Yevamot 20b (כ:) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

It is reasonable

to distinguish between them.

For

those liable for violating negative commandments,

in general, when not in the context of yibbum,

betrothal takes effect with regard to them.

Let us understand the meaning of the verse, “If the man does not wish to take her,” as referring to those women whom, in general, when not in the context of yibbum, one may describe as fit “to take.” This includes even those liable for violating negative commandments, whom I can describe as fit “to take” after the fact. For in general, when not in the context of yibbum, betrothal takes effect with regard to those liable for violating negative commandments, after the fact.

And the verse comes to teach that even though they do not undergo yibbum, since with regard to yibbum I do not describe them as fit “to take,” nevertheless they undergo halitza, by virtue of the amplification from “and his yevama shall go up to the gate.”

Although in the context of yibbum there is no acquisition with regard to those liable for violating negative commandments, since they were included from “his yevama” only with regard to halitza, and not with regard to yibbum!

But

those liable for karet—

betrothal does not take effect with regard to them

even in general, after the fact. It is impossible to describe them as fit “to take” in any sense. Therefore, they were excluded by the verse, “If the man does not wish to take her,” which teaches that any woman who is not fit for yibbum is not subject to halitza.

We thus learn that the reason the positive commandment of yibbum does not override the prohibition against a High Priest marrying a widow from betrothal is that I do not describe her as fit “to take” [were it not for the possibility of overriding the prohibition]. And those liable for violating negative commandments were included from “his yevama” only with regard to halitza, and not with regard to yibbum.

And since I do not describe them as fit “to take,” and there is no concept of yibbum with regard to those liable for violating negative commandments, therefore even after the fact, if the yavam has intercourse with a yevama who is one of those liable for violating negative commandments, he does not acquire her.

Rava raises an objection

to the teaching of Rav Giddel citing Rav, from a beraita:

As it was taught: A yevama who is

subject to a prohibition of a mitzva or a prohibition of sanctity,

if

he has intercourse with her

in violation of the prohibition,

or if he performs halitza with her—

her rival wife is released

from halitza!

And if it should enter your mind that

those

liable for violating negative commandments by Torah law are

only

subject to halitza,

that is, they are subject to it, but

not subject to yibbum,

they are not subject to it—

This is difficult:

If he has intercourse with her—

why is her rival wife released!?

Since he does not acquire her, and the mitzva of yibbum is not fulfilled through intercourse with her, how is her rival wife released from halitza!?

He,

Rava,

raises the objection,

raising the difficulty from the beraita,

and he

also

resolves

it,

resolving it:

This beraita—

teaches the cases separately,

meaning that the beraita does not state one general rule, but that its laws divide into separate cases:

“If he has intercourse with her”

as stated in the beraita refers

to a prohibition of a mitzva,

which is the prohibition of sheniyyot enacted by the Sages; therefore he acquires her through his intercourse with her, and by virtue of this he releases her rival wife from halitza.

Whereas that which is stated in the beraita,

“if he performs halitza with her,”

refers

to a prohibition of sanctity,

which means the prohibitions applying to priests, which are prohibitions by Torah law.

And if he has intercourse with her, indeed he does not acquire her, and he does not release her rival wife from halitza.

However, since we learned from the amplification of “his yevama” that she undergoes halitza, she releases her rival wife through her halitza.

And further,

Rava raises an objection,

to Rav Giddel citing Rav, from another beraita:

As it was taught: One who was

a wounded man with crushed testicles,

whose testicles had been injured,

and

likewise one who was

one whose membrum was severed,

whose penis had been severed,

or who was

a man-made eunuch,

who cannot father children,

all of these are forbidden by Torah law to enter the congregation.

And

likewise, if he was

old,

and no longer capable of fathering children,

if they died and left wives—

they either perform halitza or perform yibbum,

as will be explained.

How so?

The beraita explains that two different cases are being discussed here:

The first is when the disqualified men died, and the issue concerns the wives whom they left behind.

The second is when their qualified brothers died, and the issue concerns the laws governing the disqualified brothers with the wives of their qualified brothers who died.

The first case:

They died [

the wounded man with crushed testicles, the man whose membrum was severed, the man-made eunuch, or the old man ],

and they had brothers

who were qualified.

And

they

had [

each of the disqualified men had ]

wives.

And when the disqualified men died, their wives fell before their qualified brothers.

And the

brothers

stood

who were qualified,

and performed maamar [

a levirate betrothal before intercourse ]

with their wives,

the wives of the disqualified men.

And they gave

afterward

a get

for their maamar,

and performed halitza—

Whatever they did,

they have done.

And if they had intercourse

with the women—

they acquired them,

as in every case of yibbum.

The second case:

The

brothers

died,

the ones who were qualified.

And they stood,

the disqualified men,

and performed maamar with their wives,

the wives of their qualified brothers.

And they gave a get

for their maamar,

or performed halitza—

Whatever they did, they have done.

And if they had intercourse—

they acquired them.

And

however,

it is forbidden

for the disqualified men

to retain them,

the wives of their brothers, in their households,

because it is stated [

Deuteronomy 23 ]:

“A man with crushed testicles shall not enter

the congregation of the Lord”!

Rava infers:

And if it should enter your mind that a yevama who is

subject to

a prohibition against violating a negative commandment by Torah law is

only

subject to halitza,

whereas

she is not subject to yibbum

by Torah law,

if the disqualified men had intercourse

with their yevamot who were forbidden to them by a negative commandment—

why did they acquire

them!?

For with regard to them she remains the forbidden relationship of a brother’s wife, for whom there is no possibility of yibbum or of betrothal taking effect!?

By virtue of this difficulty, Rava rejects the teaching of Rav Giddel citing Rav, that a widow from betrothal does not undergo yibbum by virtue of the exposition of the verses “to take” and “his yevama.”

Rather, Rava said:

This is the explanation for why she does not undergo yibbum:

A widow from betrothal also—

it is a positive commandment and a negative commandment!

And the positive commandment of yibbum does not have the power to override both a positive commandment and a negative commandment.

As it is written [

Leviticus 21 ], at the beginning of the passage dealing with the prohibitions applying to priests:

“They shall be holy to their God.”

This is a positive commandment, in addition to the negative commandment written afterward.

A mamzeret and a netina,

who are liable for violating negative commandments but are not subject to the commandment applying to priests—

what can be said?

And we answer:

It is written: [

Leviticus 11 ]

“And you shall sanctify yourselves.”

And we challenge this:

If so, the entire Torah as well is a positive commandment and a negative commandment! For

it

is written, “And you shall sanctify yourselves,”

with regard to all the commandments!?

Rather, Rava said:

It is a decree concerning a widow from betrothal, lest one come to confuse her with a widow from marriage.

And this too is difficult:

A mamzeret and a netina,

with regard to whom there is no such decree—

what can be said?

And we answer: With regard to them as well, the Sages decreed that they may not undergo yibbum:

a decree in a circumstance involving a mitzva, lest it be confused with a circumstance not involving a mitzva.

And we challenge this: If there is room for such a decree,

from now on—

the wife of one’s paternal brother should not undergo yibbum, as a decree because of the wife of one’s maternal brother!

And we answer:

With regard to yibbum,

the Torah made it dependent on inheritance.

It is known.

And we further challenge:

A woman who has no children should not undergo yibbum, as a decree because of a woman who has children!

And we answer: With regard to yibbum,

the Torah made it dependent on children.

It is known

that if she has children, she does not undergo yibbum.

And we further challenge:

The wife of one’s brother who was alive in his lifetime should not undergo yibbum, as a decree because of the wife of one’s brother who was not alive in his lifetime!

And we answer: With regard to yibbum,

the Torah made it dependent on being present

together in the world

at the same time.

It is known.

And we further challenge:

No women should undergo yibbum, as a decree because of an aylonit,

who was excluded from yibbum.

And we answer: An aylonit

is uncommon,

and the Sages did not deem it necessary to enact a decree because of her.

And we refute this: If so,

a mamzeret and a netina are also uncommon,

so why did the Sages decree with regard to them that they may not undergo yibbum, lest someone marry them when there is no mitzva involved?

Rather, Rava said:

The Sages prohibited a High Priest from performing yibbum with a widow from betrothal,

as a decree concerning the first intercourse, lest one come to the second intercourse.

For with the second intercourse there is no mitzva, and there is no positive commandment that could override the negative commandment.

It was taught likewise: If those liable for violating negative commandments had intercourse

with them,

they acquired them—

through the first intercourse.

But they are forbidden to retain them—

through the second intercourse.

Rava later said, and some say Rav Ashi: It is not

a valid statement that I made,

that the reason a High Priest does not perform yibbum with a widow from betrothal is because of a decree. Rather, by the fundamental law, it is impossible to perform yibbum!

Because

Reish Lakish said: Wherever you find a positive commandment and a negative commandment, if you can fulfill both, it is preferable,

and then the positive commandment does not override the negative commandment.

But if not,

when you cannot fulfill both, only then

let the positive commandment come and override the negative commandment.

But

here too it is possible

to fulfill both

through halitza,

without any need to override the negative commandment,

thereby fulfilling

both

the positive commandment and

the

negative commandment.

Meytivi

from the beraita cited above, where we learned with regard to those liable for violating negative commandments:

And if they had intercourse—

they acquired them!

This proves that by Torah law she is subject to yibbum, and the negative commandment is overridden by the mitzva of yibbum.

And we conclude: Indeed,

tiyuvta

against Rava, and some say against Rav Ashi!

It was stated: Intercourse by a High Priest with a widow,

his yevama, from betrothal, as the Gemara will explain immediately—

was the subject of a dispute between

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar.

One said: It does not release her rival wife.

And one said: It releases

both herself and

her rival wife

from halitza.

The intercourse served to acquire her, and she no longer requires halitza; rather, from that point onward, she leaves him only through a get.