Yevamot 25a — the Talmud in English

And likewise, if the husband found in his house

shoes turned over

, with their openings facing downward,

under the bed—

Rabbi said: Since the matter is disgraceful, she must leave her husband. For certainly these shoes belong to a strange man, with whom she committed adultery, and he fled; and the gentile turned them over so that her husband would not recognize that these are the shoes of a strange man

.

And we raise an objection: If the husband found

shoes turned over, why is she forbidden merely because they are turned over

?

Let him see whose they are

—let him see to whom these shoes belong. And only if they are neither his nor hers would it become clear that certainly another man had been with her

! And we answer: It is not speaking of a case in which he saw the shoes themselves turned over .

Rather, he saw only

the

place of turned-over shoes

.

For there was loose earth there, and the shape of the shoe’s face was found in the earth, indicating that they had placed them there turned over, so that it would not be recognizable whose shoes they were.

And when the paramour left, he took them with him, and it is impossible to clarify the matter by seeing to whom the shoe belongs.

Nevertheless, Rabbi said that she must leave, because there is basis for the matter from the turned-over shoes, for they belong to a strange man.

And it is explained in the beraita that Rabbi’s view is that they remove a woman from her husband even by means of a rumor and indications of impropriety, and we do not require witnesses that she became defiled.

And if so, we should establish the beraita above—that when she has no children, the man suspected with her removes her from under his authority—in accordance with Rabbi, who holds so.

But Rav holds that a woman leaves the authority of neither the husband nor the paramour except by witnesses.

And we say:

And the halakha is in accordance with Rav

, that they remove a woman only on the basis of witnesses, and not by means of a rumor .

And the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi , that they remove a woman on the basis of a rumor and impropriety

.

And we are astonished:

One halakha is difficult against the other halakha!

For Rav and Rabbi disagree in their opinions, and it is impossible to rule in accordance with both of them!

And we answer:

It is not difficult

.

This

is when

a rumor that ceased emerged. That is, the rumor was stopped when another rumor emerged that the slander in the first rumor was false

.

And

this is when there is a rumor that did not cease, and the slander remains as it was

.

And the Gemara explains:

With

a rumor that did not cease, and there are no witnesses

that she committed adultery, the halakha is

in accordance with Rabbi

, that she must leave the husband and the man suspected with her .

And with

a rumor that ceased, and there are witnesses

that she committed adultery, the halakha is

in accordance with Rav

, that she must leave her husband .

For there is testimony that she committed adultery, and she is forbidden to the husband and to the paramour.

And the Gemara discusses:

And a rumor that did not cease, how long must the rumor continue until it is considered a rumor that did not cease

?

Abaye said: My mother said to me: The talk of the city

—the preoccupation with suspicion of a matter of transgression concerning a person in the city—continues

a day and a half

. A day and a half.

And we said this —that if the rumor emerged and the preoccupation with this suspicion continued for a day and a half, it is demonstrated that it has something of that matter in it

—

only

where it did not cease

in which the rumor did not cease

the rumor

in between

, in the interim .

But

if the rumor ceased

the rumor ceased

in the interim,

then it ceased , and we need not be concerned about this suspicion

.

And what we said—that when the rumor ceased in the interim there is no suspicion—

we said only

where

it did not cease

, so that the cessation of the rumor was not because of fear

due to fear

of the man suspected

. But

if

the rumor ceased

because of

because of fear

, we say that

it is because of fear

that the interruption occurred, and it is not considered a rumor that ceased, but a rumor that continues .

And we said this —that a continuing rumor is evidence of a true suspicion

—

only when there are no

people who are

enemies

of that person about whom the rumor emerged .

But

if

there are enemies

, who hate that person, the rumor does not constitute evidence and grounds for suspicion, since it is reasonable that

it is enemies who brought out the rumor concerning him

, that enemies brought out the rumor concerning him because of their hatred .

We learned there :

a man who

One who divorces

—the one who divorces

his wife because of a bad name

, that emerged concerning her, that she committed adultery, behold, this is

he may not take her back

, even after it was found that the report had been false .

And likewise, one who divorces his wife

because of a vow

that she vowed, and he does not desire a wife who vows, behold, this is

he may not take her back

into his house, even if the sage annulled the vow .

And concerning the reason for the matter that he may not take her back, the amoraim disagreed in Tractate Gittin, there.

One said that it is a penalty, so that the daughters of Israel should not become wanton with forbidden sexual relations and vows.

And one said that the Sages prohibited taking her back because of concern for the corruption of his children: perhaps she will marry another man, and afterward a rumor will emerge concerning the first report, that it was false; then the divorcer will regret it and say: Had I known that this was so, I would not have divorced her!

And it will be found that the divorce document was uprooted retroactively, and the children born to her from her second husband are mamzerim.

And likewise, when he divorces because of a vow, we are concerned that perhaps she will marry another man, and afterward she will go to a sage to have her vow permitted. And the divorcer will say: Had I known that her vow could be permitted, I would not have divorced her!

And it will be found that he nullified his divorce document retroactively, and her children from the second husband are mamzerim.

And therefore they say to him at the outset, before he divorces: Know that one who divorces his wife because of a vow or a bad name is forbidden ever to take her back. Therefore, if she is dear to you, go and ascertain whether it is possible to permit this vow, or whether there is truth in the report of adultery.

And from now on, if he divorces her, he cannot uproot the divorce document. For certainly she is hated by him, and in any event he desires her divorce.

Rabba bar Rav Huna sent to Rabba bar Naḥman: Let our master teach us!

One who divorces his wife because of a vow or a bad name, whom the Sages prohibited him to take back—if he transgressed and

took her in

—

what

is it that we force him

to remove

her ?

For perhaps the Sages prohibited only taking her back initially, but after the fact, if he took her back, he need not remove her.

Or perhaps even after the fact, his law is that he must remove her from under him.

He said to him

, Rabba bar Naḥman: Behold,

we learned

a solution to this question in our Mishna :

For we learned:

One suspected

one who was suspected]

of an immoral relation with a married woman, and she was removed

by her husband from under his authority, even though

he took her in

the man suspected with her,

he must remove her

.

And we have to compare them: just as the man suspected may not take her in, and if he took her in he must remove her, so too, when the husband removed her because of a bad name, thereby revealing his view that the rumor was true and that she became forbidden to him, even if he takes her in again, his law is that he must divorce her.

He said to him , Rabba bar Rav Huna: We cannot compare this law to the law of one suspected of an immoral relation with a married woman

.

For

are they comparable?

For

there

, concerning one suspected of an immoral relation with a married woman, it teaches

“they removed her”

, that the court removed her from her husband because witnesses of defilement came, and she became forbidden to the paramour by Torah law forever. Therefore he must remove her, as Rav explained our Mishna above .

But

here, in

“he removed her”

, it is speaking of the husband, who removed her only because of a rumor and a report that she committed adultery; and the entire prohibition against taking her back is only rabbinic, and in this it is possible that if he transgressed and took her in, he need not remove her

.

And we say:

And Rabba bar Rav Naḥman

, who compared the matters and did not take account of this distinction, necessarily holds that our Mishna

,

our Mishna,

also teaches, “he removed her” and not “they removed her”

.

And not like Rav, who explained our Mishna as referring to the arrival of witnesses that she committed adultery; rather, it is speaking of a case in which a rumor emerged without witnesses, and the husband removed her on his own. Therefore she is forbidden to the paramour only because of rabbinic disrepute.

And even so, our Mishna teaches that if the suspected man took her in, he must remove her. And if so, the same law applies to one who divorces his wife because of a bad name: since it is rabbinically forbidden for him to take her back, if he transgressed and took her in, he must remove her.

And we reject this:

But still, are they comparable

, the law of one suspected of an immoral relation with a married woman to that of one who divorced her because of a bad name and took her back? For

here, in our Mishna,

in our Mishna, the

the husband

is the one who took her back, after it became clear that the rumor was unfounded, and this is not a disgraceful matter .

And

if

there

—for there it is speaking of the

paramour

who takes her in—and such a thing is disgraceful, and therefore he must remove her .

He said to him:

Even so,

they are properly comparable to one another

.

For

here, in our Mishna, concerning the suspected man, who may not take her in but did take her in,

in our Mishna, regarding the suspected man, who is forbidden to marry her but did marry her,

the Sages said: He may not take her in! And

nevertheless,

if he took her in

, the law is that

he must remove her

.

If so,

here too, concerning the husband who divorced and then took her back,

with regard to a husband who divorced his wife and then remarried her,

the Sages said: He may not take her back!

And the law must be that

if he took her in, he must remove her

.

For in both cases the prohibition is rabbinic, and there is no concern for the distinction of whether the matter is disgraceful.

And we reject this:

That is not so!

For

there, when the suspected paramour took in the woman concerning whom he was suspected,

he strengthens the rumor!

he strengthened the rumor!

He confirms and strengthens by this the first rumor that he committed adultery with her, and therefore even if he took her in, he must remove her.

But

here, when the husband divorced her because of a slander that emerged concerning her, if he takes her back,

where the husband divorced her because of slander that emerged about her, if he remarries her—

we say

the opposite :

He investigated the rumor, and it is not so!

For the husband examined the first rumor thoroughly and found that there was no substance to it.

For by taking her back, we say that certainly the husband went back and examined the first rumor of a bad name, found that there was no substance to it, and therefore took her back. Therefore, if he took her in, he need not remove her.

Mishna:

1.

One who brings a divorce document from overseas

to the Land of Israel, and testified before us and said: “In my presence it was written”

saying: “It was written in my presence”

this divorce document

“and in my presence”

it was

signed

.

For such is the law: the agent must testify concerning this, since the inhabitants of outside the Land are not expert and do not know that the divorce document must be written for the sake of the woman being divorced.

And since on the basis of the speech and testimony of the agent of the divorce document she is permitted to marry,

the agent who brings the divorce document may not marry

the wife

the wife

of the divorcer, since we must be concerned that he set his eyes upon her and forged and wrote a divorce document .

2. If one witness came and testified that a woman’s husband had died, she is permitted to marry on his word. This is a leniency with which the Sages were lenient, permitting a woman without the testimony of two witnesses, despite the principle that “there is no matter concerning forbidden relations with less than two,” for testimony permitting a married woman is accepted only through the testimony of two fit witnesses.

And the reason that they were lenient concerning a woman whose husband died, allowing reliance on the testimony of one witness, is that certainly the woman will not marry unless she investigates and examines thoroughly that her husband certainly died; it follows that the reliance is on the woman’s clarification, and not on the testimony of one witness.

3. One witness who said that the husband of so-and-so had died, such that the law is that they give her permission to marry on his word—the witness himself may not marry her, for perhaps he set his eyes upon her and testified falsely.

4. And likewise, if he said in his testimony that her husband did not

die

on his own, but I

killed him

.

Or if he said,

“We killed him” , I and others with me

.

This one too

may not marry the wife

of the deceased, for since she marries on the basis of his speech, we are concerned that perhaps he set his eyes upon her and testified falsely.

However, she may marry another man, for such is the law: a woman marries on the basis of the testimony of one witness that her husband died.

Rabbi Yehuda

disagrees, and

says

: If he said in his testimony,

“I killed him,” his wife may not marry

the deceased , even another man, because according to his statement that he himself killed him, he is wicked, and a wicked person is disqualified from testimony. As it is stated: “Do not place a wicked person as a witness.”

And Rabbi Yehuda holds that a person is believed to establish himself as wicked.

However, he too agrees that if the witness said

“We killed him”

, I and others, the witness is believed, and

his wife may marry

another man on the basis of his words .

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: One who brings a divorce document from overseas to the Land of Israel and says, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed,” may not marry the wife of the divorcer.

And the Gemara infers:

The reason is that

this divorce document was brought

from overseas

, and therefore the witness may not marry the divorcer’s wife, since upon him

,

upon his testimony,

we rely

. For we rely upon him, upon his testimony that he says, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed” .

But

if he brought a divorce document

from the Land of Israel

, where he does not need to say, “In my presence it was written and signed,” since everyone is expert and knows that a divorce document must be written for the sake of the woman being divorced, since

we do not rely upon him

, for the divorce document is valid without his testimony—even one who brings the divorce document

may marry the wife

of the divorcer, if he wishes .

And

it is difficult:

But

concerning a witness who testifies that the husband died

died

of so-and-so,

we do not rely upon him

, not upon the witness’s testimony,

we rely

, since the Sages did not permit the woman to marry another because of his testimony, but because

the Master said

:

the woman

herself, hearing from the witness that her husband died,

examines

—she investigates and examines thoroughly—until she knows that he certainly died, and only afterward

marries

another .

And only for this reason do we give a woman permission to marry on the basis of one witness.

And it follows that we do not rely on his testimony and speech, but on the woman’s clarification, which she clarified thoroughly because she heard from the witness that her husband died.

And

even so,

it teaches

in our Mishna that the witness who testifies concerning the husband’s death

may not marry his wife

.

And what is different from one who brings a divorce document from the Land of Israel, from which it is implied in our Mishna that he is permitted to marry her, since we do not rely on his speech?

And we answer: In any event, there is a distinction between the cases.

For

there, in testimony of death,

there is no written document

there is no written document

. Rather, there is speech alone, and we must be concerned that he is lying, because he set his eyes upon her .

In contrast,

here, concerning one who brings a divorce document,

there

there is a written document

. For the divorce document is in his hand, and since the divorce document is in his hand, we are not so concerned to say that he forged the document .

And this matter resembles that

we learned in Tractate Gittin: even women who are not believed to testify that so-and-so’s husband died—such as her mother-in-law and her rival wife, who hate her and seek to cause her harm if she marries another and her husband comes—are nevertheless believed to bring her divorce document, even though they must say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”

.

And there we explain:

What is the difference between

bringing a

divorce document

, for they are believed to bring it and testify concerning its validity,

and death

, for they are not believed to say that her husband died ?

Because

the writing

of the divorce document

proves!

For we do not rely upon them entirely, but upon the document .

And it is explained there that there is reliance upon the writing. We learned in the Mishna: The witness said

“He died, I killed him”

, or

“We killed him”

, behold, this witness

may not marry his wife

of the deceased.

And the Gemara infers: specifically

he is the one who may not marry his wife

. But to another, she may marry

But she may marry another man

this woman on the basis of the witness’s testimony, whether when he testified that he died or when he testified, “I killed him.”

And it is difficult: When he testified, “I killed him,” he is wicked, and his testimony is not testimony.

For every person who committed a transgression for which he is liable to lashes is disqualified from testimony.

As Rav Yosef said

: A witness testifying in court who says:

“So-and-so sodomized me”

against my will, rather,

by force

— he

,

the one sodomized,

and

another witness

join

the testimony of two, in order

to kill him

, the one who sodomized him, on the basis of their testimony .

But if the witness said in his testimony:

“So-and-so sodomized me willingly!”

he cannot join the testimony with another witness in order to execute the sodomizer on the basis of their testimony. For according to his words, that he was sodomized willingly,

he is wicked, and the Torah said that a wicked person is disqualified from testimony

.

As it is written:

“Do not place your hand with a wicked person

to be a false witness”

.

And the same law applies when he says, “I killed him”: he is wicked, and he is not believed in his testimony at all.

And why is she permitted to marry another man?

And if you would say

to answer:

The testimony concerning a woman is different

,

for the Sages were lenient in it

to rely even on a wicked witness, for the woman clarifies the truth of the matter, and we rely on her clarification .

This cannot be answered so. For: