Yevamot 24b (כד:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, for what halakhic purpose did the Merciful One call him a “firstborn” -

for what halakhic purpose

did the verse call him a “firstborn”?

After all, it would have been appropriate for the verse to write “the eldest,” since there is also a mitzva concerning the eldest of the ordinary sons.

And we answer:

to his detriment.

This teaches from the inheritance of the firstborn from his father to the case here:

Just as a firstborn does not take

a double portion

of property expected

to come to his father after his father’s death,

as

he takes twice as much

of

the property

in his father’s possession

on the day of his death,

so too this

yavam

does not take

from his father’s inheritance, in which he is entitled to two portions, his own portion and the portion of his deceased brother,

of property expected as of property in his possession.

Thus, with regard to an inheritance that comes after the father’s death, the yavam takes only his own portion and not the portion of his deceased brother.

Mishna:

If one was rumored

[that is, he was suspected] of having relations

with a maidservant,

and people spread this allegation about him,

and

afterward

she was emancipated,

the maidservant, thereby becoming Jewish and being permitted to marry into the Jewish people,

or

one who was suspected of having relations

with a gentile woman, and

afterward

she converted -

that

suspect

may not marry her

[that is, he may not take her as a wife], even though the original suspicion was not established by witnesses, because the Sages prohibited him from marrying her on account of the disrepute that would result, lest people say that the original rumor that emerged was true.

And if

the suspect transgressed and

married

the emancipated maidservant or the female convert -

they do not remove

her

from his possession,

despite the fact that he was initially forbidden to marry her.

One who was rumored regarding a married woman, and

because of this

they removed her

the court

from under

her husband’s authority—for a married woman who committed adultery is forbidden to her husband, and he must divorce her—is forbidden for the suspected adulterer to marry her.

And if he went and married her,

even though he married her -

he must divorce her

and remove her from under his authority, because a married woman who committed adultery is forbidden by Torah law both to her husband and to the adulterer.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If one was rumored regarding a maidservant and she was emancipated, or regarding a gentile woman and she converted, he may not marry her.

And we infer: Although we said that he may not marry her,

this means that at least she is a female convert,

for her conversion is a fully valid conversion. Only he is forbidden to marry her because of the suspicion, whereas others are permitted to marry her. And even he, if he married her, need not divorce her, as explained in the Mishna.

This proves that her conversion was effective even though the circumstances indicate that she did not convert for the sake of Judaism, but in order that the man with whom she had committed adultery should marry her.

And we raise a contradiction

from that which was taught in a beraita: Any man who comes to convert, when we know the reason for which he converted,

whether a man who converted for the sake of a woman

an Israelite woman whom he wishes to marry,

or a woman who converted for the sake of a man,

and likewise one who converted for the sake of “the table of kings”,

in order to dine at the table of the kings of Israel,

or one who converted

for the sake of “the servants of Solomon”,

because he wished to become one of the king’s servants, so that the populace would fear him, as was the case with Solomon’s servants, who held positions of authority and were feared by the populace,

all of these

are not converts; these are the words of Rabbi Nehemiah.

For Rabbi Nehemiah would say:

Whether

one who converts because of a particular fear, such as the Samaritans at the time of the exile of Samaria, who were

converts because of lions,

for God sent lions against them and they converted out of fear of the lions,

or converts because of dreams,

who converted because someone told them, “the master of dreams”—

or

one who converts because he fears for his life, such as the

converts of Mordecai and Esther,

mentioned in the Scroll of Esther, as it is written: “And many of the peoples of the land became Jews, because the fear of the Jews had fallen upon them”—

all such people and the like

are not converts.

Unless they convert in the present time,

as will be explained immediately.

And the Gemara explains the words of the beraita:

And we inquire: What, does the phrase “unless they convert” mean

in the present time—

could it enter your mind

that this is what it means?

Does it mean that all converts who converted until the present time are not converts?

Rather, say

“unless they convert

‘as in the present time.’”

That is, converts are accepted only if they convert without any such ulterior motive, and not because of a desire for authority or the like. Rather, they convert despite seeing us subjugated, as in the present time, when we are in exile and possess neither authority nor honor.

This creates a difficulty with our Mishna, for this beraita states that a convert is accepted only when his purpose is solely Judaism. Why, then, does our Mishna say that a woman who converts for the sake of a particular man has undergone a valid conversion?

And he answers: This was stated concerning it,

concerning this beraita:

Rav Yitzḥak bar Shemuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says

that anyone who completed the conversion process, even though he converted for a particular reason,

all of them are converts

fully valid converts;

they are.

Therefore, even the female convert in our Mishna is a fully valid convert.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if she is a fully valid convert,

even initially

the suspect should be permitted to marry her. Why, then, does our Mishna say that he may not marry her?

And we answer: Even though she is a convert, he may not marry her

because of Rav Asi’s ruling.

For Rav Asi said,

the reason our Mishna says that he may not marry her is the evil speech of the people, as it is written in Proverbs:

“Remove crooked speech from your mouth, and perversity of lips

keep far from you.”

If we permit the suspect to marry her, people will spread the allegation that the original rumor was indeed true, namely, that she had committed adultery with him. For the fact that he ultimately married her indicates this.

Nevertheless, if he married her, he need not divorce her.

The Sages taught: Converts are not accepted in the days of the Messiah.

Similarly, they did not accept converts either in the days of David or in the days of Solomon,

because they converted for the sake of authority and honor.

Rabbi Elazar said: What is the verse

from which we learn this?

For it is written in Isaiah:

“Behold, he shall surely gather, though not through Me; whoever gathers against you, because of you shall fall.”

And the explanation of the verse is:

“Behold, he shall surely gather”—one who comes to convert—“though not through Me,” he will convert when I, the Holy One, blessed be He, am not present among you. That is, in the present time, when we are in exile.

“Whoever gathers against you, because of you shall fall”: One who becomes a convert with you [the Jewish people] in your poverty, during the time of exile, “because of you shall fall”—he will merit, together with you, your prosperity, in the time of rest in the World-to-Come.

But the other one—

no!

One who did not convert during the poverty of the Jewish people is not accepted.

Therefore, converts are not accepted in the days of the Messiah.

We learned in our Mishna:

One who was rumored

[that is, one who was suspected] of having relations

with a married woman,

and because of this they removed this woman who had committed adultery with him from her husband’s authority, as is the law in the case of a married woman who committed adultery, who is forbidden to her husband—the adulterer is not permitted to marry her.

And if he married her, he must divorce her, since a married woman who committed adultery is forbidden both to her husband and to the adulterer.

Rav said:

The statement that if the adulterer married her he must divorce her applies specifically when she became forbidden

through witnesses.

Witnesses came and testified to actual intercourse, having seen that she committed adultery with him. In such a case, she is forbidden to her husband by Torah law, and just as she is forbidden to her husband, she is forbidden to the adulterer. Therefore, if the suspect married her, he must divorce her.

But if she left her husband only because of a rumor that she had committed adultery, without witnesses to the intercourse, and the suspect married her, he need not divorce her.

Rav Sheshet said: I say that when Rav was dozing and lying down, he said this statement

[I believe that Rav said these words while he was drowsing, as he was going to lie down]: that they remove her from the suspect who married her specifically where witnesses came. But the beraita clearly indicates otherwise!

For it was taught in a beraita: One who was rumored

[that is, one who was suspected] of having relations

with a married woman, and they removed her because of him

from her husband, and afterward another man married her

and she was divorced

also

from under the authority of

the

other man—

from this point,

if

the suspect came and

married

her,

he need not divorce her, but she remains with him, since the fact that the suspect did not marry her immediately when her husband divorced her indicates that the rumor of adultery has no substance.

And now this is difficult:

what are the circumstances

of this beraita?

of this beraita?

If

it is speaking

where there are witnesses

who saw that she committed adultery, and because of this she became forbidden to her husband,

when another man came

and married her,

and thereby interrupted

the

rumor—

what difference would that make?!

It is entirely ineffective as a reason not to remove her from the suspect’s authority. For we prohibited her on the basis of witnesses, and not on the basis of rumor and suspicion. Since there are witnesses, she is permanently forbidden to the adulterer.

Rather, is it not

necessarily speaking

where there are no witnesses

who saw her committing adultery, but her husband divorced her because of a rumor that she had committed adultery?

And it follows that only

because another person came

and

interrupted the rumor,

she is not removed from the suspect.

Since the rumored man did not marry her immediately when she was divorced, this indicates that the rumor has no substance.

If not,

but the suspect married her immediately after she was divorced, without another man’s marriage intervening, as in the case discussed by our Mishna,

we remove her!

We remove her from him.

This is difficult for Rav, who said that only when she became forbidden to her husband through witnesses that she had committed adultery, and the suspect married her, must he divorce her. But if her husband divorced her because of a rumor, the suspect need not divorce her.

And we answer:

Rav could say to you:

The fact that the beraita mentioned that another man married her before the suspect did is entirely unrelated to the question of whether the suspect must divorce her.

Rather,

the same law applies even though another man did not come

and marry her

and interrupt

thereby

the rumor;

nevertheless, if the suspect married her, he need not divorce her.

For only

if there are witnesses

that she committed adultery

do we remove her

[that is, they remove her] from the suspect’s authority, since the adulterer is permanently forbidden to her.

But

if there are no witnesses

that she committed adultery, and only a rumor emerged that she did so,

we do not remove her

from his authority.

And the fact that the beraita mentioned that another man’s marriage interrupted the rumor was stated only to teach us that initially the suspect may not marry her, even though she had already married another man!

And this is what it is saying: Even though another man came and interrupted the rumor—

initially, he may not marry her!

But our Mishna, which discusses the law after the fact, that he must divorce her, speaks only of a case in which witnesses came and testified that she committed adultery, as Rav established it.

We challenge

Rav from that which is taught later in the beraita:

When are these matters stated,

that if the suspect married her he must remove her from his authority? Specifically

when she has no children

from her first husband.

But

if

she has children

from her first husband, and the suspect married her,

she need not leave

him!

For if we remove her from him, we strengthen the original rumor that she committed adultery with the suspect, and we thereby cause her children born to her previous husband to be deemed mamzerim.

We must not do this as long as we rely not on clear testimony that she committed adultery, but only on a rumor.

But

if witnesses to the defilement came

and testified that she committed adultery, then

even if she has several children

from her first husband,

she must leave

the adulterer who married her. We need not be concerned for her children, since the adulterer is forbidden to her by Torah law.

It follows from the beraita that if she has no children, they remove her from the suspect’s authority by rabbinic decree even if no witnesses came and testified that she committed adultery.

This is difficult for Rav, who said that she leaves the adulterer only if witnesses came and testified that she committed adultery.

And we answer: Indeed, Rav agrees that even without witnesses she is forbidden to him by rabbinic decree, and he must divorce her if she has no children from her first husband.

However,

Rav establishes our Mishna

[that is, he explains our Mishna]

as referring to a case where she has children.

Therefore, he had to say that

there are also witnesses

who came and testified. For when she has children, they remove her only if witnesses came.

And we ask:

What compelled Rav to establish our Mishna

[why was Rav forced to explain our Mishna]

as referring to a case where she has children and there are witnesses

that she committed adultery?

And it is only because there are witnesses

that she committed adultery that

we remove her.

But if there are no witnesses, we do not remove her.

Let him establish it

[let Rav explain] our Mishna simply

as referring to a case where she has no children

from her first husband, and therefore he must remove her

even though there are no witnesses

that she committed adultery.

And we answer:

Rava said:

Rav had to establish our Mishna in this manner because

our Mishna was difficult for him

[our Mishna presented him with a difficulty].

For our Mishna teaches: One who was rumored regarding a married woman, “and they removed her” from under his authority; even though he married her, he must divorce her.

And this is difficult:

Why specifically did it teach, “they removed her”

which implies that others removed her?

Let it teach, “he removed her”!

For it was her first husband who removed her from under his authority by means of a bill of divorce.

Rather,

necessarily,

every instance of “they removed her”

means

in court,

that the court compelled him to divorce her, and that he did not divorce her on his own initiative.

Necessarily, then, our Mishna is speaking of a case in which witnesses came and testified that she committed adultery. For

a court

only

removes her through witnesses

[that is, they remove her] from her husband, since a woman does not become forbidden to her husband merely because of a rumor that she committed adultery.

Since our Mishna necessarily speaks of a case in which witnesses came, Rav said that the law stated here—that the suspect must divorce her—applies specifically because there are witnesses that she committed adultery. But without witnesses, if the husband divorced her of his own will and the suspect married her, he need not divorce her, since she has children.

Indeed, when she has no children, the Sages penalized him and required him to divorce her.

And if you wish, say instead:

In fact, the law is as we initially thought: Rav came to teach us that even when she has no children, as long as there are no witnesses that she committed adultery, the suspect need not divorce her.

And as for the Gemara’s challenge from the beraita, which indicates that even without witnesses he must divorce her when she has no children,

this beraita

[this beraita] is stated in accordance with the opinion of

Rabbi

and his view.

For Rabbi’s opinion is that even on the basis of a rumor they remove a woman from her husband.

As it was taught:

If the husband saw a

peddler,

who sold perfumes and women’s ornaments,

leaving

his house,

and a woman girded in a cloak,

meaning that the husband found his wife, who was in the house, girding

herself in a cloak

[a garment resembling trousers that women girded themselves with for modesty]—

Rabbi said: Since the matter is disgraceful,

and indicates that she had removed the cloak for the purpose of adultery and was now girding herself with it after the adultery,

she must leave

her husband!

For such evidence is sufficient to forbid her to her husband, even though there are no witnesses who actually saw her commit adultery.

Likewise, if the husband saw a peddler leaving the house, and the husband found

spittle above the canopy,

on the roof of the canopy over his bed—

Rabbi said: Since the matter is disgraceful,

and indicates that she committed adultery with the peddler, for it is reasonable to assume that the spittle reached the upper part because she lay facing upward and spat during intercourse—

she must leave

her husband, since there is circumstantial evidence that she committed adultery.