Yevamot 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

For

there:

in the case of four brothers, where both sisters are subject to levirate obligation,

according to the one who says

that the reason neither of them can enter levirate marriage is the halakhic principle that

there is a levirate bond,

each one is therefore considered the sister of a woman subject to levirate obligation. The halitza performed by his brother does not permit her to him, since she was forbidden to him for one moment when she fell before him, while her sister was still subject to levirate obligation to him.

But only there is there a reason to prohibit her, because

there is a levirate bond.

And

likewise,

according to the one who says

that the reason in the case of four brothers is that

it is forbidden to nullify the mitzva of levirate marriage: if the first brother enters levirate marriage, we are concerned that the second brother might die before entering levirate marriage, leaving his sister free to marry someone else without halitza or levirate marriage, since she is the sister of the first brother’s wife.

Therefore, each of them is initially forbidden to enter levirate marriage. And once she was forbidden for one moment, even if one of them performs halitza, the other remains forbidden in levirate marriage because she was forbidden for one moment.

But this reason as well—that

it is forbidden to nullify the mitzva of levirate marriage—applies only in the case of four brothers.

But

here,

the case concerns two men who betrothed two sisters, and the two brothers of each of the deceased men, each of whom betrothed only one sister. Thus, only one of the sisters is a yevama with respect to both brothers; the prohibition exists because of the doubt that perhaps he took in marriage the one who is not a yevama.

But since this is only a doubt, if he acted first and took her in levirate marriage, we do not remove her from his possession, since

each one

who took her in marriage

perhaps it was his own [yevama] who was destined for him. Only one of them is a yevama, and when the second brother took the other one in marriage, the prohibition of the sister of a woman subject to levirate obligation was removed from her. She was never his brother’s wife, and therefore they do not require him to divorce her.

We learned in the Mishna:

If they acted first and took them in marriage, they do not remove them from their possession,

etc.

Shila taught: and even

if

both of them are kohanim, they do not remove them from their possession, even though one of the sisters is necessarily a woman who underwent halitza and is forbidden to a kohen. For the two brothers of the first betrothed man performed halitza with both sisters because of the doubt, and one of them had indeed been subject to their halitza, as the wife of their brother [the second betrothed man].

And we explain:

What is the reason

that they do not require her to leave because of the doubt concerning halitza? In either event, one of the alternatives applies between them.

Because

a woman who underwent halitza is forbidden only

by rabbinic decree.

And the Sages did not institute their decree with regard to a woman who may have undergone halitza,

and since for each of them there is a possibility that he entered levirate marriage with his yevama, he need not divorce her because of the possibility that she is the woman who underwent halitza from the second brother.

And we object: Is a woman who underwent halitza forbidden only by rabbinic decree?

But it was taught in a beraita: It is written with regard to kohanim: [Leviticus 21] “And a woman

divorced from her husband they shall not take.”

I have derived only that a divorced woman

is forbidden to a kohen.

From where is it derived

that a woman who underwent halitza is forbidden to him?

The verse therefore states: “And a woman.”

It would have been sufficient for the verse to state, “A divorced woman they shall not take.” By stating “a divorced woman,” it includes a woman who underwent halitza, so that she is forbidden to a kohen.

It follows that her prohibition is from the Torah!

And we reject this: In truth, the prohibition of a woman who underwent halitza is only

by rabbinic decree.

And the verse—the derivation from “and a woman”—

is merely a supporting allusion.

Mishna:

The mitzva is assigned to the eldest

of the deceased man’s brothers

to enter levirate marriage.

But if

the

younger

brother acted first and entered levirate marriage,

he has acquired her.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: It is written in the passage concerning levirate marriage: “

A yevama shall come to him, and he shall take her to himself as a wife, and perform levirate marriage with her.

And it shall be that the firstborn son whom she bears shall stand in the name of his deceased brother.”

The Sages expounded the verses as though they had been written consecutively: “

And perform levirate marriage with her”—

“And it shall be that the firstborn.”

From here

you learn

that the mitzva is assigned to the eldest to enter levirate marriage.

The meaning of the verse is that the brother who performs levirate marriage should be the firstborn of the brothers.

With regard to the yevama, they expounded the phrase

“whom she bears”:

to exclude a barren woman who cannot give birth,

and therefore one does not enter levirate marriage with her.

And with regard to the brother performing levirate marriage, the verse states

“shall stand in the name of his brother”,

meaning

with regard to inheritance. The brother who performs levirate marriage inherits the deceased brother’s estate, and the other brothers do not divide the deceased brother’s inheritance with him.

The beraita continues its exposition of the verse:

You say: “The firstborn brother shall stand in the name of his brother” —

with regard to inheritance.

Or perhaps

this is not so,

but rather

the verse is meant according to its plain meaning: it refers to the son born to him from the yevama, so that the son of the brother who performed levirate marriage stands

in the name

of the deceased brother.

If the deceased brother was called

Yosef,

they call him Yosef.

And if his name was

Yohanan,

they call him Yohanan.

And from where do we derive that the verse is to be expounded differently from its plain meaning, namely, that the brother who performs levirate marriage inherits the deceased’s estate?

It is stated here,

in the passage concerning levirate marriage,

“shall stand in the name of his brother.”

And it is stated elsewhere,

in Jacob’s command that Ephraim and Manasseh receive a portion like all the tribes,

“They shall be called by the name of their brothers in their inheritance.”

And we derive a gzera shava:

Just as “name”

in the verse “They shall be called by the name of their brothers in their inheritance,”

which is stated elsewhere,

means “name” with regard to

inheritance,

so too, “name” stated here

with regard to levirate marriage means

inheritance

of the brother who performs levirate marriage.

The beraita continues its exposition of the verse:

“And his name shall not be erased”—

to exclude

the wife of a

eunuch, whose name has been erased.

Since the deceased brother was incapable of having children, his name had already been erased, and there is no obligation to establish a name for him; his wife is exempt from levirate marriage.

Rava said, with regard to the exposition that “he shall stand in the name of his brother” refers to inheritance:

Even though throughout the entire Torah,

when a verse is expounded,

the verse does not depart from its plain meaning,

and the plain meaning remains in force as well,

here, the gzera shava “name—name” came and

removed it

entirely from its plain meaning,

and it is not necessary to name the son born to him after his deceased brother [and Rashi wrote that he learned this from his teacher].

And we object:

And

if not for the gzera shava,

I would have said that the meaning of the verse was that the mitzva is to establish for his brother a

name, namely, to establish the

actual name

of the deceased brother

himself!

But this cannot be so.

For

whom did the Torah warn

to establish the name?

If

it warned

the brother performing levirate marriage, then

“he shall stand in the name of your brother”

should have been written.

And

if

the command is directed

to the court, then

“he shall stand in the name of his father’s brother”

should have been written!

It is therefore necessarily the case that the verse commands the court to ensure that the brother performing levirate marriage shall stand in the name of his deceased brother, with regard to inheritance.

The Gemara still objects:

Perhaps this is what the Torah said to the court: “Tell the brother performing levirate marriage”,

that the son born to him

shall stand in the name of his brother!

And in truth, the meaning is that the son should be given the deceased’s name?

Rather, we conclude, this is why Rava said:

“The gzera shava came and removed it entirely!”

And we expound the verse as establishing the brother performing levirate marriage as the heir to the estate of his deceased brother.

The Gemara now challenges the exposition of “And it shall be that the firstborn,” from which it was derived that the mitzva is assigned to the eldest to enter levirate marriage:

Now that you have said

that

the verse is written with regard to “the eldest,”

say:

perhaps it refers specifically to the brother who is

the firstborn, who is the one required

to enter levirate marriage,

but a

non-firstborn brother should not enter levirate marriage

at all, even when there is no firstborn brother!?

And we answer:

If so,

if a non-firstborn brother does not enter levirate marriage with his brother’s wife at all—

the case of

the wife of a brother who was not alive in his lifetime,

who was born after his brother died,

and whom the Torah excluded from entering levirate marriage with her—

why do I need

to state that exclusion?

Surely the brother born after the death of his first brother is not a firstborn, since he was born after the deceased brother.

It is proven from this exclusion that even a non-firstborn brother is included in the mitzva of levirate marriage.

Rav Aha challenges:

But say that a non-firstborn brother does not enter levirate marriage.

The brother who was not alive in his brother’s lifetime does need to be

excluded, for example, when the brother who was born was

the firstborn of his mother, having been born after his paternal brother died.

Were he not excluded, he would have been obligated to enter levirate marriage with the wife of his brother who was not alive in his lifetime, by virtue of being a firstborn, since he is his mother’s firstborn.

And we answer:

That case—you cannot say so! It is impossible to say that a maternal firstborn is called “firstborn” with regard to levirate marriage.

Since

with regard to levirate marriage, the Torah made it dependent on inheritance. The verse states “together,” and we expound it: those united with regard to inheritance.

And inheritance

applies only

through the father, and not through the mother.

For a maternal firstborn does not receive a double portion in his mother’s inheritance as a paternal firstborn does. Therefore, a maternal firstborn is not included in the category of firstborn with regard to levirate marriage, which is dependent on inheritance.

, meaning a brother who was born after the other brother died, whom the Merciful One

excluded

from entering into levirate marriage with her—

why do I need

this exclusion?

It is necessarily the case, then, that since the verse nevertheless needed to exclude a brother who was not alive in his brother’s lifetime from levirate marriage, it is proven that the verse does not refer specifically to a firstborn, but to the eldest of the brothers, even if he is a non-firstborn brother.

The Gemara still objects:

But say that the verse refers specifically to a firstborn brother.

It comes only to teach us that

when there is

a

firstborn

brother, only then

is the mitzva of levirate marriage fulfilled.

At that point it is fulfilled whether by the firstborn or by a non-firstborn brother.

This may be learned from the exclusion of the wife of a brother who was not alive in his brother’s lifetime: it is possible for a non-firstborn brother also to enter levirate marriage, but that possibility applies only when there is a firstborn brother in the world.

But

when there is no firstborn—

the mitzva of levirate marriage is not fulfilled,

and she would be exempt from levirate marriage even with the non-firstborn brother, despite the fact that he was alive in the deceased’s lifetime!?

And we answer:

The verse states: “When brothers dwell together, and one of them dies,”

“and one of them dies.”

It necessarily follows that even a non-firstborn brother can enter levirate marriage, since the meaning of the verse includes a case in which there were only two brothers.

And in such a case,

is it not possible that the firstborn died, and

nevertheless

the Torah commanded him to enter levirate marriage!? Thus it is explicit that the mitzva also applies to a younger brother. And we object: But say that the verse refers specifically to a case in which the younger brother died, since we expound “And it shall be that the firstborn” to mean that the mitzva is assigned to the firstborn to enter levirate marriage, and let us establish that the verse speaks specifically of this circumstance.

And

in such a case

the Torah commanded: “Let the firstborn enter levirate marriage.”

And we answer:

This—in that very verse it is written “together.” Through this expression

the Torah excluded the wife of a brother who was not alive in his brother’s lifetime.

firstborn

, only then

the mitzva of levirate marriage is fulfilled

.

In that case, it is fulfilled both by the firstborn and by an ordinary brother.

But

This refers to a case in which the firstborn died and an exclusion was needed to teach that his younger brother should not enter levirate marriage with the widow of a brother who was not alive in his lifetime. It is therefore proven that a younger brother enters levirate marriage even when there is no firstborn.

And we object: From the exclusion of the wife of a brother who was not alive in his brother’s lifetime, we learned only that the verse “and one of them dies” refers to a case in which the firstborn died, and that a younger brother can enter levirate marriage.

But say:

only

when there is no firstborn,

if

the younger brother acted first, he has acquired her.

And

in a case where

there is a firstborn,

if

the younger brother acted first—

he has not acquired her!?

And we answer:

The verse states, “When brothers dwell together” —

the dwelling of the brothers is equated with regard to one another,

so that all are equally entitled to perform levirate marriage.

And the phrase “And it shall be that the firstborn” applies only to the mitzva!

And we object:

But say that the mitzva initially applies only

when there is a firstborn,

in which case the mitzva is

to return

to the

eldest

brother.

But

when there is no firstborn— one does not return to the eldest among the non-firstborn brothers, and he is not compelled to enter levirate marriage as a firstborn would be. And if you say that this is indeed so, that the mitzva initially applies only to a firstborn, then it follows: why did the elder Abaye teach: “The mitzva is assigned to the eldest to enter levirate marriage”?

If he does not wish to, they go to his younger brother

instead.

If he does not wish to, they go to his younger brother

instead.

If he does not wish

even for the younger brother to enter levirate marriage,

they return to the eldest,

and compel him to enter levirate marriage.

It follows that the mitzva was stated not only with regard to a firstborn, but also with regard to the eldest of the brothers. The meaning of “his younger brother” is that they proceed according to age, and not according to the distinction between firstborn and non-firstborn.

And we answer: The law of the eldest of the brothers is

like that of a firstborn,

and his mitzva is based on the same reason.

—

For

just as in the case of a firstborn, his firstborn status caused it, so too

the eldest,

his seniority caused it, so that he has a greater mitzva to enter levirate marriage than the other brothers.

, meaning that they are all equally entitled to perform levirate marriage.

And the phrase “and it shall be that the firstborn” refers only to the mitzva!

And we challenge this:

The Gemara considers:

But say: When a firstborn enters levirate marriage, he should take the inheritance,

as the verse says, “And it shall be that the firstborn … shall stand in the name of his brother.”

But

when a non-firstborn enters levirate marriage—

he should not take the inheritance

of the deceased beyond the share of his other brothers who inherit with him, since the verse does not state with regard to him, “shall stand in the name of his brother”!?

And we resolve it:

The verse states that the brother who performs levirate marriage inherits the deceased, in the words

“shall stand in the name of his brother.”

And this brother

is the one who

stands

in his place; therefore, he also inherits from him.

And we object: If the mitzva also applies to the eldest of the brothers, then—

If he does not wish to, they go to his younger brother

instead.

If he does not wish to, they go to his younger brother

instead.

If he does not wish

—the younger brother also does not wish to enter into levirate marriage—

they return to the oldest

, and compel him to enter into levirate marriage.

It follows that the mitzva was stated not only with regard to a firstborn, but also with regard to the oldest of the brothers. The meaning of “his younger brother” is that the order follows age, and not whether one is a firstborn or an ordinary brother.

And we answer: The law of the oldest of the brothers is

like that of a firstborn

, and his mitzva is for the same reason.

For

just as the firstborn’s firstborn status caused him

so too the oldest

of the brothers,

his seniority caused him

to have a greater mitzva to enter into levirate marriage than the other brothers.

The Gemara raises a further uncertainty:

And say: When a firstborn enters into levirate marriage, he should take the inheritance

, as the verse says, “And it shall be that the firstborn … shall succeed in the name of his brother.”

But

when an ordinary brother enters into levirate marriage

he should not take the inheritance

of the deceased more than his other brothers who inherit, since the verse “he shall succeed in the name of his brother” was not stated with regard to him!?

And we resolve this:

The verse states

that the levir inherits the deceased, using the wording

“he shall succeed in the name of his brother.”

And

this levir

succeeds

in his place, and therefore he also inherits from him.

And we challenge this: If the mitzva also applies to the oldest of the brothers, then—