not divorce her,

is it a received tradition

that you received from your teachers,

or

is it based on

reasoning

that you say this?

Rav Ashi said to them:

It is a Mishna!

For we learned above:

One concerning whom there was a report regarding a maidservant,

who was suspected of having relations with the maidservant, and afterward she

was emancipated,

or who was suspected of having relations with

a gentile woman, and

afterward she

converted—

he may not marry her

because of the disrepute that would result, as people would say that the marriage proves that the rumor was true.

And if

he transgressed and

married—

he need not divorce her.