Yevamot 20b — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

It is reasonable

to distinguish between them.

For

those liable for prohibitions,

in general, when not in the context of yibbum,

betrothal takes effect with them.

And we should establish the meaning of the verse, “If the man does not desire to take,” with regard to those women whom, in general, when not in the context of yibbum, we call “to take.” And included among them are also those liable for prohibitions, with regard to whom I call it “to take” after the fact. For in general, when not in the context of yibbum, betrothal takes effect with those liable for prohibitions, after the fact.

And the verse comes to say that even though they do not undergo yibbum, because with regard to yibbum I do not call them “to take,” nevertheless they undergo halitza, by virtue of the amplification of “and his yevama shall go up to the gate.” [

Even though in the context of yibbum there is no acquisition with regard to those liable for prohibitions, since they were amplified from “his yevama” only for halitza, and not for yibbum ]!

But

those liable for karet—

betrothal does not take effect with them

even in general, after the fact. And it is impossible to call them “to take” in any respect. Therefore, they were excluded by the verse, “If the man does not desire to take,” which says that any woman who is not subject to yibbum is not subject to halitza.

And we learn from this that the reason the positive commandment of yibbum does not override the prohibition concerning a High Priest with a widow from betrothal is that I do not call her “to take” [were it not for the overriding]. And those liable for prohibitions were amplified from “his yevama” only for halitza, and not for yibbum.

And since I do not call them “to take,” and there is no concept of yibbum with those liable for prohibitions, therefore even after the fact, if the yevam comes upon a yevama who is one of those liable for prohibitions, he does not acquire her.

Rava raised an objection

to the teaching of Rav Giddel in the name of Rav, from a beraita:

As it was taught: A yevama who is

subject to a prohibition of a mitzva or a prohibition of sanctity,

if

he came upon her

in violation,

or he performed halitza for her—

her rival is released

from halitza!

And if it enters your mind

that

those liable for prohibitions by Torah law

are only

assigned to halitza,

they are subject to it, but

not assigned to yibbum,

they are not subject to it—

the difficulty is:

If he came upon her—

why is her rival released!?

Since she is not acquired by the yavam, and the commandment of yibbum is not fulfilled through his coming upon her, how is her rival released from halitza!?

He,

Rava,

raised the objection to it,

as a difficulty from the beraita,

and he

also

resolved

it,

resolving it:

This beraita—

teaches its cases separately,

for the beraita does not state one general rule, but its laws divide into separate cases:

“If he came upon her”

stated in the beraita refers

to a prohibition of a mitzva,

which is the prohibition of “secondary relatives” instituted by the Sages; therefore he acquires her through his coming upon her, and by virtue of this he releases her rival from halitza.

Whereas that which is stated in the beraita,

“or he performed halitza for her,”

refers

to a prohibition of sanctity,

which is the prohibitions of the priesthood, which are a prohibition by Torah law.

And if he comes upon her—indeed, he does not acquire her, and he does not release her rival from halitza.

However, since we learned from the amplification of “his yevama” that she undergoes halitza, through her halitza she releases her rival.

And further

Rava raised an objection

to Rav Giddel in the name of Rav, from another beraita:

As it was taught: One who was

crushed in the testicles,

whose testicles had been injured;

and

likewise one who was

cut in the member,

whose organ had been cut;

or who was

a eunuch by human action,

who cannot father children;

all these are forbidden by Torah law to enter the assembly.

And

likewise if he was

old,

who is not fit to father children.

If they died and left wives—

they either perform halitza or perform yibbum,

as will be explained.

How so?

And the beraita explains that two different circumstances are being discussed here:

The first is, for example, that the disqualified men died, and the case concerns the wives whom they left behind.

The second is, for example, that their qualified brothers died, and the case concerns the law of the disqualified brothers with the wives of their qualified brothers who died.

The first circumstance:

They died [

the one crushed in the testicles, the one cut in the member, the eunuch by human action, or the old man ],

and they had brothers

who were qualified.

And

there were

for them [

for all the disqualified men ],

wives.

And when the disqualified men died, their wives fell before their qualified brothers.

And the qualified

brothers

brothers

stood

and performed maamar [

the betrothal of a yevama before intercourse ]

with their wives

of the disqualified men.

And they gave

afterward

a bill of divorce

for their maamar,

and performed halitza—

what they did,

they did.

And if they had intercourse

with the women—

they acquired them,

as with every yibbum.

The second circumstance:

The

brothers

qualified brothers

died.

And they stood,

the disqualified men,

and performed maamar with their wives

of their qualified brothers.

And they gave a bill of divorce

for their maamar,

or they performed halitza—

what they did, they did.

And if they had intercourse—

they acquired them.

And

however,

it is forbidden

for the disqualified men

to keep them

the wives of their brothers with them,

because it is stated [

Deuteronomy 23 ]

“A man crushed in the testicles shall not enter

the assembly of the Lord”!

And Rava derives:

And if it enters your mind

that a yevama who is

liable for prohibitions by Torah law

is only

assigned to halitza,

whereas

she is not assigned to yibbum

by Torah law—

if they had intercourse

with the disqualified men, with their yevamot who were forbidden to them by a prohibition—

why did they acquire them

!?

For with regard to them, she remained the forbidden relationship of a brother’s wife, with whom there is no possibility of yibbum or of betrothal taking effect!?

And on the basis of this difficulty, Rava rejects the teaching of Rav Giddel in the name of Rav, that a widow from betrothal does not undergo yibbum by virtue of the exposition of the verses “to take” and “his yevama.”

Rather, said Rava:

this is the explanation of why she does not undergo yibbum:

A widow from betrothal, as well—

it is a positive commandment and a prohibition!

And the positive commandment of yibbum does not have the power to override a positive commandment and a prohibition.

As it is written [

Leviticus 21 ], at the beginning of the passage dealing with the prohibitions of the priesthood:

“They shall be holy to their God.”

And this is a positive commandment, added to the prohibition written after it.

A mamzeret and a netina,

who are liable for prohibitions but do not have the commandment concerning priests—

what can be said?

And we answer:

It is written: [

Leviticus 11 ]

“And you shall sanctify yourselves.”

And we question:

If so, the entire Torah as well is a positive commandment and a prohibition! For

it

it is written, “And you shall sanctify yourselves,”

with regard to all the commandments!?

Rather, said Rava:

A decree concerning a widow from betrothal on account of a widow from marriage.

And it is also difficult concerning this:

a mamzeret and a netina,

with regard to whom this decree does not apply—

what can be said?

And we answer: with regard to them as well, a decree should be issued that they should not undergo yibbum:

a decree in the context of a mitzva on account of when it is not in the context of a mitzva.

And we question: If there is room for such a decree,

from now then—

a paternal brother’s wife should not undergo yibbum, as a decree on account of a maternal brother’s wife!

And we answer:

“Yibbum”—

the Merciful One made it dependent on inheritance.

It is known.

And we further question:

A woman who has no children should not undergo yibbum, as a decree on account of a woman who has children!

And we answer: yibbum—

the Merciful One made it dependent on children.

It is known

that if she has children, she does not undergo yibbum.

And we further question:

A brother’s wife whose brother was in his world should not undergo yibbum, as a decree on account of a brother’s wife whose brother was not in his world!

And we answer: yibbum—

on dwelling

together in the world

the Merciful One made it dependent.

It is known.

And we further question:

All women should not undergo yibbum, as a decree on account of a aylonit

who was excluded from yibbum.

And we answer: An aylonit

is uncommon,

and they did not fear issuing a decree on her account.

And we refute: If so, then

a mamzeret and a netina as well are uncommon,

so why did they issue a decree concerning them that they should not undergo yibbum, lest he take her as a wife when it is not in the context of a mitzva?

Rather, said Rava:

The Sages prohibited a High Priest from performing yibbum with a widow from betrothal,

a decree that the first intercourse should be on account of the second intercourse.

For with the second intercourse there is no mitzva, and there is no positive commandment in it that would override a prohibition.

It was taught likewise: If those liable for prohibitions had intercourse

with their yevamot,

they acquired them—

with the first intercourse.

And it is forbidden to keep them—

with the second intercourse.

Rava later said, and some say Rav Ashi: It is not

a valid statement that I said,

that a High Priest does not perform yibbum with a widow from betrothal because of a decree. Rather, by strict law it is impossible to perform yibbum!

Because

Reish Lakish said: Wherever you find a positive commandment and a prohibition, if you can fulfill both, it is preferable,

and then the positive commandment does not override the prohibition.

And if not,

when you cannot fulfill both, only then

the positive commandment comes and overrides the prohibition.

But

here too it is possible

to fulfill both,

through halitza,

without any need to override the prohibition,

for he fulfills

through this both

the positive commandment and

also

the prohibition.

It was objected

from the beraita above, where we learned concerning those liable for prohibitions:

“And if they had intercourse”—

“they acquired them!”

And it is proven that by Torah law she is subject to yibbum, and the prohibition is overridden because of the commandment of yibbum.

And we conclude: Indeed,

a tiyu vta

it is against Rava, and some say against Rav Ashi!

It was stated: The intercourse of a High Priest with a widow,

his yevama, from betrothal, and as the Gemara will explain immediately—

there was a dispute concerning the matter between

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar.

One said: It does not release her rival.

And one said: It releases

herself and

her rival

from halitza.

And the intercourse was effective to acquire her, and she no longer requires halitza; rather, from now on she leaves him only through a bill of divorce.