Yevamot 21a (כא.) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains:

with regard to a widow from marriage—

Everyone agrees that she does not exempt

herself and her rival-wife, because

the positive mitzva

of levirate marriage

does not override a prohibition and a positive mitzva

of a widow marrying a High Priest.

When they disagree—

with regard to a widow from betrothal.

The one who says that she exempts—

because

the positive mitzva comes and overrides the prohibition.

And the one who says that she does not exempt—

because

the positive mitzva does not come and override the prohibition, since it is possible to perform ḥalitza.

The objection is raised

from what we learned in a beraita:

And if they engaged in intercourse

with women forbidden by negative commandments—

they acquire them!

This proves that she is fit for levirate marriage, because if a positive mitzva does not override a prohibition, how did they acquire them? After all, the yevama is acquired by the yavam only by virtue of the mitzva of levirate marriage.

And we conclude:

Tiyuvta

against the one who says that she does not exempt her rival-wife.

And we consider the matter:

Shall we say that

this beraita

is also a refutation of Reish Lakish!?

For according to him, wherever it is possible to fulfill both, a positive mitzva does not override a prohibition; and here it is possible to fulfill both through ḥalitza! And we answer:

Reish Lakish could say to you: When I said this, I meant—

where

it is possible

to fulfill the mitzva

without overriding the prohibition.

But here, ḥalitza in place of levirate marriage—

is not a mitzva!

Therefore, here the positive mitzva overrides the prohibition.

Rava said: A hint to

the Sages’ enactment prohibiting

“secondary”

relatives of those forbidden as incestuous relations,

from the Torah—

where is it indicated?

As it is stated: [Leviticus 18]

“

For all these abominations the people of the land have done”

“These”—

the word indicates strength, and teaches that they committed abominations

“that are harsh,”

and Scripture warned us not to act as they did.

And

from this

you learn

that there are

also abominations

“that are mild.”

And what are they?

The mild abominations—

“Secondary”

relatives of those forbidden as incestuous relations.

This is a hint from Scripture that the relatives of those forbidden as incestuous relations must also be prohibited, as they are on the level of “secondaries” to them.

And from where is it evident that “these”—

is an expression of something harsh?

As it is written [Ezekiel 17]:

“

And he took the mighty ones of the land

[the strong ones]

.”

And we consider the matter:

Shall we say that this disagrees

with what Rava said, that “these,” stated with regard to incestuous relations, is an expression of harshness and strength, with

what

said

Rabbi Levi said!?

For according to Rabbi Levi, we find that the word “these” stated with regard to incestuous relations is not an expression of harshness and strength.

As Rabbi

Rabbi

Levi said: The punishment for

those who falsify

weights is harsher than the punishment for those who engage in incestuous relations,

as

with regard to the abomination of incestuous relations

it is stated concerning them, “these.”

But

if

this

is referring to the abomination of those who falsify weights,

it is stated concerning them: “The one who does

the abomination of the Lord, all who do

these.”

That is to say, “these” is mild, whereas “all these” is harsh!

And we answer: The expression

“these”

is also an expression of

harshness.

Rather, the expression

“and all these”

is even more

harsh than “these.”

The Gemara now challenges this: How could Rabbi Levi say that the punishment of those who falsify weights is harsher than that for incestuous relations because “all these” is stated concerning them?

But

with regard to incestuous relations too, it is written: “From all these abominations

of the Lord,

these, they shall be cut off”!?

And we answer:

That

“and all these”

stated with regard to incestuous relations does not come to teach about the severity of incestuous relations; rather, it comes

to exclude the falsification of weights from

the punishment of

karet.

This teaches that only for incestuous relations is one liable to karet, and not for falsifying weights, even though the punishment of those who falsify weights is harsher than that for incestuous relations.

The Gemara asks:

But in what way is their severity

greater than that of incestuous relations? After all, the punishment of karet does not apply to them as it does to incestuous relations!

And we answer:

These,

the incestuous relations,

can

have the sin rectified

through repentance,

if he did not father a mamzer through them.

But

these,

the falsified weights,

cannot

be rectified

through repentance,

since through the falsified weights he deceived the public, and he cannot return and rectify the sin without reimbursing them for the deception, while he cannot find all those whom he deceived.

Rav Yehuda said: From here

a source for the enactment of “secondaries” can be learned, as it is written [Ecclesiastes 12]:

“And he weighed, investigated, and arranged many proverbs.”

And Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said,

in explanation of this verse:

Before Solomon came, the Torah was like a basket

a basket or a box,

that had no “handles,”

a place by which to hold it, so that it would not fall from one’s hands, and thus it could not be preserved.

Until Solomon came and made “handles” for it.

He instituted enactments through which it was possible to hold on to the Torah and preserve it from being violated. Among Solomon’s enactments was the enactment prohibiting secondaries to incestuous relations, through which the laws prohibiting relations with the relatives of those forbidden as incestuous relations themselves were preserved [see Rashi].

Rabbi Oshaya said: From here: [Proverbs 4]

“Make it great,”

increase the prohibition and add to it, and through increasing the prohibition you will merit that

“you shall not pass through it,”

but

“turn aside”

from it

to the side,

and

thus

“pass on”!

thus

“pass by!”

Rav Ashi said: Rabbi Oshaya’s parable—

to what can the matter be compared?

To a man

who was

guarding an orchard.

If he stood and

guarded it from outside—

the entire orchard was preserved.

But if he

guarded it from inside—then only the portion of the orchard

in front of him

was preserved,

but the portion

behind him—

was not preserved.

And the Gemara rejects this:

But Rav Ashi’s analogy

is nonsense!

The comparison is not valid.

For

there,

when one guards the orchard from inside, at least what is

in front of him is preserved.

But

here,

with regard to incestuous relations,

if not for

the enactment of

secondaries

to incestuous relations—

one would encounter the incestuous relation itself.

Rav Kahana said: From here

as it is written with regard to incestuous relations [Leviticus 18]:

“And you shall keep My safeguard”—

Make a safeguard for My safeguard.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: This is from the Torah!

After all, it is an explicit verse!

Rav Yosef said to him: The teaching is indeed

from the Torah, and the Sages interpreted

it

as referring to the Rabbis’

enactment of secondaries.

Abaye said to him: But

the entire Torah too was interpreted

by

the Rabbis!

Yet they did not refer to it merely as a “safeguard”!?

And we conclude:

Rather,

the enactment of secondaries

is rabbinic,

and the verse

is

merely a supporting allusion

to it!

The Sages taught: What are

the prohibitions of

“secondaries,”

which we learned in our Mishna are a prohibition of mitzva, and which were prohibited only by rabbinic enactment?

His mother’s mother.

His mother is prohibited by Torah law, and the Sages prohibited even his mother’s mother as a safeguard, so that he would not come to marry his mother.

And his father’s mother,

is prohibited like his mother’s mother. Although the reason for the enactment does not apply to her, the Sages prohibited her because of her resemblance to his mother’s mother, since both are called “great-grandmother.”

And his father’s father’s wife,

whom they prohibited as a safeguard against his father’s wife, which is prohibited by the Torah.

And his mother’s father’s wife

is prohibited because of her resemblance to his father’s father’s wife, since both are called “the wife of a great-grandfather.”

And his father’s maternal uncle’s wife

is prohibited because she parallels his father’s paternal uncle’s wife, who alone is prohibited by Torah law [as stated below, 54b].

And his mother’s paternal uncle’s wife,

whom they prohibited because she resembles his father’s maternal uncle’s wife, who is also a secondary relative, as stated above; they prohibited her because in both cases the relationship is through the mother.

And his son’s daughter-in-law,

who is prohibited as a safeguard against his daughter-in-law, which is prohibited by the Torah.

And his daughter’s daughter-in-law,

prohibited as a rabbinic decree because of his son’s daughter-in-law.

And a man is permitted

to marry his father-in-law’s wife,

when she is not his mother-in-law.

And his stepson’s wife,

that is, his wife’s daughter-in-law, the wife of his stepson, who was born to his wife from her previous husband.

And he is prohibited from marrying his stepson’s daughter.

Her prohibition is explained shortly: it is explicit in the Torah, as she is the daughter of his wife’s son; it will be explained below why she was counted among the secondaries.

And his stepson

—his stepchild, his wife’s son from her previous husband—

is permitted to marry his

father’s other wife, since she is not his mother.

And

likewise his stepson is permitted to marry

the daughter

of his stepfather from another woman.

And

as a result of these laws,

his stepson’s wife

[his stepdaughter-in-law, the wife of his stepson]

says to him,

the husband of her mother:

I

myself

am permitted to you, but

if

my daughter—

you would be prohibited from marrying her,

by virtue of her being the daughter of your wife’s son.

The Gemara asks: How can the daughter of his stepson be included among the secondaries?

After all, marrying

his stepson’s daughter—

is a

Torah prohibition!

As it is written: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter;

her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter

you shall not take.”

How, then, did the tanna include her among the secondaries, which are prohibited only by rabbinic law!?

How, then, did the tannaitic sage include her among the second-degree relatives, who are prohibited only by rabbinic decree!?

And we answer: The tanna did not mention the daughter of his stepson in order to say that she is included among the secondaries.

Rather,

because he needed to teach in the latter clause

that the tanna wished to emphasize a particular novelty in the latter clause: the circumstance in which

his stepson’s wife says to him,

the husband of her mother:

I am permitted to you, but

if

my daughter is prohibited to you!

And

this is a major novelty:

even though my daughter is prohibited to you by Torah law

because of “a woman and her son’s daughter,”

with regard to me—

the Sages did not enact a prohibition!

For this purpose, the tanna

also taught

in

the first clause, the daughter of his stepson.

The Gemara asks:

If so,

if the tanna wished to emphasize this special matter—that there can be a case in which the mother is permitted and the daughter is prohibited, and the Sages did not prohibit the mother—then

his father-in-law’s wife,

when she is not his wife’s mother,

should also say

to her husband’s son-in-law:

I

myself

am permitted to you,

as it is taught in a beraita.

But

if

my daughter,

who was born to me from your father-in-law—

is prohibited to you,

and her prohibition is by Torah law, since

she is “your wife’s sister”

through her father [and not through her mother]!

And we answer:

This one,

the daughter of his stepson, who is prohibited to him—

is unequivocal; it is an absolute matter, since a man is always prohibited from marrying his wife’s son’s daughter, by virtue of “a woman and her son’s daughter.”

But

this one,

the daughter

of his father-in-law’s wife,

is not unequivocal.

Her prohibition is not absolute in every circumstance.

For the prohibition of a wife’s sister applies only during the wife’s lifetime. Since there is a circumstance in which he is permitted to marry his mother-in-law’s daughter—after his wife’s death, when she is no longer prohibited to him as his wife’s sister—the tanna did not mention this matter, because it does not apply universally.

Rav said: Four women who are

secondaries

have a stopping point!

That is, only those women were prohibited; the prohibition was not extended through the generations to their mothers or daughters, and they are unlike the other secondaries.

For with regard to the other secondaries, when his mother’s mother was prohibited, all the generations preceding her were also prohibited.

Likewise, when his father’s father’s wife or his father’s father’s mother was prohibited, all the earlier generations were prohibited as well, namely, his father’s father’s father’s wife and his father’s father’s father’s mother.

And Rav learned from his teacher that four of the secondaries were not prohibited through their generations.

Rav had in his possession

only

three

women who have a stopping point.

Rav did not know which the fourth woman was who was prohibited herself, but whose descendants were not prohibited.

These are the three whose identities Rav knew:

His mother’s paternal uncle’s wife,

but his mother’s maternal uncle’s wife is not prohibited.

His father’s maternal uncle’s wife,

but his father’s paternal uncle’s wife is not prohibited.

And his daughter-in-law,

which, as explained below, refers to his daughter’s daughter-in-law, whose prohibition has a stopping point. His granddaughter’s daughter-in-law is permitted.

The reason these have a stopping point is that no Torah-level incestuous relation applies to them; their prohibition is only because they parallel prohibited women.

By contrast, with the other secondaries to incestuous relations, their prohibition is because the first generation is prohibited by Torah law, such as his mother’s mother, who was prohibited because of his mother, which is prohibited by Torah law.

And his father’s father’s wife is prohibited because of his father’s wife, which is prohibited by Torah law.

Likewise, the Sages prohibited analogous secondaries, such as his father’s father’s mother, because of his mother’s mother.

But with regard to his daughter’s daughter-in-law, his father’s maternal uncle’s wife, and his mother’s paternal uncle’s wife, there is no Torah prohibition even in the first generation that was prohibited. There is therefore no concern that they will be confused with their parallels in later generations, and the later generations were not prohibited.

Zeiri adds: Also his mother’s father’s wife,

which in his view is the fourth woman that Rav did not count among the secondaries without a stopping point.

Only she is prohibited, while the generations above her are not prohibited; his mother’s father’s father’s wife is not prohibited, since there is no Torah prohibition in any of those generations.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And your mnemonic is

the sign clarifying what Zeiri added to Rav:

“higher than Rav.”

That is, Zeiri permitted one generation higher than Rav did.

Rav mentioned only the permitted cases of his mother’s uncle’s wife and his father’s uncle’s wife, which are in the generation of his father and mother; Zeiri permitted a generation higher than that, his mother’s father’s wife.

And we consider the matter:

But why did Rav not count it?

After all, there is no Torah prohibition in this case. And we explain: According to Rav, she has a prohibition extending through the generations because

she might be confused

between his mother’s father’s wife and

his father’s father’s wife.

Therefore, if one were to permit his mother’s father’s father’s wife, people might say that his father’s father’s wife also has a stopping point.

But in that case, there is a Torah prohibition in the first generation, namely that of his father’s wife. Because of this concern, Rav also prohibited the generations above his mother’s father’s wife without a stopping point.

And

if

Zeiri

held that there was no need to be concerned about such confusion—

because

there,

in his father’s family, one

frequently goes and is familiar

with the relationships there, more than

here,

in his mother’s family, where one

does not frequently go and is not familiar

with the relationships—