Yevamot 21b (כא:) — the Talmud in English

therefore, he would not come to confuse them and permit his father’s father’s wife just as his mother’s father’s wife is permitted. And we raise an objection against Rav: Why did Rav include, in the list of the shniyot that have a limit, also

his daughter-in-law?

But she is not a shniya; rather, her prohibition is

by Torah law! m

For

it is written:

“You shall not uncover the nakedness of your daughter-in-law”!?

And we answer:

Say that Rav’s statement refers to

the daughter-in-law of his son,

his son’s daughter-in-law,

whose prohibition is only rabbinic, like the law of the shniyot.

And we question this:

But

does

the daughter-in-law of his son have a limit?

But it was taught in a beraita: His daughter-in-law

is

an erva.

His son’s daughter-in-law

is

a shniya.

And likewise you say

that a daughter-in-law is forbidden

to his son’s

son,

and to his son’s

son, and so on,

until the end of all generations!?

And the Gemara retracts this answer and establishes the matter differently:

Rather, say

that this is what Rav said:

His daughter’s daughter-in-law

has a limit, since a Torah prohibition does not apply to her.

For Rav Ḥisda said: “I heard this matter from a great man.”

And who was he?

Who was the great man from whom I heard this matter? —

Rav Ami!

And Rav Ami said as follows:

“They prohibited a daughter-in-law only because of a daughter-in-law!”

To explain these words further, Rav Ḥisda added and said:

And

once it happened that

the astrologers told me,

those who foretell through the stars:

“You will be a scholar!”

You will become wise!

And

I said,

I said to myself then: If what the astrologers saw—that I would become wise—will be fulfilled through my becoming

“a great man”

in Torah study, then I will not need to ask the Sages to explain Rav Ami’s statement, “They prohibited a daughter-in-law only because of a daughter-in-law”; rather,

I will explain it,

I will explain Rav Ami’s words myself,

on my own.

But

if

what the astrologers meant was that

“I would be a teacher of children,”

that I would be merely a teacher of young children and would not be able to understand Rav Ami’s words on my own, then

I would ask,

I would ask for an explanation of his words

from the Sages who come to the synagogue,

those who come to the synagogue.

And

now,

at present,

you have understood

I have understood

on my own,

that Rav Ami intended to say:

They prohibited a daughter’s daughter-in-law only because of a son’s daughter-in-law.

There is no Torah prohibition with regard to a daughter’s daughter-in-law; her entire prohibition is because she may be confused with a son’s daughter-in-law, which is a shniya, and with regard to that relative a Torah prohibition does apply in the first generation—namely, his own daughter-in-law, who is his son’s wife.

Just as Rav Ḥisda explained Rav Ami’s words, so we explain Rav’s words, that he included his daughter-in-law among the shniyot that have a limit: His intention was his daughter’s daughter-in-law, which has a limit.

Abaye said to Rava: “I will explain

I will explain

to you

how it is possible to confuse a son’s daughter-in-law with a daughter’s daughter-in-law.

For example, the daughter-in-law of

a man named

“bar Tzita’i,”

who had both a son’s daughter-in-law and a daughter’s daughter-in-law, so that people could mistakenly exchange one for the other.

Rav Pappa said: For example, the daughter-in-law of the household of Rav Pappa bar Abba.

Rav Ashi said: For example, the daughter-in-law of the household of Mari bar Isak.

Each one mentioned a family that existed in his own time [Tosafot].

A dilemma was raised before them: The wife of his maternal uncle on his mother’s side —

what is her status?

Is she prohibited as a rabbinically prohibited relative, or did they not issue a decree concerning her at all?

The sides of the dilemma are as follows:

Perhaps only

the wife of his paternal uncle on his mother’s side, and the wife of his maternal uncle on his father’s side,

were prohibited as shniyot to the arayot, because

there is

in them

a “paternal side,” and therefore the Sages issued a decree

concerning them,

[making them] shniyot.

Since on the “paternal side” there is a form of Torah prohibition: the wife of his paternal uncle on his father’s side, who is prohibited by Torah law.

But where there is no “paternal side,”

since the relationship to the wife of his maternal uncle on his mother’s side exists only through his mother and his mother’s mother,

the Sages did not issue a decree concerning them.

Or perhaps there is no difference,

and they issued a decree concerning the wife of a maternal uncle, whether she is the wife of his maternal uncle on his father’s side or the wife of his maternal uncle on his mother’s side.

And we resolve the dilemma:

Rav Safra said:

The wife of his maternal uncle on his father’s side

is itself a decree

of the shniyot.

And

when

we arise and issue a decree

concerning the wife of his maternal uncle on his mother’s side, it would be

a decree upon a decree,

because of the wife of his maternal uncle on his father’s side.

But the Gemara rejects Rav Safra’s argument.

Rava said: Is it so

that

all of them [the reference is not to all the shniyot, but only to those that Rava will now enumerate]

[This does not refer to all the secondary prohibited relationships, but only to those that Rava will enumerate now]

are not “a decree upon a decree”?

But I have three proofs that the Sages do issue a decree upon a decree:

a. For

his mother

is

an erva

by Torah law.

And they issued a decree concerning

his mother’s mother,

making her prohibited rabbinically as

a “shniya.”

And they added

and issued a decree

upon a decree, also

concerning his father’s mother, because of his mother’s mother.

Even though there is no reason to prohibit his father’s mother solely because of the prohibition of his mother.

If so, you too should not wonder if the Sages issued a decree concerning the wife of his maternal uncle on his mother’s side because she corresponds to the wife of his maternal uncle on his father’s side. Consequently, the dilemma remains unresolved: whether or not they issued a decree concerning her!

And we explain:

And what is the reason?

Why, indeed, did they issue a decree upon a decree, when the Sages do not generally issue a decree upon a decree?

Because

all of them [here too, the reference is not to all the shniyot, but to “his mother’s mother” and “his father’s mother,” which are under discussion]

[Here too, this does not refer to all the secondary prohibited relationships, but to “his mother’s mother” and “his father’s mother,” which are under discussion]

are called “the household of the great mother.”

Therefore, they are considered one decree, concerning the “great mother,” because of his mother, who is prohibited by Torah law.

b.

His father’s wife

is

an erva

by Torah law.

And the Sages made

his paternal grandfather’s wife “a shniya.”

And they issued a decree concerning his maternal grandfather’s wife,

even though no Torah prohibition applies to her,

because of his paternal grandfather’s wife,

and this is not considered a decree upon a decree.

And what is the reason?

Because

all of them

[his maternal grandfather’s wife and his paternal grandfather’s wife]

are called “the

house of

the great father.”

c.

The wife of his paternal uncle on his father’s side

is

an erva

by Torah law.

And they made

the wife of his paternal uncle on his mother’s side a shniya.

And they issued a decree concerning the wife of his maternal uncle on his father’s side because of the wife of his paternal uncle on his mother’s side.

And what is the reason

that this is not considered a decree upon a decree?

Because

all of them

[the maternal half-brothers of his father and the paternal half-brothers of his mother]

are called “the

house of

the uncles.”

Therefore, they prohibited their wives.

It is evident from all these decrees that the Sages did not refrain from issuing a decree upon a decree. Because of the similarity in their relationships, they issued the prohibitions concerning them as one.

The dilemma therefore returns: The wife of his maternal uncle on his mother’s side —

what

is her status?

And we say:

Come and hear

from this:

When

when

Rav Yehuda bar Sheila

came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said: “They say in the West”

[in Eretz Yisrael, which lies west of Babylonia], as a general rule concerning shniyot to the arayot:

Any relationship that is an erva when it involves a female,

that is, any degree of relationship that causes a female relative to be prohibited to her relative as an

erva

by Torah law—

then,

with regard to a male,

anyone related to the male by the same degree of relationship—

they issued a decree concerning his wife,

making her prohibited to that relative of her husband,

as a “shniya.”

The Gemara now specifies to whom this rule applies.

And

Rava asked:

And

is this matter

a general rule

in every case of such a relationship?

But

his mother-in-law

is prohibited as

an erva.

And

if so,

his father-in-law’s wife—

is permitted!

This is so even though his father-in-law’s wife is the wife of a male relative whose degree of relationship is identical to that of his mother-in-law, who is an erva when the relative is female.

And likewise we find

his mother-in-law’s daughter,

who is

an erva

because she is his wife’s sister.

And

if so,

his mother-in-law’s son’s wife is permitted.

Although his mother-in-law’s son has a degree of relationship corresponding to that of his mother-in-law’s daughter, nevertheless they did not prohibit his wife as a shniya.

And

likewise we find that

his father-in-law’s daughter

is

an erva, and

if so,

his father-in-law’s son’s wife is permitted.

They did not prohibit her because her husband is related in the same manner as his father-in-law’s daughter.

And likewise,

his stepdaughter,

his wife’s daughter, is

an erva

because of the prohibition of a woman and her daughter.

And

if so,

his stepson’s wife is permitted.

Although his wife’s son corresponds in degree of relationship to his stepdaughter, they do not prohibit his wife.

And likewise,

his stepdaughter’s daughter

is

an erva, and

if so,

his stepson’s wife is permitted.

Although his stepson is related in the same manner as his stepdaughter, nevertheless they did not prohibit his wife.

And Rava concludes his objection:

And

if so, since this is not a general rule, we must determine precisely:

This

that

Rav Yehuda bar Sheila

said, that they said in the West, “Any relationship that is an erva when it involves a female, with regard to a male they issued a decree concerning his wife as a shniya”—

what does it come to include?

What, does it not come to include the wife of his maternal uncle on his mother’s side,

who is prohibited because

“any relationship that is an erva when it involves a female”

[his mother’s maternal sister]

is an erva—

with regard to the male

[his maternal uncle on his mother’s side]

they issued a decree

concerning

his wife as a shniya.

And we ask about this:

And in what way are these different,

his father-in-law’s wife, his father-in-law’s son’s wife, his mother-in-law’s son, his stepson’s wife, and his stepson, whose wives are not prohibited by this rule?

And in what way is this different,

the wife of his maternal uncle on his mother’s side, who was prohibited by this rule?

And we answer:

This,

the wife of his maternal uncle,

is brought into relationship with him through a single act of betrothal

alone,

and that brings her close to him.

Her relationship to the person to whom she is prohibited comes about through the fact that her maternal uncle betrothed her; therefore, it is appropriate to prohibit her.

But

these require two acts of betrothal—

they do not bring them close to him.

In the case of his father-in-law’s wife, his relationship with her did not come about solely through his betrothing his wife; it also required his father-in-law’s betrothal of her.

Likewise, in the case of his father-in-law’s son’s wife, she did not become related to him through the betrothal of his wife until his father-in-law’s son betrothed her.

Therefore, this relationship does not prohibit the wife of the male corresponding to the female who is an erva, since an additional stage of betrothal is required.

Rav Mesharsheya of Tosneya sent to Rav Pappi: “Let our master teach us!”

The wife of his paternal grandfather’s brother

on his father’s side,

and his paternal grandfather’s sister,

whether his grandfather’s sister is on his father’s side or on his mother’s side—

what is their status?

Since we found above that the wife of his paternal uncle on his mother’s side is included among the forbidden relationships that have a limit—that is, the wife of his paternal grandfather’s maternal half-brother is not prohibited at all, since even the relationship preceding her, the wife of his paternal uncle on his mother’s side, is not prohibited by Torah law—

Rav Mesharsheya therefore wondered whether the wife of his paternal grandfather’s brother on his father’s side, and his paternal grandfather’s sister, whether his grandfather’s sister is on his father’s side or on his mother’s side, are also prohibited.

The sides of the dilemma are:

Since

we find that

below

them—that is, the wife of his paternal uncle on his father’s side and his paternal aunt—are

an erva

by Torah law, therefore with regard to these relatives too

they likewise issued a decree,

giving them the status of shniyot.

Or perhaps, the generations have become divided,

as the relationship has become more remote by an additional generation, and no decree was issued.

Come and hear

from the beraita cited above, as it was taught:

Who are the shniyot?

And he did not count them

among them—his paternal grandfather’s sister and the wife of his paternal grandfather’s brother—

together with them.

This indicates that they were not prohibited as shniyot to the arayot.

And we reject this: There is no proof from the fact that the tanna did not mention them in the beraita.

For perhaps

the tanna taught some and omitted others.

And we ask: It is not reasonable that the tanna would omit only one item, since the reason for omitting items is that the tanna does not wish to enumerate every detail. Necessarily, if he omitted one, there are additional items that he omitted.

And since we rejected the proof from the beraita only on the basis of the possibility that the tanna omitted items, we must determine:

What else did he omit

in addition,

that this

one too

was omitted!?

And we answer:

He omitted

the tanna

“the shniyot of the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya,”

which are enumerated below [22a] as six additional shniyot to the arayot, but were not mentioned by the tanna in the beraita.

Consequently, there is no proof that those not mentioned as shniyot are permitted, since he held that they too are important shniyot to the arayot.

Ameimar deemed it fit

to marry

the wife of his paternal grandfather’s brother and his paternal grandfather’s sister.

Rav Hillel said to Rav Ashi: “For me, I saw

the list of the

shniyot

to the arayot that

Mar, son of Ravana,

wrote down,

and it contains

sixteen prohibitions.

And which are these sixteen shniyot?

Is it not

that the sixteen shniyot should be counted as follows:

Eight from the Mishna,

the eight shniyot taught in the beraita above,

and six

additional shniyot

from the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya,

as will be stated below,

and those two,

the wife of his paternal grandfather’s brother and his paternal grandfather’s sister, about whom Rav Mesharsheya raised his doubt.

Together,

that makes sixteen,

sixteen.

We should therefore resolve from here that they are prohibited. How, then, did Ameimar permit them!?

Rav Ashi rejected this argument:

“But according to your reasoning, there are seventeen!”

There are seventeen:

For there is also

the

wife of his maternal uncle on his mother’s side, concerning whom we resolved

above

that she is prohibited!

Rav Hillel said to him:

“This is not difficult.”