Yevamot 22a (כב.) — the Talmud in English

Because

you have two:

the wife of one's father's paternal uncle and the sister of one's father's paternal uncle, since

they are analogous to one another,

as both are forbidden due to the paternal side of the relationship, and in both cases the preceding generation includes a forbidden relation, therefore

they are considered as one.

And

together with the wife of one's maternal uncle on his mother's side,

that makes sixteen.

And

the proof returns:

in any event, they appear to me to be forbidden, for it is written in his name that they are forbidden.

He said to him,

Rav Ashi said to Rav Hillel:

And according to your reasoning, if it had been written

in the name of Mar, son of Ravina, that those second-degree forbidden relations are

permitted—

would you have relied upon them?

For

behold,

Mar, son of Ravina—

did he sign them!?

Now too,

since you saw in his name

that it is written that they are forbidden,

you cannot bring proof from this.

Since

Mar, son of Ravina, did not sign them!

The school of Rabbi Hiyya taught

six additional second-degree forbidden relations:

The

third generation—

a.

Those related through his son:

the daughter of his son's son, which is a second-degree forbidden relation relative to the daughter of his son.

b.

And those related through his daughter:

the daughter of his daughter's son, which is a second-degree forbidden relation relative to the daughter of his daughter.

c.

And those related through his wife's son:

the daughter of his wife's daughter's son, which is a second-degree forbidden relation relative to the daughter of her son.

d.

And those related through his wife's daughter's daughter:

the daughter of his wife's daughter's daughter, which is a second-degree forbidden relation relative to her daughter's daughter.

Each of these is forbidden as a

second-degree forbidden relation

relative to the forbidden relations.

And likewise the

fourth generation—

e.

Those related through his father-in-law:

his father-in-law's mother's mother, which is the fourth generation when counting upward from his wife.

f.

Those related through his mother-in-law:

his mother-in-law's mother's mother.

Each of these is forbidden as a

second-degree forbidden relation

relative to the forbidden relation in the generation below it. For his mother-in-law and father-in-law are included in the Torah prohibition of: “You shall not take a woman and her son's daughter or her daughter's daughter.” Therefore, their mothers are second-degree forbidden relations relative to those forbidden relations.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: What is different above,

with regard to his father-in-law's mother's mother,

that he counts her wife—

that Rabbi Hiyya called her the “fourth” generation, because he included his wife in the count of the generations—

and what is different below,

with regard to his son's son's daughter,

that he does not count her wife—

that Rabbi Hiyya said “the third generation through his son,” whereas had he counted his wife, it would have been the fourth generation?

And Rav Ashi explained to him: The count

above,

since

the prohibition

of the mother, the mother's mother, and the father's mother

comes by virtue of his wife,

as it is forbidden to marry a woman and her daughter, and so on—therefore

he counts her

as part of the generations of forbidden relations.

But in the count

below,

since

the prohibition

of his son's son's daughter

does not come by virtue of his wife,

as even the daughter of a son born to him from a woman whom he raped is forbidden to him, therefore

he does not count her.

Rather, the count of the generations of forbidden relations begins with his son and daughter.

And we raise an objection: This works with regard to the third generation through his son and through his daughter.

But it still remains difficult:

but

the members of the school of Rabbi Hiyya said, “the third generation through the

son of his wife and the daughter of his wife, for

with regard to them there is

a prohibition—

it comes by virtue of his wife.

And

nevertheless

he does not count her

as part of the count of the generations; for had he counted her, this would have been the fourth generation!?

And we answer:

Since it taught

with regard to his son and his daughter

three generations below him,

whose prohibition comes by virtue of the father,

and did not count her

in the count of the generation of his wife,

it likewise taught three generations below her,

with regard to the son of his wife and the daughter of his wife,

and did not count her

as his wife in the count of the generations.

He said

Rav Ashi asked

Rav Kahana:

Do those

second-degree forbidden relations

enumerated by

the school of Rabbi Hiyya —

do they have an endpoint, or do they have no endpoint?

And he brought him a proof:

ta shma,

from that

Rav said

above:

There are four women who have

an endpoint.

And it follows: Four women,

and no more.

And we reject this:

Perhaps when Rav said

that four women have an endpoint,

he was referring to that Mishna

above.

His intention was to say that among those eight second-degree forbidden relations there are four women who have an endpoint; but perhaps among the six second-degree forbidden relations of the school of Rabbi Hiyya there are additional second-degree forbidden relations that have an endpoint.

And he brought him another proof:

ta shma,

from that which the school of Rabbi Hiyya taught with regard to its second-degree forbidden relations: “

third

generation through his son” and “

fourth

generation through his father-in-law.”

And it follows that specifically the

third and fourth generations, no more.

Further,

another generation after it, above or below,

no.

And it is explicit that Rabbi Hiyya's second-degree forbidden relations have an endpoint.

And we reject this:

Perhaps

his intention is not to say that only the third generation through his son and the fourth generation through his father-in-law are forbidden, and that from that point onward they are permitted.

Rather, his intention is to say that beginning

with

the

third generation and onward

through his son,

and beginning

with

the

fourth generation and onward

through his father-in-law, they are forbidden, and they have no endpoint.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: See,

please

my master,

this

one of the Sages who came from the West and said:

They asked in the West:

Whether

the Sages issued a decree of second-degree forbidden relations with regard to converts,

if a convert was married to his mother's mother, did they require him to divorce her because of the prohibition of second-degree forbidden relations?

Or did they not issue a decree of second-degree forbidden relations with regard to converts?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said to Rava: A convert who converts is like a newborn child, and he has no familial relationship at all with the members of his family. By strict law, he is permitted to marry his mother or daughter who converted.

And

now,

we should reason and say:

And

a convert who was married to

the forbidden relation herself—

she should have been permitted to him,

were it not

that the Sages prohibited her to him, because of the concern

lest people say

disparagingly about converts that they

come

from

“a stricter sanctity”

of a gentile

to

“a lesser sanctity” of a Jew, since previously they had been forbidden to their relatives—for the descendants of Noah were also commanded regarding forbidden relations—whereas now, once they converted, their relatives became permitted to them.

Were it not for this reason,

the Sages would not have issued a decree with regard to them!

The Sages would not have decreed that they divorce the women related to them, for converts are like newborn children, and there is no familial relationship whatsoever between them. It was solely because of the concern that people would say this that the Sages prohibited them from the forbidden relations to which they had been forbidden in their gentile state, although by strict law they are permitted even to these forbidden relations.

Second-degree forbidden relations

relative to forbidden relations—

is it necessary

to say so!?

Is it necessary to state that they are permitted to these relations? They were permitted even to the forbidden relations themselves, were it not for the concern that people might say that they had moved from a stricter sanctity to a lesser sanctity. There is no concern that people will say this with regard to second-degree forbidden relations.

Rav Naḥman said: Converts, since they have come before us,

as we have come to discuss their matter—

let us say a matter concerning them:

If the converts are

maternal brothers, they should not testify

to one another ab initio, since their relationship through their mother is considered a relationship, as she is certainly their mother.

But

if they testified, their testimony is valid,

since they are like newborn children and have no legal relationship, even if they were certainly born as relatives.

But converts who are

brothers

only

paternal brothers may testify ab initio,

since their relationship is not certain, as the Torah declared the seed of a gentile ownerless, and they have no brotherhood through their father.

Ameimar said: Even maternal brothers may testify ab initio.

And how is this different from forbidden relations,

with regard to which their relatives were prohibited to them even after they converted?

A forbidden relation

is entrusted to everyone,

and since every person marries on his own initiative, if converts are permitted to retain their forbidden-relations wives when they convert, they will come to permit forbidden relations among Jews as well, since not everyone is familiar with the reason for the permission—that a convert who converts is like a newborn child.

But

testimony

is entrusted to a court,

and people will not come to accept the testimony of Jewish brothers if they see that brothers who converted are able to testify, since a court knows how to distinguish between Jews and converts, accepting testimony from converted brothers only because

a convert who converts is like a newborn child.

Mishna:

a.

One who

dies, and

has a brother from any source,

even a disqualified brother, such as a mamzer—he

causes his brother's wife to be subject to

the obligation of

yibbum.

And

even though he is a disqualified brother,

he is his brother

and is considered so

for every matter: to inherit from him and to become impure for him when he dies, even if he is a kohen.

, to inherit from him and to become impure for him when he dies, even if he is a koen.

Except for one who has a brother from a slave woman or from a gentile woman,

as, for example, his father had intercourse with her; since the child of a gentile woman or a slave woman is affiliated with her, he is not considered his brother.

b.

One who has a son from any source,

even a mamzer son, he

exempts

the

wife of his father from yibbum,

even his other wife, with whom he has no son.

And the

mamzer son is liable to the death penalty

for striking him and for cursing him,

if he cursed or struck his father.

And

he is considered

his son for every matter.

Except for one who has a son from a slave woman or from a gentile woman.

He is not affiliated with him, and he does not exempt his Jewish wife from yibbum, nor does he inherit from him.

Gemara:

And we inquire concerning that which we learned in the Mishna: His brother

“from any source”—

what does this come to include?

Rav Yehuda said: It comes to include a brother who is a

brother who is a

mamzer.

And we wonder: Is it necessary to teach that even a mamzer brother causes his brother's wife to be subject to yibbum?

But this is

obvious,

for even a mamzer

is his brother!

And we explain:

Lest you say,

there might be room to say:

Let us derive “brotherhood”—

“brotherhood” from the sons of Jacob,

as we learned above [17b] by means of a gzera shava:

It is written with regard to yibbum: “For they dwell together, brothers.”

And it is written with regard to the sons of Jacob: “We are twelve brothers.”

And we would derive by a gzera shava that a mamzer brother does not cause his brother's wife to be subject to yibbum:

Just as there,

with regard to the sons of Jacob, the brothers were

fit and not disqualified,

so too here,

with regard to the obligation of yibbum, only brothers who are

fit and not disqualified are included.

It teaches us

that our Mishna does not derive this matter from the sons of Jacob, and even a disqualified brother causes his brother's wife to be subject to yibbum.

And we raise an objection:

But say: So too!

Indeed, let us derive from the sons of Jacob that a disqualified brother does not cause his brother's wife to be subject to yibbum!?

And we answer:

Since with regard to yibbum

we find that a mamzer son

definitely exempts

his father's wife from yibbum,