Yevamot 21a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains:

with regard to a widow from betrothal—

Everyone agrees that she does not exempt herself and her rival-wife, because

the positive commandment of levirate marriage

does not

of levirate marriage

override a prohibition and a positive commandment

of a widow to a High Priest.

When they disagree—

with regard to a widow from betrothal.

The one who says that she exempts—

because

the positive commandment comes and overrides the prohibition.

And the one who says that she does not exempt—

because

the positive commandment does not come and override the prohibition, since it is possible through halitza.

It was objected from what we learned in a beraita:

what we learned in a beraita:

and if they engaged in intercourse

those liable for prohibitions—

they acquire!

And it is proven that she stands for levirate marriage, for if a positive commandment does not override a prohibition, how did they acquire her? After all, the levirate woman is acquired by the levir only by virtue of the commandment of levirate marriage.

And we conclude:

refutation

of the one who says that she does not exempt her rival-wife.

And we raised an objection to it:

shall it be said

this beraita

also a refutation of Reish Lakish!?

For according to him, wherever it is possible to fulfill both, a positive commandment does not override a prohibition; and here it is possible to fulfill both, through halitza! And we answer:

Reish Lakish can say to you: When I said—

where

it is possible

that the mitzva be fulfilled,

without overriding the prohibition.

But here, halitza in place of levirate marriage—

is not a mitzva!

And therefore here the positive commandment overrides the prohibition.

Rava said: A hint to

the enactment of the Sages, to prohibit

“secondaries”

to forbidden relationships,

from the Torah—

from where?

As it is stated: [Leviticus 18]

[Leviticus 18]

“For all these abominations the people of the land have done”

“These”—

which is an expression of strength, comes to say that they performed abominations

“harsh,”

and Scripture warned us against doing like them.

And

from the implication

of this you learn

that there are

also abominations

“soft.”

And what are they

the soft abominations?—

“Secondaries”

to forbidden relationships.

And this is a hint from Scripture that the relatives of forbidden relationships must be prohibited, for they are on the level of “secondaries” to them.

And from where is it indicated that “these”—

is an expression of harshness?

As it is written [Ezekiel 17]

[Ezekiel 17]

“And he took the mighty ones of the land

[the strong ones]

.”

And we raised an objection to it:

shall it be said, it disagrees

with what Rava said, that “these” mentioned with regard to forbidden relationships is an expression of difficulty and strength, with

what

he said

Rabbi Levi!?

For according to the words of Rabbi Levi, we find that the expression “these” said with regard to forbidden relationships is not considered an expression of difficulty and strength.

For

Rabbi

Levi said: The punishment of

those who falsify

measures is harsher than the punishment of forbidden relationships

for this,

in the abomination of forbidden relationships,

“these” is stated of them.

And

if

this,

in the abomination of those who falsify measures,

is stated of them

“An abomination of the Lord is everyone who does”

these.”

And that means that “these” is mild, while “these” is harsh!

And we answer: Even the expression

“these”

is an expression of

harshness.

Rather, the expression

“and these”

is even more

harsh than “these.”

And now we challenge: How did Rabbi Levi say that the punishment of those who falsify measures is more severe than that of forbidden relationships because “these” is stated of them?

But

with regard to forbidden relationships too, is it not written

“from all the abominations of the”

these,

“and they shall be cut off”?

And we answer:

That

“and these” stated with regard to forbidden relationships does not come to teach about the severity of forbidden relationships, but comes

to exclude measures from

the punishment of

karet.

To teach that only for forbidden relationships is one liable for karet, and not for falsifying measures, despite the fact that their punishment is harsher than that of forbidden relationships.

And the Gemara wonders:

Rather, what is their severity

of measures over forbidden relationships? After all, the punishment of karet does not apply to them as it applies to forbidden relationships!

And we answer:

These,

forbidden relationships,

are possible

to rectify the sin

through repentance,

if he did not father a mamzer from them.

But

these,

measures,

are not possible

to rectify

through repentance,

since with falsified measures he deceived the public, and he cannot return and rectify the sin without returning to them what he cheated them of, and he cannot find all those whom he deceived.

Rav Yehuda said: From here

a source for the enactment of “secondaries” is to be learned: for it is written [Ecclesiastes 12]

“And he weighed and searched, and arranged many proverbs.”

And Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elazar,

in explanation of this verse:

Before Solomon came, the Torah was like a basket,

a basket, a container,

that had no “handles,”

a place of holding, with which to hold it so that it would not fall from his hands, and thus it was not preserved.

Until Solomon came and made “handles” for it.

He enacted enactments by virtue of which it is possible to hold the Torah and preserve it so that it would not be damaged. And among Solomon’s enactments was the enactment of the decree of secondaries to forbidden relationships, and through it the laws of the prohibitions of relations with the forbidden relationships themselves were preserved [see Rashi].

Rabbi Oshaya said: From here: [Proverbs 4]

[Proverbs 4]

“Make it great,”

make it greater for prohibition, and add to it, and by virtue of making the prohibition greater you will merit that

“you not pass through it,”

but

turn aside

turn aside

from it

of the prohibition,

and

thus

pass through!

Rav Ashi said: Rabbi Oshaya’s analogy—

to what is this comparable?

To a man

who was

guarding an orchard.

If he stood and

guarded it from outside—

all of it was preserved.

But if he

guarded it from inside—then only the part of the orchard

before him

was preserved,

but the part

behind him—

was not preserved.

And the Gemara rejects this:

But Rav Ashi’s [analogy]—

is nonsense!

The comparison is not valid.

For

there,

with one guarding the orchard from inside, at least what is

before him, in any event, is preserved

But

here,

with forbidden relationships,

if not for

the decree of

secondaries

to forbidden relationships—

he would encounter the forbidden relationship itself.

Rav Kahana said: From here: for it is written concerning forbidden relationships [Leviticus 18],

[Leviticus 18],

“And you shall safeguard My safeguard”—

Make a safeguard for My safeguard.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: This is from the Torah!

For it is an explicit verse!

Rav Yosef said to him: The teaching is indeed

from the Torah, and the Sages interpreted

it

the Sages

as referring to the decree of secondaries.

Abaye said to him: But

the entire Torah too was interpreted

by

the Sages!

And they did not call this merely a “safeguard”!?

And we conclude:

Rather,

the decree of secondaries

is rabbinic

in origin,

and the verse

is merely a supporting allusion

to it!

The Sages taught: What are

the prohibitions of

“secondaries,”

which we learned in our Mishna are a prohibition of mitzva, and which were prohibited only by the words of the Scribes?

His mother’s mother.

His mother is prohibited by Torah law, and the Scribes decreed that his mother’s mother also be prohibited, as a safeguard so that he would not come to his mother.

And his father’s mother,

she is prohibited like his mother’s mother. And although the reason for the decree does not apply to her, they decreed concerning her because of her similarity to his mother’s mother, since both are called “great-grandmother.”

And his father’s father’s wife,

for they decreed concerning her as a safeguard against his father’s wife, which is written in the Torah.

And his mother’s father’s wife

is prohibited, because of her similarity to his father’s father’s wife, since both are called “the wife of the great-grandfather.”

And his mother’s father’s wife,

she is prohibited because she parallels his father’s father’s wife, which alone is prohibited by Torah law [as below, 54b].

And his mother’s brother’s wife,

for they decreed concerning her because she resembles his mother’s father’s wife, which is also a secondary, as above, and they prohibited them because both of their relationships are through the mother.

And his son’s daughter-in-law,

who is prohibited as a safeguard for the prohibition of his daughter-in-law, which is from the Torah.

And his daughter’s daughter-in-law,

a decree because of his son’s daughter-in-law.

And a man is permitted

to his father-in-law’s wife,

when she is not his mother-in-law.

And with his stepson’s wife,

that is, his wife’s daughter-in-law, the wife of her stepson, who was born to his wife from her previous husband.

And he is prohibited with his stepson’s daughter.

And it is explained shortly that her prohibition is explicit in the Torah, for she is the daughter of his wife’s son, and it will be explained below why she was counted among the secondaries.

And his stepson,

his stepson, the son of his wife from her previous husband—

is permitted with his wife

the other wife of his stepfather, since she is not his mother.

And

likewise his stepson is permitted with

his daughter

of his stepfather, from another woman.

And

as a result of these laws, behold,

his stepson’s wife [

his stepson’s wife, who is his wife’s daughter-in-law]

says to him,

to her mother-in-law’s husband:

I

myself

am permitted to you, and

if

my daughter—

she is prohibited to you,

by the law concerning the daughter of your wife’s son.

And we ask: How is “his stepson’s daughter” counted among the secondaries?

After all, marrying

his stepson’s daughter—

is a prohibition

from the Torah!

For it is written

“The nakedness of a woman and her daughter you shall not uncover.

Her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter

you shall not take.”

And how did the tannai include her among the secondaries, which are prohibited only by the words of the Scribes!?

And we answer: The tannai did not mention his stepson’s daughter in order to say that she is included among the secondaries.

Rather,

because he needed to teach in the latter clause,

for the tannai wished to continue and emphasize in the latter clause a special novelty, the manner in which

his stepson’s wife says to him,

to her mother-in-law’s husband:

I am permitted to you, and

if

my daughter is prohibited to you!

And

it is a great novelty that

even though my daughter is prohibited to you by Torah law

because of “a woman and her son’s daughter,”

with regard to me—

the Sages did not decree concerning her!

And for this purpose the tannai

taught

in

the first clause also, his stepson’s daughter.

And we ask:

If so, since the tannai wished to emphasize this special matter, that there can be a situation in which the mother is permitted and the daughter is prohibited, and the Sages did not decree concerning the mother, then

if the tannaitic sage wanted to emphasize this special point—that there can be a situation in which the mother is permitted and the daughter is prohibited, and the Sages did not decree a prohibition against the mother—then

his father-in-law’s wife,

when she is not his wife’s mother,

should also say,

she too can say to her husband’s son-in-law:

I

myself

am permitted to you,

as it is taught in a beraita:

And

if

my daughter,

who was born to me from your father-in-law—

she is prohibited to you,

and her prohibition is from the Torah, since

she is “your wife’s sister

from the father [and not from the mother]!

And we answer:

This,

that his stepson’s daughter is prohibited to him—

is definitive for him; it is an absolute matter! For a man is always prohibited with his wife’s son’s daughter, by the law of “a woman and her son’s daughter.”

it is an absolute matter, since a man is always prohibited from marrying his wife’s son’s daughter, because of the prohibition of a woman and her son’s daughter.

Whereas

this,

his father-in-law’s wife’s daughter,

is not definitive for him.

Her prohibition is not absolute in every situation.

For the prohibition of a wife’s sister applies only during his wife’s lifetime. And since there is a circumstance in which he is permitted with his mother-in-law’s daughter, after his wife’s death, when she is no longer prohibited to him as his wife’s sister, the tannai did not mention this matter, since it does not exist in every case.

Rav said: Four women, who are secondaries

to forbidden relationships

have a stopping point!

That is, they prohibited only those women, and did not extend their prohibition through the generations, to their mothers or their daughters, and they are unlike the other secondaries.

For with the other secondaries, when they prohibited his mother’s mother, they also prohibited all the generations preceding her.

And likewise, when they prohibited his father’s father’s wife, or his father’s father’s mother, all the preceding generations were prohibited, namely, his father’s father’s father’s wife and his father’s father’s father’s mother.

And Rav learned from his teacher that four of the secondaries are not prohibited through their generations.

Rav held in his hand

only

three,

three women who have a stopping point.

And Rav did not know who the fourth woman was who was prohibited herself, but whose generations were not prohibited.

And these are the three whom Rav knew:

His mother’s brother’s wife,

but his mother’s mother’s brother’s wife is not prohibited.

His father’s sister’s wife,

but his father’s father’s sister’s wife is not prohibited.

And his daughter-in-law,

and it is explained below that the reference is to his daughter’s daughter-in-law, which has a stopping point. For his daughter’s daughter-in-law is permitted.

And the reason that these have a stopping point is that a Torah forbidden relationship does not apply among them, and their prohibition is only because they parallel prohibited women.

Whereas with the other secondaries to forbidden relationships, their prohibition is because the first generation is prohibited by Torah law, such as his mother’s mother, concerning whom they decreed because of his mother, who is prohibited by Torah law.

And his father’s father’s wife is prohibited because of his father’s wife, who is prohibited by Torah law.

And likewise they decreed concerning interchangeable secondaries, such as his father’s father’s mother, because of his mother’s mother’s mother.

But with his daughter’s daughter-in-law, and his father’s sister’s wife from the mother, and his mother’s brother’s wife from the father—there is no Torah prohibition even in the first generation concerning which they decreed, and they do not fear that they will be confused with their parallels in later generations; therefore the generations were not prohibited concerning them.

Zeiri adds: Even his mother’s father’s wife,

for in his view she is the fourth, whom Rav did not count among the secondaries that have no stopping point.

And only she is prohibited, while her higher generations are not prohibited; his mother’s father’s father’s wife is not prohibited, since there is no Torah prohibition throughout the generations.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said, and your sign is,

the sign clarifying what Zeiri added to Rav is

“higher than Rav.”

That is, Zeiri added one higher generation that he permitted beyond Rav.

For Rav mentioned only the permission concerning his mother’s brother’s wife and his father’s sister’s wife, which are the generation of his father and mother, whereas Zeiri permitted a generation higher than this, his mother’s father’s wife.

And we raise an objection:

And Rav, what is the reason that he did not count it,

after all, there is no Torah prohibition among them? And we explain: According to Rav, it has a generational prohibition because

she is confused for him

his mother’s father’s wife

with his father’s father’s wife.

And therefore, if you permit his mother’s father’s father’s wife, people will say that his father’s father’s wife also has a stopping point.

And there, in the first generation, there is the Torah prohibition of his father’s wife. And because of this concern, he also prohibited the higher generations of his mother’s father’s wife without a stopping point.

And

if

Zeiri

held that one need not fear such confusion.

For

there,

to his father’s family,

one frequently goes and is found,

and he knows that there is a relationship there, more than

here,

to his mother’s family, to which

one does not frequently go and is found.

And therefore he will not come to confuse matters and permit his father’s father’s wife, just as they permit his mother’s father’s wife.