Yevamot 22a — the Talmud in English

For

you have two

, the wife of his father’s father’s brother and the sister of his father’s father, since

they resemble one another

, for both are forbidden because of the aspect of the father’s brotherhood, and in both of them the generation preceding them contains a forbidden relation; therefore

they are considered as one.

And

together with the wife of his maternal uncle from his mother,

that is sixteen.

And

the proof returns:

in any event, according to me they are fit for me, for it is written concerning prohibition.

He said to him

, Rav Ashi to Rav Hillel:

And according to your reasoning, if it had been written

in the name of Mar, son of Ravina, those same shniyot

for permissibility—

would you have relied upon them?

For

behold,

Mar, son of Ravina—

who signed his name to them!?

Now also, since you saw in his name

although you saw in his name

that it is written concerning prohibition

, you have no basis for bringing proof from this,

since

it was not Mar, son of Ravina, who signed his name to them!

The school of Rabbi Hiyya taught

six additional shniyot:

The

third generation—

a.

His son’s daughter,

the daughter of his son’s son, is a second-degree relation to the forbidden relation of his son’s daughter.

b.

And his daughter’s daughter,

the daughter of his daughter’s daughter, which is a second-degree relation to the forbidden relation of his daughter’s daughter.

c.

And his wife’s son’s daughter,

the daughter of his wife’s daughter’s son, which is a second-degree relation to the forbidden relation of his wife’s son’s daughter.

d.

And his wife’s daughter’s daughter,

the daughter of his wife’s daughter’s son, which is a second-degree relation to his wife’s daughter’s daughter.

Each one of them is forbidden as a

second-degree relation

to the forbidden relations.

And likewise the

fourth generation—

e.

His father-in-law’s,

his father-in-law’s mother’s mother, which is the fourth generation when one counts upward from his wife.

f.

His mother-in-law’s,

his mother-in-law’s mother’s mother.

Each one of them is forbidden as a

second-degree relation

to the forbidden relation in the generation below it. For his mother-in-law and his father-in-law are included in the Torah prohibition of “You shall not take a woman and her daughter’s son, or her daughter’s daughter.” Therefore their mothers are second-degree relations to the forbidden relations in them.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: What is different above,

with regard to his father-in-law’s mother’s mother,

that he counts her as his wife

, that Rabbi Hiyya called her the “fourth” generation, because he included his wife in the counting of the generations?

And what is different below,

with regard to his son’s son’s daughter,

that he does not count her as his wife

, for Rabbi Hiyya said “the third of his son,” whereas had he counted his wife, she would have been the fourth generation?

And Rav Ashi explained to him: The counting

above,

since

the prohibition

of his mother-in-law’s mother, and his mother-in-law’s mother’s mother, and his mother-in-law’s father’s mother

comes by reason of his wife

, for it is forbidden to marry a woman and her daughter and onward—therefore

he counts her

as his wife within the generations of the forbidden relations.

But in the counting

below,

since

the prohibition

of his son’s son’s daughter

does not come by reason of his wife

, for even with regard to his son born from a woman whom he violated, his daughter is forbidden to him—therefore

he does not count her.

Rather, the beginning of the counting of the forbidden generations is with his son and his daughter.

And we challenge: This works with regard to the third of his son and the third of his daughter.

But it still presents a difficulty:

this

which the school of Rabbi Hiyya said, the third of the

son of his wife and the daughter of his wife, that

in them there is

prohibition—

comes by reason of his wife.

And

nevertheless

he does not count her

as his wife in the counting of the generations, for had he counted her, this would have been the fourth generation!?

And we answer:

Since he taught

with regard to his son and his daughter

three generations below him,

whose prohibition comes by reason of the father,

and he did not count her

in the counting of the generation of his wife,

he likewise taught three generations below her,

with regard to the son of his wife and the daughter of his wife,

and he did not count her

as his wife in the counting of the generations.

He said

asked

Rav Ashi of Rav Kahana:

Do those

second-degree relations

that

the school of Rabbi Hiyya counted —

do they have an endpoint, or do they have no endpoint?

And he brought him a proof:

Come and hear

from this

that Rav said

above:

Four women have

an endpoint.

And it follows: Four women,

and no more.

And he rejects:

Perhaps when Rav said

that four women have an endpoint, he said it

with regard to that Mishna

above.

And his intention is to say that among these eight shniyot there are four women who have an endpoint, but perhaps among the six shniyot of the school of Rabbi Hiyya there are additional shniyot that have an endpoint.

And he brought him another proof:

Come and hear,

from this which the tanna of the school of Rabbi Hiyya said concerning his shniyot:

“Third

of his son”

and “fourth

of his father-in-law.”

And it follows that specifically the

third and fourth generations, no.

Further,

the generation after it, upward or downward,

no.

And it is explicit that the shniyot of Rabbi Hiyya have an endpoint.

And he rejects:

Perhaps,

his intention is not to say that only the third of his son and the fourth of his father-in-law are forbidden and from that point onward they are permitted.

Rather, his intention is to say that beginning

from

the

third generation onward

of his son,

and beginning

from

the

fourth generation onward

of his father-in-law, they are forbidden, and they have no endpoint.

Rava said to Rav Nahman: Look,

look, please,

master,

at

this one of the Sages who came from the West, and said:

They asked in the West:

whether

they decreed second-degree relations with regard to converts,

if a convert was married to his mother’s mother, whether they required him to divorce her because of the prohibition of shniyot?

Or they did not decree second-degree relations with regard to converts.

He said to him, Rav Nahman to Rava: Behold, a convert who converted is considered like a newborn, and he has no relationship of kinship with the members of his family; and according to the basic law, he is permitted to marry his mother or his daughter who converted.

Rav Nahman to Rava: A convert who converts is considered like a child newly born, and he has no familial relationship with the members of his former family. By strict law, he is permitted to marry his mother or daughter if they converted.

And

now, we must reason and say:

we should reason and say:

And what of a convert who was married to

what about a convert who was married to

the forbidden relation herself—

she should have been permitted to him,

were it not

that the Sages forbade her to him, because of the concern

lest people say

concerning converts disparagingly, that they have as though

come from

from

“a severe sanctity”

of a gentile

to “a lesser sanctity”

of an Israelite, since previously they had been forbidden to their relatives, for the descendants of Noah were also commanded concerning forbidden relations, whereas now, once they converted, their female relatives became permitted to them.

And without this reason,

the Sages would not have decreed concerning them!

The Sages would not have decreed that they divorce the women who are their relatives, for they are like newborns and there is no kinship at all between them. And only because people should not say this did they forbid them the forbidden relations that had been forbidden to them in their gentile state, even though according to the basic law they are permitted even with these forbidden relations.

Second-degree relations

to forbidden relations—

is it necessary

to say [that they are permitted]!?

And is there a need to say that they should be permitted to them? Behold, even with regard to the forbidden relations themselves they would have been permitted were it not for the concern lest people say that they came from a severe sanctity to a lesser sanctity. And with regard to second-degree relations there is no concern that they will say this.

Rav Nahman said: Converts, since they have come into our hands,

for their matter has come before us to discuss—

let us say a matter concerning them:

If the converts are

maternal brothers, they should not testify

to one another ab initio, since their kinship through the mother is considered kinship, for certainly she is their mother.

But

if they testified, their testimony is testimony

, since they are like newborns and have no legal kinship, even when they certainly were born as relatives.

But converts who are

brothers

only

through the father may testify ab initio

, since their kinship is not certain, and the Torah rendered the seed of a gentile ownerless, and they have no brotherhood through the father.

Ameimar said: Even maternal brothers may also testify ab initio.

And what is different from forbidden relations

, that the relatives were forbidden to them even though they converted?

A forbidden relation—

is entrusted to everyone

, and since every person marries at his own discretion, if they permit them to keep their forbidden-relations wives when they convert, they will come to permit also the forbidden relations of Israelites, since not everyone is expert in the reason for the permission, that a convert who converted is considered like a newborn.

But

testimony—

is entrusted to the court

, and they will not come to accept the testimony of Israelite brothers if they see that brothers who converted are able to testify, since the court knows to distinguish between Israelites and converts, that they accept testimony from brothers only in their case, because

a convert who converted is considered like a newborn.

Mishna:

a.

One who

dies,

and has a brother of any kind,

even an unfit brother, such as a mamzer—he

subjects his brother’s wife to

the obligation of

yibbum.

And

even though he is an unfit brother,

he is his brother

and is considered

for every matter

, to inherit from him and to become impure for him when he dies, even if he is a koen.

Except for one who has a brother from a slave-woman or from a gentile woman,

such as when his father had intercourse with her, since the child of the gentile woman or the slave-woman is affiliated after her and is not considered his brother.

b.

One who has a son of any kind

, even a mamzer son, he

exempts

the

wife of his father from yibbum

, even his other wife from whom he has no son.

And the son is liable

to the death penalty, the mamzer son,

for striking him and for cursing him

, if he cursed or struck his father.

And

he is considered

his son for every matter.

Except for one who has a son from a slave-woman or from a gentile woman.

For he is not affiliated after him, and he does not exempt his Israelite wife from yibbum, and he does not inherit from him.

Gemara:

And we inquire concerning that which we learned: His brother

“of any kind”—

what does this come to include?

Rav Yehuda said: It comes to include a

brother who is a

mamzer.

And we wonder: Is it necessary to teach us that even a mamzer brother subjects [his brother’s wife] to yibbum?

But the matter is

obvious,

for even a mamzer

is his brother!

And we explain:

Lest you say,

there was room to say,

let us derive “brotherhood—

brotherhood” from the sons of Jacob,

as we derived above [17b] by means of a gzera shava:

It is written concerning yibbum: “When brothers dwell together.”

And concerning the sons of Jacob it is written: “We are twelve brothers.”

And we should learn by means of a gzera shava that a mamzer brother does not subject [the woman] to yibbum:

Just as there,

with regard to the sons of Jacob, the reference is to

fit brothers and not unfit ones.

So too here,

with regard to the obligation of yibbum, the reference is only to

fit brothers and not unfit ones.

It teaches us

our Mishna that with regard to this matter we do not learn from the sons of Jacob, and even an unfit brother subjects [the woman to yibbum].

And we challenge:

And say, so too!

Indeed, let us learn from the sons of Jacob that the unfit brother should not subject his brother’s wife to yibbum!?

And we answer:

Since with regard to yibbum

we find that a mamzer son

does indeed exempt

his father’s wife from yibbum,