Yevamot 25a (כה.) — the Talmud in English

And likewise, if the husband found in his house

shoes turned upside down,

with their openings facing downward,

beneath the bed—

Rabbi said: Since the matter is disgraceful, she must leave

her husband. For these shoes certainly belong to a stranger with whom she committed adultery, and who fled; and the stranger turned them over so that her husband would not recognize that they belonged to a stranger.

And we object: If the husband found

shoes turned upside down,

why is she forbidden merely because they were turned upside down?

Let him see whose they are [

that is, let him determine to whom these shoes belong]. Only if they belong neither to him nor to her would it thereby become clear that another man had certainly been with her!

And we answer: This is not referring to a case in which he saw the shoes themselves turned upside down.

Rather,

he saw only

the place where overturned shoes had been.

.

There was loose earth there, and the imprint of the soles of the shoes was found in the earth, indicating that they had been placed there upside down so that it would not be recognizable to whom they belonged.

When the adulterer left, he took them with him, and it is impossible to clarify the matter by seeing to whom the shoes belong.

Nevertheless, Rabbi said that she must leave, because the overturned shoes provide grounds for the suspicion that they belonged to a stranger.

It is explained in the beraita that Rabbi’s opinion is that a woman may be removed from her husband even on the basis of rumor and circumstantial evidence; witnesses that she became defiled are not required.

If so, the earlier beraita should be understood as referring to the opinion of Rabbi, who maintains that when she has no children, the man suspected of having relations with her must remove her from his household.

But Rav maintains that a woman is removed from both her husband and the man who had relations with her only on the testimony of witnesses.

And we say:

And the halakha is in accordance with Rav,

that a woman is removed only on the basis of witnesses, and not on the basis of rumor.

And the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi,

that a woman is removed on the basis of rumor and disgraceful circumstances.

And we wonder:

The halakhot contradict one another!

For Rav and Rabbi disagree in their opinions, and it is impossible to rule in accordance with both of them!

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

.

This

is a case in which

the rumor ceased,

meaning that the rumor was interrupted by the emergence of another rumor that the slander in the first rumor was false.

And

this is a case of a rumor that did not cease,

and the slander remains in force.

The Gemara explains:

In a case of

an uninterrupted rumor, but there are no witnesses

that she committed adultery, the halakha is

in accordance with Rabbi,

and she must leave both her husband and the man suspected of having relations with her.

And in a case of

a rumor that ceased, but there are witnesses

that she committed adultery, the halakha is

in accordance with Rav,

and she must leave her husband.

For there is testimony that she committed adultery, and she is forbidden to both her husband and the adulterer.

The Gemara discusses:

And an uninterrupted rumor—for how long

must the rumor continue in order to be considered uninterrupted?

Abaye said: My mother told me: The talk of the city [

the city’s preoccupation with suspicion of a person regarding a transgression] continues

for a day and a half.

A day and a half.

And we said

that if a rumor emerges and the preoccupation with this suspicion continues for a day and a half, this proves that there is substance to it—

only

in a case

where the rumor did not cease

the rumor

in the interim,

during that time.

But

if

the rumor ceased

the rumor

in the interim, then it has ceased,

and we need not be concerned about this suspicion.

And when we said that if the rumor ceased in the interim there is no suspicion,

we said this only

in a case

where it did not cease,

meaning that the cessation of the rumor was not

due to fear

of the suspected man.

But

if

the rumor ceased

the rumor

due to fear,

we say that

it was due to fear

that it ceased for that reason, and it is not considered a rumor that ceased, but rather a continuing rumor.

And we said

that a continuing rumor is evidence of a genuine suspicion

only where there are no

for that person about whom the rumor emerged

enemies.

of the person about whom the rumor emerged.

But

if

there are enemies,

who hate that person, the rumor does not constitute evidence or grounds for suspicion, since it is reasonable that

it was his enemies who publicized the rumor,

as they spread the rumor about him because of their hatred.

We learned there: [

in tractate Gittin 45b]

One who divorces [

one who divorces]

his wife because of a bad reputation

that spread about her that she had committed adultery—this man

may not remarry

her, even after it is discovered that the report was false.

And likewise, one who divorces his wife

because of a vow

that she took, because he does not desire a wife who takes vows—this man

may not remarry

her, even if a sage releases her from the vow.

The amoraim in tractate Gittin there disagree concerning the reason that he may not remarry her.

One said that it is a penalty, so that Jewish women will not be licentious with regard to forbidden sexual relations and vows.

And one said that the Sages prohibited him from remarrying her because of concern for the disqualification of her children. Perhaps she will marry another man, and afterward a rumor will emerge concerning the first report, saying that it was false. The divorcer will then regret his action and say: Had I known that this was the case, I would not have divorced her!

It would then emerge that the divorce was retroactively nullified, and her children born to her second husband would be mamzerim.

And likewise, when he divorces her because of a vow, we are concerned that she may marry another man and afterward go to a sage to have her vow released. The divorcer will say: Had I known that her vow could be released, I would not have divorced her!

It would then emerge that he retroactively nullified his divorce, and her children from the second husband would be mamzerim.

Therefore, before he divorces her, they tell him: Know that one who divorces his wife because of a vow or a bad reputation may never remarry her. Accordingly, if she is dear to you, go and ascertain whether this vow can be released or whether there is truth in the report of adultery.

And from that point onward, if he divorces her, he cannot uproot the divorce. For she is certainly hateful to him, and in any event he desires her divorce.

Rabba bar Rav Huna sent to Rabba bar Naḥman: Let our master teach us!

One who divorces his wife because of a vow or a bad reputation, whom the Sages prohibited him from remarrying, if he transgressed and

remarried her—

—

what is the ruling

regarding forcing him

to divorce

her?

Perhaps the Sages prohibited him from remarrying her only initially, but after the fact, if he remarried her, he need not divorce her.

Or perhaps even after the fact, the law is that he must remove her from his household.

Rabba bar Naḥman said to him:

Rabba bar Naḥman said:

We already learned [

we learned] the resolution of this question in our Mishna:

As we learned:

A man suspected [

a man suspected]

with regard to a married woman, and her husband

removed her

from his household; even if

the suspected man

must divorce her.

.

We should compare the cases: Just as the suspected man is forbidden to marry her, and if he marries her he must divorce her, so too, when the husband divorced her because of a bad reputation, thereby revealing that he considered the rumor true and that she was forbidden to him, if he remarries her, he must divorce her.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him:

We cannot compare this case to the case of one suspected with regard to a married woman.

For

are they comparable?

Indeed,

there,

in the case of one suspected with regard to a married woman, it is taught:

“They removed her””,

meaning that the court removed her from her husband because witnesses of adultery came, and she became forbidden to the adulterer by Torah law forever. Therefore, he must divorce her, as Rav explained our Mishna above.

But

here,

in the case of

“he removed her””,

the reference is to the husband, who removed her only because of a rumor and report that she had committed adultery. The entire prohibition against remarrying her is only rabbinic, and in this case it is possible that if he transgressed and remarried her, he need not divorce her.

And we say:

And Rabba bar Naḥman,

who compared the cases and did not consider this distinction, must necessarily hold that

our Mishna,

our Mishna,

also teaches, “he removed her,”

and not “they removed her.”

And he does not agree with Rav, who explained our Mishna as referring to witnesses who came and testified that she committed adultery. Rather, it refers to a case in which a rumor emerged without witnesses, and the husband removed her on his own initiative. Therefore, she is forbidden to the suspected man only because of rabbinic concern for disrepute.

Nevertheless, our Mishna teaches that if the suspected man marries her, he must divorce her. If so, the same applies to one who divorces his wife because of a bad reputation: since he is forbidden by rabbinic law to remarry her, if he transgresses and marries her, he must divorce her.

We reject this:

But are they still comparable,

the case of one suspected with regard to a married woman and the case of a husband who divorced his wife because of a bad reputation and remarried her?

Here,

in our Mishna, the

husband

is the one who remarried her, after it became clear that the rumor was unfounded, and this is not disgraceful.

Whereas

if

there,

the

adulterer

is the one who marries her, and such an act is disgraceful; therefore, he must divorce her.

He said to him:

Even so,

the cases are properly comparable.

.

For

here,

in our Mishna, regarding the suspected man, who is forbidden to marry her but did marry her,

the Sages said: “He may not marry her!” And

nevertheless,

if he married her

the law is that he

must divorce her.

.

If so,

here too,

with regard to a husband who divorced his wife and then remarried her,

the Sages said: “He may not remarry her!”

and the law should be that

if he married her, he must divorce her.

.

For in both cases the prohibition is rabbinic, and there is no reason to distinguish between them based on whether the act is disgraceful.

We reject this:

That is not so!

For

there,

when the suspected adulterer marries the woman regarding whom he was suspected,

he reinforces the rumor!

By doing so, he confirms and strengthens the first rumor—that he had committed adultery with her—and therefore, even if he married her, he must divorce her.

But

here,

where the husband divorced her because of slander that emerged about her, if he remarries her—

we say,

to the contrary:

He investigated the rumor and found that it had no substance! [

For the husband thoroughly investigated the first rumor and found that it had no substance.]

For by remarrying her, we say that the husband certainly went back and investigated the first bad-reputation rumor, found that it had no substance, and therefore remarried her. Consequently, if he married her, he need not divorce her.

Mishna:

1.

One who brings a bill of divorce from overseas

to Eretz Yisrael and testified before us

and said: “It was written in my presence,

this bill of divorce,

and in my presence

it was

signed.

.

For this is the law: the agent must testify to this, because the inhabitants of overseas are not sufficiently expert and do not know that the bill of divorce must be written for the sake of the woman being divorced.

And since she is permitted to marry on the basis of the statement and testimony of the agent who brought the bill of divorce—

he may not marry

the agent who brought the bill of divorce

the wife

of the divorcer, because we are concerned that he set his eyes upon her and forged and wrote a bill of divorce.

2. If one witness came and testified that a woman’s husband had died, she is permitted to marry on his testimony. This is a leniency that the Sages instituted, permitting a woman without the testimony of two witnesses, despite the principle that “a matter concerning forbidden relations requires no fewer than two [witnesses]”; testimony permitting a married woman is ordinarily accepted only through the testimony of two qualified witnesses.

And the reason that they were lenient in the case of a woman whose husband died, allowing reliance on the testimony of one witness, is that the woman will certainly not marry unless she thoroughly investigates and ascertains that her husband definitely died. Thus, the reliance is on the woman’s verification, and not on the testimony of one witness.

3. If one witness said that a certain woman’s husband died, and the law is that she may marry on his testimony, the witness himself may not marry her, lest he set his eyes upon her and testify falsely.

4. And likewise, if he said in his testimony that her husband did not

die

of his own accord, but rather, “I”

killed him.

.

Or he said:

“We killed him”,

I and others with me.

This man too

may not marry the wife

of the deceased, since she is marrying on the basis of his statement, and we are concerned that he set his eyes upon her and testified falsely.

However, she may marry another man, since the law is that a woman may marry on the testimony of one witness that her husband died.

Rabbi Yehuda

disagrees and

says:

If he said in his testimony,

“I killed him,” his wife may not marry

of the deceased, even another man, because according to his statement that he himself killed him, he is wicked, and a wicked person is disqualified from testimony. As it is stated: “Do not place a wicked person as a witness.” [

And Rabbi Yehuda maintains that a person is believed to establish himself as wicked.]

However, he too concedes that if the witness said

“We killed him”,

I and others, the witness is believed and

his wife may marry

another man on the basis of his statement [and the Gemara explains why Rabbi Yehuda concedes in this case].

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: One who brings a bill of divorce from overseas to Eretz Yisrael and says, “It was written in my presence and signed in my presence,” may not marry the wife of the divorcer.

The Gemara infers:

The reason is that

this bill of divorce was brought

from overseas,

and therefore the witness may not marry the divorcer’s wife, since

with regard to him,

with regard to his testimony,

we rely.

For we rely upon him, upon his testimony that it was written and signed in his presence.

But

if he brought a bill of divorce

from Eretz Yisrael,

as he need not say that it was written and signed in his presence [because everyone is expert and knows that a bill of divorce must be written for the sake of the woman being divorced], since

we do not rely upon him,

for the bill of divorce is valid even without his testimony—the one who brings the bill of divorce

may marry

the divorcer’s wife, if he wishes.

And

this is difficult:

but

with regard to a witness who testifies that

the husband died

of a certain woman,

that we do not rely upon him,

not on the testimony of the witness

do we rely,

because the Sages did not permit the woman to marry another because of his testimony, but rather because

the Master said:

the

woman

herself, upon hearing from the witness that her husband died,

investigates [

she carefully investigates until she knows that he certainly died, and only afterward

marries [

marries another man].

And it is only for this reason that we allow a woman to marry on the testimony of one witness.

It follows that we do not rely on his testimony and statement, but rather on the woman’s verification, which she conducted thoroughly because she heard from the witness that her husband had died.

And

nevertheless,

it is taught

in our Mishna that the witness who testifies to the husband’s death

may not marry his wife.

.

And how is this different from one who brings a bill of divorce from Eretz Yisrael, concerning whom our Mishna implies that he may marry her, since we do not rely on his statement?

And we answer: In any event, there is a distinction between the cases.

For

there,

in testimony of death,

there is no document [

there is no document]. There is only a statement, and we must be concerned that he is lying because he set his eyes upon her.

This is not so

here,

with regard to one who brings a bill of divorce, where

there is a document.

For he has the bill of divorce in his hand, and once he has it in his hand, we are not as concerned that he forged the document.

This matter is similar to that

which we learned

in tractate Gittin: Even women who are not believed to testify that a certain woman’s husband died [for example, her mother-in-law and her rival wife, who hate her and seek to harm her should she marry another and her husband return] are nevertheless believed to bring her bill of divorce, even though they must say, “It was written in my presence and signed in my presence.”

And there we explain:

What is the difference between

bringing

a bill of divorce,

with regard to which they are believed to bring it and testify to its validity,

and death,

with regard to which they are not believed to say that her husband died?

It is because

the writing

of the bill of divorce

provides proof!

For we do not rely on them entirely, but rather on the document.

And it is explained there that one may rely on the written document. We learned in the Mishna: If the witness said

“He died; I killed him,”

or

“We killed him,”

then this witness

may not marry the wife

of the deceased.

The Gemara infers: Specifically,

he may not marry his wife.

. But to another, she may marry

But she may marry another

on the basis of the witness’s testimony, whether he testified that the husband died or that he killed him.

And this is difficult: When he testified, “I killed him,” he is wicked, and his testimony is not testimony.

For anyone who commits a transgression for which he is liable to receive lashes is disqualified from testimony.

As Rav Yosef said:

A witness who testifies in court and says:

“So-and-so sodomized me

against my will, but

under duress”—

— he

he,

the one who was sodomized,

and

another witness

join

the testimony of two, in order

to execute him

the aggressor on the basis of their testimony.

But if the witness said in his testimony:

“So-and-so sodomized me willingly!”

he cannot join another witness’s testimony so that the aggressor may be executed on their testimony. For according to his own statement, he was sodomized willingly;

he is wicked, and the Torah said

that a wicked person is disqualified from testimony.

As it is written:

“Do not place your hand with a wicked person—

to be a corrupt witness.”

.

The same applies when he says, “I killed him”: he is wicked and is not believed in his testimony at all.

And why is she permitted to marry another man?

And should you say,

in order to answer:

the testimony concerning a woman is different [

testimony concerning the husband’s death],

as the Sages were lenient regarding it,

allowing reliance even on a wicked witness, since the woman verifies the truth of the matter, and we rely on her verification.

This cannot be the answer. For: